The Epistles — Plato
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ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΑΙ
Translation/edition: Thomas Taylor (1804)
Language: English
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Numbers in [brackets] are the edition's reference loci (Stephanus, Bekker, book.line, page...). Superscript numerals refer to the Notes at the end.


## The Epistles¹


## Epistle I

[309a] Dion to Dionysius—Prosperity.
[309a] While I resided so long with you, and managed the affairs of your kingdom with such fidelity, that you might be benefited beyond others, I sustained grievous calumnies. For I know you are convinced, that nothing inhuman was ever perpetrated with my consent. And of the truth of this, all those are my witnesses, who governed in conjunction with you; [309b] many of whom, through strenuous endeavours, I liberated from no trifling calamities. And when you possessed the sole authority, I often preserved your city; but at length I was dismissed by you, and ordered to set sail, in a more ignominious manner than it becomes you to expel a mendicant; and this, after I had so long resided with you. As to what remains, therefore, I shall consult respecting myself in a more inhuman manner. But you being so great a tyrant, will govern alone. [309c] As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my dismission, I return it you by Bacchius, the bearer of this Epistle: for it was neither sufficient for a viaticum, nor useful for the rest of life. It would likewise procure great disgrace to you as the giver, and not much less to me as the receiver. [309d] But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; [309e] and on its being returned to you, you may make the same present to some other of your associates, as you made to me. For you have paid sufficient attention to me. And now that sentence of Euripides seasonably occurs to my remembrance, “That when affairs happen to be different from what they are at present, you will pray for such a man to be present with you.” But I wish to remind you, that the greater part of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant dying through the machinations of some one, make him vociferate as follows: [310a] “Miserable that I am, I perish destitute of friends.” But no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of gold. The following poetical sentences, likewise, will not be disapproved by the intelligent: “Not splendid gold, in this miserable life of mortals most rare, not diamonds, nor tables of silver, which are highly valued by men, are so glittering to the sight; [310b] nor yet fertile, weighty acres of wide extended land, as the unanimous conceptions of good men.” Farewell, and know thus much of us who are far distant, that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

## Epistle II

[310c] Plato to Dionysius—Prosperity.
[310c] I have heard from Archidemus, that you think respecting yourself, that not only I, but my familiars, Dion alone excepted, ought neither to do you any injury, nor speak ill of you. But this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted signifies that I do not rule over my familiars. For if I had dominion, as well over others, as you and Dion, I think great good would be the result, both to all you and the rest of the Greeks. But now I am great, in rendering myself obedient to the dictates of my reason. I speak in this manner, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you any genuine information: for they report, that one of these should say, he had heard among the Olympians that many of my associates reviled you. Perhaps he heard more accutely than I did. But it is proper, as it appears to me, that, whenever any thing of this kind respecting my associates is mentioned to you, to write to me respecting the affair: for I shall neither be afraid nor ashamed to speak the truth. But to you and me things are thus mutually circumstanced. Nor are we unknown to any one of the Greeks, as I may say, nor is our conversation passed over in silence; nor should it be concealed from you, that neither will it be passed over in silence by posterity: for those by whom it is received are such, that they are neither few nor obscure. But why do I thus speak? I will now tell you, assuming an elevated exordium.
[310d] Wisdom and mighty power naturally tend to the same: [310e] and these two always pursue, seek, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted with these, whether they make them the subject of their private conversations, or hear them celebrated in poetical compositions. Thus those who discourse about Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, rejoice to mention the familiarity of Simonides with these men, and to relate what he did and said to them. In like manner they are accustomed to celebrate Periander the Corinthian in conjunction with Thales the Milesian; Pericles and Anaxagoras, Crœsus and Solon, as powerful with wise men, and Cyrus as a powerful man. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias; Polydus and Minos; Agamemnon and Nestor; Ulysses and Palamedes: [311a] and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the first men joined Prometheus with Jupiter. But of these, they represent some as discordant, and others as friendly with each other; and again, some as at one time friendly, and at another discordant: and they celebrate as well their mutual agreements as their dissensions. But I mention all these particulars, because I am willing to evince that men will not be silent respecting us when we are dead; so that we ought not to neglect the opinion of mankind. For it is necessary, as it seems, that we should pay attention to futurity; since it comes to pass, through a certain nature, that the most illiberal of mankind are not at all concerned about the opinion of posterity: [311b] but the most worthy men do every thing that they may be justly celebrated hereafter. And this I consider as an argument that the dead have a certain perception of what is transacted here. For the most excellent souls prophesy that this will be the case; but this is not asserted by the most depraved. And the prophecies of divine men are more powerful than of those that are not divine. I also think, that if it were permitted those deceased persons, of whom I have spoken above, to correct their conversations, they would very earnestly endeavour that better things might be said of them than at present. [311c] This, therefore, it is yet permitted us to say, through the favour of divinity, that if we have done any thing unbecoming during our former acquaintance with you, either in word or deed, we may correct it; that a true opinion may be entertained of us by posterity respecting philosophy; viz. [311d] a better opinion if we are worthy, and the contrary if we are depraved. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we cannot do any thing more pious, nor is any thing more impious than the neglect of it. But how this ought to take place, and what the justice is which it contains, I will tell you.
[311e] When I came into Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philosophy. I was also willing on my arrival among the Syracusians to have you a witness of my renown, that philosophy might also be honoured for me by the multitude. But my wishes were not crowned with success. I do not however assign as the cause of this, that which is assigned by many, but I attribute it to your not entirely believing in me. [312a] But you were willing to dismiss me and call others, and to inquire into the nature of my business, by this as it seems distrusting me. And those that spoke loudly of these things were many, and who likewise affirmed that you indeed despised me, and seriously applied yourself to other things. Such indeed were the reports at that time.
