The Cratylus — Plato
====================
ΚΡΑΤΥΛΟΣ
Translation/edition: Thomas Taylor (1804)
Language: English
Read in Plato Scroll: https://plato-scroll.com/s/crat/
This file: https://plato-scroll.com/text/crat-g.txt
Other editions of this work:
  - David Horan: https://plato-scroll.com/text/crat.txt
  - Benjamin Jowett: https://plato-scroll.com/text/crat-b.txt
  - H.N. Fowler (Loeb, 1926): https://plato-scroll.com/text/crat-c.txt
  - Greek text: https://plato-scroll.com/text/crat-e.txt
  - Spanish: https://plato-scroll.com/text/crat-h.txt
Sources and licences: https://plato-scroll.com/attribution.html
Numbers in [brackets] are the edition's reference loci (Stephanus, Bekker, book.line, page...). Superscript numerals refer to the Notes at the end.


## The Cratylus

[383a] Hermogenes: Are you willing, then, that we should communicate this discourse to Socrates?
[383a] Cratylus: If you think proper.
[383a] Hermogenes: Cratylus here, Socrates, says, that there is a rectitude of name naturally subsisting in every thing; and that this is not a name which certain persons pronounce from custom, while they articulate a portion of their voice; [383b] but that there is a certain rectitude of names which is naturally the same both among Greeks and Barbarians. [383d] I ask him, therefore, whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. I then inquire of him, what is the appellation belonging to Socrates? He replies, Socrates. [383e] In all other particulars, therefore, I say, is not that the name by which we call each? Yet, says he, your name is not Hermogenes, though all men should agree in calling you so. And upon my eagerly desiring to know the meaning of what he says, he does not declare any thing, but uses dissimulation towards me, feigning as if he was thinking about something on this subject, which if he should be willing to relate clearly, he would oblige me to agree with him in opinion, and to say the same as he does. If, therefore, you can by any means conjecture this divination of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I should much more gladly hear your opinion concerning the rectitude of names.
[384a] Socrates: O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, according to the antient proverb, beautiful things are difficult to be understood; [384b] and the discipline respecting names is no small affair. If, therefore, I had heard that demonstration of Prodicus, valued at fifty drachmas, which instructed the hearer in this very partilar, as he himself says, nothing would hinder but that you might immediately know the truth respecting the rectitude of names: but I never have heard it; and am acquainted with nothing more than the circumstance about the drachmas. Hence I am unacquainted with the truth respecting these particulars; but am nevertheless prepared to investigate this affair, along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he derides you: for he thinks, perhaps, that you are covetous of wealth, and at the same time have not obtained your desire. But, as I just now said, the knowledge of these matters is difficult. However, placing the arguments in common, it is proper to consider, whether the truth is on your side, or on that of Cratylus.
[384c] Hermogenes: But indeed, Socrates, though I have frequently disputed with Cratylus and many others, yet I cannot persuade myself, that there is any other rectitude of nomination, than what custom and mutual consent have established. For to me it appears, that the name which any one assigns to a thing, is a proper name; [384d] and that, if he should even change it for another, this name will be no less right than the first; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants. [384e] For I am of opinion, that no name is naturally inherent in any thing, but subsists only from the law and habit of those by whom it is instituted and called. But, if the case is otherwise, I am prepared both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.
[385a] Socrates: Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something to the purpose. Let us consider therefore. Is that by which any one calls any thing, the name of that thing?
[385a] Hermogenes: To me it appears so.
[385a] Socrates: And this, whether a private person calls it, or a city?
[385b] Hermogenes: I think so.
[385b] Socrates: What, then, if I should call any thing in such a manner, as to denominate that an horse which we now call a man, and that a man which we now call a horse; would not the name man remain the same publicly, but the name horse privately; and again, privately the name man, and publicly the name horse? Would you not speak in this manner?
[385b] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[385b] Socrates: Tell me, then, do you call it any thing to speak true and false?
[385b] Hermogenes: I do.
[385b] Socrates: Therefore, one thing will be a true sentence, but another a false one. Will it not?
[385b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[385b] Socrates: Will not that sentence, then, which speaks of things as they are, be a true sentence; but that which speaks of them different from what they are, a false one?
[385b] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[385b] Socrates: Is not this, therefore, to speak of things which are, and which are not, by discourse.
[385b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[385b] Socrates: But with respect to a sentence which is true, is the whole true, but the parts of it not true?
[385c] Hermogenes: The parts, also, are no otherwise than true.
[385c] Socrates: But whether are the large parts true, and the small ones not? or, are all the parts true?
[385c] Hermogenes: I think that all the parts are true.
[385c] Socrates: Is there any part of what you say, smaller than a name?
[385c] Hermogenes: There is not. But this is the smallest of all.
[385c] Socrates: And does not this name belong to a true sentence?
[385c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[385c] Socrates: And this, you say, is true.
[385c] Hermogenes: I do.
[385c] Socrates: But is not the part of a false sentence false?
[385c] Hermogenes: I say it is.
[385d] Socrates: It is permitted us, therefore, to call a name true and false, since we can call a sentence so.
[385d] Hermogenes: How should it not be so?
[385d] Socrates: Is that, therefore, which each person says the name of a thing is, the name of that thing?
[385d] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[385d] Socrates: Will there be as many names belonging to a thing, as any person assigns it; and at that time when he assigns them?
[385e] Hermogenes: I have no other rectitude of name, Socrates, than this; that I may call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you think proper to attribute to it. And after this manner, I see that in cities, the same things are assigned proper names, both among the Greeks with other Greeks, and among the Greeks with the Barbarians.
[385e] Socrates: Let us see, Hermogenes, whether things appear to you to subsist in such a manner, with respect to the peculiar essence of each, as they did to Protagoras, who said that man was the measure of all things; so that things are, with respect to me, such as they appear to me; and that they are such to you, as they appear to you: or do some of these appear to you to possess a certain stability of essence?
[386a] Hermogenes: Sometimes, Socrates, through doubting, I have been led to this, which Protagoras asserts; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.
[386b] Socrates: But what, was you never led to conclude that there is no such thing as a man perfectly evil?
[386b] Hermogenes: Never, by Jupiter! But I have often been disposed to think, that there are some men profoundly wicked, and that the number of these is great.
[386b] Socrates: But have you never yet seen men perfectly good?
[386b] Hermogenes: Very few, indeed.
[386b] Socrates: You have seen such then?
[386b] Hermogenes: I have.
[386b] Socrates: How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus: That those who are completely good, are completely prudent; and that the completely bad, are completely imprudent?
[386c] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[386c] Socrates: If, therefore, Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, for every thing to be such as it appears to every one, can some of us be prudent, and some of us imprudent?
[386c] Hermogenes: By no means.
[386c] Socrates: And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since there is such a thing as prudence and imprudence, Protagoras does not entirely speak the truth; for one person will not in reality be more prudent than another, if that which appears to every one, is to every one true.
[386d] Hermogenes: It is so.
[386d] Socrates: But neither do I think you will agree with Euthydemus, that all things subsist together with all, in a similar manner, and always; for thus things would not be good, and others evil, if virtue and vice were always; and in a similar manner, inherent in all things.
[386d] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[386d] Socrates: If, therefore, neither all things subsist together similarly and always with all things, nor each thing is what it appears to each person, it is evident that there are certain things which possess a stability of essence, and this not from us, nor in consequence of being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through the power of imagination, but which subsist from themselves, according to the essence which naturally belongs to them.
[386e] Hermogenes: This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.
[386e] Socrates: Will, therefore, the things themselves naturally subsist in this manner, but their actions not so? or are their actions, in like manner, one certain species of things?
[386e] Hermogenes: They are perfectly so.
[387a] Socrates: Actions therefore, also, are performed according to the nature which they possess, and not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut any thing, shall we say that each particular can be divided just as we please, and with what we please? or rather, shall we not say; that if we desire to cut any thing according to its natural capacity of receiving section, and likewise with that instrument which is natural for the purpose; we shall divide properly, effect something satisfactory, and act rightly? But that if we do this contrary to nature, we shall wander from the purpose, and perform nothing?
[387b] Hermogenes: To me it appears so.
[387b] Socrates: If therefore we should attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it according to every opinion, but according to that which is right; and this is no other, than after that manner in which any thing is naturally adapted to burn and be burnt, and with those materals which are proper on the occasion.
[387b] Hermogenes: It is so.
[387b] Socrates: Must we not, therefore, proceed with other things after the same manner?
[387b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[387b] Socrates: Is not to speak, therefore, one particular operation?
[387b] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[387b] Socrates: Whether, therefore, does he speak rightly, who speaks just as he thinks fit; or he, who speaks in such a manner as the nature of things requires him to speak, and themselves to be spoken of; and who thinks, that if he speaks of a thing with that which is accommodated to its nature, he shall effect something by speaking; but that, if he acts otherwise, he shall wander from the truth, and accomplish nothing to the purpose?
[387c] Hermogenes: It appears to me, it will be just as you say.
[387c] Socrates: Is not, therefore, the nomination of a thing, a certain part of speaking? For those who denominate things, deliver after a manner sentences.
[387c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[387c] Socrates: Is not the nomination of things, therefore, a certain action, since to speak is a certain action about things?
[387d] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[387d] Socrates: But it has appeared that actions do not subsist with respect to us, but that they have a certain proper nature of their own.
[387d] Hermogenes: It has so.
[387d] Socrates: It follows, therefore, that we must give names to things, in such a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by such means as are proper, and not just as we please, if we mean to assent to what we have before asserted. And thus we shall act and nominate in a satisfactory manner, but not by a contrary mode of conduct.
[387d] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[387d] Socrates: Come then, answer me. Must we not say, that a thing which ought to be cut, ought to be cut with something?
[387e] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[387e] Socrates: And that the thread, which ought to be separated in weaving, ought to be separated with something? And that the thing which ought to be perforated, ought to perforated with something?
[387e] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[387e] Socrates: And likewise that the thing which ought to be named, ought to be named with something?
[388a] Hermogenes: It ought.
[388a] Socrates: But with what are the threads separated in weaving?
[388a] Hermogenes: With the shuttle.
[388a] Socrates: And what is that with which a thing is denominated?
[388a] Hermogenes: A name.
[388a] Socrates: You speak well. And hence a name is a certain organ.
[388a] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[388a] Socrates: If, therefore, I should inquire what sort of an instrument a shuttle is, would you not answer, that it is an instrument with which we separate the threads in weaving?
[388b] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[388b] Socrates: But what do we perform in weaving? Do we not separate the woof and the threads, which are confused together?
[388b] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[388b] Socrates: Would you not answer in the same manner concerning perforating, and other particulars?
[388b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[388b] Socrates: Can you in like manner declare concerning a name, what it is which we perform, whilst we denominate any thing with a name which is a certain instrument?
[388b] Hermogenes: I cannot.
[388b] Socrates: Do we teach one another any thing, and distinguish things according to their mode of subsistence?
[388b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[388b] Socrates: A name, therefore, is an instrument endued with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web.
[388c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[388c] Socrates: But is not the shuttle textorial?
[388c] Hermogenes: How should it not?
[388c] Socrates: The weaver therefore uses the shuttle in a proper manner, so far as concerns the art of weaving; but he who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.
[388c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[388c] Socrates: Through whose operation is it that the weaver acts properly when he uses the shuttle?
[388c] Hermogenes: The carpenter’s.
[388c] Socrates: But is every one a carpenter, or he only who possesses art?
[388c] Hermogenes: He who possesses art.
[388d] Socrates: And whose work does the piercer properly use, when he uses the auger?
[388d] Hermogenes: The blacksmith’s.
[388d] Socrates: Is every one therefore a blacksmith, or he only who possesses art?
[388d] Hermogenes: He who possesses art.
[388d] Socrates: But whose work does the teacher use when he employs a name?
[388d] Hermogenes: I cannot tell.
[388d] Socrates: Nor can you tell who delivered to us us the names which we use?
[388d] Hermogenes: I cannot.
[388d] Socrates: Does it not appear to you that the law delivered these?
[388d] Hermogenes: It does.
[388d] Socrates: He who teaches, therefore, uses the work of the legislator when he uses a name.
[388e] Hermogenes: It appeas so to me.
[388e] Socrates: But does every man appear to you to be a legislator, or he only who possesses art?
[388e] Hermogenes: He who possesses art.
[388e] Socrates: It is not the province, therefore, of every man, O Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it appears, is a legislator, who is the most rare of artificers among men.
[389a] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[389a] Socrates: But come, consider, what it is which the legislator beholds, when he establishes names; and make your survey from the instances above adduced. What is it which the carpenter looks to, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing as is naturally adapted to the purposes of weaving?
[389b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[389b] Socrates: But if the shuttle should break during its fabrication, do you think the carpenter would make another, taking pattern by the broken one? or rather would he not look to that form, agreeably to which he endeavoured to make the broken shuttle?
[389b] Hermogenes: It appears to me that he would look to this in his fabrication.
[389b] Socrates: Do we not, therefore, most justly call this form, the shuttle itself?
[389b] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[389b] Socrates: When, therefore, it is requisite to make shuttles, adapted for the purpose of weaving a slender garment, or one of a closer texture, or of thread or wool, or of any other kind whatever, it is necessary that all of them should possess the form of the shuttle; but that each should be applied to the work to which it is naturally accommodated, in the most becoming manner.
[389c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[389c] Socrates: And the same reasoning takes place with respect to other instruments. For an instrument must be found out which is naturally adapted to the nature of each particular, and a substance must be assigned to it, from which the artificer will not produce just what he pleases, but that which is natural to the instrument with which he operates. For it is necessary to know, as it appears, that an auger ought to be composed of iron, in order to operate in each particular naturally.
[389c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[389c] Socrates: And that a shuttle should for this purpose be made of wood.
[389c] Hermogenes: It is so.
[389d] Socrates: For every shuttle, as it appears, is naturally adapted to every species of weaving; and other things in a similar manner.
[389d] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[389d] Socrates: It is necessary, [389e] therefore, excellent man, that the legislator should know how to place a name naturally, with respect to sounds and syllables; and that, looking towards that particular of which this is the name, he should frame and establish all names, if he is desirous of becoming the proper founder of names. But if the founder of names does not compose every name from the same syllables, we ought to take notice, that neither does every blacksmith use the same iron, when he fabricates the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but that the instrument is properly composed, so long as they fabricate it according to the same idea, though from different sorts of iron, whether it is made here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?
[390a] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[390a] Socrates: Will you not therefore be of opinion, that as long as a founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians, assigns a form of name accommodated to each, in any kind of syllables, that while this is the case, the founder of names here will not be worse than the founder in any other place?
[390b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[390b] Socrates: Who therefore is likely to know whether a convenient form of the shuttle is situated in every kind of wood? Does this belong to the artificer of the shuttle, or to the weaver by whom it is used?
[390b] Hermogenes: It is probable, Socrates, that he is more likely to know this, by whom the shuttle is used.
[390b] Socrates: Who is it, then, that uses the work of the fabricator of the lyre? Is it not he who knows how to instruct the artificer of it in the best manner, and who is able to judge whether it is properly made or not?
[390b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[390b] Socrates: But who is this?
[390b] Hermogenes: The lyrist.
[390b] Socrates: And who is it that uses the work of the shipwright?
[390b] Hermogenes: The pilot.
[390c] Socrates: And who is he that knows whether the work of the founder of names is beautiful, or not; and who is able to judge concerning it when finished, both here and among the Barbarians? Must it not be the person who uses this work?
[390c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[390c] Socrates: And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?
[390c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[390c] Socrates: And likewise to answer?
[390c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[390c] Socrates: But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer any thing else, than one who is skilled in dialectic?
[390d] Hermogenes: I should not.
[390d] Socrates: It is the business, therefore, of the shipwright to make a rudder, according to the directions of the pilot, if he means to produce a good rudder.
[390d] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[390d] Socrates: And the legislator, as it seems, ought, in the establishing of names, to consult a man skilled in dialectic, if he means to found them in a beautiful manner.
[390d] Hermogenes: He ought.
[390d] Socrates: It appears, therefore, [390e] O Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is no despicable affair, as you think it is, nor the business of depraved men, or of any that may occur. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature, and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone who looks to that name which is naturally accommodated to any thing, and who is able to insert this form of a name in letters and syllables.
[391a] Hermogenes: I have nothing proper to urge, Socrates, in contradiction of what you say. And, perhaps, it is not easy to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think that I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what that is which you call a certain rectitude of name according to nature.
[391b] Socrates: As to myself, O blessed Hermogenes, I say nothing; but I even almost forget what I said a short time since, that I had no knowledge in this affair, but that I would investigate it in conjunction with you. But now, in consequence of our mutual survey, thus much appears to us, in addition to our former conviction, that a name possesses some natural rectitude; and that every man does not know how to accommodate names to things, in a becoming manner. Is not this the case?
[391b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[391b] Socrates: After this, therefore, it is necessary to inquire, what the rectitude of name is, if you desire to know this.
[391b] Hermogenes: But I do desire to know it.
[391b] Socrates: Consider then.
[391b] Hermogenes: But in what manner is it proper to consider?
[391c] Socrates: The most proper mode of inquiry, my friend, must be obtained from those endued with science, offering them money for this purpose, and loading them with thanks: and these are the sophists, through whom your brother Callias, in consequence of having given them a great quantity of money, appears to be a wise man. But, since you have no authority in paternal matters, it is proper to supplicate your brother, and entreat him to show you that rectitude about things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.
[391c] Hermogenes: But this request of mine, Socrates, would be absurd, if, notwithstanding my entirely rejecting the truth of Protagoras, I should be pleased with assertions resulting from this truth, as things of any worth.
[391d] Socrates: But if this does not please you, it is proper to derive our information from Homer, and the other poets.
[391d] Hermogenes: And what does Homer say, Socrates, concerning names; and where?
[391e] Socrates: Every where. But those are the greatest and most beautiful passages, in which he distinguishes between the names which are assigned to the same things by men, and those which are employed by the gods. Or do you not think that he speaks something in these, great and wonderful, concerning the rectitude of names? For it is evident that the gods call things according to that rectitude which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?
[391e] Hermogenes: I well know, that if the gods denominate any thing, they properly denominate it. But what are the passages you speak of?
[391e] Socrates: Do you not know, that speaking of the Trojan river, which contested in a singular manner with Vulcan, he says,
[391e] Xanthus its name with those of heav’nly birth,
But call’d Scamander by the sons of earth¹?
[392a] Hermogenes: I do.
[392a] Socrates: But what then, do you not think that this is something venerable, to know in what respect it is more proper to call that river Xanthus, than Scamander? Likewise, if you are so disposed, take notice that he says²; the same bird is called Chalcis by the gods, but Cymindis by men. And do you think this is a despicable piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Myrines than Batica; and so in many other instances, which may be found both in this poet and others? But these things are, perhaps, beyond the ability of you and me to discover. But the names Scamandrius and Astyanax may, as it appears to me, be comprehended by human sagacity; and it may easily be seen, what kind of rectitude there is in these names, which, according to Homer, were given to the son of Hector. [392b] For you doubtless know the verses in which these names are contained.
[392c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[392c] Socrates: Which therefore of these names do you think Homer considered as more properly adapted to the boy, Astyanax or Scamandrius?
[392c] Hermogenes: I cannot tell.
[392c] Socrates: But consider the affair in this manner: if any one should ask you, which you thought would denominate things in the most proper manner, the more wise or the more unwise?
[392c] Hermogenes: It is manifest that I should answer, the more wise.
[392c] Socrates: Which therefore appears to you to be the more wise in cities, the women or the men, that I may speak of the whole genus?
[392c] Hermogenes: The men.
[392c] Socrates: Do you not therefore know that, according to Homer, the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy, Astyanax, but by the women, Scamandrius?
[392d] Hermogenes: It appears that it was so.
[392d] Socrates: Do you not think that Homer considered the Trojan men as wiser than the Trojan women?
[392d] Hermogenes: I think he did.
[392d] Socrates: He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was more proper for the boy than Scamandrius.
[392d] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[392e] Socrates: But let us consider the reason which he assigns for this denomination: for, says he,
[392e] Astyanax the Trojans call’d the boy,
From his great father, the defence of Troy³.
[392e] On this account, as it appears, it is proper to call the son of the saviour of his country Astyanax, that is, the king of that city, which, as Homer says, his father preserved.
[392e] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[392e] Socrates: But why is this appellation more proper than that of Scamandrius? for I confess I am ignorant of the reason of this. Do you understand it?
[393a] Hermogenes: By Jupiter, I do not.
[393a] Socrates: But, excellent man, Homer also gave to Hector his name.
[393a] Hermogenes: But why?
[393a] Socrates: Because it appears to me that this name is something similar to Astyanax, and that these names were considered by the Greeks as having the same meaning; for king and Hector nearly signify the same, since both these names are royal. For whoever is a king, is also doubtless a Hector; since such a one evidently rules over, possesses, and has, that of which he is the king. Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but deceive myself, in thinking, as through certain vestiges, to touch upon the opinion of Homer respecting the rectitude of names?
[393b] Hermogenes: By no means, by Jupiter, but perhaps you in some degree apprehend his meaning.
[393b] Socrates: For it is just, as [393c] it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not say, that this ought to be the case when something monstrous is produced from a horse, and which is different from a horse; but only when the offspring is a natural production. For if the natural progeny of an ox should generate a horse, the offspring ought not to be called a calf, but a colt. [And if a horse, contrary to nature, should generate a calf, the offspring ought not to be called a colt, but a calf⁴.] And again, if from a man an offspring not human should be produced, the progeny, I think, ought not to be called a man. And the same reasoning must take place respecting trees, and all other producing natures. Or does it not appear so to you?
[393c] Hermogenes: It does.
[393c] Socrates: You speak well: for take care that I do not fraudulently deceive you. For the same reason, therefore, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. But it is of no consequence, though the same thing should be expressed in different syllables, or a letter should be added or taken away, as long as the essence of the thing possesses dominion, and manifests itself in the name.
[393d] Hermogenes: What is this which you say?
[393d] Socrates: Nothing complex. But, as you well know, we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, four alone excepted, viz. ε̄ & ῡ, and ο̄ & ω̄: and adding other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, we form names, which we afterwards enunciate. But, as long as we insert the apparent power of the element, it is proper to call the name that which is manifested to us by the element. As is evident, for instance, in the letter βητα: for here you see that the addition of the η̄, and the τ̄, and the ᾱ, does not hinder the nature of that element from being evinced by the whole name, agreeably to the intention of its founder; so well did he know how to give names to letters.
[393e] Hermogenes: You appear to me to speak the truth.
[393e] Socrates: Will not, therefore, the same reasoning take place respecting a king? [394a] For a king will be produced from a king, good from good, and beauty from beauty; and in the same manner with relation to every thing else, from every genus a progeny of the same kind will be produced, unless something monstrous is generated; and will be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary these names in such a manner by syllables, that, to ignorant men, the very same appellations will appear to be different from each other. Just as the medicines of physicians, when varied with colours or smells, appear to us to be different, though they are still the same; [394b] but to the physician, as one who considers the power of the medicines, they appear to be the same, nor is he at all astonished by the additions. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names speculates their power, and is not astonished, if at any time a letter should be added, or changed, or taken away; or that in other all-various letters, the same power of name should be found. As in the names Astyanax and Hector, which we have just spoken of, they do not possess any thing of the same letters, except the t, and yet, at the same time, they signify the same thing. So likewise with respect to the name αρχεπολις, or a ruler of a city, what communication has it in letters with the two preceding names? [394c] and yet it has the same signification. And there are many other words which signify nothing else than a king; many which signify nothing else than the leader of an army, as αγις, πολεμαρχος, ευπολεμος; and likewise many which imply a professor of medicine, as ιατροκλης and ακεσιμβροτος. And perhaps many other may be found, disagreeing indeed in syllables, and letters, but in power vocally emitting the same signification. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?
[394d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[394d] Socrates: And that to things which subsist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?
[394d] Hermogenes: Perfectly so.
[394d] Socrates: But that, as often as generations take place contrary to nature, and by this means produce things in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious man is generated, then the offspring ought not to be called by the name of his producer; just as we said before, that if a horse should generate the progeny of an ox, the offspring ought not to be called a horse, but an ox?
[394d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[394d] Socrates: When an impious man, therefore, is generated from one who is pious, the name of the genus to which he belongs must be assigned him.
[394e] Hermogenes: It must so.
[394e] Socrates: Such a son, therefore, ought not to be called either one who is a friend to divinity, or mindful of divinity, or any thing of this kind: but he should be called by that which signifies the contrary of all this, if names ought to possess any thing of rectitude.
[394e] Hermogenes: This ought to be the case more than any thing, Socrates.
[394e] Socrates: Just, Hermogenes, as the name Orestes appears to be properly invented; whether a certain fortune assigned him this name, or some poet, evincing by this appellation his rustic nature, correspondent to an inhabitant of mountains.
[395a] Hermogenes: So it appears, Socrates.
[395a] Socrates: It appears also, that the name of his father subsists according to nature.
[395a] Hermogenes: It does so.
[395b] Socrates: For it seems that Agamemnon was one who considered that he ought to labour and patiently endure hardships, and obtain the end of his designs through virtue. But his stay before Troy, with so great an army; evinces his patient endurance. That this man, therefore, was wonderful, with respect to perseverance, is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps also Atreus is a proper denomination: for his slaughter of Chrysippus, and the cruelty which he exercised towards Thyestes, evince that he was pernicious and noxious. His surname, therefore, suffers a small degree of declination, and conceals its meaning; so that the nature of the man is not evident to every one; but to those who are skilful in names, the signification of Atreus is sufficiently manifest. For his name properly subsists throughout, according to the intrepid, inexorable, and noxious. It appears also to me, that the name given to Pelops was very properly assigned: for this name signifies one who sees things near at hand, and that he is worthy of such a denomination.
[395c] Hermogenes: But how?
[395d] Socrates: Because it is reported of this man, that in the slaughter of Myrtilus, he neither provided for any thing, nor could perceive afar off how great a calamity his whole race would be subject to from this circumstance; but he only regarded that which was just before him, and which then subsisted, that is, what was πελας, or near; and this when he desired, by all possible means, to receive Hippodamia in marriage. So that his name was derived from πελας near, and οψις sight. Every one also must think that the name given to Tantalus was properly and naturally assigned him, if what is related concerning him is true.
[395d] Hermogenes: But what is that relation?
[395d] Socrates: That, while he was yet [395e] living, many unfortunate and dire circumstances happened to him, and at last the whole of his country was subverted; and that, when he was dead, a stone was suspended over his head in Hades, these particulars, as it appears corresponding with his name in a wonderful and artless manner: for it is just as if any one should be willing to call him ταλαντατος, i. e. most miserable, but, at the same time, desirous to conceal this circumstance, should call him Tantalus instead of Talantatus. And it seems that the fortune of rumour caused him to receive this appellation. But it appears that the name of him who was called his father, is composed in an all-beautiful manner, though it is by no means easy to be understood: [396a] for in reality the name of Jupiter is, as it were, a sentence; but dividing it into two parts, some of us use one part, and some another, for some call him ζηνα, and some δια. And these parts collected into one, evince the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought to effect: For there is no one who is more the cause of living, both to us and every thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all things⁵. [396b] It happens, therefore, that this god is rightly denominated, through whom life is present with all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, viz. into δια and ζηνα. But he who suddenly hears that this god is the son of Saturn, may perhaps think it a reproachful assertion: for it is rational to believe that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain great dianoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called κορος, it does not signify a boy, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect⁶. But, according to report, Saturn is the son of Heaven: and sight directed to things above is called by this name, ουρανια⁷, from beholding things situated on high. From whence, O Hermogenes, those who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with him, and that he is very properly denominated Heaven. [396c] Indeed, if I did but remember the genealogy of the gods, according to Hesiod, and the yet superior progenitors of these which he speaks of, I should not desist from showing you the rectitude of their appellations, until I had made trial of this wisdom, whether it produces any thing of consequence, or not; and whether those explanations which I have just now so suddenly delivered, though I know not from whence, are defective or true.
[396d] Hermogenes: Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to pour forth oracles on a sudden, like those who are agitated by some inspiring god.
[396e] Socrates: And I think indeed, O Hermogenes, that this wisdom happened to me through the means of Euthyphro, the son of Pantius: for I was with him in the morning, and listened to him with great attention. It seems therefore, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but that he has also arrested my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in such a manner as to make use of this wisdom to-day, and contemplate what yet remains concerning the rectitude of names. But to-morrow, if it is agreeable to you, we will lay it aside, and purify ourselves from it, finding out for this purpose one who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he is some one of the priests, or the sophists.
[397a] Hermogenes: I assent to this; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains of the discussion concerning names.
[397a] Socrates: It is necessary to act in this manner. [397b] From whence then are you willing we should begin our speculation, since we have insisted upon a certain formula of operation; that we may know whether names themselves will testify for us, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but contain a certain rectitude of construction? The names, therefore, of heroes and men may perhaps deceive us: for many of these subsist according to the surnames of their ancestors, and sometimes have no correspondence with the persons, as we observed in the beginning of this disputation. But many are added, as tokens of renown, such as the prosperous, the saviour, the friend of divinity, and a variety of others of this kind. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to neglect the discussion of these: but it is probable that we shall particularly find names properly fabricated, about eternal and natural beings; for it is most becoming to study the position of names in these. But, perhaps, some of these are established by a power more divine than that of men.
[397c] Hermogenes: You appear to me, Socrates, to speak excellently well.
[397c] Socrates: Will it not therefore be just, to begin from the gods, considering the reason why they are properly denominated gods?
[397c] Hermogenes: It will be proper.
[397c] Socrates: I therefore conjecture as follows:—It appears to me that the most antient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name. Has what I say any similitude to truth, or not?
[397d] Hermogenes: It possesses a perfect similitude.
[397d] Socrates: What then shall we consider after this?
[397d] Hermogenes: It is evident that we ought to speculate concerning dæmons, heroes, and men.
[397e] Socrates: Concerning dæmons? And truly, Hermogenes, this is the proper method of proceeding. What then are we to understand by the name dæmon? See whether I say any thing to the purpose.
[397e] Hermogenes: Only relate what it is.
[397e] Socrates: Do you not know who those dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of?
[397e] Hermogenes: I do not.
[397e] Socrates: And are you ignorant that he says, the golden race of men was first generated⁸?
[397e] Hermogenes: This I know.
[398a] Socrates: He says, therefore, concerning this, “that after this race was concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons⁹ denominated holy, terrestrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men.”
[398a] Hermogenes: But what then?
[398a] Socrates: I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally composed from gold, but as being beautiful and good: but I infer this, from his denominating our race an iron one.
[398a] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[398a] Socrates: Do you not therefore think, that if any one of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he belonged to the golden race?
[398b] Hermogenes: It is probable he would.
[398b] Socrates: But are the good any other than such as are prudent?
[398b] Hermogenes: They are the prudent.
[398c] Socrates: On this account therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other he calls them dæmons, because they were prudent and learned (δαημονες). And, in our antient tongue, this very name is to be found. Hence both he, and many other poets, speak in a becoming manner, when they say that a good man after death will receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a dæmon, according to the surname of prudence. I therefore assert the same, that every good man is learned and skilful; that he is dæmoniacal, both while living and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a dæmon.
[398c] Hermogenes: And I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name hero¹⁰ signify?
[398c] Socrates: This is by no means difficult to understand; for this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love.
[398c] Hermogenes: How is this?
[398c] Socrates: Do you not know that heroes are demigods?
[398c] Hermogenes: What then?
[398c] Socrates: All of them [398d] were doubtless generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddess. [398e] If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the antient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation: for it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name: or you may say, that this name is deduced from their being wise and rhetoricians, sagacious and skilled in dialectic, and sufficiently ready in interrogating; for ειρειν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists is, in consequence of this, an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men is obscure, I mean, why they were called ανθρωποι, men. Can you tell the reason?
[398e] Hermogenes: From whence, my worthy friend, should I be able? And, indeed, if I was by any means capable of making this discovery, I should not exert myself for this purpose, because I think you will more easily discover it than I shall.
[399a] Socrates: You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphro.
[399a] Hermogenes: Evidently so.
[399a] Socrates: And your confidence is proper: [399b] for I now seem to myself to understand in a knowing and an elegant manner; and I am afraid, if I do not take care, that I shall become to-day wiser than I ought. But consider what I say. For this, in the first place, ought to be understood concerning names, that we often add letters, and often take them away, while we compose names just as we please; and, besides this, often change the acute syllables. As when we say Διι φιλος, a friend to Jove: for, in order that this name may become instead of a verb to us, we take away the other ιωτα, and, instead of an acute middle syllable, we pronounce a grave one. But, on the contrary, in others we insert letters, and others again we enunciate with a graver accent.
[399b] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[399b] Socrates: This, therefore, as it appears to me, takes place in the name man: for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, ᾱ, being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.
[399c] Hermogenes: How do you mean?
[399c] Socrates: Thus. This name man signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon that which he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated ανθρωπος, viz. con- templating what he beholds¹¹. But what shall we investigate after this? Shall it be that, the inquiry into which will be very pleasing to me?
[399c] Hermogenes: By all means.
[399d] Socrates: It appears then to me, that we ought, in the next place, to investigate concerning soul and body; for we call the composition of soul and body, man.
[399d] Hermogenes: Without doubt.
[399d] Socrates: Let us, then, endeavour to divide these in the same manner as the former subjects of our speculation. Will you not therefore say, that we should first of all consider the rectitude of this name soul, and afterwards of the name body?
[399e] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[399e] Socrates: That I may speak, then, what appears to me on a sudden, I think that those who assigned this name soul, understood some such thing as this, that whenever this nature is present with the body, it is the cause of its life, extending to, and refrigerating it with, the power of respiration; but that when the refrigerating power ceases, the body at the same time is dissolved and perishes: and from hence, as it appears to me, they called it soul (ψυχη). But, if you please, stop a little; for I seem to myself to perceive something more capable of producing persuasion than this, among the followers of Euthyphro: for, as it appears to me, they would despise this etymology, and consider it as absurd. But consider whether the following explanation will please you.
[400a] Hermogenes: Only say what it is.
[400a] Socrates: What other nature, except the soul, do you think gives life to the whole body, contains, carries, and enables it to walk about?
[400a] Hermogenes: No other.
[400a] Socrates: But what, do you not believe in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul distribute into order, and contain the nature of every thing else?
[400b] Hermogenes: I do.
[400b] Socrates: It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which carries and contains nature, φυσεχην: but it may more elegantly be called ψυχη.
[400b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[400b] Socrates: And this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.
[400b] Hermogenes: For it certainly is so.
[400b] Socrates: But it would truly appear to be ridiculous, if it was named according to its composition.
[400b] Hermogenes: But what shall we next consider after this?
[400c] Socrates: Shall we speak concerning body?
[400c] Hermogenes: By all means.
[400c] Socrates: But this name appears to me to deviate in a certain small degree from its original: for, according to some, it is the sepulchre of the soul, which they consider as buried at present; and because whatever the soul signifies, it signifies by the body; so that on this account it is properly called σημα, a sepulchre. And indeed the followers of Orpheus appear to me to have established this name, principally because the soul suffers in body the punishment of its guilt, and is surrounded with this enclosure that it may preserve the image of a prison¹². They are of opinion, therefore, that the body should retain this appellation, σωμα, till the soul has absolved the punishment which is her due, and that no other letter ought to be added to the name.
[400c] Hermogenes: But it appears to me, Socrates, that enough has been said concerning these particulars. But do you think we can speak about the names of the gods, in the same manner as we considered the name of Jupiter, and determine the rectitude of their denominations?
[400d] Socrates: By Jupiter, Hermogenes, if we are [400e] endued with intellect, we shall confess that the most beautiful mode of conduct, on this occasion, is to acknowledge that we know nothing either concerning the gods, or the names by which they denominate themselves¹³: for it is evident that they call themselves by true appellations. But the second mode of rectitude consists, I think, in calling the gods by those names which the law ordains us to invoke them by in prayer, whatever the names may be which they rejoice to hear; and that we should act thus, as knowing nothing more than this: [401a] for the method of invocation which the law appoints appears to me to be beautifully established. If you are willing, therefore, let us enter on this speculation, previously, as it were, declaring to the gods that we speculate nothing concerning their divinities, as we do not think ourselves equal to such an undertaking; but that we direct our attention to the opinion entertained by those men who first fabricated their names: for this will be the means of avoiding their indignation.
[401b] Hermogenes: You appear to me, Socrates, to speak modestly: let us therefore act in this manner.
[401b] Socrates: Ought we not, therefore, to begin from Vesta, according to law?
[401b] Hermogenes: It is just that we should.
[401b] Socrates: What then shall we say is to be understood by this name Ἑστια?
[401b] Hermogenes: By Jupiter, I do not think it is easy to discover this.
[401b] Socrates: It appears, indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that those who first established names were no despicable persons, but men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study.
[401b] Hermogenes: But what then?
[401c] Socrates: It seems to me that the position of names was owing to some such men as these. And, indeed, if any one considers foreign names, he will not less discover the meaning of each. As with respect to this which we call ουσια, essence, there are some who call it εσια, and others again ωσια. In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things Ἑστια, according to one of these names, εσια: and because we denominate that which participates of essence Ἑστια, essence, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called Ἑστια¹⁴: for our ancestors were accustomed to call ουσια, essence, εσια. Besides, if any one considers the business of sacrifice, he will be led to think that this was the opinion of those by whom sacrifices were ordained. [401d] For it was proper, that those who denominated the essence of all things Ἐστια (Vesta), should sacrifice to Vesta, before all the gods. But those who called essence ωσια, these nearly, according to the opinion of Heraclitus, considered all things as perpetually flowing, and that nothing had any permanent subsistence. The cause, therefore, and leader of things, with them, is impulse: and hence they very properly denominated this impelling cause ωσια. And thus much concerning the opinion of those who may be considered as knowing nothing. But, after Vesta, it is just to speculate concerning Rhea and Saturn, though we have discussed the name of Saturn already. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.
[401e] Hermogenes: Why so, Socrates?
[401e] Socrates: O excellent man, I perceive a certain hive of wisdom.
[401e] Hermogenes: But of what kind is it?
[402a] Socrates: It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it is capable of producing a certain probability.
[402a] Hermogenes: What probability is this?
[402a] Socrates: I seem to myself to behold Heraclitus formerly asserting something wisely concerning Saturn and Rhea, and which Homer himself also asserts.
[402a] Hermogenes: Explain your meaning.
[402a] Socrates: Heraclitus then says, that all things subsist in a yielding condition, and that nothing abides; and assimilating things to the flowing of a river, he says, that you cannot merge yourself twice in the same stream.
[402b] Hermogenes: He does so.
[402c] Socrates: Does he, therefore, appear to you to conceive differently from Heraclitus, who places Rhea and Saturn among the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heraclitus assigned both of them by chance, the names of streams of water? As, therefore, Homer¹⁵ calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod. Likewise Orpheus says,
[402c] In beauteous-flowing marriage first combin’d
Ocean, who mingling with his sister Tethys join’d¹⁶.