[312b] Now hear however what after these things it is just to do, that I may reply to your question, how you and I ought mutually to conduct ourselves. If then you entirely despise philosophy, you must bid farewell to it. But if you have either heard from another, or have yourself discovered things more excellent than those you have received from me, then honour these. But if our doctrines please you, then you ought highly to honour me. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by, I will honour you; but not being honoured, I will remain silent. Further still, if you honour me, and in doing this take the lead, you will appear to honour philosophy: and this will procure you that which you ardently desire, the reputation of being considered by the multitude as a philosopher. But if I should honour you, without being honoured by you, I should seem to admire and pursue wealth: and we know that this is considered as disgraceful by all men. In short, if you honour me, an ornament to both of us will ensue; but if I honour you, disgrace to both of us will be the consequence. And thus much for these particulars.
[312c] But the little sphere² is not properly made: [312d] and this Archidemus will show you on his arrival. It is likewise requisite to render apparent to him the particulars respecting that which is far more honourable and divine than this, and about which you interrogate me through him. For you say, according to his report, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents: All things are situated about the king³ of all things; and all things subsist for his sake, and he is the cause of all beautiful things. But second things are situated about that which is second; [312e] and such as are third in gradation about that which is third. The human soul therefore extends itself in order to learn the quality of these things, and looks to such particulars as are allied to itself, none of which are sufficient for the purpose. But about the king himself, and the na- tures of which I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind: but the soul speaks of that which is posterior to this. Indeed, O son of Dionysius and Doris, this your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful⁵ things, is as of a nature endued with a certain quality. Or rather it is a parturition respecting this in- generated in the soul; from which he who is not liberated will never in reality acquire truth.
[313a] You have said, that you [313b] thought of mentioning this to me, in the garden, when we were seated under the laurel trees, and that it was your invention. But I have said, that if this appears to you to subsist in this manner, you have freed me from a long discussion. Nor shall we ever find any other inventor; but about this I shall be very busily employed. [313c] Perhaps however you have heard this from some one, or perhaps you have been impelled to advance thus far by a divine allotment. You have not however apprehended what a stability the demonstrations of this thing possess; but you spring forward at different times in a different manner, about that which is the object of phantasy, while in the mean time the thing of which we are now speaking is not any thing of this kind. [313d] Nor is this the case with you alone: but be well assured that no one, when he first hears me, is in the beginning otherwise affected. And one indeed, finding more difficulty, and another less, they are scarcely at length liberated from parturition. But nearly all of them labour not a little. As this therefore has been, and is the case, in my opinion, we have nearly found that about which you inquire in your letters, I mean, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For after you have discussed these particulars, with the assistance of other persons, and have compared them with the opinions of others, and considered them by themselves, then, if your inquiry has been properly conducted, you will accord both with them and us. How then is it possible that these things, and all of which we have spoken, should not take place?
[313e] You have, therefore, acted rightly in now sending Archidemus to us. And after he has returned to you and has related my opinion, other doubts will perhaps rise in your mind. If, therefore, you consult properly, you will send Archidemus to me again. But he, as if laden with merchandise, will again return to you. And if you do this, twice or thrice, and sufficiently examine the things which I shall send, I should wonder if you are not much better disposed with respect to the particulars you are in doubt of than at present. You should, therefore, boldly act in this manner: for neither you, nor Archidemus, can engage in any merchandise more becoming or more acceptable to divinity than this. Be careful, however, that these things do not fall among men void of discipline: for, as it appears to me, there are scarcely any particulars which will appear more ridiculous to the multitude than these; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusi- astic to those that are well born. But when often repeated and continually heard, and this for many years, they are scarcely at length, with great labour, purified like gold.
[314a] But hear the wonderful circumstance which takes place in this affair: [314b] for there are many men who have heard these things, who are able to learn and able to remember, who are sagacious in examining and judging, who are now advanced in years, and who have heard these things for not less than thirty years; these men now say, that things which formerly appeared to them to be most incredible, now appear to them to be most credible and perspicuous. And things which were formerly considered by them as most credible, now appear to them to be the very contrary. Looking therefore to this, be careful lest you repent of what you have now unworthily uttered. But the greatest means of defence in this case, consists not in writing, but learning: [314c] for things which are written cannot be kept from the public view. On this account, I have never at any time written any thing about these particulars. Nor is there any book professedly composed by Plato, nor will there be. But what has now been said, is to be ascribed⁶ to Socrates, who was a worthy character, even while a young man. Farewell, and be persuaded by me; and when you have often read this Epistle, commit it to the flames. And thus much for these particulars.
[314d] With respect to Polyxenus, you wonder that I do not send him to you. But I say the same at present as I have formerly said concerning Lycophron, and the others that are with you, viz. that, both naturally and from the method of your discourse, you very much excel them in the art of speaking. Nor is any one of them willingly confuted as some suppose, but unwillingly. [314e] And you appear indeed to have used and bestowed gifts upon them sufficiently well. Many other things may be said about these particulars, as well as about others of the same kind. But if you use Philistion, do not spare him. And if you can, employ Speusippus, and dismiss him. Speusippus indeed stands in need of your assistance. But Philistion promised me that he would very willingly come to Athens, if you would dismiss him. You will likewise do well to dismiss him who belongs to the stone quarries. But the request is trifling, both respecting his domestics, and Egesippus the son of Ariston: [315a] for in one of your letters to me you say, that if any one either injures him, or his domestics, and you perceive it, you will not suffer a continuance of the injury. Besides, it is worth while to speak the truth respecting Lysiclides: for he alone, of those who came from Sicily to Athens, has made no alteration respecting our intimacy with each other, but continually speaks of our past conduct as laudable and good.