[402c] Behold, therefore, how all these consent with each other in their doctrine, and how they all tend towards the opinion of Heraclitus!
[402c] Hermogenes: You seem to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose, but I do not understand what the name Tethys implies.
[402c] Socrates: But this nearly implies the same, and signifies that it is the occult name of a fountain; for leaping forth, and straining through, represent the image of a fountain. But from both these names the name Tethys is composed.
[402d] Hermogenes: This, Socrates, is an elegant explanation.
[402d] Socrates: What then shall we next consider? Jupiter we have already spoken of.
[402d] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[402d] Socrates: Let us, therefore, speak of his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and that other name by which Pluto is called.
[402d] Hermogenes: By all means.
[402e] Socrates: He, therefore, who first called Neptune ποσειδων, appears to me to have given him this name from the nature of the sea, restraining his course when he walks, and not permitting him to proceed any further, as if it became a bond to his feet. He, therefore, denominated the ruler of this power ποσειδων, as ποσιδεσμον οντα, viz. having a fettered foot¹⁷. The ι perhaps was added for the sake of elegance. [403a] But, perhaps, this was not the meaning of its founder, but two λλ were originally placed instead of σ; signifying that this god knows a multitude of things. And, perhaps, likewise he was denominated σειων, i. e. shaking, from σειειν, to shake, to which π and δ were added. But Pluto was so called from the donation of πλουτος, wealth, because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation αιδης, the multiude appear to me to conceive the same as αειδες, i. e. obscure and dark; and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.
[403b] Hermogenes: But what is your opinion, Socrates, about this affair?
[403b] Socrates: It appears to me, that men have abundantly erred concerning the power of this god, and that they are afraid of him without occasion; for their fear arises from hence; because, when any one of us dies, he abides for ever in Hades; and because the soul departs to this god, divested of the body. But both the empire of this god, and his name, and every other particular respecting him, appear to me to tend to one and the same thing.
[403c] Hermogenes: But how?
[403c] Socrates: I will tell you how this affair appears to me. Answer me, therefore, Which of these is the stronger bond to an animal, so as to cause its detention, necessity, or desire?
[403c] Hermogenes: Desire, Socrates, is by far the most prevalent.
[403c] Socrates: Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who dwell there by the strongest bond?
[403c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[403c] Socrates: It binds them, therefore, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.
[403c] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[403c] Socrates: Are there not, therefore, many desires?
[403c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[403c] Socrates: It binds them, therefore, with the greatest of all desires, if it binds them with the greatest of bonds.
[403d] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[403d] Socrates: Is there then any greater desire, than that which is produced when any one, by associating with another, thinks that, through his means, he shall become a better man?
[403d] Hermogenes: By Jupiter, Socrates, there is not any.
[403d] Socrates: On this account, [403e] Hermogenes, we should say, that no one is willing to return from thence hither, not even the Syrens themselves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted by the beautiful discourses of Pluto. And hence it follows that this god is a perfect sophist; that he greatly benefits those who dwell with him; and that he possesses such great affluence as enables him to supply us with those mighty advantages which we enjoy; and from hence he is called Pluto. [404a] But does he not also appear to you to be a philosopher, and one endued with excellent prudence and design, from his being unwilling to associate with men invested with bodies, but then only admits them to familiar converse with him, when their souls are purified from all the evils and desires which subsist about the body? for this divinity considered, that he should be able to detain souls, if he bound them with the desire belonging to virtue; but that, while they possess the consternation and furious insanity of body, even his father Saturn would not be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he is said to be bound.
[404b] Hermogenes: You seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.
[404b] Socrates: We ought then, O Hermogenes, by no means to denominate αιδης from αειδες, dark and invisible, but much rather from a knowledge of all beautiful things¹⁸: and from hence this god was called by the fabricator of names αδης.
[404b] Hermogenes: Be it so. But what shall we say concerning the names Ceres, Juno, Apollo, Minerva, Vulcan, Mars, and those of the other gods?
[404c] Socrates: It appears that Ceres was so called from the donation of aliment, being, as it were, διδουσα μητηρ, or a bestowing mother¹⁹. But Juno, from being lovely, on account of the love which Jupiter is said to have entertained for her²⁰. Perhaps also the founder of this name, speculating things on high, denominated the air ἠρα; and, for the sake of concealment, placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name of Juno. With respect to the names φερρεφαττα, or Proserpine, and Apollo, many are terrified at them, through unskilfulness as it appears in the rectitude of names. And indeed, changing the first of these names, they consider φερσεφονη; and this appears to them as something terrible and dire. But the other name, φερρεφαττα, signifies that this goddess is wise: [404d] for that which is able to touch upon, handle, and pursue things which are borne along, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may, with great propriety, be named φερεπαφα, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along²¹: and hence the wise αιδης, or Pluto, associates with her, because of these characteristics of her nature. But men of the present times neglect this name, valuing good pronunciation more than truth; and on this account they call her φερρεφαττα. In like manner with respect to Apollo, many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dire. Or are you ignorant that this is the case?
[404d] Hermogenes: I am not; and you speak the truth.
[404e] Socrates: But this name, as it appears to me, is beautifully established, with respect to the power of the god.
[404e] Hermogenes: But how?
[405a] Socrates: I will endeavour to tell you what appears to me in this affair: for there is no other one name which can more harmonize with the four powers of this god, because it touches upon them all, and evinces, in a certain respect, his harmonic, prophetic, medicinal, and arrow-darting skill²².
[405a] Hermogenes: Tell me, then; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something prodigious.
[405b] Socrates: This name then is well harmonized as to its composition, as belonging to an harmonical god: for, in the first place, do not purgations and purifications, both according to medicine and prophecy, and likewise the operations of pharmacy, and the lustrations, washings and sprinklings employed by the divining art, all tend to this one point, viz. the rendering man pure, both in body and soul?
[405b] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[405b] Socrates: Will not then the purifying god, who washes and frees us from evils of this kind, be Apollo?
[405b] Hermogenes: Perfectly so.
[405c] Socrates: According, therefore, to the solutions and washings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called απολυων or the liberator; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called ἅπλος, or simple, as he is denominated by the Thessalians; since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god the simple. But, on account of his perpetually prevailing might in the jaculation of arrows, he may be called αεὶ βαλλων, that is, perpetually darting. But with respect to his harmonic power, it is proper to take notice, that ᾱ often signifies the same as together, as in the words ακολουθος, a follower, and ακοιτις, a wife. [405d] So likewise in the name of this god, ᾱ and πολησις signify the revolution subsisting together with, and about the heavens, which they denominate the pole; and the harmony subsisting in song, which they call symphony. Because all these, according to the assertions of those who are skilled in music and astronomy, revolve together with a certain harmony. But this god presides over harmony, ομοπολων, i. e. converting all these together, both among gods and men. As, therefore, we call ομοκελευθος, and ομοκοιτις, i. e. going together, and lying together, ακολουθος and ακοιτις, changing ο into α, so likewise we denominate Apollo as ομοπολων, inserting at the same time another λ; because otherwise it would have been synonimous with a difficult name. And this many of the present time suspecting, through not rightly perceiving the power of this name, they are terrified at it, as if it signified a certain corruption. But in reality this name, as we just now observed, is so composed, that it touches upon all the powers of the god, viz. his simplicity, perpetual jaculation, purifying, and joint-revolving nature.
[405e] —But the name of [406a] the Muses, and universally that of Music, was derived, as it seems, from μωσθαι, to inquire, and from investigation and philosophy. But λητω, i. e. Latona, was derived from the mildness of this goddess, because she is εθελημων, viz. willing to comply with the requests of her suppliants. Perhaps, too, they denominate her as a stranger; for many call her ληθω: and this name ληθω they seem to have assigned her, because her manners are not rough, but gentle and mild. But αρτεμις, i. e. Diana, appears to signify integrity and modesty, through her desire of virginity. Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being skilful in virtue²⁶. And it is not likewise improbable, that, from her hating the copulation of man and woman, or through some one, or all of these, the institutor of her name thus denominated the goddess.
[406b] Hermogenes: But what will you say concerning Dionysius and Venus?
[406c] Socrates: You inquire about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the mode of nomination, belonging to these divinities, is both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious mode; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocose: for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Dionysius, therefore, is the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called διδοινυσος. But οινος, wine, may be most justly denominated οιονους, because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it before²⁷. But, with respect to Venus, it is not proper to contradict Hesiod, but to allow that she was called αφροδιτη, through her generation from αφρος, foam²⁸.
[406d] Hermogenes: But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you ought not to neglect the investigation of Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars.
[406d] Socrates: For such a neglect is, indeed, by no means becoming.
[406d] Hermogenes: Certainly not.
[406d] Socrates: One of the names of Minerva, therefore, it is by no means difficult to explain.
[406d] Hermogenes: Which do you mean?
[406d] Socrates: Do we not call her Pallas?
[406d] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[406d] Socrates: This name, therefore, we must consider as derived from leaping in armour; [406e] and in so doing, we shall, as it appears to me, think properly: for to elevate oneself, or something else, either from the earth or in the hands, is denominated by us to vibrate and be vibrated, and to dance and be made to dance.
[407a] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[407a] Socrates: The goddess, therefore, is on this account called Pallas.
[407a] Hermogenes: And very properly so. But how will you explain her other name?
[407a] Socrates: Do you mean that of Athena?
[407b] Hermogenes: I do.
[407b] Socrates: This name, my friend, is of greater moment; for the antients appear to have considered Athena in the same manner as those of the present day, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer: for many of these explain the poet as signifying, by Athena, intellect and the dianoëtic power. And he who instituted names seems to have understood some such thing as this about the goddess, or rather something yet greater, expressing, by this means, the intelligence of the goddess, as if he had said that she is θεονοη, or deific intelligence, employing after a foreign mode ᾱ instead of η̄, and taking away ι and σ. Though perhaps this was not the case, but he called her θεονοη, as understanding divine concerns in a manner superior to all others. Nor will it be foreign from the purpose to say that he was willing to call her ηθονοη, as being intelligence in manners²⁹. But either the original founder of this name, or certain persons who came after him, by producing it into something which they thought more beautiful, denominated her Athena.
[407c] Hermogenes: But what will you say concerning Vulcan?
[407c] Socrates: Do you inquire concerning the noble arbiter of light?
[407c] Hermogenes: So it appears.
[407c] Socrates: This divinity, therefore, being φαιστος, luminous, and attracting to himself η̄, is called ηφαιστος, or the arbiter of light³⁰.
[407c] Hermogenes: It appears so, unless you think it requires some other explanation.
[407c] Socrates: But, that it may not appear otherwise to me, inquire concerning Mars.
[407c] Hermogenes: I inquire then.
[407c] Socrates: If you please, then, the name of Mars shall be derived from το αῤῥεν masculine, and το ανδρειον bold. But if you are willing that he should be called Mars, from his hard and inconvertible nature³¹, the whole of which is denominated αῤῥατον, this also will perfectly agree with the properties of the warlike god.
[407d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[407d] Socrates: Let us therefore dismiss our investigations concerning the names of the gods, as I am afraid to discourse about them. But urge me to any thing else you please, that you may see the quality of the horses of Euthyphro.
[407e] Hermogenes: I will consent to what you say, if you will only suffer me to ask you concerning Hermes; for Cratylus says that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour, then, to behold the meaning of the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any thing to the purpose.
[408a] Socrates: This name seems to pertain to discourse, and to imply that this god is an interpreter and a messenger, one who steals, and is fraudulent in discourse, and who meddles with merchandise³²: and the whole of this subsists about the power of discourse. As, therefore, we said before, το ειρειν is the use of speech: and of this Homer frequently says, εμησατο, i. e. he deliberated about it. This name, therefore, is composed both from to speak and to deliberate; just as if the institutor of the name had authoritatively addressed us as follows: “It is just, O men, that you should call that divinity, who makes speech the object of his care and deliberation, Ειρεμης.” But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμης, Hermes. But Iris³³ likewise is so called, from το ειρειν, to speak, because she is a messenger.
[408b] Hermogenes: By Jupiter, then, Cratylus appears to me to have spoken well, in denying that I am Hermogenes; because I am by no means an excellent artist of discourse.
[408c] Socrates: It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan³⁴ is the bipartite son of Hermes.
[408c] Hermogenes: But why?
[408c] Socrates: You know that speech signifies the all; that it circulates and rolls perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.
[408c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[408c] Socrates: Is not, therefore, that which is true in speech, smooth and divine, and dwelling on high in the gods; but that which is false, a downward inhabitant, dwelling in the multitude of mankind, and, besides this, rough and tragic? For in speech of this kind, the greater part of fables, and the falsities about a tragic life, subsist.
[408c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[408d] Socrates: With great propriety, therefore, he who indicates every thing, and perpetually rolls, is παν αιπολος, the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us leave these investigations of the gods.
[408d] Hermogenes: Gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates, we will omit; but what should hinder you from discussing the names of such divinities as the sun and moon, stars and earth, æther and air, fire and water, the seasons and the year?
[408e] Socrates: You assign me an arduous task; yet at the same time, if it will oblige you, I am willing to comply.
[408e] Hermogenes: It will so, indeed.
[408e] Socrates: What therefore do you wish we should first investigate? Or shall we, agreeably to the order in which you mentioned these, begin with the sun?
[408e] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[409a] Socrates: It seems, then, that this would become more manifest, if any one should use the Doric appellation: for the Dorians call the sun αλιον. He will therefore be αλιος, from his collecting men into one, when he rises; and likewise, from his always revolving about the earth. To which we may add, that this name belongs to him, because he varies, in his circulation, the productions of the earth. But το ποικιλειν, and αιολειν, have one and the same meaning.
[409a] Hermogenes: But what will you say of σεληνη, or the moon?
[409a] Socrates: This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.
[409a] Hermogenes: Why?
[409b] Socrates: Because it seems to manifest something of a more antient date, which he lately revived, when he said that the moon derives her light from the sun.
[409b] Hermogenes: But how?
[409b] Socrates: Σελας is the same with φως, light.
[409b] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[409b] Socrates: But this light about the moon is perpetually νεον and εννον, new and old, if what the Anaxagorics say is true: for, perpetually revolving in a circle, it perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.
[409c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[409c] Socrates: But many call the moon σελαναιας.
[409c] Hermogenes: They do so.
[409c] Socrates: But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendour, it may be more justly called σελαεννεοαεια; but is now concisely denominated σελαναια.
[409c] Hermogenes: This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of month and the stars?
[409c] Socrates: Μεις, or month, may be properly so called, from μειουσθαι, to be diminished; but the stars appear to derive their appellation from αστραπη, corruscation. But αστραπη is denominated from ωπας αναστρεφει, i. e. converting to itself the sight; but now, for the sake of elegance, it is called αστραπη.
[409c] Hermogenes: But what is your opinion concerning fire and water.
[409d] Socrates: I am in doubt with respect to fire; and it appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro deserts me, or that this word is most extremely difficult to explain. Behold then the artifice which I employ, in all such things as cause me to doubt.
[409d] Hermogenes: What is it?
[409d] Socrates: I will tell you. Answer me, therefore: Do you know on what account πυρ, fire, is so called?
[409d] Hermogenes: By Jupiter, I do not.
[409e] Socrates: But consider what I suspect concerning it: for I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the dominion of the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.
[409e] Hermogenes: But what then?
[409e] Socrates: If any one, therefore, should investigate the propriety of these names according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that language to which the name belongs, he would certainly be involved in doubt.
[409e] Hermogenes: It is likely he would.
[410a] Socrates: Consider then, whether this name, πυρ, is not of Barbaric origin: for it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek tongue; and it is manifest that the Phrygians thus denominate fire, with a certain trifling deviation; as likewise that ὑδωρ water, κυνας dogs, and many other names, are indebted to them for their origin.
[410a] Hermogenes: They are so.
[410a] Socrates: It is not proper, [410b] therefore, to use violence with these words, since no one can say any thing to the purpose about them. On this account, therefore, I shall reject the explanation of πυρ fire, and ὑδωρ water. But air, O Hermogenes, is so called, because it elevates things from the earth; or because it always flows; or because, from its flowing, spirit is produced: for the poets call spirits αηται, winds. Perhaps, therefore, it is called αηρ, as if implying a flowing spirit, or a flowing blast of wind. But I consider æther as deriving its appellation from always running in a flowing progression, about the air; and on this account it may be called αειθεηρ. But γη, or earth, will more plainly signify its meaning, if any one denominates it γαια. For γαια may be properly called γεννητειρα, the producer, as Homer says; for he calls γεγαασι, γεγενησθαι, or that which is produced in itself.
[410b] Hermogenes: Let it be so.
[410b] Socrates: What then remains for us to investigate after this?
[410c] Hermogenes: The hours, Socrates, and the year.
[410d] Socrates: But ωραι, that is, the hours, must be pronounced in the Attic tongue, as that which is more antient, if you wish to know the probable meaning of this word. For they are ὡραι, on account of their bounding the winter and summer, as likewise winds and proper occasions subservient to the fruits of the earth. And hence, because they bound, ὁριζουσαι, they are most justly called ὡραι. But ενιαυτος and ετος, the year, appear to be one and the same: for that which, at stated periods, educes into light the productions of the earth, and explores them in itself, is the year. And as in the foregoing part of our discourse we gave a two-fold distribution to the name of Jupiter, and asserted that he was by some called ζηνα, and by others δια; so likewise, with respect to the year, it is called by some ενιαυτος, because it explores IN ITSELF; but ετος, because it explores. But the entire reason of its denomination is because it explores things in itself; so that two names are generated, ενιαυτος and ετος, from one reason.
[410d] Hermogenes: But now, Socrates, you have certainly proceeded to a great length.
[410e] Socrates: I seem, indeed, to have pursued wisdom to a considerable distance.
[410e] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[410e] Socrates: Perhaps you will urge me still further.
[411a] Hermogenes: But after this species of inquiry, I would most gladly contemplate the rectitude of those beautiful names concerning virtue, such as φρονησις prudence, συνεσις consciousness, δικαιοσυνη equity, and all the rest of this kind.
[411b] Socrates: You raise up, my friend, no despicable genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion’s-skin, I ought not to fly through fear, but to investigate prudence and intelligence, consideration and science, and all the other beautiful names which you speak of.
[411b] Hermogenes: We ought by no means to desist till this is accomplished.
[411b] Socrates: And indeed, by [411c] the dog, I seem to myself not to prophesy badly, about what I understand at present, that those antient men who established names, experienced that which happens to many wise men of the present times; for, by their intense investigation concerning the manner in which things subsist, they became giddy, far beyond the rest of mankind, and afterwards, things themselves appeared to them to stagger and fluctuate. They did not however consider their inward giddiness as the cause of this opinion, but the outward natural fluctuation of things; for they imagined that nothing was stable and firm, but that all things flowed and were continually hurried along, and were full of all-various agitation and generation. I speak this, as what I conceive respecting the names which we have just now mentioned.
[411c] Hermogenes: How is this, Socrates?
[411c] Socrates: Perhaps you have not perceived that these names were established as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.
[411c] Hermogenes: I do not entirely perceive this.
[411c] Socrates: And, in the first place, the first name which we mentioned entirely pertains to something of this kind.
[411d] Hermogenes: Which is that?