## Epistle III

[315b] Plato to Dionysius—Health.
[315b] You inquire, by your letter, whether it is better in salutations to use the word health, or rather to write, as I am accustomed to do in letters to my friends, prosperity. For you, as those who were then present relate, flattering the god who is worshipped at Delphi, call him by this very appellation. And as they say, you write hail, and yet preserve the voluptuous life of a tyrant. But I address neither man nor divinity with this salutation. Not divinity, because in so doing I should place him in an order contrary to his nature; as he is far removed from pleasure and pain. Nor man, because pleasure often produces detriment and pain, and generates in the soul, indocility, oblivion, stupidity, and insolence. And thus much respecting salutation, which, after you have read, you may take as you please.
[315c] But not a [315d] few report, that you said to certain ambassadors who were with you, that you intended to reestablish the Grecian cities in Sicily, to rectify the government of the Syracusians, and give them a kingdom instead of a tyranny. [315e] You assert, however, that though you very much desired, yet being impeded by me, you had not then an opportunity to put these intentions in execution; that I now teach Dion to do the very same things himself; and that, according to your conceptions of things, we shall subvert your government. [316a] You indeed know whether you derive any advantage from such assertions; but you certainly injure me by speaking contrary to the truth: for I am become sufficiently odious both to the mercenary soldiers and the Syracusian vulgar, through Philistides and many others, on account of my residence in the acropolis. [316b] For then those that dwelt out of the tower blamed me as the author of every crime, and asserted that you did every thing through my persuasions. However, you most clearly know, that of my own accord I meddled very little with politics, and that this was only at first, when I thought I might in some degree be beneficial, while with a sufficient degree of earnestness I was composing my books of Laws; to which you, or some other person, have made additions contrary to my intention. For I hear that, afterwards, some of you acted in a fraudulent manner with respect to these writings: and these things indeed are manifest to those that are able to distinguish the nature of my disposition. But, as I just now said, I do not stand in need of calumny from the Syracusians, and certain others whom you may have persuaded by these assertions; but I am much more in want of an apology against the former calumny, than that which has now arisen after it, as being greater and more vehement.
[316c] Against these two calumnies, therefore, it is necessary I should make a two-fold apology. In the first place asserting, that I very properly avoided engaging with you in political affairs: and in the second place, that my advice was not that which you say it was, and that I did not impede you, when you designed to reestablish the Grecian cities. Hear then, in the first place, the particulars of my first apology. I came to Syracuse, in consequence of being called by you and Dion, who was already approved of by me, and who had formerly been my guest. He likewise had arrived at that period of life which we call a middle age, and in which those that are endued [316d] with the smallest degree of intellect, will apply themselves to such affairs as were then the subject of your deliberations. But you were very young, and very ignorant of those particulars in which you ought to have been skilled; and you were likewise perfectly unknown to me. After this, some man, or god, or a certain fortune in conjunction with you, expelled Dion, and you were left alone. Do you think therefore, that at that time I had any communion with you in political affairs; [316e] perceiving as I did, that a prudent counsellor was banished by you, and that an imprudent person was left, with a multitude of base men; so that he did not govern in reality, but while he thought he had dominion, he was governed by men of this description? In these circumstances, what ought to have done? Does it not necessarily follow, that I ought to have done what I did do? I mean, to bid farewell to politics, in order to avoid the calumnies of the malevolent, and to endeavour that you and Dion, who were far separated from, and discordant with each other, might become in the highest degree mutual friends. You are my witness, that I never at any time remitted my endeavours to accomplish this. At the same time, we could scarcely agree that I should return home, and that when the war was finished, in which you were then engaged, I and Dion should come to Syracuse; and that you would call us. These were the transactions which happened when I first came among the Syracusians, and on my returning home with safety.
[317a] After this, peace being made, you called me, not, however, according to the agreement, but you wrote to me that I should come alone, and that you would send for Dion afterwards. [317b] On this account I did not come, which displeased Dion, who thought it would be better to comply with your request. On the following year a three-banked galley and letters came from you, and in these epistles you say, that if I will come, the affairs of Dion shall be settled according to my mind; but that if I did not come, the very contrary should take place. I am ashamed to say how many letters then came, both from you, and others through you, from Italy and Sicily, to me, and to such as were my kindred and familiars; all of them exhorting and requesting me to comply by all means with your entreaties. It appeared, therefore, to all these, beginning from Dion, that I ought to set sail, and not behave effeminately, though I excused myself on account [317c] of my age, and mentioned my doubts that you would not be sufficient to resist my calumniators, and those who wished to sow dissension between us. For I then saw, and now see, with respect to the great and surpassing possessions both of private persons and monarchs, that in proportion to their magnitude, they nourish calumniators, and those that devise noxious pleasures; a greater evil than which neither wealth, nor the power of any other prerogative can produce. However, bidding farewell to all these considerations, I determined to come, that my friends might not accuse me of ruining, through my negligence, the affairs of Dion, when they might have been safe.
[317c] You well know all that happened on my arrival. For I indeed thought, according to the compact made by you in your letters, that you would in the first place recall Dion, and restore him to his former familiarity with you. If, as I persuaded you, you had done so at that time, perhaps, as my opinion prophesies, things would have been better for you, and the Syracusians, and the other Greeks. [317d] Afterwards, I thought that the property of Dion ought to be restored, and that it ought not to be given to those among whom you thought proper it should be divided. [317e] Besides this, I thought that the usual sum of money should be sent to him every year, and that it ought rather to be increased than diminished on account of my being present. But as none of these things took place, I determined to depart. [318a] After this, however, you persuaded me to stay for a year, affirming that you would restore all the property of [318b] Dion, so that one half would be sent to Corinth, and that the other half should be left for his son. I could relate many other things which you promised to do, but have not performed; but I omit them, on account of their multitude: for as you sold all the possessions of Dion without his consent, though you affirmed you would not unless he consented to it, you have placed a most glorious colophon, O wonderful man, on all your promises. For you devised a thing neither beautiful nor elegant, nor just, nor advantageous; [318c] I mean, you attempted to frighten me, as being ignorant of the transactions at that time, that I might cease entreating you to send money to Dion. For when you banished Heraclides, which did not appear just either to the Syracusians, or to me, and I, together with Theodotus and Euribius, requested you to pardon him, making use of this as a sufficient pretext, you said that it [318d] had been for some time past evident to you, that I was not at all concerned about you, but only for Dion, and his friends and kindred. And now, as Theodotes and Heraclides are calumniated as being the familiars of Dion, you assert that I endeavour, by every possible device, that they may not suffer punishment. And thus much for the political transactions of you and me. And if you have seen any thing else discordant in me with respect to you, think it is reasonable that all this should have happened, and do not wonder that it has: for I should deservedly appear to be depraved to a man endued with any portion of intellect, if, persuaded by the magnitude of your authority, I should betray my antient friend and guest when acting evilly through you, and yet, as I may say, being in no respect a worse character than you are; and if I should prefer you though acting unjustly, and should do every thing which you enjoin for the sake of accumulating wealth. For if there had been any change in my conduct, no other cause than this would have been assigned of such mutation. And thus much for this; you being the occasion of the deceitful friendship and disagreement between you and me.
[318e] But my discourse now nearly brings me in connection to the second part of my apology. Attend therefore diligently, and consider whether I appear to you to assert that which is false, and not the truth: for I say, that when Archidemus and Aristocritus were with you in the garden, about twenty days before I returned home from Syracuse, you reproached me with the very same thing as at present; [319a] I mean, that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and every other person, than for you. You likewise interrogated me before them, whether I remembered, on my first coming to Syracuse, that I advised you to reestablish the Grecian cities. But I acknowledged that I did remember: [319b] and, even now, it appears to me that it were best to do so. I must likewise relate, O Dionysius, what was said after this: for I asked you, whether I should advise you to do this alone, or something else besides this. [319c] But you answered me in an angry and insolent manner; and on this account the injurious reply which you then made me is now become a true vision instead of a dream. But you asked me, in a very undisguised manner, and laughing at the same time if I remember, whether I exhorted you as one properly instructed to do all these things or not. I replied, that you very properly reminded me. You then asked me whether I exhorted you as one learned in geometry, or how? But after thi I did not say what I might have said, fearing lest, for the sake of a trifling word, the navigation which I expected should be contracted, instead of being ample. That, therefore, for the sake of which all this has been said by me, is as follows: I am unwilling to be calumniated by you, as having hindered you from reestablishing the Grecian cities, which were subverted by the Barbarians, and assisting the Syracusians, by giving them a kingdom instead of a tyranny. For you cannot falsely assert any thing of me, which less becomes me than this.
[319c] Indeed, if there appeared to be any sufficient judgment of this affair, I could adduce other arguments, still clearer than these, to prove that I exhorted you to do these things, but that you were unwilling to do them: [319d] for it is by no means difficult to show, in a perspicuous manner, that by thus acting you would have done the best for yourself, the Syracusians, and all Sicily. [319e] If, therefore, you deny that you said these things, when at the same time you did say them, this is sufficient to condemn you. But if you acknowledge that you did, think after this, that Stesichorus was a wise man, and imitating his recantation⁷, betake yourself from a false assertion to one that is true.

## Epistle IV

[320a] Plato to Dion of Syracuse—Prosperity.
[320a] I think that my alacrity with respect to casual actions is apparent at all times, and that I very seriously apply myself to accomplish them, not more for the sake of any thing else, than emulation in things beautiful. For I consider it as just, that those who are in reality worthy men, and who act in this manner, should obtain that renown which is their due. [320b] At present, therefore, through the favour of divinity, things subsist in a proper manner: but with respect to future events there is the greatest contest. For to excel in fortitude, swiftness, and strength, may appear a thing possible to be accomplished by others; but to excel in truth, justice, magnificence, and graceful conduct respecting all these, pertains to those, beyond all others, who aspire after the honour attendant on such things as these. Now, therefore, what I say is manifest. [320c] But at the same time, we ought to remind ourselves, that it is proper, as you well know, that we should differ more from other men than other men from boys. Hence it is evident that we ought to become such characters as we assert ourselves to be; especially since, through the favour of divinity, we may say that this will be easy for us to accomplish: for others, in order to effect this, must necessarily wander through many places. But the state of your affairs is such, that this must be accomplished by you in one particular part of the earth; and in this part the eyes of all men are especially turned towards you. [320d] As you are therefore beheld by all men, prepare yourself to exhibit to the world a specimen of the ancient Lycurgus and Cyrus, or any other, who appears to have surpassed in the moral and political virtues; especially since many, and indeed nearly all, men say, there is great reason to expect that, when Dionysius is taken away, things will be in a ruinous state, through the emulation of you, Heraclides, Theodotus, and other illustrious persons.
[320e] If, therefore, this should happen to be the case, which we must hope will not, do you apply a remedy, that affairs may be brought to the best condition. It will perhaps seem to you ridiculous that I should mention these things, because you are not ignorant of them: but I see that in the theatres the combatants are incited by boys, and not by their friends, though it might be supposed that these would be induced earnestly to exhort them, through benevolence. Now therefore do you begin the contest, and inform me by a letter if you require my assistance. Affairs here are just as when you were with us. Inform me, likewise, what you have done, or what you are now doing: for though we hear many things, we know nothing; and now letters from Theodotus and Heraclides are come to Lacedæmon and Ægina. But we, as I have said, though we hear many things about these particulars, yet we know nothing with certainty. Think likewise, that you appear to certain persons to be less affable than is proper. Do not therefore forget, that the power of acting arises from pleasing mankind, but that moroseness occasions a desertion of associates. May prosperity [321a] attend you.

## Epistle V

[321c] Dion to Perdiccas.
[321c] I have persuaded Euphræus, as you request me in your letter, to pay constant attention to your affairs. But it is just, hospitable, and holy, that I should both advise you respecting other things, and how you ought to use Euphræus. I ought, however, mostly to advise you in that of which you are now indigent through your age, and the scarcity of youthful monitors. For there is a particular sound from the several polities, just as if it were emitted from certain animals, one from a democracy, another from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy. Many assert that they understand these voices, but, except a few, they are very far from understanding them. Whichever of these polities therefore emits a proper sound, both towards the gods, and towards men, and produces actions correspondent to its sound, that polity always flourishes and is preserved. But when it imitates another sound, it is corrupted. For this Euphræus will be useful to you in no small degree, though he will likewise possess fortitude in other things. for I hope that he will discover the reasons of a monarchy, not less than your associates. If you employ him therefore for this purpose, you will both derive advantage to yourself, and greatly benefit him.
[321e] But if any one, hearing these things, should say, Plato professed to know what is advantageous to a democracy, but though he had an opportunity, in his own city, of speaking to the people, and giving them the best advice, yet he never was known to rise and address them; [322a] to this it may be answered, that Plato came late to his country, and that he became acquainted with the people [322b] when they were advanced in years, and after they had been accustomed by those prior to him to do many things contrary to his advice: [322c] for he would most willingly have consulted for its good, as for that of his father, if he had not thought he should have exposed himself to needless danger. But I think that the same thing will take place with respect to his advice to me: for if we should appear to be incurable, he will bid a long farewell to us, and will abstain from advising either me or mine. May you be prosperous.

## Epistle VI

[322d] Plato to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus—Prosperity.
[322d] It appears to me, that some one of the gods has benevolently and abundantly procured for you good fortune, if you only receive it in a becoming manner: for you dwell near to, and are able to benefit each other in the greatest degree. And to Hermias I say, that neither a multitude of horses, nor any other warlike apparatus, nor even an abundance of gold, possesses greater power, than friends that are stable, and endued with sound manners. [322e] But to Erastus and Coriscus I say, though I am an old man, that besides this beautiful wisdom of ideas, that wisdom is requisite which possesses a guardian and defensive power against the base and unjust: for they are unskilled in fraud, through living for a long time with us, who are orderly, and not vicious men. On this account I have said, that they stand in need of these two kinds of wisdom, lest they should be compelled to neglect true wisdom, and should pay more attention than is proper to human and necessary wisdom. [323a] But Hermias appears to me to have received this power from a nature which is not yet connate, and from art through experience. What then do I say? To you, Hermias, I, as being more skilled in the manners and disposition of Erastus and Coriscus than you are, assert, indicate, and testify, that you will not easily find men whose manners deserve greater confidence than these your neighbours. I advise you, therefore, to cultivate an acquaintance with these men as much as possible. And again, I advise you, Erastus and Coriscus, to cultivate in return an acquaintance with Hermias, and endeavour, by mutual offices of kindness, to be united in the bonds of friendship.
[323b] But if any one of you shall appear to dissolve this union (for human affairs are not altogether stable), send hither to me and mine an epistle containing an accusation of the delinquent. For I think that the reasons which our answer to this letter will contain, unless there has been some great cause for this dissolution, will again bind you in your former friendship and union, more than any incantation. Indeed, if all we and you philosophize as much as we are able, and as far as is permitted to each of us, the things which have now been oracularly delivered will possess their proper authority. [323c] But if we do not act in this manner, I will not relate the consequences: for I predict a good omen to you, and I say, that if divinity pleases, you will perform all these good actions. But it is requisite that this Epistle should be read by you three together; or at least by two of you in common, as often as possible; and that you should use it by compact, and an established law; [323d] at the same time taking an oath, with an earnestness by no means inelegant, and with discipline, the sister of this earnestness, and swearing by that god, who is the leader⁸ of all things present and future, and by the father and lord of this leader and cause: whom, if we truly philosophize, we shall all clearly know, in as great a degree as is possible to happy men.