[411d] Socrates: Prudence, or φρονησις: for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. [411e] It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that it is plainly conversant with agitation. But if you will, γνωμη, or consideration, perfectly signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for το νωμᾶν is the same as το σκοπειν, to speculate. Again, νοησις, or intelligence, if you please, is του νεου εσις, or the desire of that which is new: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name νεοεσις: for it was not at first called νοησις, but two ε̄ ε̄ ought to be substituted instead of η̄, so as to produce νεοεσις. But temperance signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered: and science, indeed, implies that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. [412a] On which, account, by inserting ε̄, it ought to be called επιστημενης. But συνεσις appears to be, as it were, a syllogism. And when συνιεναι is said to take place, the same things happens in every respect, as when any one is said επιστασθαι, to know: for συνιεναι asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions; but wisdom signifies the touching upon local motion. [412b] This, however, is more obscure and foreign from us. But it is necessary to recollect from the poets, that when they wish to express any thing which accedes on a sudden, they say εσυθη, it rushed forth: and the name of a certain illustrious Lacedemonian was Σους, i. e. one who rushes forward; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate a swift impulse. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. But το ἀγαθον, the good, signifies that which excites admiration, in the nature of every thing: for, since all things subsist in continual progression, in some swiftness, and in others slowness, prevails. Every thing, therefore, is not swift, but there is something in every thing which is admirable. Hence the name ταγαθον is the same with το ἀγαστον, the admirable. But, with respect to the name equity, we may easily conjecture that it is derived from the intelligence of that which is just: but the signification of the just itself, is difficult to determine: for it appears that the multitude agree thus far to what we have said, but that what follows is a subject of doubt. For, indeed, such as think that the universe subsists in progression, consider the greatest part of it to be of such a nature that it does nothing else than yield to impulsion; [412c] that, on this account, something pervades through every thing, from which all generated natures are produced; [412d] and that this pervading nature is the swiftest and most attenuated of all things: for it would not be able to pass through every thing, unless it was the most attenuated, so that nothing can stop its progression; and the swiftest, so that it may use other things as if in an abiding condition with respect to itself. [412e] Because, therefore, it governs all other things διαϊὸν, i. e. by pervading through them, it is properly called δικαιον, receiving the power of the κ̄ for the sake of elegant enunciation. And thus far the multitude agree with us, concerning the meaning of το δικαιον, the just. But I, O Hermogenes, as being assiduous in my inquiries about this affair, have investigated all these particulars, and have discovered in the απορρητα, or sacred mysteries, that the just is the same with cause. For that through which a thing is generated, is the cause of that thing: and a certain person said, that it was on this account properly denominated το δικαιον. [413a] But, notwithstanding this information, I do not the less cease to inquire, O best of men, what the just is, if it is the same with cause. I seem, therefore, now to inquire further than is becoming, and to pass, as it is said, beyond the trench; for they will say that I have sufficiently interrogated and heard, and will endeavour, through being desirous to satisfy me, to give different solutions of the difficulty, and will no longer harmonize in their opinions. [413b] For a certain person says that the sun is the just, because the sun alone, by his pervading and heating power, governs all things. But when, rejoicing in this information, I related it to another person, as if I had heard something beautiful and excellent, he laughed at me when I told it him, and asked me if I thought that there was no longer any thing just in men after sun-set? Upon my inquiring, therefore, what the just was, according to him, he said it was fire. But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person said, it was not fire, but the heat which subsisted in fire. [413c] Another again said, that all these opinions were ridiculous, but that the just was that intellect which Anaxagoras speaks of; for he said that this was an unrestrained governor, and that it was mingled with nothing, but that it adorned all things, pervading through all things. But in these explanations, my friend, I find myself exposed to greater doubts than before I endeavoured to learn what justice is. But, that we may return to that for the sake of which we entered on this disputation, this name appears to be attributed to equity, for the reasons which we have assigned.
[413d] Hermogenes: You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these particulars somewhere, and not to have fabricated them yourself.
[413d] Socrates: But what do you say respecting my other explanations?
[413d] Hermogenes: That this is not entirely the case with them.
[413d] Socrates: Attentively hear then; [413e] for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, by speaking as if I had not heard.—What then remains for us after equity? I think we have not yet discussed fortitude: for injustice is evidently a real hinderance to the pervading power; but fortitude signifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than a contrary fluxion. If any one, therefore, takes away the δ from this name ανδρια fortitude, the name ᾳνρια, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to the just; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner το αῤῥεν, that is, the male nature, and ᾳνηρ man, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from ανω ῥοη, or a flowing upwards. But the name woman appears to me to imply begetting; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast, O Hermogenes, seems to derive its appellation from causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated.
[414a] Hermogenes: It appears so, Socrates.
[414a] Socrates: But the word θαλλειν, to flourish, appears to me to represent the increase of youth, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly: and this is imitated by the founder of the name, who composed it from θειν to run, and αλλεσθαι to leap. But do you not perceive that I am borne, as it were, beyond my course, since I have met with words plain and easy? But many things yet remain, which appear to be worthy of investigation.
[414b] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[414b] Socrates: And one of these is, that we should consider the meaning of the word art.
[414c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[414c] Socrates: Does not the word τεχνη, then, signify εχονοη, or the habit of in- tellect, taking away for this purpose τ̄, and inserting ο̄ between χ̄ and ν̄, and between ν̄ and η̄?
[414c] Hermogenes: And this in a very far-fetched manner, Socrates.
[414d] Socrates: But do you not know, blessed man! that such names as were first established, are now overwhelmed through the studious of tragic discourse; who, for the sake of elegant enunciation, add and take away letters; and who entirely pervert them, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word κατοπτρω, a mirror, does not the addition of the ρω appear to you absurd? But such alterations as these are, I think, made by those who care nothing for truth, but are solicitous about the elegant conformation of the mouth: so that these men, having added many things to the first names, at length rendered it impossible for any one to apprehend the meaning of a name; as in the name Sphynx, which they call σφιγγξ instead of σφιγξ, and so in many others.
[414d] Hermogenes: This is indeed the case, Socrates.
[414d] Socrates: Indeed, if it should be allowed for every one to add to, and take away from names, just as he pleased, this would certainly be a great licence; and any one might adapt every name to every thing.
[414e] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[414e] Socrates: The truth indeed. But I think that you who are a wise president, ought to preserve and guard the moderate and the probable.
[414e] Hermogenes: I wish I could.
[414e] Socrates: And I also, O Hermogenes, wish the same in conjunction with you. But you should not, O demoniacal man, demand a discussion very exact, lest you perfectly exhaust my force: for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after art, I have considered artifice or skill. For μηχανη, or artifice, seems to me to signify the completion of a thing in a very high degree. It is composed therefore from μηκος, length, and ανειν, to finish a thing completely. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse, and to inquire the signification of the names virtue and vice.
[415a] —One of these, therefore, I have not yet discovered; but the other appears to me to be manifest, for it harmonizes with all that has been said before: for, in consequence of every thing subsisting in progression, whatever passes on badly will be depravity; [415b] but this, when it subsists in the soul, badly acceding to her concerns, then most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity. But it appears to me, that the faulty mode of progression is manifest in timidity, which we have not yet discussed; though it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have omitted many other names. [415c] Timidity therefore signifies, that the bond of the soul is strong: for the word vehement implies a certain strength. And hence the most vehement and greatest bond of the soul, will be timidity: [415d] just as want is an evil; and every thing as it appears, which is an impediment to passing on and progression.—Passing on badly, therefore, seems, to evince a detention and hindrance of progression: and when the soul is thus affected, she then becomes full of evil. But if the name vice is applicable to such things as these, the contrary of this will be virtue; signifying, in the first place, facility of progression; and, in the next place, that the flowing of a good soul ought to be perpetually loosened and free. [415e] And hence, that which always flows unrestrained and without impediment, may, as it appears, very properly receive this denomination, ᾳειῤῥητη. Perhaps also, some one may call it αἱρετη, because this habit is the most eligible of all. Perhaps, too, you will say that I feign; but I assert, that if the preceding name vice is properly established, the same may be said of the name virtue.
[416a] Hermogenes: But what is the meaning of το κακον, evil, through which you explained many things in the word depravity?
[416a] Socrates: It appears to me, by Jupiter, to imply something prodigious, and difficult to collect. I introduce therefore to this also the artifice mentioned above.
[416a] Hermogenes: What is that?
[416a] Socrates: To assert that this name is something Barbaric.
[416a] Hermogenes: And, in so doing, you appear to me to speak properly. But, if you think fit, we will omit these, and endeavour to consider the rectitude of composition in the names, the beautiful, and the base.
[416b] Socrates: The base, then, seems to me to evince its signification plainly, and to correspond with the preceding explanations: for he who established names appears to me, throughout, to have reviled that which hinders and detains the flowing of things; and that he now assigned the name ᾁεισχοῤῥουν to that which always detains a flowing progression. But, at present, they call it collectively αἱσχρον.
[416b] Hermogenes: But what will you say concerning the beautiful?
[416b] Socrates: This is more difficult to understand, though they say that the ᾱ in this word, is produced only for the sake of harmony and length.
[416b] Hermogenes: But how?
[416b] Socrates: It appears that this appellation is the surname of the dianoëtic energy.
[416c] Hermogenes: How do you prove this?
[416c] Socrates: What do you think is the cause of the denomination of every thing? Is it not that which establishes names?
[416c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[416c] Socrates: Will not this cause, then, be the dianoëtic conception, either of gods, or men, or of both?
[416c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[416c] Socrates: To call things therefore, and the beautiful, are the same with dianoëtic energy.
[416c] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[416c] Socrates: Are not, therefore, the operations of intellect and the dianoëtic power laudable; but such things as are not the result of their energies blameable?
[416c] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[416d] Socrates: That which belongs to medicine, therefore, produces medical works; and that which belongs to the carpenter’s art, carpentry works: or what is your opinion on the subject?
[416d] Hermogenes: The same as yours.
[416d] Socrates: Does not therefore the beautiful produce things beautiful?
[416d] Hermogenes: I is necessary that it should.
[416d] Socrates: But this as we have said, is dianoëtic energy.
[416d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[416d] Socrates: Το καλον, therefore, or the beautiful, will be properly the surname of prudence, which produces such things as, in consequence of acknowledging to be beautiful, we are delighted with.
[416e] Hermogenes: It appears to be so.
[416e] Socrates: What then remains for us to investigate, of such like names?
[417a] Hermogenes: Whatever belongs to the good and the beautiful; such as the names signifying things conducive, useful, profitable, lucrative, and the contraries of these.
[417b] Socrates: You may find then what το συμφερον, or the conducive is, from our foregoing speculations; for it appears to be a certain brother of science. For it evinces nothing else than the local motion of the soul, in conjunction with things; and that things resulting from hence should be called συμφεροντα and συμφορα, i. e. conducive, from συμπεριφερεσθαι, or being borne along in conjunction.
[417b] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[417b] Socrates: But the name lucrative (κερδαλεον) is derived from κερδος, gain. And if any one inserts a ν instead of a δ in this name, it will manifest its meaning: for it will thus, after another manner, become the name for good; since he who assigned it this name intended to express that power which it possesses, of becoming mingled with, and pervading through all things, and thus, by placing δ instead of ν, he pronounced it κερδος.
[417c] Hermogenes: But what will you say concerning λυσιτελουν, or the useful?
[417c] Socrates: It appears, O Hermogenes! that this name was not established according to the meaning in which it is employed by inn-keepers, because it frees from expense; but because it is the swiftest of being, and, in consequence of this, does not suffer things to stand still, nor lation, by receiving an end of being borne along, to stop, and rest from its progression: but, on the contrary, it always departs from lation, as long as any end remains to be obtained, and renders it unceasing and immortal. And, on this account, it appears to me λυσιτελουν was called the good; for that which dissolves the end of lation was called λυσιτελουν. But ωφελιμον, or the profitable, is a foreign name; and Homer himself often uses τῳ οφελλειν. But this is the surname of increasing and making.
[417c] Hermogenes: But what shall we say respecting the contraries of these?
[417d] Socrates: There is no occasion, as it appears to me, to evolve such as are the negations of these.
[417d] Hermogenes: But what are they?
[417d] Socrates: The non-conducive, useless, unprofitable, and the non-lucrative.
[417d] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[417d] Socrates: But may we not inquire concerning βλαβερον and ζημιωδες, the noxious and pernicious.
[417e] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[417e] Socrates: And το βλαβερον, indeed, or the noxious, says that it is βλαπτον τον ῥουν. But βλαπτον signifies that which wishes to bind; and ἁπτειν, to bind, is the same as δεῖν: but this it blames in every respect. He, therefore, who wishes ἁπτειν ῥουν, i. e. to bind that which flows, will be most properly called βουλαπτερουν; but it appears to me, that, for the sake of elegance, it was denominated βλαβερον.
[417e] Hermogenes: A variety of names, Socrates, presents itself for your consideration; and you just now appeared to me to have founded a prelude on your pipe, as it were, of the melody belonging to Minerva, while you pronounced this name βουλαπτερουν.
[418a] Socrates: I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but he who founded the name.
[418a] Hermogenes: You speak the truth; but what will you say about ζημιωδες, the pernicious?
[418a] Socrates: I will tell you, Hermogenes, the meaning of this word; [418b] and do you behold how truly I shall explain it, by asserting that men, through adding and taking away letters, very much vary the meaning of names, so that sometimes a very small alteration causes a word to imply the very contrary of what it did before. As, for instance, in the word το δεον, the becoming: for I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that this beautiful word δεον is new to us, and induces us to enunciate το δεον and ζημιωδες contrary to their meaning, and by this means to obscure their signification: but the antient name evinces the sense of both these words.
[418b] Hermogenes: How is this?
[418b] Socrates: I will tell you. You know that our ancestors very frequently used the ι and δ, and that this was not less the case with such women as particularly preserved the antient tongue. But now, instead of the ι, they perversely use either ε or η, and ζ instead of δ, as being more magnificent.
[418c] Hermogenes: But how?
[418c] Socrates: Just as, for instance, the most antient men called day ἱμερα, and some of them ἑμερα; but those of the present times ἡμερα.
[418c] Hermogenes: This is indeed the case.
[418c] Socrates: You know, therefore, that this antient name only manifests the conceptions of its founder; for, because light emerges from darkness, and shines upon men rejoicing in and desiring its beams, they called day ἱμερα.
[418c] Hermogenes: It appears so
[418c] Socrates: But as it is now celebrated in tragical performances, you can by no means understand what ἡμερα means; though some are of opinion that day is called ἡμερα, because it renders things ἥμερα, placid and gentle.
[418d] Hermogenes: So it appears to me.
[418d] Socrates: And you likewise know that the antients called ζυγον, a beam, δυογον.
[418e] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[418e] Socrates: And ζυγον, indeed, manifests nothing: but that which subsists for the sake of bringing two things together, so that they may be bound, is very justly named δυογον. But it is now called ζυγον; and this is the case with a great variety of other particulars.
[418e] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[418e] Socrates: Hence then, the word δεον, when it is thus pronounced, signifies the contrary to all the names which belong to the good. For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a bond and impediment of local motion; as being the brother of βλαβερον, the noxious.
[418e] Hermogenes: And indeed, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.
[419a] Socrates: But this will not be the case if you use the antient name, which it is much more probable was properly founded than the present name. But you will agree with those antient good men, if you substitute ι for ε; for διον, and not δεον, will signify that good which is celebrated by the institutor of names. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself, but the names δεον, ωφελιμον, λυσιτελουν, κερδαλεον, αγαθον, συμφρον, ευτορον, or proceeding with facility, will all of them appear to have the same meaning: for he meant to signify and celebrate, by different names, that which adorns and pervades through every part of the universe; and to reprobate that which detains and binds. And indeed, in the name ζημιωδες, if, according to the antient tougue, you substitute δ for ζ, it will appear to you that this name was composed from δουντι το ιον, or binding that which is in progression, and was called δημιωδες.
[419b] Hermogenes: But what will you say concerning pleasure, pain, desire, and such like names?
[419c] Socrates: They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes: for pleasure seems to be an action tending towards emolument, and on this account to have derived its appellation; but the δ was added, that it might be called ἡδονη, instead of ἡονη. But pain seems to have derived its appellation from the dissolution of the body, which the body experiences in this passion: and the name sorrow was so called from impeding the motion of progression: but the name αλγήδων, i. e. torment, appears to me to be foreign, and to be so called from αλγεινος, troublesome. Οδυνη, i. e. anxiety, was denominated from the ingress of pain.
[419c] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[419c] Socrates: But αχθηδων, grief, clearly signifies that it is a name assimilated to the slowness of lation: for αχθος is a burthen, and ιον, any thing in progression. Joy seems to have received its appellation from the diffusion and easy progression of the flowing of the soul; but τερψις, delight, was derived from τερπνος, the pleasant. But το τερπνον was so called, from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through the soul; it was therefore justly called ἑρπνον, i. e. inspiring; but in the course of time, it came to be denominated τερπνον. But, with respect to ευφροσυνη, or hilarity, there is no occasion to explain the why of its denomination; for it is obvious to every one, that it was so called from ευ and συμφερεσθαι, that is, from the soul’s being well borne along in conjunction with things. Hence it ought, in justice, to be denominated ευφερωσυνη; but, notwithstanding this, we call it ευφροσυνη. [419d] But neither is it difficult to discover the meaning of επιθυμια, desire: for it evinces a power proceeding to θυμος, anger. But θυμος, anger, derives its appellation from θυσεως, and ζεσεως, raging and ardour. [419e] And again, ιμερος, amatory desire, was so called from ῥῳ, or a flowing which ve- hemently attracts the soul; for because it flows excited, and desiring the pos- session of things, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called ἱμερος. But ποθος, desire, was so called, from signifying that it is not conversant with present amatorial desire, [420a] and its effluxive streams, like ιμερος, but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. But, ερως, love, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external source; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors εσρος, from εσρειν, to flow inwardly. But at present it is called ερως, through the insertion of ω instead of ο. But what shall we consider after this?
[420b] Hermogenes: What opinion, and such-like names, appear to you to signify.
[420c] Socrates: Opinion, δοξα, was denominated from the pursuing which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from the darting of an arrow; and this last appears to be the most likely derivation. Hence οιησις, opinion, harmonizes with δοξα; for it signifies the οισις, or ingress of the soul, in considering the οιον, or quality of a thing. Just as βουλη, counsel or deliberation, is so called from βολη, hurling forth: and βουλεσθαι, to be willing, signifies το εφιεσθαι, to desire, and βουλευεσθαι, to consult. For all these following δοξα, opinion, appear to be certain resemblances of βολη, hurling forth; just as the contrary of this αβουλια, or a want of counsel, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire.
[420c] Hermogenes: You seem to me, Socrates, to have introduced these particulars with great density of conception; [420d] let us therefore now, if it is pleasing to divinity, end the discussion. Yet I should wish you to explain the meaning of necessity, which is consequent to what we have already unfolded, and that which is voluntary.
[420e] Socrates: Το ἑκουσιον, therefore, or the voluntary, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say εικον τω ιοντι, yields to that which is in progression; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to βουλησις, the will. But το αναγκαιον and αντιτυπον, i. e. the necessary and the resisting, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about guilt and ignorance. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick-planted with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, necessity was denominated from an assimilation to a progression through a valley. But as long as our strength remains we ought not to desert it; do not therefore desist, but still interrogate me.
[421a] Hermogenes: I ask you then about things the greatest and most beautiful, viz. truth, falsehood, and being; and why name, which is the subject of our present disputation, was so called?
[421a] Socrates: What therefore do you call μαιεσθαι?
[421a] Hermogenes: I call it ζητειν, to inquire.
[421a] Socrates: It appears then that this word ονομα, a name, was [421b] composed from that discourse which asserts that ον, being, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that which we call ονομαστον, or capable of being named; for in this it clearly appears that name is an inquiry about being. With respect to αληθεια, truth, this name seems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being, and therefore implies that it is θεια αλη, a divine wandering. But ψευδος, falsehood, signifies the contrary to lation. For here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels any thing to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the ψ conceals its meaning. But ον, being, and ουσια, essence, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an ι; for then they will signify ιον, or that which is in progression. And again, το ουκ ον, or non-being, is by some denominated ουκ ιον; that is, not proceeding.