## Epistle VII

[323e] Plato to the Kindred and Associates of Dion—Prosperity.
[323e] You write to me, that it is requisite to think that your sentiments about politics are the same as those of Dion; and that I should be exhorted to join with you as much as possible, both in word and deed. Indeed, if you have the same opinion and desire with him, I shall certainly join with you; but if you have not, it will be requisite to deliberate frequently on the subject. But his thoughts and desire were not such as you conjecture. I, however, as knowing them, can clearly relate what they were.
[324a] When I first came to Syracuse, I was nearly forty years old, and the age of Dion was then the same as that of Hipparinus is at present. He has likewise always persevered in the opinion which he then entertained; I mean, that the Syracusians ought to be free, and that they should be governed by the best laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if some god has caused Dion to accord with him in opinion respecting a polity. But the manner in which this was effected, is a thing which deserves to be heard both by young and old. I will, however, endeavour to relate the affair to you from the beginning: for at present it will be opportune.
[324a] When I was a young man I was affected in the same manner as the many. For I determined, as soon as I became my own master, to betake myself immediately to the common affairs of the city. In the mean time, the following political circumstances happened to me: The polity which existed at that time being reviled by many, a change took place. Then one and fifty men being chosen as governors, eleven of them presided in the city, and ten in the Piræus; [324b] and each of these directed the affairs in the city. But the remaining thirty were invested with supreme authority. Some of these being my familiars, were well known to me, and immediately called on me to attend to politics, as a thing proper for me to study. But the manner in which I was affected was not at all wonderful, on account of my youth: for I thought that they ought to govern the city so as to bring it from an unjust life to just manners. [324c] And in consequence of this, I very diligently attended to their conduct. But I perceived that these men, in a short time, evinced that the former polity was golden in comparison with theirs: for, besides acting unjustly in other respects, they sent Socrates, who was my friend, and older than I am, and who, I [324d] am not ashamed to say, was the most just of any one then existing; [324e] they sent him, I say, together with certain others, in order to bring back one of the citizens by force, that he might be punished with death. They likewise endeavoured to make Socrates join with them in the management of affairs, whether he was willing or not. He refused however to comply, and determined to expose himself to every danger, rather than be a partaker of their impious deeds. All which when I perceived, together with other similar particulars of no small importance, I was indignant, and withdrew myself from the evil men of that time.
[325a] Not long after this, the thirty tyrants were cut off, and the whole of the then existing polity was subverted. Again, therefore, I was incited, though in a more moderate degree, to engage in common and political affairs. But many circumstances then took place, at which any one might be indignant, owing to the disordered state of affairs at that time. Nor was it wonderful, that in such mutations certain enemies should be punished in a more severe manner, although those that returned were very equitable. However, through a certain fortune, it happened, that our associate Socrates was brought into a court of justice, and was accused of the greatest impiety, and which pertained to Socrates the least of all men. For some led him along as an impious person, but others gave sentence against him, and condemned him to death, who at that very time was unwilling to partake of the unholy deed respecting the removal of one of his exiled friends. [325b] On perceiving these things therefore, together with the men who had the management of political affairs, and their laws and manners, the more I considered them as I advanced in years, by so much the more difficult did the right administration of political concerns appear to me: for this cannot be accom- plished without friends and faithful associates. But at that time, it was not easy to find these: for our city was then no longer governed according to our fathers manners and pursuits; and it was not possible to obey such as were new, with any degree of ease, in consequence of the written laws and the manners being corrupted.
[325c] This likewise was [325d] wonderful in the affair, that I, who at first was ardently desirous of engaging in political concerns, when I beheld the disordered state of things, was at length giddy with the view. [325e] However, I did not withdraw my attention from them, but determined to see whether something better might not take place respecting these very things, and the whole polity, and always to wait a fit opportunity of acting. At last I perceived that all the cities existing at present were badly governed. For as to what relates to laws, they are nearly in an incurable state, without the assistance of some wonderful apparatus in conjunction with fortune. I am therefore compelled to say, praising genuine philosophy, that through this we are enabled to perceive such political concerns as are just, and all the affairs of private individuals. Hence, the human race will not be liber- ated from evils, till either the genus of those that philosophize [326a] with rectitude and truth obtains the government of political affairs, or those that govern in cities, from a certain divine allotment, truly philosophize. [326b] With this conception, I first came to Italy and Sicily. But on my arriving thither, I was by no means pleased with the life which is called happy; [326c] a life full of the Italian and Syracusian tables, and which consists in repletion twice a day, in never lying alone by night, and such other particulars as follow a life of this kind: [326d] for from these manners, no man under the heavens would ever become wise, if he is nourished in them from his youth, however admirable his natural disposition may be: nor will such a one ever become temperate. And the same thing may be said respecting the other virtues. But no city can acquiesce in its laws, while the citizens are of opinion, that it is proper to consume all their possessions in superfluous cost; [326e] and that, neglecting every thing else, they should give themselves up to feasting and venereal delight. For it is necessary that such cities as these should never cease changing into tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies, and that the powerful among them should not even endure the name of a just and equitable polity. With these, and the above-mentioned conceptions, I came to Syracuse: perhaps through the interference of fortune. It appeared indeed, that the administration of the present affairs respecting Dion and the Syracusians, was devised by some one of the natures more excellent⁹ than mankind. And I am afraid, that you, on consulting me a second time, will be less persuaded by me than before. However, I affirm that the beginning of all the transactions was my journey to Sicily. For I associated with Dion who was then a young man; and in my discourse, explained to him, and advised him to do, such things as appeared to me to be best for mankind; not knowing that certain persons were then secretly contriving a dissolution of the tyranny. [327a] For Dion being very docile, both with respect to other things, and what was then said by me, he so acutely apprehended, and readily embraced my doctrines, that he surpassed all the young men with whom I was ever acquainted. [327b] He was likewise determined to pass the remainder of his life in a manner superior to many of the Italians and Sicilians, viz. in pursuing virtue, rather than pleasure and luxury. Hence he was hated by those, who lived conformably to tyrannic institutes, even till the death of Dionysius.
[327c] After this he perceived that the very same conception, which he had framed through the assistance of right reason, did not subsist in him alone, but in certain other persons, though they were not numerous, among whom he thought was Dionysius the younger. He likewise hoped that if this were the case, both his own life, and that of the other Syracusians, would be transcendently more blessed. On this account he thought that I ought by all means to come with the utmost celerity to Syracuse, that I might assist them in their undertakings; remembering how easily, by my conversation, he was inflamed with the desire of leading the most beautiful and best life. If he could but enkindle this desire in Dionysius, as he was attempting to do, he was in hopes that a happy and true life, without slaughter and death, and the evils which exist at present, would flourish through every part of Syracuse.