[421b] Hermogenes: You appear to me, Socrates, to have discussed these particulars in a very strenuous manner. But if any one should ask you, what rectitude of nomination there is in the words ιον, proceeding, ῥεον, flowing, and δουν, binding, would you be able to answer him or not?
[421c] Socrates: I should perfectly so. And something just now occurred to me, by the mentioning of which I may appear to say something to the purpose.
[421d] Hermogenes: What is it?
[421d] Socrates: That, if we are ignorant of any thing, we should say, it is of Barbaric origin: for, perhaps, this is really the case with some names; and others are, perhaps, inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For, through names being every where wrested from their proper construction, it will be by no means wonderful, if the antient tongue, when compared with the present, is in no respect different from a Barbaric language.
[421d] Hermogenes: And, indeed, you say nothing foreign from the purpose.
[421e] Socrates: I say that, indeed, which is probable; but yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of an excuse. Let us, however, endeavour to consider this affair, and make our inquiry, as follows: If any one should always investigate those words through which a name derives its subsistence, and again those words through which words are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, would not he who answers such a one at length fail in his replies?
[421e] Hermogenes: It appear so to me.
[422a] Socrates: When, therefore, will he who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they have an elementary subsistence, can no longer be justly said to be composed from other names. Just as we said above, that το αγαθον was composed from αγαστος; admirable, and θοος, swift. But θοος, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever apprehend that which is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.
[422a] Hermogenes: You seem to me to speak properly.
[422b] Socrates: Are not the names, then, which are the subject of your present inquiry, elements? And is it not necessary that the rectitude of their formation should be considered in a manner different from that of others?
[422c] Hermogenes: It is probable.
[422c] Socrates: It is probable certainly, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must be reduced to these: and if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again along with me, lest I should act like one delirious, while I am explaining what the rectitude of the first names ought to be.
[422c] Hermogenes: Only do but speak; and I will endeavour to the utmost of my ability to speculate in conjunction with you.
[422c] Socrates: I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one certain rectitude of every name, as well of that which is first as of that which is last; and that none of these differ from one another, so far as they are names.
[422d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[422d] Socrates: But the rectitude of those names which we have just now discussed, consists in evincing the quality of every thing.
[422d] Hermogenes: How should it be otherwise?
[422d] Socrates: This property, then, ought no less to belong to prior than posterior names, if they have the proper requisites of names.
[422d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[422d] Socrates: But posterior names, as it appears, produce this through such as are prior.
[422d] Hermogenes: It appears so.
[422d] Socrates: Be it so then. But after what manner can first names, which have no others preceding them, be able, as much as possible, to unfold to us the nature of things, if they have the properties of names? But answer me this question: If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to manifest things to one another, should we not, like those who are at present mute, endeavour to signify our meaning by the hands, head, and other parts of the body?
[422e] Hermogenes: How could it be otherwise, Socrates?
[423a] Socrates: I think, therefore, that if we wished to signify that which is upwards and light, we should raise our hands towards the heavens, imitating the nature of the thing itself; but that if we wished to indicate things downwards and heavy, we should point with our hands to the earth. And again. if we were desirous of signifying a running horse, or any other animal, you know, that we should fashion the gestures and figures of our bodies, as near as possible, to a similitude of these things.
[423a] Hermogenes: It appears to me, that it would necessarily be as you say.
[423b] Socrates: In this manner then, I think, the manifestations of the body would take place; the body imitating, as it seems, that which it wishes to render apparent.
[423b] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[423b] Socrates: But since we wish to manifest a thing by our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not a manifestation of every thing then take place through these, when an imitation of any thing subsists through these?
[423b] Hermogenes: It appears to me, that it must be necessarily so.
[423b] Socrates: A name then, as it seems, is an imitation of voice, by which every one who imitates any thing, imitates and nominates through voice.
[423b] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[423c] Socrates: But, by Jupiter, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.
[423c] Hermogenes: Why?
[423c] Socrates: Because we must be compelled to confess, that those who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.
[423c] Hermogenes: You speak the truth.
[423c] Socrates: But do you think this is becoming?
[423c] Hermogenes: I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will a name be?
[423d] Socrates: In the first place, as it appears to me, it will not be such an intimation as that which takes place through music, although this imitation should be effected by the voice: nor, in the next place, though we should imitate the same things as music imitates, yet we should not appear to me to denominate things. But I reason thus: Is there not a certain voice, figure, and colour, in many things?
[423d] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[423d] Socrates: It appears, therefore, that though any one should imitate these, yet the denominating art would not be conversant with these imitations: for these are partly musical, and partly the effects of painting. Is not this the case?
[423e] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[423e] Socrates: But what will you say to this? Do you not think that there is an essence belonging to every thing, as well as colour, and such things as we just now mentioned? And, in the first place, is there not an essence belonging to colour, and voice, and to every thing else, which is considered as deserving the appellation of being?
[423e] Hermogenes: It appears so to me.
[423e] Socrates: But what then? If any one is able to imitate the essence of every thing, by letters and syllables, must he not evince what every thing is?
[424a] Hermogenes: Entirely so.
[424a] Socrates: And how would you denominate him who is able to do this? For, with respect to the former characters, one you called musical, and the other conversant with painting. But how will you call this character?
[424b] Hermogenes: This person, Socrates, appears to me to be that institutor of names which we formerly sought after.
[424b] Socrates: If this then is true, as it appears to be, let us consider about those names which are the subjects of your inquiry, i. e. ῥοη, flowing, ιεναι, to go, σχεσις, habitude; whether, in the letters and syllables from which they are composed, they really imitate essence, or not.
[424b] Hermogenes: By all means.
[424b] Socrates: Come then, let us see whether these alone belong to the first names, or many others besides these.
[424b] Hermogenes: I think that this is the case with many others besides these.
[424c] Socrates: And your opinion is probable. But what will the mode of division be, from whence the imitator will begin to imitate? Since then the imitation of essence subsists through letters and syllables, will it not be most proper to distribute in the first place the elements? just as those who are conversant with rhythms, in the first place, distribute the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables; and thus at length begin to speculate the rhythms themselves, but never till this is accomplished.
[424c] Hermogenes: Certainly.
[424d] Socrates: In like manner, therefore, ought not we first of all to divide the vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both mutes and semivowels? For this is the language of those who are skilled in these matters. And again, ought we not after this to divide such as are capable of being sounded indeed, yet are not semivowels, and consider the different species of vowels, with reference to one another? And after we have properly distributed all these, it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which both these may be referred as elements; and from which both these may be known; and whether species are contained in them after the same manner as in the elements. But all these particulars being contemplated in a becoming manner, it is proper to know how to introduce each according to similitude; whether one ought to be introduced to one, or many mingled together: just as painters, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes only introduce a purple colour, and sometimes any other paint: [424e] and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they make preparations for the purpose of producing the likeness of a man, or any thing else of this kind; [425a] and this in such a manner, I think, as to give to every image the colours which it requires. [425b] In the same manner we should accommodate the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it appears to be necessary, and should fabricate symbols, which they call syllables. And again, combining these syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed, we should again from these nouns and verbs compose something beautiful and entire; that what the animal described by the painter’s art was in the above instance, discourse may be in this; whether constructed by the onomastic, or rhetorical, or any other art. Or rather this ought not to be our employment, since we have already surpassed the bounds of our discourse; for, if this is the proper mode of composition, it was adopted by the antients. But if we mean to speculate artificially, it is proper that, distinguishing all these, we should consider whether or not first and last names are established in a proper manner; for to connect them without adopting such a method would be erroneous, my dear Hermogenes, and improper.
[425b] Hermogenes: Perhaps so, indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.
[425b] Socrates: What then? Do you believe that you can divide them in this manner? for I cannot.
[425b] Hermogenes: There is much greater reason, then, that I should not be able to do this.
[425b] Socrates: Let us give up the attempt then: [425c] or are you willing that we should undertake it to the best of our ability, though we are able to know but very little concerning such particulars? But as we said before respecting the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth belonging to their names, we might conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; so now, with regard to the present subject, we may proceed in its investigation, declaring that, if these particulars have been properly distributed, either by us or by any other, they ought, doubtless, to have been so divided. Now, therefore, as it is said, it is requisite that we should treat concerning them in the best manner we are able. Or, what is you opinion on the subject?
[425d] Hermogenes: Perfectly agreeable to what you say.
[425e] Socrates: It is ridiculous, I think, Hermogenes, that things should become manifest through imitation produced by letters and syllables: and yet it is necessary; for we have not any thing better than this, by means of which we may judge concerning the truth of the first names; unless, perhaps, as the composers of tragedies, when they are involved in any difficulty, fly to their machinery, introducing the gods, in order to free them from their embarrassment; so we shall be liberated from our perplexity, by asserting that the gods established the first names, and that on this account they are properly instituted. Will not such an assertion be our strongest defence? or that which declares we received them from certain Barbarians? For the Barbarians are more antient than us. Or shall we say that, through antiquity, it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with Barbaric names? [426a] But all these solutions will only be so many plunderings, and very elegant evasions of those who are not willing to render a proper reason concerning the right imposition of the first names; though, indeed, he who is ignorant of the proper establishment of first names cannot possibly know such as are posterior; for the evidence of the latter must necessarily be derived from the former; and with these he is perfectly unacquainted. But it is evident, that he who professes a skill in posterior names ought to be able to explain such as are first, in the most eminent and pure manner, or, if this is not the case, to be well convinced that he trifles in his explanation of posterior names. Or does it appear otherwise to you?
[426b] Hermogenes: No otherwise, Socrates.
[426b] Socrates: My conceptions then, about the first names, appear to me very insolent and ridiculous. If you are willing, therefore, I will communicate them to you; and do you, in your turn, if you have any thing better to offer, impart it to me.
[426c] Hermogenes: I will do so; but speak confidently.
[426c] Socrates: In the first [426d] place, then, ρ appears to me to be as it were the organ of all motion, though we have not yet explained why motion is called κινησις. But it is evident that it implies ιεσις, going; for η was not formerly used, but ε. But its origin is from κιειν, to go, which is a foreign name, and signifies ιεναι. If, therefore, any one could find out its antient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called ιεσις. But now from the foreign name κιειν, and the change of the η, together with the interposition of the ν, it is called κινησις. It ought, however, to be called κιεινησις, or εισις. But στασις, or abiding, is the negation of ιεναι, to go; and for the sake of ornament is called στασις. The element, therefore, ρ, as I said, appeared to the institutor of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to lation; and hence he every where employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words ῥειν and ῥοη, that is, to flow, and flowing, imitate lation, or local motion, by this letter; and this resemblance is found, in the next place, in the words τρομος and τραχυς, i. e. trembling, and rough; also, in words of this kind, κρουειν, to strike; θραυειν, to wound; ερυκειν, to draw; θρυπτειν, to break; κερματιζειν, to cut into small pieces; and ῥεμβειν, to roll round. For all these very much represent motion through the ρ. Not to mention that the tongue, in pronouncing this letter, is detained for the least space of time possible, and is agitated in the most eminent degree; and on this account it appears to me that this letter was employed in these words. [426e] But the institutor of names used the ι for the purpose of indicating all attenuated natures, and which eminently penetrate through all things. And hence this is imitated by the words ιεναι and ιεσθαι, to go, and to proceed, through the ι: just as through φ, ψ, σ, and ζ, because these letters are more inflated, the author of names indicated all such things as ψυχρον, the cold; ζεον, the fer- vid; σεισθαι, to be shaken; and universally σεισμόν, concussion. And when he wished to imitate any thing very much inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters. [427a] But he seems to have thought that the power of compressing δ and τ, and [427b] the tongue’s action in adhering, were useful for the purpose of imitating the words δεσμος, a bond, and στασις, abiding. And because the tongue remarkably slides in pronouncing λ, the institutor of names perceiving this, and employing this letter in an assimilative way, he established the names λεια, smooth; ολισθαινειν, to slip; λιπαρον, unctuous; κολλωδες, liquid; and all other such-like words. But in consequence of the tongue sliding through λ, he employed the power of the γ, and thus imitated γλισχρον, the slippery; γλυκυ, the sweet; and γλοιωδες, the viscous. Perceiving likewise that the sound of the ν was inward, he denominated το ενδον, the inward, and τα εντος, things inward, that he might assimilate works to letters. [427c] But he assigned α to μεγαλον, the great, and η to μηκος, length, because these letters are great. But in the construction of στρογγυλον, round, which requires the letter ο, he mingled ο abundantly. And in the same manner the legislator appears to have accommodated other letters and syllables to every thing which exists, fabricating a signature and name; and from these, in an assimilative manner, to have composed the other species of names. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the rectitude of names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.
[427d] Hermogenes: And, indeed, Socrates, Cratylus often finds me sufficient employment, as I said in the beginning, while he declares that there is a rectitude of names, but does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I cannot tell whether he is willingly or unwillingly thus obscure in his assertions. Now, therefore, Cratylus, speak before Socrates, and declare whether you are pleased with what Socrates has said respecting names, or whether you have any thing to say on the subject more excellent; and if you have, disclose it, that either you may learn from Socrates, or that you may teach both of us.
[427e] Cratylus: But what, Hermogenes! Does it appear to you to be an easy matter to perceive and teach any thing so suddenly, and much more that which seems to be the greatest, among things which are the greatest?
[427e] Hermogenes: To me, by Jupiter, it does not; but that assertion of Hesiod³⁵ appears to me very beautiful, “that it is worth while to add a little to a little.” If, therefore, you are able to accomplish any thing, though but trifling, do not be weary, but extend your beneficence both to Socrates and me.
[428a] Socrates: And, indeed, Cratylus, I do not confidently vindicate any thing which I have above asserted; but I have considered with Hermogenes what appeared to me to be the truth: so that on this account speak boldly, if you have any thing better to offer, as I am ready to receive it. Nor shall I be surprised if you produce something more beautiful on this subject; for you appear to me to have employed yourself in speculations of this kind, and to have been instructed in them by others. If, therefore, you shall assert any thing more excellent, you may set me down as one of your disciples about the rectitude of names.
[428b] Cratylus: But, indeed, Socrates, [428c] as you say, I have made this the subject of my meditations, and perhaps I shall bring you over to be one of my disciples: and yet I am afraid that the very contrary of all this will take place: for, in a certain respect, I ought to say to you what Achilles said to Ajax³⁶ upon the occasion of his embassy; but he thus speaks: “O Jove-born Telamonian Ajax, prince of the people, you have spoken all things agreeably to my opinion.” In like manner you, O Socrates, appear to have prophesied in conformity to my conceptions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some muse, who was latently inherent in you before, has now agitated you by her inspiring influence.
[428d] Socrates: O worthy Cratylus, I myself have some time since wondered at my wisdom, and could not believe in its reality; and hence I think it is proper to examine what I have said: for to be deceived by oneself is the most dangerous of all things; for since the deceiver is not for the least moment of time absent, but is always present, how can it be otherwise than a dreadful circumstance? But it is necessary, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to the consideration of what we have before said, and to endeavour, according to the poet³⁷, “to look at the same time both before and behind.” And let us at present take a view of what we said. We said then, that rectitude of name was that which pointed out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this definition is sufficient for the purpose?
[428e] Cratylus: To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.
[428e] Socrates: Names, then, are employed in discourse for the sake of teaching?
[428e] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[428e] Socrates: Shall we not therefore say, that this is an art, and that it has artificers?
[428e] Cratylus: Perfectly so.
[428e] Socrates: But who are they?
[428e] Cratylus: Those legislators, or authors of names, which you spoke of at first.
[429a] Socrates: Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts, or not? But what I mean is this: Are not some painters more excellent than others?
[429a] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[429a] Socrates: Will not such as are more excellent produce more beautiful works; i. e. the representations of animals; but such as are inferior, the contrary? And will not this also be the case with builders, that some will fabricate more beautiful, and others more deformed houses?
[429a] Cratylus: It will.
[429a] Socrates: And with respect to legislators, will not some produce works more beautiful than others?
[429b] Cratylus: It does not appear to me that they will.
[429b] Socrates: It does not therefore appear to you, that some laws are better, and others worse?
[429b] Cratylus: It certainly does not.
[429b] Socrates: One name, therefore, does not seem to you to be better assigned than another?
[429b] Cratylus: It does not.
[429b] Socrates: All names, therefore, are properly established?
[429b] Cratylus: Such indeed as are names.
[429b] Socrates: But what then shall we say to this name of Hermogenes, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly assigned him, unless something ἑρμου γενεσεως, of the generation of Mercury, belongs to him? Or that it was, indeed, assigned him, but improperly?
[429c] Cratylus: It does not seem to me, Socrates, to have been assigned him in reality, but only in appearance; and I think that it is the name of some other person, who is endued with a nature correspondent to the name.
[429c] Socrates: Will not he then be deceived, who says that he is Hermogenes? for he will no longer be the person whom he calls Hermogenes, if he is not Hermogenes.
[429c] Cratylus: What is this which you say?
[429c] Socrates: Is the efficacy of your assertion founded in the opinion, that it is impossible to speak any thing which is false? for this has been said, my dear Cratylus, by many formerly, and is the opinion of many at present.
[429d] Cratylus: How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not to speak of non-being, to speak of things which are false?
[429e] Socrates: This discourse, my friend, is more elegant than my condition and age require. But at the same time inform me, whether it appears to you impossible to discourse about that which is false, but possible to pronounce it?
[429e] Cratylus: It appears to me impossible even to pronounce it.
[429e] Socrates: And are you of opinion likewise, that it is impossible to denominate it? As if, for instance, any one, on meeting you, should in an hospitable manner take you by the hand, and say, I am glad to see you, O Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, would he not some way or other, by means of voice, express these words? And would it not be this Hermogenes, and not you, whom he thus denominated, or else no one?
[429e] Cratylus: It appears to me, Socrates, that he would enunciate these words in vain.
[430a] Socrates: Let it be so. But whether would he who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would some of these words be true, and some false? for this last supposition will be sufficient.
[430a] Cratylus: I should say, that he sounded these words, moving himself in vain, just as if any one should move brass by striking on it.
[430a] Socrates: Come then, see, Cratylus, whether we agree in any respect. Do you not say that a name is one thing, and that of which it is the name another?
[430a] Cratylus: I do.
[430a] Socrates: And do you not acknowledge, that a name is a certain imitation of a thing?
[430b] Cratylus: I acknowledge this the most of all things.
[430b] Socrates: And will you not therefore confess that pictures are in a different manner imitations of certain things?
[430b] Cratylus: Certainly.
[430c] Socrates: But come, for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you say, through you perhaps speak properly. Can we distribute and introduce both these imitations, viz. the pictures and the names, to the things of which they are imitations? Or is this impossible?
[430c] Cratylus: It is possible.
[430c] Socrates: But consider this in the first place. Can any one attribute the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?
[430c] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[430c] Socrates: And is it possible, on the contrary, to attribute the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?
[430c] Cratylus: This also is possible.
[430c] Socrates: Are both these distributions therefore proper; or only one of them?
[430c] Cratylus: Only one of them.
[430c] Socrates: And this I think must be that which attributes to each, the peculiar and the similar?
[430c] Cratylus: It appears so to me.
[430c] Socrates: Lest therefore you and I, who are friends, should fall into verbal contention, take notice of what I say; [430d] for I, my friend, call such a distribution in both imitations (i. e. in the pictures and names) right; and in names not only right, but true: but I call the other attribution and introduction of the dissimilar, not right; and when it takes place in names, false.
[430e] Cratylus: But consider, Socrates, whether it may not indeed happen in paintings, that an improper distribution may take place, but not in names; but that these must always be necessarily right.