[327d] Dion rightly conceiving that this would be the case, persuaded Dionysius to send for me, and himself requested that I would by all means come with the utmost celerity, before certain other persons, associating with Dionysius, turned him to a life different from that which is best. [327e] But it is necessary to relate more fully what he said. Why, says he, should we expect a fitter opportunity than that which now presents itself to us through a certain divine fortune? He likewise mentioned the empire of Italy and Sicily, the power of Dionysius in this empire, and his vehement desire after philosophy and erudition. He informed me how much inclined his own kindred and familiars were to the doctrines and mode of life which I inculcated, and that he himself was most sufficient to incite Dionysius to embrace them. He added, that in consequence of this, if at any time, there was now every reason to hope that these persons would become philosophers and rulers of mighty cities. With these therefore, and many other such reasons, did he urge me to comply with his request. But I was fearful of the event; as the desires of young men are hasty, and are often borne along in a direction contrary to themselves.
[328a] However, I knew that the disposition of Dion was naturally grave, and that his age was sufficiently mature. Hence, while I was considering and doubting whether I should go and comply with his request, or not, it at the same time occured to me that I ought to go; [328b] and that if ever any one thought of attempting to give perfection to laws and a polity, now was the time to make the attempt. For I considered, that if I could only persuade one person, I should sufficiently produce every good. With this conception and this confidence, and not from the motives which some have thought, I left my home; feeling at the same time in myself the greatest shame lest I should ever appear to myself to be nothing more than a man of words, and should never voluntarily accomplish any thing in deeds. I was likewise fearful, lest the hospitality and friendship of Dion should be exposed to no small dangers; [328c] who, if he should fall into any calamity, or be banished by Dionysius, and his other enemies, would fly to us, and thus address us: “I come to you, O Plato, an exile, but am neither indigent of horses nor soldiers to oppose my enemies, but I am in want of words and persuasion, by which I know you are especially able to convert young men to probity and justice, and unite them in friendship and fellowship with each other; through a defect of which on your part I have now left Syracuse, and have betaken myself hither. [328e] As to what relates to myself indeed, this will bring you less disgrace: but as to philosophy, which you always praise, and which you say is dishonoured by other men, is it not now betrayed by you together with me? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of Megara, you would have come to my assistance when I had called you, or I should have considered you as the most depraved of all men. But now, excusing yourself through the length of the journey, and the magnitude of the voyage and the labour, you think you shall avoid infamy, though this is far from being the case.”
[329a] If Dion had thus addressed me, I should certainly have been at a loss for a becoming answer. I, therefore, came to Syracuse, with reason and justice, leaving my own pursuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny, which was neither adapted to my discourses nor myself. But when I came thither I liberated myself, and thus preserved the allotment of hospitable Jupiter, and of a philosopher, unblameable. This allotment indeed would have been disgraceful, if, being in any respect effeminate and timid, I had been a partaker of vicious shame. [329b] On my arrival then (for there is no occasion to be prolix) I found all things about Dionysius full of sedition, and calumnies respecting the tyranny of Dion. [329c] I defended Dion, therefore, to the utmost of my power, but I was able to effect but little. For, on the fourth month nearly after my arrival, Dionysius accused Dion of endeavouring to obtain the tyranny by stratagem, and disgracefully sent him into exile in a small ship. After this all of us that were the friends of Dion were fearful lest Dionysius should accuse and punish any one of us as cooperating with Dion in his stratagem. [329d] It was likewise reported in Syracuse, that I was put to death by Dionysius, as being the cause of every thing that then happened. But he perceiving that we were all thus affected, and dreading lest something of greater consequence should arise from our fear, received all of us benevolently, consoled me, desired me to confide in him, and requested that I would by all means stay; as he would derive no advantage from my flight, but from my continuing at Syracuse. On this account, he pretended to request me very much to stay. However, we know that the requests of tyrants are mingled with necessity.
[329e] Contriving, therefore, to prevent my departure, he obliged me to reside in the acropolis, whence no sailor could lead me away, not because he would be hindered by Dionysius, but because he could not accomplish this without his orders. Nor was there any merchant, or provincial magistrate, who, on seeing me leaving the country, would not immediately have brought me back again to Dionysius; especially since the report at that time was contrary to that which was circulated before; for now it was said that Dionysius again received Plato with wonderful kindness. [330a] And indeed this was the case: for it is necessary to speak the truth. He behaved therefore to me with increasing kindness every day, and was delighted with my manners and habits. But he wished me to praise him more, and to consider him as my friend in a far greater degree than Dion: and this he strove to accomplish in a wonderful manner. However, he neglected the most beautiful means of effecting his purpose, if it could have been effected, I mean associating and becoming familiar with me, by hearing and learning discourses on philosophy. [330b] But this he was fearful of doing, lest, as was asserted by my calumniators, he should be impeded in his designs, and Dion should have the entire management of affairs. However, I endured every thing, perservering in the opinion which I entertained when I first came to Syracuse, and trying if by any possible means Dionysius could be brought to a desire of a philosophic life. But he rendered my endeavours ineffectual by his opposition. And such are the particulars of my first voyage to Sicily.
[330c] However, in consequence of the earnest solicitations of Dionysius, I made a second voyage to Sicily. But on what account I came thither, and what I did there, I may reasonably and justly relate to you, when I advise you how it is proper to act in the present state of affairs. I say I may relate this to you, for the sake of those who ask why I came a second time to Sicily. I speak in this manner, that superfluous things may not be preferred by me to such as are important.
[330d] I think, indeed, that he who gives his advice to a sick man, and one who uses bad diet, should persuade him in the first place to change his mode of living; and if the diseased person is willing to comply with him in this, that he should then persuade him to other things; but if he is unwilling to comply, then I should think that his adviser, if he abandons him, acts like a man and a physician, but if he still continues with him, that he acts like one effeminate and destitute of art. I assert the same thing likewise of a city, whether it has one governor, or many. For if the polity proceeds in a right way, it is the province of a man, endued with intellect, to give it useful advice; but if the very contrary of this happens to be the case, and the people do not by any means wish to tread in the vestiges of an upright polity, but proclaim to their adviser that he must relinquish his concern about the polity, and not disturb it, for if he does he shall suffer death; and at the same time exhort him to be subservient to their wills and desires, and thus advise them how they may always procure pleasures with celerity and ease; when this is the case, I should consider him who endures to give such advice, as effeminate, but him who does not endure it, as a man.
[330e] In consequence of this conception, when any one consults me about one of the greatest concerns of his life, such as about the acquisition of riches, or the attention pertaining to the body or soul, if he appears to me to live daily in an orderly manner, or is willing to be persuaded when I give him my advice, then I readily join with him in consultation, nor do I desist till the affair is brought to a conclusion. But if either he does not at all consult me, or, if he does, obviously neglects to follow my advice, in this case I should not of my own accord give advice to such a one, nor would I be compelled to give it, even if he were my son. But I would voluntarily give advice to a slave, and, if he were unwilling, force him to follow it. I should not however think it holy to force my father, unless he was void of understanding through disease.