[430e] Socrates: What do you say? What does this differ from that? May not some one, on meeting a man, say to him, This is your picture, and shew him perhaps by chance his proper image, or by chance the image of a woman? But I mean by showing, placing it before his eyes.
[430e] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[431a] Socrates: But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, This is your name? for a name is an imitation, as well as a painting. But my meaning is this: May he not therefore say, This is your name? And after this, may he not present to his sense of hearing, perhaps, an imitation of what he is, and which asserts that he is a man; and perhaps an imitation of a female of the human species, and which asserts that he is a woman? Does it not appear to you, that this may be some time or other possible?
[431a] Cratylus: I am willing to allow you, Socrates, that this may be so.
[431b] Socrates: You do well, my friend, if the thing subsists in this manner; for neither is it proper at present to contest much about it. If, therefore, there is a distribution of this kind in names, we must confess that one of these wishes to call a thing according to truth, but the other falsely. And if this is the case, and it is possible to distribute names erroneously, and not to attribute things adapted to each, it will also be possible to err in words. And if words and names may be thus established, this must likewise necessarily be the case with sentences; for sentences are, I think, the composition of these. Or what is your opinion, Cratylus?
[431b] Cratylus: The same as yours; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.
[431c] Socrates: If, therefore, we assimilate first names to letters, the same things will take place as in pictures, in which it is possible to attribute all convenient colours and figures; and again, not to attribute all, but to leave some and add others, and this according to the more and the less. Will not this be the case?
[431c] Cratylus: It will.
[431c] Socrates: He then who attributes every thing proper, will produce beautiful letters and images; but he who adds or takes away, will indeed produce letters and images, but such as are defective?
[431d] Cratylus: Certainly.
[431d] Socrates: But will not he who imitates the essence of things through syllables and letters, according to the same reasoning, produce a beautiful image, when he attributes every thing in a convenient manner? And this beautiful image is a name. But if any one fails in the least circumstance, or sometimes makes an addition, does it not follow that he will, indeed, produce an image, but not a beautiful one? And so that some of the names will be beautifully fabricated, and others badly?
[431e] Cratylus: Perhaps so.
[431e] Socrates: Perhaps therefore the one will be a good, and the other a bad artificer of names?
[431e] Cratylus: Certainly.
[431e] Socrates: But was not the name which we assigned to this character that of legislator?
[431e] Cratylus: Certainly.
[431e] Socrates: Perhaps therefore, by Jupiter, as in other arts, one legislator will be good and another bad, if we only agree in what has been before asserted?
[431e] Cratylus: It will be so. But do you perceive, Socrates, that when we attribute the letters α and β, and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is described for us, yet not properly; or rather, it is by no means described, but becomes immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this kind?
[432a] Socrates: Let us thus consider this affair, Cratylus, lest we should not contemplate it in a becoming manner.
[432a] Cratylus: But how?
[432a] Socrates: Perhaps such things as ought necessarily either to be composed or not from a certain number, are subject to the property which you speak of; as ten things, or if you will any other number, if you take away or add any thing, immediately become some other number. [432b] But perhaps there is not the same rectitude of any certain quality and of every image, but a contrary one: for neither is it necessary to attribute to an image every thing belonging to that which it represents, in order to its becoming an image. But consider if I say any thing to the purpose. Would then these be two things, I mean Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if any one of the gods should not only assimilate your colour and figure, after the manner of painters, but should produce all such inward parts as you contain, and attribute the same softness and heat, the same motion, soul, and wisdom, as you possess; and, in one word, should fashion every thing else similar to the parts which you contain; whether in consequence of such a composition would one of these be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, or would there be two Cratyluses?
[432c] Cratylus: It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.
[432d] Socrates: Do you see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another rectitude of an image than that which we just now spoke of; and that it does not necessarily follow, that if any thing is taken away or added, it will no longer be an image? Or do you not perceive how much images want, in order to possess the same things as their paradigms?
[432d] Cratylus: I do.
[432d] Socrates: Those particulars therefore of which names are names, would become ridiculous through names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them: for all things would become double; and the difference between a thing and its name could no longer be ascertained.
[432d] Cratylus: You speak the truth.
[432d] Socrates: You may therefore, generous man, confidently own that some names are properly composed, and others not so; [432e] nor will you be obliged to attribute every letter to a name, that it may be perfectly such as that of which it is the name: but you will sometimes suffer a letter which is not convenient to be introduced; and if a letter, you will likewise permit an unadaptd name in a discourse; and if a name, you will suffer a sentence unadapted to things to be introduced in a discourse; and will at the same time acknowledge, that a thing may nevertheless be denominated and spoken of, as long as the name or sentence contains the effigies of the thing which is the subject of discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.
[433a] Cratylus: I do remember.
[433b] Socrates: It is well, therefore; for when this effigies is inherent, though every thing properly adapted may not be present, yet the representation may be said to subsist as it ought. But let us now, blessed man! cease our disputation, that we may not be exposed to danger, like those who travel late by night in Ægina; and that we may not, in a similar manner, appear to have arrived at the truth of things later than is becoming. Or at least seek after some other rectitude of name, and do not confess that a manifestation produced by letters and syllables is the name of a thing: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.
[433b] Cratylus: But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a very becoming manner, and I lay down the position which you mention.
[433b] Socrates: Since therefore we thus far agree, let us consider what remains. We say then, that in order to the beautiful position of a name, it ought to possess convenient letters?
[433c] Cratylus: Certainly.
[433c] Socrates: But it is proper that it should contain such as are similar to things?
[433c] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[433c] Socrates: Such then as are beautifully composed will be composed in this manner. But if any name is not rightly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of convenient and similar letters, since it is an image; but it will possess something unadapted, through which it is neither beautiful, nor beautifully established. Shall we speak in this manner, or otherwise?
[433c] Cratylus: There is no such occasion, I think, Socrates, of contesting; though it does not please me to say, that a name has a subsistence, and yet is not beautifully composed.
[433c] Socrates: Is this also unpleasing to you, that a name is the manifestation of a thing?
[433d] Cratylus: It is not.
[433d] Socrates: But do you think it is not beautifully said, that some names are composed from such as are first, and that others are themselves first names?
[433d] Cratylus: I think, it is well said.
[433e] Socrates: But if first names ought to be manifestations of certain things, can you mention any better method of accomplishing this, than their being so formed as to become, in the most eminent degree, such as the things which they render manifest? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of, please you better, that names are signatures, that they manifest by signatures, and that they are prescient of things? And, besides this, that rectitude of name subsists by compact; and that it is of no consequence whether any one composes them as they are at present composed, or the contrary; calling, for instance, that which is considered at present as small ο͂, great, and ῶ, ο͂? Which of these modes is most agreeable to you?
[434a] Cratylus: It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to evince by similitude that which any one wishes to evince, than by any other method.
[434b] Socrates: You speak well. If, therefore, a name is similar to a thing, is it not necessary that the elements from which first names are composed should be naturally similar to things themselves? But my meaning is this: Could any one produce a picture, which we have just now said is the similitude of some particular thing, unless the colours from which the picture is composed were naturally similar to the things which the art of painting imitates? Is it not otherwise impossible?
[434b] Cratylus: Impossible.
[434b] Socrates: In a similar manner, therefore, names can never become similar to any thing, unless the things from which names are composed possess, in the first place, some similitude to the particulars of which names are the imitations. But the component parts of names are elements.
[434b] Cratylus: Certainly.
[434b] Socrates: You therefore now participate of the discourse which Hermogenes a little before received. Tell me, then, whether we appear to you to have determined in a becoming manner, or not, that the letter ρ͂ is similar to local motion, to motion in general, and to hardness?
[434c] Cratylus: In a becoming manner, in my opinion.
[434c] Socrates: But the letter λ͂ to the smooth and soft, and other things which we mentioned?
[434c] Cratylus: Certainly.
[434c] Socrates: Do you know therefore that the same word, i. e. hardness, is called by us σκληροτης, but by the Eretriensians σκληροτηρ?
[434c] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[434c] Socrates: Whether, therefore, do both the ρ͂ and the σ appear similar to the same thing; and does the termination of the ρ manifest the same thing to them, as the termination of the σ͂ to us: or is nothing manifested by letters different from ours?
[434d] Cratylus: The word evinces its meaning by both letters.
[434d] Socrates: Is this accomplished, so far as ρ͂ and σ͂ are similars, or so far as they are not?
[434d] Cratylus: So far as they are similars.
[434d] Socrates: Are they, therefore, in every respect, similars?
[434d] Cratylus: Perhaps they are so, for the purpose of manifesting lation.
[434d] Socrates: But why does not the insertion of λ͂ signify the contrary of hardness?
[434d] Cratylus: Perhaps, Socrates, it is not properly inserted, just as in the names which you lately discussed with Hermogenes, taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, ρ͂ ought to be inserted instead of λ͂.
[434e] Socrates: You speak well. Do we, therefore, according to our present manner of speaking, mutually understand nothing when any one pronounces the word σκληρον? And do you not understand what I now say?
[434e] Cratylus: I do, my friend, through custom.
[434e] Socrates: But when you say through custom, what else do you think you imply by this word, except compact? Or do you call custom any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, and understand by it hardness, you also know that this is what I understand. Is not this what you mean?
[435a] Cratylus: Certainly.
[435a] Socrates: If, then, you know this, when I pronounce it, something becomes manifest to you through me.
[435a] Cratylus: Certainly.
[435a] Socrates: But what I understand, I enunciate from that which is dissimilar? [435b] since λ is dissimilar to the σκληροτης, which you pronounce. But if this is the case, what else can be the consequence, but that you accustom yourself to this, and that you derive rectitude of name through compact; since both similar and dissimilar letters manifest the same thing to you, through custom and compact? But if custom is very far from being compact, it will no longer be proper to say that similitude is a manifestation, but this ought to be asserted of custom: for this, as it appears, manifests both from the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we allow the truth of these things (for I consider your silence as a signal of assent), it is necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the manifestation of what we understand and enunciate. For if, O best of men! you are willing to pass on to the consideration of number, from whence do you think you can be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit your consent and compact to possess some authority about the rectitude of names? The opinion, indeed, pleases me, which asserts that names should be as much as possible similar to things. [435c] But yet I am afraid, lest perhaps, as Hermogenes said, the attraction of this similitude should be very precarious, and we should be obliged, in this troublesome affair, to make use of compact, in order to obtain rectitude of names: since, perhaps, we shall then speak as much as possible in the most beautiful manner, when our speech is composed either entirely, or for the most part, from similars, that is, from things convenient; but in the most base manner, when the contrary takes place. But still further inform me, what power names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect we must assert they are able to produce.
[435d] Cratylus: Names, Socrates, appear to me to teach, and that it is simply true, that he who knows names, knows also things.
[435e] Socrates: Perhaps, Cratylus, your meaning is this: that when any one knows the quality of a name (and it is of the same quality as a thing), he then also knows a thing, since it is similar to a name. But there is one art of all things which are similar to one another; and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he who knows names, knows also things.
[435e] Cratylus: You speak most truly.
[435e] Socrates: But come, let us see what this mode of teaching things is, which you now speak of, and whether there is any other method, this at the same time being the best; or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case?
[436a] Cratylus: That there is no other method than this, but that this is the only one, and the best.
[436a] Socrates: But whether do you think that the invention of things is the same as the invention of names, and the same as the discovery of those things, of which names are at present significant? Or do you think that it is necessary to seek and find according to another method, and that this should be learned?
[436a] Cratylus: I think that we ought, above all things, to seek after and discover these things according to this method.
[436a] Socrates: But let us consider, Cratylus, if any one, while seeking after things, follows after names, speculating the quality of each, do you perceive that there is no small danger of his being deceived?
[436b] Cratylus: How?
[436b] Socrates: Because, evidently, he who first established names fashioned them such as he thought things themselves were. Is it not so?
[436b] Cratylus: Certainly.
[436b] Socrates: If, therefore, he did not think rightly, but fashioned them agreeable to his conceptions, what must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him? Can it be any thing else, than that they must be deceived?
[436b] Cratylus: But this is not the case, Socrates: but it is necessary that he who composed names must have known how to compose them; [436c] for otherwise, as I have before observed, names would never have existed. But you may derive the greatest conviction, that the inventor of names did not wander from the truth, by considering that, if he had conceived erroneously, all things would not have thus corresponded with his conceptions. Or, did you not perceive this, when you were saying that all names were composed according to the same conceptions, and tended to the same thing?
[436d] Socrates: But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight: for if the founder of names was deceived in the first instance, but compelled other things to this his first conception, and obliged them to harmonize with it; just as in diagrams, in which sometimes a very trifling and unapparent error taking place, all the remaining parts, which are very numerous, consent notwithstanding with each other: [436e] if this be the case, every one ought in the beginning of a thing to employ much discussion and diligent consideration, in order that he may know whether the principle is properly established, or not; for this being sufficiently examined, what remains will appear consequent to the principle. And yet I should wonder if names harmonized with each other. For let us again consider what we discussed before; in the course of which we asserted, that, in consequence of every thing proceeding, hurrying along, and flowing, names signified to us essence. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?
[437a] Cratylus: Very much so, and that they properly signify this.
[437b] Socrates: Let us consider, then, repeating some of these. In the first place, then, this name επιστημη, science, is dubious, and seems rather to signify that it stops (ἱστησιν) our soul at certain things, than that it is borne along with them; and hence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of ε͂, πιστημη, and to insert an ῖ instead of ε͂. In the next place, το βεβαιον, the firm, is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain ba- sis and abiding, but not of lation. Again, ἱστορια, history, signifies that it stops the flowing of things; and πιστον, the credible, implies that which produces perfect stability. Likewise μνημη, or memory, entirely indicates a quiet abiding in the soul, and not local motion. And, if you will, ἁμαρτια, guilt, and συμφορα, calamity, when these names are attentively considered, appear to be the same with συνεσις, intelligence, and επιστημη, science, and all the other names belonging to things of an excellent nature. But still further, αμαθια, and ακολασια, that is, ignorance and intemperance, will appear to be similar to these: for ignorance will signify the progression of one proceeding in conjunction with divinity; but intemperance will appear to be a perfect pursuit of things. And thus, those names which we consider as belonging to the basest of things, will appear to be most similar to the names of the most beautiful things. And I think that any one may discover many others of this kind, if he applies himself to the investigation; from which he may be led to think, that the institutor of names did not indicate things proceeding and borne along, but such as stably abide.
[437c] Cratylus: And yet you see, Socrates, that he signified many things according to the conception of agitation and flowing.
[437d] Socrates: What then shall we do, Cratylus? Shall we number names like suffrages? And does their rectitude consist in the same thing being signified by the most names?
[437d] Cratylus: This is by no means proper.
[438a] Socrates: Certainly not, my friend. But, omitting these particulars, let us consider whether you will agree with us in this, or not. Have we not already acknowledged, that those who instituted names in the several cities, both of Greeks and Barbarians, were legislators, and that the art, which is capable of accomplishing this, is legislative?
[438a] Cratylus: Entirely so.
[438a] Socrates: Tell me now, then, whether those who founded the first names knew the things to which they assigned names, or were ignorant of them?
[438a] Cratylus: It appears to me, Socrates, that they were acquainted with them.
[438a] Socrates: For, friend Cratylus, they could not accomplish this, while ignorant of things.
[438a] Cratylus: It does not appear to me that they could.
[438a] Socrates: Let us then return again from whence we have digressed: for you lately said, if you recollect, that he who established names must have previously known the things to which he assigned names. Are you, therefore, of this opinion at present, or not?
[438a] Cratylus: I am.
[438a] Socrates: Will you say, that he who established first names, established them in consequence of possessing knowledge?
[438a] Cratylus: Yes.
[438a] Socrates: From what names, then, did he either learn or find out things, since first names were not yet established? But have we not said, that it is impossible to learn and find out things any other way, than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?
[438b] Cratylus: You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.
[438c] Socrates: After what manner then, shall we say that they possessing knowledge established names? Shall we say, that founders of names existed prior to the establishment of names, and that they then possessed a knowledge of names, since it is impossible to learn things otherwise than by names?
[438c] Cratylus: I think, Socrates, that the opinion about these particulars is most true, which asserts that a power greater than the human assigned the first names to things; in consequence of which they must of necessity be rightly established.
[438c] Socrates: Do you think that he who established names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would establish things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?
[438c] Cratylus: But the other sort of these were not names.
[438c] Socrates: Which sort do you mean, best of men! those which lead to permanency, or those which lead to lation? For, as we just now said, this cannot be determined by their multitude.
[438d] Cratylus: Your observation is indeed just, Socrates.
[438d] Socrates: Since names then contest with each other, and, as well these as those, assert that they are similar to the truth, how shall we be able to determine in this affair? Or where shall we turn ourselves? For we cannot have recourse to other names different from these; for there are no others. But it is evident that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which may show us, without names, which of these are true; pointing out for this purpose the truth of things.
[438e] Cratylus: It appears so to me.
[438e] Socrates: It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, as it seems, to learn things without names, if what we have just now asserted is true.
[438e] Cratylus: It appears so.
[438e] Socrates: Through what else, then, do you expect to learn things? Can it be through any thing else than that which is proper and most just, and through their communion with each other, if they are in any respect mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For that which is different, and foreign from these, will signify something else, and not these.
[438e] Cratylus: You appear to me to speak the truth.
[438e] Socrates: But tell me, by Jupiter, have we not often confessed that names, which are properly established, are similar to the things of which they are the names, and are indeed the images of things?
[439a] Cratylus: Certainly.
[439b] Socrates: If then it is possible, in the most eminent degree, to learn things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the most excellent and the clearest discipline? Will it be possible to obtain this knowledge from an image, if it should be beautifully assimilated, and to perceive the truth, of which this is the image? Or rather, shall we be able from truth to obtain truth itself, and its image, if the image is but properly fabricated?
[439b] Cratylus: It appears to me, that this must necessarily be obtained from truth.
[439b] Socrates: After what manner, therefore, it is necessary to learn, or to find out things, is perhaps a degree of knowledge beyond what you and I are able to obtain. It will be sufficient, therefore, to acknowledge this, that things are not to be learned from names, but are much rather to be learned and discovered from themselves.
[439c] Cratylus: It appears so, Socrates.
[439c] Socrates: But still further, let us consider, lest this multitude of names tending to the same thing should deceive us, if, in reality, those by whom they were established considered all things as proceeding and flowing; for they appear to me to have held this opinion. But should this be the case, their opinion is however erroneous: for these men having fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, are themselves confounded, and would willingly, by dragging us along, hurl us into the same whirlpool. For consider, O wonderful Cratylus! that which I often dream about, whether or not we should say that there is any such thing as the beautiful itself, and the good, and so of every thing else.
[439c] Cratylus: It appears to me, Socrates, that there is.
[439c] Socrates: Let us therefore consider this affair, not as if a certain countenance, or any thing of this kind, is beautiful; for all these appear to flow: but we ask, whether the beautiful itself does not always remain such as it is?
[439d] Cratylus: It is necessary that it should.
[439d] Socrates: Can it therefore be properly denominated, if it is always secretly flying away? And can it, in the first place, be said that it is, and, in the next place, that it is of such a particular nature? Or is it not necessary, in this case, that, while we are speaking about it, it should immediately become something else, secretly withdraw itself, nor be any longer such as it was?
[439e] Cratylus: It is necessary.
[439e] Socrates: How, then, can that be any thing, which never subsists in a similar manner? For if, at any time, it should subsist in a similar manner, in that time in which it is thus similarly effected, it is evident that it would suffer no mutation: but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it suffer mutation, or be moved, since it never departs from its idea?
[439e] Cratylus: By no means.
[440a] Socrates: But neither can it be known by any one; for, as soon as that which is endued with knowledge accedes to it, it becomes something different and various, so that it cannot be known what quality it possesses, or how it subsists: for no knowledge can know that which it knows, when the object of its knowledge has no manner of subsistence.
[440a] Cratylus: It is as you say.
[440b] Socrates: But neither, Cratylus, can there be any such thing as knowledge, if all things glide away, and nothing abides. For if knowledge itself does not fall from a subsistence, as knowledge, knowledge will perpetually abide, and will be always knowledge: but if the form itself of knowledge glides away, it will at the same time glide into something different from the form of knowledge, and will no longer be knowledge; but if it always glides away, it will always be something different from knowledge: and from hence it follows that neither knowledge, nor the object of knowledge, will have any subsistence. But if that which knows always is, then that which is known will always have a subsistence, together with the beautiful, the good, and every thing else which we are now speaking of; and none of these, as it appears to me, will be similar either to that which flows, or is borne along. [440c] But whether things of this kind subsist in this manner, or whether as the followers of Heraclitus and many others assert, it is by no means easy to perceive: nor is it very much the province of a man endued with intellect, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, believing in their reality, and confiding in their author, as one endued with knowledge: and thus, in consequence of possessing no sound knowledge, either concerning the founder of names, or things themselves, considering all things as flowing like earthen vessels, and viewing them similar to men diseased with a rheum, as if every thing subsisted according to flowing and distillation. Perhaps, therefore, Cratylus, this may be the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to consider this affair in a very strenuous and diligent manner, since it is by no means easy to apprehend the truth: for as yet you are but a young man, and in the vigour of your age; and if you should discover any thing in the course of your inquiries, you ought to communicate it to me.
[440d] Cratylus: I shall act in this manner. And I very well know, Socrates, that I am not at present without consideration; but, in consequence of speculating this affair, the truth seems to me to be much more on your side, than on that of Heraclitus.
[440e] Socrates: Afterwards therefore, my friend, when you come hither again, instruct me: but now, agreeably to your determination, proceed to the field; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.
[440e] Cratylus: Be it so, Socrates: and do you also endeavour to think upon these things.

## Notes

[1] Iliad xx. v. 74.
[2] Iliad xiv. v. 291.
[3] Iliad vi. v. 402.
[4] A great part of this sentence within the crotchets is omitted in the Greek text of all the printed editions of Plato; and a great part likewise of the preceding sentence is wanting: though Ficinus, as is evident from his version, found the whole complete in the manuscript, from which he made his translation. In the Greek, there is nothing more than, εαν βοος εκγονον φυσει ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκῃ μοσχον, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχον. Instead of which we ought to read, εαν βοος εκγονον φυσει ιππον τεκῃ ου μοσχον κλητεον, αλλα πωλον, και εαν ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκῃ μοσχον, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχον. But though, without this emendation, the passage is perfect nonsense, yet this has not been discovered by any of the verbalists; a plain proof this, that they never read this Dialogue with a view to understand it. Or perhaps, they considered an emendation of this kind beneath their notice; for doubtless it is not to be compared with the remarks with which their works abound. Such as, for instance, the following observation in Fischer’s edition of this Dialogue, p. 2. in which we are informed that instead of ἁυτων, “the Basil edition has ἀυτων, and this not badly:” “Ald. Bas. 1. 2. ἀυτων, non male.” And this author’s edition is replete with remarks no less curious, acute, and important.
[5] It is evident from hence, that Jupiter, according to Plato, is the demiurgus, or artificer of the universe; for no one can be more the cause of living to all things, than he by whom the world was produced. But if this be the case, the artificer of the world is not, as we have before observed according to the Platonic theology, the first cause: for there are other gods superior to Jupiter, whose names Plato, as we shall shortly see, etymologizes agreeably to the Orphic theology. Indeed, his etymology of Jupiter is evidently derived from the following Orphic verses, which are cited by Joannes Diac. Allegor. ad Hesiodi Theog. p. 278.

Εστιν δη παντων αρχη Ζευς. Ζευς γαρ εδωκε,
Ζωα τ’ εγεννησεν· και Ζην αυτον καλεουσι,
Και Δια τ’ ηδ, οτι δη δια τουτον απαντα τετυκται.
Εις δε πατηρ ουτος παντων, θηρων τε βροτων τε.

i. e. “Jupiter is the principle of all things. For Jupiter is the cause of the generation of animals; and they call him Ζην, and Δια also, because all things were fabricated through him; and he is the one father of all things, of beasts and men.” Here too you may observe that he is called fabricator and father, which are the very epithets given to the demiurgus of the world by Plato in the Timæus. In short, Jupiter, the artificer of the world, subsists at the extremity of that order of gods which is called νοερος, intellectual, as is copiously and beautifully proved by Proclus, in Plat. Theol. lib. v. And he is likewise celebrated by the Chaldaic theology, as we are informed by Damascius and Psellus under two names, δις επεκεινα, twice beyond.
[6] Saturn, therefore, according to Plato, is pure intellect, viz. the first intellectual intellect: for the intellects of all the gods are pure in the most transcendent degree; and therefore purity here must be characteristic of supremacy. Hence Saturn subsists at the summit of the intellectual order of gods, from whence he is received into all the subsequent divine orders, and into every part of the world. But from this definition of Saturn we may see the extreme beauty of that divine fable, in which he is said to devour his children: for this signifies nothing more than the nature of an intellectual god, since every intellect returns into itself: and consequently its offspring, which are intellectual conceptions, are, as it were, absorbed in itself.
[7] Heaven, which is here characterized by sight, is the heaven which Plato so much celebrates in the Phædrus, and composes that order of gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles νοητος και νοερος, i. e. intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. This will be evident from considering that Plato, in what follows, admits with Hesiod, that there are gods superior to heaven, such as night, chaos, &c. But as sight corresponds to intelligence, and this is the same with that which is both intelligible and intellectual, and as Saturn is the summit of the intellectual order, it is evident that heaven must compose the middle order of gods characterized by intelligence, and that the order above this must be entirely intelligible. In consequence of all this, what must we think of their system, who suppose Heaven, Saturn, and Jupiter, and indeed all the gods of the antients, to have been nothing more than dead men deified, notwithstanding the above etymologies, and the express testimony of Plato to the contrary in the Timæus, who represents the demiurgus commanding the subordinate gods, after he had produced them, to fabricate men and other animals? For my own part, I know not which to admire most, the ignorance, the impudence, or the impiety of such assertions. All that can be said is, that such opinions are truly barbaric, modern and Galilæan.
[8] The different ages of men which are celebrated by Hesiod, in his Works and Days, are not to be understand literally, as if they once really subsisted, but only as signifying, in beautiful poetical images, the mutations of human lives from virtue to vice, and from vice to virtue. For earth was never peopled with men either wholly virtuous or vicious; since the good and the bad have always subsisted together on its surface, and always will subsist. However, in consequence of the different circulations of the heavens, there are periods of fertility and sterility, not only with respect to men but likewise to brutes and plants. Hence places naturally adapted to the nurture of the philosophical genius, such as Athens and Egypt, will, in periods productive of a fertility of souls, such as was formerly the case, abound with divine men: but in periods such as the present, in which there is every where a dreadful sterility of souls, through the general prevalence of a certain most irrational and gigantic impiety, αλογιστος και γιγαντικη ανοσιουργια, as Proclus elegantly calls the established religion of his time, in Plat. Polit. p. 369—at such periods as these, Athens and Egypt will no longer be the seminaries of divine souls, but will be filled with degraded and barbarous inhabitants. And such, according to the arcana of antient philosophy, is the reason of the present general degradation of mankind. Not that formerly there were no such characters as now abound, for this would be absurd, since mankind always have been, and always will be, upon earth, a mixture of good and bad, in which the latter will predominate; but that during the fertile circulations of the heavens, in consequence of their being a greater number of men than when a contrary circulation takes place, men will abound who adorn human nature, and who indeed descend for the benevolent purpose of leading back apostate souls to the principles from which they fell. As the different ages therefore of Hesiod signify nothing more than the different lives which each individual of the human species passes through, hence an intellectual life is implied by the golden age. For such a life is pure, and free from sorrow and passion; and of this impassivity gold is an image, through its never being subject to rust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is with great propriety said to be under Saturn, because Saturn, as we have a little before observed, is pure intellect. But for a larger account of this interesting particular, and of the allegorical meaning of the different ages celebrated by Hesiod, see Proclus upon Hesiod, p. 39, &c.
[9] By dæmons, here, must not be understood those who are essentially such, and perpetually subsist as mediums between gods and men, but those only who are such κατα σχεσιν, or according to habitude; or, in other words, the souls of truly worthy men, after their departure from the present life: for such, till they descend again upon earth, are the benevolent guardians of mankind, in conjunction with those who are essentially dæmons.
[10] Heroes form the last order of souls which are the perpetual attendants of the gods, and are characterized by a venerable and elevated magnanimity; and as they are wholly of an anagogic nature, they are the progeny of love, through whom they revolve about the first beauty in harmonie measures, and with ineffable delight. Men likewise, who in the present life knew the particular deity from whom they descended, and who lived in a manner conformable to the idiom of their presiding and parent divinity, were called by the antients, sons of the gods, demigods, and heroes: i. e. they were essentially men, but according to habitude, κατα σχεσιν, heroes. But such as these were divided into two classes; into those who lived according to intellectual, and those who lived according to practical virtue: and the first sort were said to have a god for their father, and a woman for their mother; but the second sort, a goddess for their mother and a man for their father. Not that this was literally the case; but nothing more was meant by such an assertion, than that those who lived according to an intellectual life, descended from a deity of the male order, whose illuminations they copiously participated; and that those who lived according to practical virtue, descended from a female divinity, such a species of life being more imbecile and passive than the former. But the masculine genius in the gods, implies the cause of stable power, being, identity, and conversion; and the feminine, that which generates from itself all-various progressions, divisions, measures of life, and prolific powers. I only add, that as the names of the gods were not only attributed by the antients to essential dæmons and heroes, but to men who were such according to habitude, on account of their similitude to a divine nature; we may from hence perceive the true origin of that most stupid and dire of all modern opinions, that the gods of the antients were nothing but dead men, ignorantly deified by the objects of their adoration. Such an opinion indeed, exclusive of its other pernicious qualities, is so great an outrage to the common sense of the antients, that it would be disgraceful even to mention the names of its authors. For,

O’er such as these, a rase of nameless things,
Oblivion scornful spreads her dusky wings.
[11] For every thing receives its definition from its hyparxis, or summit, which in man is intellectual reason; and this is entirely of a contemplative nature.
[12] With this doctrine, that the body is the sepulchre of the soul, and that the soul suffers the punishment of her guilt in body, as in a prison, Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans perfectly agree. Thus Heraclitus, speaking of unembodied souls: Ζωμεν τον εκεινων θανατον, τεθνηκαμεν δε τον εκεινων βιον, i. e. “We live their death, and we die their life.” And Empedocles, blaming generation, beautifully says of her:

Εκ μεν γαρ ζωων ετιθει νεκρα, ειδε αμειβων.
“The species changing with destruction dread,
She makes the living pass into the dead.”

And again, lamenting his connection with this corporeal world, he pathetically exclaims:

Κλαυσα τε και κωκυσα, ιδων ασυνηθεα χωρον.
“For this I weep, for this indulge my woe,
That e’er my soul such novel realms should know.”

Thus too the celebrated Pythagorean Philolaus, in the following remarkable passage in the Doric dialect, preserved by Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromat. lib. iii. p. 403: Μαρτυρεονται δε και οι παλαιοι θεολογοι τε και μαντεις, ως δια τινας τεμωριας, α ψυχα τῳ σωματι συνεζευκται, και καθαπερ εν σωματι τουτῳ τεθαπται, i. e. “The antient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with body for the sake of suffering punishment; and that it is buried in body, as in a sepulchre.” And lastly, Pythagoras himself confirms the above doctrine, when he beautifully observes, according to Clemens in the same book: Θανατος εστιν οκοσα εγερθεντες ορεομεν οκοσα δε ευδοντες υπνος, i. e. “Whatever we see when awake is death, and when asleep a dream.” Hence, as I have shown in my Treatise on the Eleusinian Mysteries, the antients by Hades signified nothing more than the profound union of the soul with the present body; and consequently, that till the soul separated herself by philosophy from such a ruinous conjunction, she subsisted in Hades even in the present life; her punishment hereafter being nothing more than a continuation of her state upon earth, and a transmigration, as it were, from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream: and this, too, was occultly signified by the shows of the lesser mysteries. Indeed, any one, whose intellectual eye is not perfectly buried in the gloom of sense, must be convinced of this from the passages already adduced. And if this be the case, as it most assuredly is, how barbarous and irrational is the doctrine, which asserts that the soul shall subsist hereafter in a state of bliss, connected with the present body.
[13] A modern reader will doubtless imagine, from this passage, that Plato denied in reality the possibility of knowing any thing concerning divine natures, and particularly if he should recollect the celebrated saying of Socrates, “This one thing I know, that I know nothing.” But as Proclus beautifully observes, in his book on Providence, Socrates, by such an assertion, meant to insinuate nothing more than the middle kind of condition of human knowledge, which subsists between intellect and sense; the former possessing a total knowledge of things, because it immediately knows the essence of things, and the reality of being; and the latter neither totally knowing truth, because it is ignorant of essence, nor even the nature of sensible things, a knowledge of which is feigned to have a subsistence. So that the Oracle might well call Socrates the wisest of men, because he knew himself to be not truly wise. But who, except a wise man, can possess such a knowledge? For a fool is ignorant that he is ignorant; and no one can truly know the imperfection of human knowledge, but he who has arrived at the summit of human wisdom. And after this manner the present assertion of Plato must be understood.
[14] The goddess Vesta has a manifest agreement with essence, because she preserves the being of things in a state of purity, and contains the summits of the wholes from which the universe consists. For being is the most antient of all things, after the first cause, who is truly superessential; and Earth, which, among mundane divinities, is Vesta, is said by Plato, in the Timæus, to be the most antient of all the gods in the heavens. This goddess first subsists among the liberated απολυτοι, gods, of whom we have already given an account in our notes on the Phædrus, and from thence affords to the mundane gods an unpolluted establishment in themselves. Hence every thing which is stable, immutable, and which always subsists in the same manner, descends to all mundane natures from this supercelestial Vesta. So that, from the stable illuminations which she perpetually imparts, the poles themselves, and the axis about which the spheres revolve, obtain and preserve their immoveable position: and the earth itself stably abides in the middle.
[15] Iliad ix.
[16] Ocean, according to Proclus, in Tim. lib. iv. is the cause, to all secondary natures, of all motion, whether intellectual, psychical (ψυχικη) or natural. But Tethys is the cause of all the distinction and separation of the streams proceeding from the Ocean; conferring on each its proper purity, in the exercise of its natural motion. Ocean therefore may with great propriety be called the generation of the gods, as it is the cause of their progressions into the universe, from their occult subsistence in the intelligible order. But it is necessary to observe, that this mutual communication of energies among the gods was called by antient theologists ιερος γαμος, a sacred marriage; concerning which Proclus, in the second book of his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides, admirably remarks as follows: Ταυτην δε την κοινωνιαν, ποτε μεν εν τοις συστοιχοις ορωσι θεοις (οι θεολογοι) και καλουσι γαμον Ηρας και Διος, Ουρανου και Γης, Κρονου και Ρεας· ποτε δε των καταδεεστερων προς τα κρειττω, και καλουσι γαμον Διος και Δημητρας· ποτε δε και εμπαλιν των κρειττωνων προς τα υφειμενα, και λεγουσι Διος και Κορης γαμον. Επειδη των θεων αλλαι μεν εισιν αι προς τα συστοιχα κοινονιαι, αλλαι δε αι πρες τα προ αυτων· αλλαι δε αι προς τα μετα ταυτα. Και δει την εκαστης ιδιοτητα κατανοειν και μεταγειν απο των θεων επι τα ειδη την τοιαυτην διαπλοκην: i. e. “Theologists at one time considered this communion of the gods, in divinities coordinate with each other; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Juno, of Heaven and Earth, of Saturn and Rhea. But at another time they considered it as subsisting between subordinate and superior divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Ceres. But at another time, on the contrary, they beheld it as subsisting between superior and subordinate divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Proserpine. For, in the gods there is one kind of communion, between such as are of a coordinate nature; another, between the subordinate and supreme; and another again, between the supreme and subordinate. And it is necessary to understand the idiom of each, and to transfer a conjunction of this kind from the gods, to the communion of ideas with each other.” And in lib. i. in Tim. p. 16, he observes: Και το την αυτην (supple θεαν) ετεροις, ἢ τον αυτον θεον πλειοισι συζευγνυσθαι, λαβοις αν εκ των μυστικων λογων, και των εν απορρητοις λεγομενων Ιερων Γαμων: i. e. “And that the same goddess is conjoined with other gods, or the same god with many goddesses, may be collected from the mystic discourses, and those marriages which are called, in the mysteries, Sacred Marriages.” Thus far the divine Proclus; from the first of which admirable passages the reader may perceive how adultery and rapes are to be understood, when applied to the gods; and that they mean nothing more than a communication of divine energies, either between a superior and subordinate, or a subordinate and superior divinity. For none, but a person of the most simple understanding, would ever suppose that the antient theological poets believed there was any such thing as marriage or adultery among the gods, according to the literal meaning of the words.
[17] See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue.
[18] The first subsistence of Pluto, as well as that of Neptune, is among the supermundane gods, and in the demiurgic triad, of which he is the extremity. But his first allotment and distribution is according to the whole universe; in which distribution he perpetually administers the divisions of all mundane forms, and converts all things to himself. But his second distribution is into the parts of the universe; and in this he governs the sublunary region, and perfects intellectually the terrestrial world. His third progression is into that which is generated; and in this he administers, by his providence, the earth, and all which it contains, and is on this account called terrestrial Jupiter. But his fourth distribution is into places under the earth, which, together with the various streams of water which they contain, Tartarus, and the places in which souls are judged, are subject to his providential command. Hence souls, which after generation are purified and punished, and either wander under the earth for a thousand years, or again return to their principle, are said to live under Pluto. And lastly, his fifth distribution is into the western centre of the universe, since the west is allied to earth, on account of its being nocturnal, and the cause of obscurity and darkness. Hence, from the preceding account of Pluto, since he bounds the supermundane demiurgic triad, and is therefore intellectual, the reason is obvious why Plato characterizes him according to a knowledge of all beautiful things; for the beautiful first subsists in intellect.
[19] See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue for an account of this goddess.
[20] Juno, so far as she is filled with the whole of Venus, contains in herself a power of illuminating all intellectual life with the splendour of beauty. And hence, from her intimate communion with that goddess, she is very properly characterized by Plato as lovely. But her agreement with Venus is sufficiently evident, from her being celebrated as the goddess who presides over marriage; which employment was likewise ascribed by the antients to Venus.
[21] Proserpine first subsists in the middle of the vivific supermundane triad, which consists of Diana, Proserpine, and Minerva. Hence, considered according to her supermundane establishment, she subsists together with Jupiter, and in conjunction with him produces Bacchus, the artificer of divisible natures. But considered according to her mundane subsistence, she is said (on account of her procession to the last of things) to be ravished by Pluto, and to animate the extremities of the universe, these being subject to the empire of Pluto. “But Proserpine (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 371) is conjoined paternally with Jupiter prior to the world, and with Pluto in the world, according to the beneficent will of her father. And she is at one time said to have been incestuously violated by Jupiter, and at another to have been ravished by Pluto, that first and last fabrications may participate of vivific procreation.” According to the same author too, in the same admirable work, p. 373, the epithet of wisdom assigned to this goddess by Plato, in the present place, evinces her agreement with Minerva: and this correspondence is likewise shown by her contact of things in progression: since nothing but wisdom can arrest their flowing nature, and subject it to order and bound. But her name being terrible and dire to the multitude, is a symbol of the power which she contains, exempt from the universality of things, and which, on this account, is to the many unapparent and unknown.