[330e] Again, if those that consult me live according to an established mode which is pleasing to themselves, but not to me, I would not hate them, because I had admonished them in vain, nor yet flattering be subservient to them, and afford them those means of gratifying their desires, which, if I were to embrace, I should not wish to live. With the same conceptions respecting his country, a prudent man ought to live, exposing its errors, if it appears to him not to be well governed, when this can be done, without speaking in vain, or losing his life. But he should never by violence effect a change in the government of his country, when it cannot be brought to the best condition, without the [331a] expulsion and slaughter of the citizens, but in this case, leading a quiet life, he should pray for the good both of himself and the city.
[331b] In the very same manner I [331c] advise you to act. And I advised Dionysius [331d] to live daily in such a manner with Dion, that he might both have the mastery over himself, and acquire faithful friends and associates, that the same thing might not befall him which happened to his father. [332d] For his father having obtained the possession of and reestablished many and great cities in Sicily, which had been subverted by the Barbarians, could not establish in the politics of these faithful men, neither from his own associates, nor from among strangers, nor from his younger brothers, whom he himself had educated. Nor yet could he find men worthy to be trusted, either among the private persons whom he had made governors, or the poor, whom he had made very rich. But among these he could not procure one faithful associate, either by persuading or teaching, or the benefits which he conferred. But he was seven times worse than Darius, who neither confiding in his brothers, nor in those that were educated by him, but alone associating with himself in the government of his kingdom a Mede and captive eunuch, he divided seven parts of his dominions between them, each of which was larger than all Sicily, and found them to be faithful adherents, and neither insidious to him, nor to each other. He likewise gave an example how a good legislator and king ought to act. For he established laws by which the Persian government is preserved even at present. To which we may add, that the Athenians, after they had taken possession of many Grecian cities, which they had not founded themselves, and which had been subverted by the Barbarians, preserved their empire over them for seventy years, in consequence of procuring to themselves friends in each of the cities.
[332d] But Dionysius having collected all Sicily into one city, and through his wisdom confiding in no one, was with difficulty saved. [332e] For he was destitute of friends, and men in whom he could confide, than which there can be no greater sign of vice, as on the contrary the possession of these is the greatest proof of virtue. I therefore and Dion advised Dionysius to procure himself friends from his associates, and such as were his equals in age, and who unanimously cultivated virtue, since, through the situation of his father’s affairs, he neither cultivated learning, nor had proper associates. But we particularly advised him to accord with himself. For we asserted that he was in a wonderful manner deficient in this respect, not indeed in perspicuous terms (for this was not safe), but in an obscure manner, contending in our discourse, that when this is the case, every man will become the saviour both of himself and those whom he governs; [333a] but that when he does not accord with himself, he will cause the very contrary of this to take place. If therefore, as we said, he was consistent with himself, and acquired prudence and temperance, and if afterwards he restored the desolated cities of Sicily, and bound them together with such laws and polities, that they might be friendly both to him and to each other, in resisting the incursions of the Barbarians, then he would not only double, but in reality multiply his paternal kingdom. For thus the Carthaginians would much more readily become subject to his power, than they were to that of Gelon; nor would he on the contrary, like his father, be compelled to pay a tribute to the Barbarians.
[333b] This was the substance of what we said, and the advice which we gave to Dionysius, at the very time when it was reported in many places that we were forming stratagems against him. Indeed, the men who raised these reports prevailed over Dionysius, expelled Dion, and threw us into fear. But, in short, Dion, departing from Peloponnesus and Athens, admonished Dionysius in reality. [333c] When therefore Dion had liberated and twice restored the city to its inhabitants, the Syracusians were then affected in the same manner towards him, as Dionysius had been before. For Dionysius had endeavoured to educate Dion so as that he might become a king worthy of his kingdom, and be his associate through the whole of life. But those that calumniated Dion, reported that he endeavoured to gain the tyranny by stratagem, and did every thing at that time, that the mind of Dionysius, which was allured by discipline, might neglect the affairs of government, and commit them entirely to Dion, who, by fraudulent usurpation, would expel Dionysius from the empire.
[333c] These things being then reported a second time among the Syracusians, vanquished by a very absurd and base victory those who were the causes of the victory. [333d] But it is proper that the particulars of this affair should be heard by you, who now call upon me to settle the present affairs. I therefore being an Athenian, the associate of Dion, and one who joined with him in opposing the tyrant, that he might make peace instead of war, was vanquished in opposing the calumniators. [333e] But Dionysius, by loading me with honours and riches, endeavoured to persuade me to stay with him, and to make me his friend, that I might serve as a witness that he had not undeservedly expelled Dion. However, he was entirely disappointed in his expectations. But Dion afterwards returning home, brought with him two Athenian brothers, who had not become his friends from philosophy, but from that casual association of most friends, which arises from performing the rites of hospitality, and from being mutually initiated in sacred mys- teries. From these causes, and from offering to attend Dion in his return to Syracuse, he had contracted a friendship with them. But these men, on their coming to Sicily, when they understood that Dion was calumniated as endeavouring by stratagem to obtain the tyranny, by those very men whom he had liberated, not only betrayed their associate and guest, but becoming as it were perpetrators of murder with their own hands, they assisted the murderers with arms. However, I shall neither pass by in silence, nor relate the particulars of this base and unholy deed: for it has been elegantly related by many others, and will be again in some future period of time.
[334b] But I will wipe away the infamy with which the Athenians are branded. For I say, that he was an Athenian, who could never be induced either by riches or honours to betray the city. For he was not made a friend through illiberal benevolence, but through the communion of liberal discipline; in which alone, he who is endued with intellect ought to confide, rather than in the alliance of souls and bodies. These men, therefore, are not of consequence sufficient to bring disgrace on the city for killing Dion: for they were men of no renown. But I have said thus much for the sake of giving advice to the friends and kindred of Dion.
[334c] I give you likewise the same advice as before, and address you in the same words the third time, viz. that you should neither subject Sicily, nor, in my opinion, any other city, to despotic men, but to the laws; [334d] for this is neither better for the governors nor the governed, nor for their children, nor their children’s children, but the experiment is perfectly pernicious. But little and illiberal souls delight to seize gain of this kind, understanding nothing of things just and good, human and divine, whether pertaining to the present time, or to futurity. Of the truth of these things, I endeavoured first to persuade Dion, and afterwards Dionysius, and now, in the third place, you. Be persuaded therefore by me, for the sake of Jupiter the third saviour.