[22] For an accurate and beautiful account of these four powers of the sun, and his nature in general, let the Platonic reader attend to the following observations, extracted from Proclus, on Plato’s theology, and on the Timæus; and from the emperor Julian’s oration to this glorious luminary of the world. To a truly modern reader, indeed, it will doubtless appear absurd in the extreme, to call the sun a god; for such regard only his visible orb, which is nothing more than the vehicle (deified as much as is possible to body) of an intellectual and divine nature. One should think, however, that reasoning from analogy might convince even a careless observer, that a body so transcendently glorious and beneficent, must be something superior to a mere inanimate mass of matter. For if such vile bodies, as are daily seen moving on the surface of the earth, are endued with life (bodies whose utility to the universe is so comparatively small), what ought we to think of the body of the sun! Surely, that its life is infinitely superior, not only to that of brutes, but even to that of man: for unless we allow, that as body is to body, so is soul to soul, we destroy all the order of things, and must suppose that the artificer of the world acted unwisely, and even absurdly, in its fabrication. And from hence the reader may perceive how necessarily impiety is connected with unbelief in antient theology. But to begin with our account of the powers and properties of this mighty ruler of the world: The fontal sun subsists in Jupiter, the perfect artificer of the world, who produced the hypostasis of the sun from his own essence. Through the solar fountain contained in his essence, the demiurgus generates solar powers in the principles of the universe, and a triad of solar gods, through which all things are unfolded into light, and are perfected and replenished with intellectual goods; through the first of these solar monads participating unpolluted light and intelligible harmony; but from the other two, efficacious power, vigour, and demiurgic perfection. The sun subsists in the most beautiful proportion to the good: for as the splendour proceeding from the good is the light of intelligible natures; so that proceeding from Apollo is the light of the intellectual world; and that which emanates from the apparent sun is the light of the sensible world. And both the sun and Apollo are analogous to the good; but sensible light and intellectual truth are analogous to superessential light. But though Apollo and the sun subsist in wonderful union with each other, yet they likewise inherit a proper distinction and diversity of nature. Hence, by poets inspired by Phœbus, the different generative causes of the two are celebrated, and the fountains are distinguished from which their hypostasis is derived. At the same time they are described as closely united with each other, and are celebrated with each other’s mutual appellations: for the sun vehemently rejoices to be celebrated as Apollo; and Apollo, when he is invoked as the sun, benignantly imparts the splendid light of truth. It is the illustrious property of Apollo to collect multitude into one, to comprehend number in one, and from one to produce many natures; to convolve in himself, through intellectual simplicity, all the variety of secondary natures; and, through one hyparxis, to collect into one, multiform essences and powers. This god, through a simplicity exempt from multitude, imparts to secondary natures prophetic truth; for that which is simple is the same with that which is true: but through his liberated essence he imparts a purifying, unpolluted, and preserving power; and his emission of arrows is the symbol of his destroying every thing inordinate, wandering, and immoderate in the world. But his revolution is the symbol of the harmonic motion of the universe, collecting all things into union and consent. And these four powers of the god may be accommodated to the three solar monads, which he contains. The first monad²³, therefore, of this god is enunciative of truth, and of the intellectual light which subsists occultly in the gods. The second²⁴ is destructive of every thing wandering and confused: but the third²⁵ causes all things to subsist in symmetry and familiarity with each other, through harmonic reasons. And the unpolluted and most pure cause, which he comprehends in himself, obtains the principality, illuminating all things with perfection and power, according to nature, and banishing every thing contrary to these. Hence, of the solar triad, the first monad unfolds intellectual light, enunciates it to all secondary natures, fills all things with universal truth, and converts them to the intellect of the gods; which employment is ascribed to the prophetic power of Apollo, who produces into light the truth contained in divine natures, and perfects that which is unknown in the secondary orders of things. But the second and third monads are the causes of efficacious vigour, demiurgic effection in the universe, and perfect energy, according to which these monads adorn every sensible nature, and exterminate every thing indefinite and inordinate in the world. And one monad is analogous to musical fabrication, and to the harmonic providence of natures which are moved. But the second is analogous to that which is destructive of all confusion, and of that perturbation which is contrary to form, and the orderly disposition of the universe. But the third monad, which supplies all things with an abundant communion of beauty, and extends true beatitude to all things, bounds the solar principles, and guards its triple progression. In a similar manner, likewise, it illuminates progressions with a perfect and intellectual measure of a blessed life, by those purifying and pæonian powers of the king Apollo, which obtain an analogous principality in the sun.—The sun is allotted a supermundane order in the world, an unbegotten supremacy among generated forms, and an intellectual dignity among sensible natures. Hence he has a two-fold progression, one in conjunction with other mundane gods, but the other exempt from them, supernatural and unknown. For the demiurgus, according to Plato in the Timæus, enkindled in the solar sphere a light unlike the splendour of the other planets, producing it from his own essence, extending to mundane natures, as it were from certain secret recesses, a symbol of intellectual essences, and exhibiting to the universe the arc anenature of the supermundane gods. Hence, when the sun first arose, he astonished the mundane gods, all of whom were desirous of dancing round him, and being replenished with his light. The sun, too, governs the two-fold coordinations of the world, which coordinations are denominated hands, by those who are skilled in divine concerns, because they are effective, motive, and demiurgic of the universe. But they are considered as two-fold; one the right hand, but the other the left. As the sun, by his corporeal heat, draws all corporeal natures upwards from the earth, raising them, and causing them to vegetate by his admirable warmth; so by a secret, incorporeal, and divine nature resident in his rays, he much more attracts and elevates fortunate souls to his divinity. He was called by the Chaldeans, the seven-rayed god: and light, of which he is the fountain, is nothing more than the sincere energy of an intellect perfectly pure, illuminating in its proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this exalted situation scattering its light, it fills all the celestial orbs with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine and incorruptible light. The sun is said to be the progeny of Hyperion and Thea; signifying by this that he is the legitimate progeny of the supereminent god, and that he is of a nature truly divine. This god comprehends, in limited measures, the regions of generation, and confers perpetuity on its nature. Hence, exciting a nature of this kind with a sure and measured motion, he raises and invigorates it as he approaches, and diminishes and destroys it as he recedes: or rather, he vivifies it by his progress, moving, and pouring into generation the rivers of life. The sun is the unifying medium of the apparent and mundane gods; and of the intelligible gods who surround the good. So far as the sun contains in himself the principles of the most beautiful intellectual temperament, he becomes Apollo, the leader of the Muses; but so far as he accomplishes the elegant order of the whole of life, he generates Esculapius in the world, whom at the same time he comprehended in himself prior to the world: and he generates Bacchus, through his containing the cause of a partial essence and divisible energy. The sun, too, is the cause of that better condition of being belonging to angels, dæmons, heroes, and partial divine souls, who perpetually abide in the reason of their exemplar and idea, without merging themselves in the darkness of body. As the sun quadruply divides the three worlds, viz. the empyrean, the æthereal, and the material, on account of the communion of the zodiac with each; so he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of gods, and each of these into three others: so that thirty-six are produced in the whole. Hence a triple benefit of the Graces is conferred on us from those circles, which the god, quadruply dividing, produces, through this division, a quadripartite beauty and elegance of seasons and times. Monimus and Azizus, viz. Mercury and Mars, are the attendants of the sun, in conjunction with whom they diffuse a variety of goods on the earth. The sun loosens souls from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them to the kindred essence of divinity, and assigns them the subtle and firm texture of divine splendour as a vehicle in which they may safely descend to the realms of generation. And lastly, the sun being supermundane, emits the fountains of light; for, among supermundane natures, there is a solar world, and total light: and this light is a monad prior to the empyrean, æthereal, and material worlds. I only add, that it appears, from the last chapter of the 4th book of Proclus on Plato’s Theology, that the celebrated seven worlds of the Chaldeans are to be distributed as follows: One empyrean; three æthereal, situated above the inerratic sphere; and three material, consisting of the inerratic sphere, the seven planets, and the sublunary region. For, after observing, that of the comprehending triad of gods, one is fiery or empyrean, another æthereal, and another material, he inquires why the gods called Teletarchs, or sources of initiation, are distributed together with the comprehending gods? To which he replies, “Because the first, on account of his possessing the extremities, governs, like a charioteer, the wing of fire. But the second, comprehending the beginning, middle and end, perfects æther, which is itself triple. And the third, comprehending, according to one union, a round, right-lined and mixed figure, perfects unfigured and formless matter: by a round figure, forming that, which is inerratic, and the first matter: but by a mixed figure, that which is erratic, and the second matter; for there (that is, among the planets) circumvolution subsists: and by a right-lined figure, a nature under the moon, and ultimate matter.” From this passage, it is evident that both Patricius and Stanley were mistaken, in conceiving the meaning of the account given by Psellus (in his summary exposition of the Assyrian Dogmata) of these seven worlds; which, when properly understood, perfectly corresponds with that of Proclus, as the following citation evinces: Επτα δε φασι κοσμους σοματικους. Εμπυρον ενα και πρωτον. και τρεις μεθ’ αυτον αιθεριους: επειτα τρεις υλαιους, το απλανες, το πλανωμενον, και το υπο σεληνην. “They assert that there are seven corporeal worlds; one empyrean, and the first; after this, three æthereal worlds; and last of all, three material, the inerratic sphere, the planetary system, and the sublunary region.” But Patricius and Stanley conceived the passage, as if the three æthereal and three material worlds were distributed by the Assyrians into the inerratic sphere, the planets, and the sublunary world. It is likewise worthy of observation, that the Assyrians, as we are informed by Julian in his Hymn to the Sun, considered that luminary as moving beyond the inerratic sphere, in the middle of these seven worlds; so that the sun, in consequence of this dogma, must revolve in the last of the æthereal worlds.
[23] i. e. Mercury.
[24] Venus.
[25] Apollo.
[26] We have before observed, that Diana first subsists in the supermundane vivific triad: and her being characterized according to virtue, in this place, evidently shows her agreement with Minerva, the third monad of that triad, who is the first producing cause of all virtues. This goddess, according to her mundane subsistence, is, as is well known, the divinity of the moon; from whence, says Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353), she benignantly leads into light the reasons of nature, and is on this account called Phosper, or light- bearer. He adds, that the moon was called by the Thracians, Bendis.
[27] Dionysius, or Bacchus, is the deity of the mundane intellect, and the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators of things. This deity is said, in divine fables, to have been torn in pieces by the Titans, because the mundane soul, which participates of this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, and through them distributed into every part of the universe. But the following beautiful account of this deity by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Phædo, will, I doubt not, be highly acceptable to the Platonic reader: Σπαραττεται δε το καθολον ειδος εν τῃ γενεσει, μοιρας δε τιτανων ο Διονυσος. Κατ’ επιβουλην δε της Ηρας, διοτι κινησεως εφορος η θεος και προοδου· διο και συνεχως εν τῃ Ιλιασι εξανιστησιν αυτη; και διεγορει τον Δια εις προνοιαν των δευτερων· και γενεσεως αλλως εφορος εστιν ὁ Διονυσος, διοτι και ζωης και τελευτης. ζωης μεν γαρ εφορος, επειδη και της γενεσεως, τελευτης δε διοτι ενθουσιαν ὁ οινος ποιει. και περι την τελευτην δε ενθουσιαστικωτεροι γινομεθα, ὡς δηλοι ὁ παρ’ Ομηρω Προκλος, μαντικος γεγονως περι την τελευτην. και την τραγωδιαν, και την κωμωδιαν ανεισθαι φασι τῳ Διονυσῳ. την μεν κωμωδιαν παιγνιον ουσαν του βιου· την δε τραγωδιαν δια τα παθη, και την τελευτην. ουκ αρα καλως οι κωμικοι τοις τραγικοις εγκαλουσιν, ὡς μη διονυσιακοις ουσιν, λεγοντες οτι ουδεν ταυτα προς τον Διονυσον. κεραυνοι δε τουτοις ὁ Ζευς, του κεραυνου δηλουντος την επιστροφην. πυρ γαρ επι τα ανω κινουμενα. επιστρεφει ουν αυτους προς εαυτον. i. e. “The form of that which is universal is plucked off, torn in pieces, and scattered into generation and Dionysius is the monad of the Titans. But his laceration is said to take place through the stratagems of Juno, because this goddess is the inspective guardian of motion and progression: and, on this account, in the Iliad she perpetually rouses and excites Jupiter to providential energies about secondary concerns. And, in another respect, Dionysius is the inspective guardian of generation, because he presides over life and death: for he is the guardian of life, because of generation; but of death, because wine produces an enthusiastic energy. And we become more enthusiastic at the period of dissolution, as Proclus evinces agreeably to Homer; for he became prophetic at the time of his death. They likewise assert, that tragedy and comedy are referred to Dionysius; comedy, indeed, as being the play or jest of life; but tragedy, on account of the passions and death, which it represents. Comedians, therefore, do not properly denominate tragedians, as if they were not Dionysiacal, asserting at the same time that nothing tragical belongs to Dionysius. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans; the thunder signifying a conversion on high: for fire naturally ascends. And hence Jupiter by this means converts the Titans to himself.”—Thus far the excellent Olympiodorus; from which admirable passage the reader may see the reason of Plato’s asserting, that the mode of nomination belonging to this divinity is both serious and jocose.
[28] As Venus first subsists in the anagogic triad of the super-mundane gods, her production from the foam of the genitals of heaven may occultly signify her proceeding into apparent subsistence from that order of gods, which we have before mentioned, and which is called νοητος και νοερος, intelligible, and at the same time intellectual; and likewise from the prolific and splendid power of this order, which the foam secretly implies. The nomination, too, of Venus, may be said to be serious, considered according to her supermundane subsistence; and she may be said to be a lover of jesting and sport, considered according to her mundane establishment; for to all sensible natures she communicates an exuberant energy, and eminently contains in herself the cause of the gladness, and, as it were, mirth of all mundane concerns, through the illuminations of beauty which she perpetually pours into every part of the universe.
[29] This whole account of Minerva is perfectly agreeable to the most mystic theology concerning this goddess, as will be evident from the following observations. In the first place, one of her names, Pallas, signifying to vibrate and dance, evidently alludes to her agreement with the Curetes, of the progressions of which order she is the monad, or proximately exempt producing cause. For the Curetes, as is well known, are represented as dancing in armour; the armour being a symbol of guardian power, through which, says Proclus, the Curetes contain the wholes of the universe, guard them so as to be exempt from secondary natures, and defend them established in themselves; but the dancing, signifying their perpetually preserving the whole progressions of a divine life according to one divine bound, and sustaining them exempt from the incursions of matter. But the first subsistence of Minerva, considered as the summit, or, as it were, flower of the Curetes, is in the intellectual order of gods, of which Jupiter, the artificer of the world, is the extremity: and, in this order, she is celebrated as the divinely pure heptad. But as Proclus, in Tim. p. 51 and 52, beautifully unfolds the nature of this goddess, and this in perfect agreement with the present account of Plato, I shall present the following translation of it to the reader. “In the father and demiurgus of the world many orders of unical gods appear; such as guardian, demiurgic, anagogic, connective, and perfective of works. But the one pure and untamed deity of the first intellectual unities in the demiurgus, according to which he abides in an uninclining and immutable state, through which all things proceeding from him participate of immutable power, and by which he understands all things, and has a subsistence separate and solitary from wholes;—this divinity all theologists have denominated Minerva: for she was, indeed, produced from the summit of her father, and abiding in him, becomes a separate and immaterial demiurgic intelligence. Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as θεονοη, or deific intelligence. But this goddess, when considered as elevating all things, in conjunction with other divinities, to one demiurgus, and ordering and disposing the universe together with her father;— according to the former of these employments, she is called the philosophic goddess; but, according to the latter, philopolemic, or a lover of contention. For, considered as unifically connecting all paternal wisdom, she is philosophic; but, considered as uniformly administering all contrariety, she is very properly called philopolemic. Hence Orpheus, speaking concerning her generation, says “that Jupiter produced her from his head, shining with armour similar to a brazen flower.” But, since it is requisite that she should proceed into the second and third orders, hence in the Coric order (that is, among the first Curetes) she appears according to the unpolluted heptad; but she generates from herself every virtue and all anagogic powers, and illuminates secondary natures with intellect and an unpolluted life: and hence she is called κορη τριτογενης, or a virgin born from the head of Jupiter. But she is allotted this virgin-like and pure nature from her Minerval idiom. Add too, that she appears among the liberated gods with intellectual and demiurgic light, uniting the lunar order, and causing it to be pure with respect to generation. Besides this, she appears both in the heavens and in the sublunary region, and every where extends this her two-fold power; or, rather, she distributes a cause to both, according to the united benefit which she imparts. For sometimes the severity of her nature is intellectual, and her separate wisdom pure and unmixed with respect to secondary natures; and the one idiom of her Minerval providence extends to the lowest orders: for where there is a similitude among partial souls to her divinity, she imparts an admirable wisdom and exhibits an invincible strength. But why should I speak concerning her Curetic, dæmoniacal, or divine orders, together with such as are mundane, liberated, and ruling? For all things receive the two-fold idioms of this goddess as from a fountain. And lastly, this goddess extends to souls, Olympian and anagogic benefits, exterminates gigantic and generation-producing phantasms, excites in us pure and unperverted conceptions concerning all the gods, and diffuses a divine light from the recesses of her nature”
[30] Light, according to Proclus, and I think according to truth, is an immaterial body, viz. a body consisting of matter so refined, that, when compared with terrene matter, it may be justly called immaterial: and Vulcan is the artificer of every thing sensible and corporeal. Hence this deity, when considered as the fabricator of light, may with great propriety be called the arbiter of light. For, since he is the producing cause of all body, and light is the first and most exalted body, the definition of his nature ought to take place from the most illustrious of his works. But this deity first subsists in the demiurgic triad of the liberated gods, and from thence proceeds to the extremity of things. He is fabled to be lame, because (says Proclus, in Tim. p. 44) he is the artificer of things last in the progressions of being, for such are bodies; and because these are unable to proceed into any other order. He is likewise said to have been hurled from heaven to earth, because he extends his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. And he is represented as fabricating from brass, because he is the artificer of resisting solids. Hence he prepares for the gods their apparent receptacles, fills all his fabrications with corporeal life, and adorns and comprehends the resisting and sluggish nature of matter with the supervening irradiations of forms; but, in order to accomplish this, he requires the assistance of Venus, who illuminates all things with harmony and union.
[31] The character of hard and resisting, which is here given to Mars, is symbolical of his nature, which (says Proclus, in Plat. Repub. p. 388) perpetually separates and nourishes, and constantly excites the contrarieties of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. But this deity requires the assistance of Venus, that he may insert order and harmony into things contrary and discordant. He first subsists in the defensive triad of the liberated gods, and from thence proceeds into different parts of the world.
[32] For an account of Hermes, see the Additional Notes to the First Alcibiades, vol. i.
[33] “Iris,” says Proclus in his MS Commentary on the Parmenides, book v. “is an archangelic deity, the peculiarity of whose essence is to conduct secondary natures to their proper principle, according to the demiurgic intellect, and especially to lead them up to Juno, the ruler of all the mundane divinities of a feminine characteristic.”
[34] See the last note on the Phædrus, in vol. iii.
[35] Opera et Dies, lib. i.
[36] Iliad ix. ver. 640.
[37] Iliad i. ver. 341; and Iliad iii. ver. 109.