[334e] In the next place, look to Dionysius and Dion, the former of whom, not following my advice, now lives in an unbecoming manner; but the latter, who acted conformably to my persuasions, died beautifully. For he who aspires after the most excellent things, both for himself and his country, will endure whatever may befall him in an upright and beautiful manner: for no one of us is naturally immortal¹⁰, nor if this should happen to be the case with any one of us, would he on that account become happy, as it appears he would to the multitude. For in things inanimate, there is nothing either of good or ill which deserves to be regarded: [335a] but good or ill happens to every soul, either during its union with, or separation from, body. But it is always proper thus to believe in antient and sacred discourses, which inform us that the soul is immortal, that it has judges of its conduct, and that it suffers the greatest punishments when it is liberated from the body. [335b] On this account it is requisite to think that it is a lesser evil to suffer than to do the greatest injuries. This, indeed, the man who is a lover of wealth, and who is poor in soul does not hear, and if he did hear, he would deride it, in consequence of thinking that he ought impudently to seize on all [335c] sides, like a wild beast, whatever he can eat or drink, and whatever can contribute to venereal delight, which is a thing servile and ungrateful, and is not properly denominated pleasure. Such a one being blind, does not perceive that he can never satisfy insatiable desire, nor see what a mighty evil is unholy conduct, nor what the particulars are with which it is always attended in conjunction with every unjust deed. For he who acts unjustly, must necessarily attract to himself impiety, both while he rolls on the earth, and when he accomplishes under the earth a journey, perfectly and in every respect dishonourable and miserable.
[335c] When I said these, and other things of the like kind to Dion, I persuaded him of their truth. [335d] But I was most justly enraged with his murderers, in the same manner nearly as with Dionysius: for both of them injured me, and all the rest, as I may say, in the highest degree. For they destroyed a man who was willing to use justice: but Dionysius, who did not by any means wish to use justice, through the whole of his government, obtained the greatest power. If, however, under his government, philosophy and power had been united in reality, they would have presented to all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, a true and sufficiently luminous opinion, that neither any city nor any man can ever be happy, unless they pass through life with prudence¹¹, and in subjection to justice; whether they possess these in themselves, or are properly educated and instructed in the manners of holy governors.
[335d] The conduct, therefore, of Dionysius in these things was noxious: but other things in which I was injured are small when compared to these. But he who slew Dion, did not know that he had done the same thing as Dionysius. [335e] For I clearly know, as far as it is possible for one man to speak confidently of another, that if Dion had retained his government, he would never have changed it into any other form than that which he first gave to his own country, Syracuse, when he delivered it from slavery, caused it to assume a joyful and splendid appearance, and established it in liberty. After this, he would have adorned the citizens, by every possible contrivance, with such laws as are adapted to them, and are the most excellent. And besides these things, he would have diligently endeavoured to make all Sicily inhabited, and free from the Barbarians, by expelling some and subjecting others, more easily than this was done by Hiero. But if these things had taken place, through a man just, brave, temperate, and who was a philosopher, the same opinion of virtue would have been produced among the multitude, as would have flourished among all men, if Dionysius had followed my advice. But now either some dæmon, or some pernicious character, replete with iniquity and impiety, and, what is of the greatest consequence, with the audacity of ignorance, in which all evils are rooted, and from which they germinate and afterwards produce the most bitter fruit,— this dæmon, or this dire person, has a second time subverted and destroyed every thing. However, for the sake of augury, we now ominate good things the third time.
[336a] I advise therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, and acquire that patriotic benevolence which he possessed, and that temperate mode of living which he adopted. But you have clearly heard from me, what are the auspices by which you should endeavour to accomplish his wish: and if there is any one among you, who is unable to live in a Doric manner, according to paternal institutes, but follows the Sicilian mode of living, and that which was adopted by the murderers of Dion, neither call on him to join with you, nor believe that he will ever be sincere and faithful in any undertaking. But you should exhort the rest to reestablish the whole of Sicily, and introduce both in Sicily and all Peloponnesus equitable laws, without dreading the Athenians: for men are to be found there who surpass all others in virtue, and who hate the audacity of those that slaughter their guests.
[336b] But if these things should take place afterwards, and the many and all various seditions and discords which spring up daily urge us to immediate exertion; in this case, every man who, through a divine fortune, partakes, though in a small degree, of right opinion, ought to know, that there will be no end to the evils [336e] resulting from sedition, till those who vanquish in battle refrain from slaughtering and banishing their fellow-citizens, and from the remembrance of injuries, and giving respite to their desire of vengeance, become reconciled to their enemies; [337a] and till obtaining the empire over themselves, they establish common laws, which no less pertain to themselves, than to those they have vanquished, at the same time compelling them to use these laws. But they should compel them by a two-fold necessity, viz. of fear and shame. By the necessity of fear, evincing their power; in consequence of being superior to them: but by the necessity of shame, through their appearing to surpass them, both in vanquishing pleasures, and in subjection to the laws. For there is no other way by which a city labouring under sedition can find a period to its evils. But seditions, enmities, hatred, perfidy, will always arise in cities, which are thus affected towards themselves. [337b] Those, therefore, that have the greatest power in cities, if they desire the welfare of their country, should choose among themselves, in preference to others, such men as they have heard to be the most excellent characters: [337c] and, in the first place, they should choose old men, who possess children, wives, and estates, together with such of their progenitors as are most worthy and renowned, and possess sufficient property. [337d] But ten thousand and fifty inhabitants will be sufficient for a city of this kind. These should be sent from their places of abode with prayers and the greatest honours: [337e] but after they are called from home, they should be bound by an oath, and exhorted to establish laws, that they may not attribute more to the victors than the vanquished, but impart the equal and that which is common to the whole city. All things, however, consist in the establishment of laws. For when the victors are more willing to be subject to the laws than those that are vanquished, all things will be well, and full of felicity, and every evil will be exiled. But if this is not the case, there is no occasion to call me, or any other, to join with him in the administration of affairs, who is not persuaded by the precepts I have now enjoined. [338a] For these are the sisters of the things which I and Dion very wisely attempted to accomplish among the Syracusians. They were, however, second attempts: for the first were those common goods, which we attempted to effect in conjunction with Dionysius. But a certain fortune superior to mankind frustrated our attempt. Do you therefore now endeavour to accomplish these things more prosperously, through a good destiny, and a certain divine fortune. And thus much concerning my advice and epistle, and my first visit to Dionysius.
[338a] But my second voyage to Sicily was both becoming and proper, of which he may now hear an account who is so inclined. [338b] For the first time of my residence in Sicily passed away as I have already said, before I could advise the kindred and associates of Dion; but after this I persuaded Dionysius, to the utmost of my power, to suffer me to depart: but we mutually agreed, that when a peace took place (for there was then a war in Sicily), Dionysius should recall Dion and me, as soon as his government was more securely established. He likewise thought it proper that Dion should understand that I was not then banished by him, but was to return to him at a certain time. And I agreed to these conditions.
[338b] A peace therefore taking place, Dionysius sent for me, but required that Dion should absent himself, for another year: bu the requested me by all means to come. Dion therefore exhorted and entreated me to set sail; for it was very much reported from Sicily, that Dionysius was again wonderfully inflamed with a desire of philosophy: and on this account Dion earnestly requested me to set sail for Sicily. But I, though I knew that many such things happened to young men respecting philosophy, at the same time thought it more safe not to comply with the request of Dionysius and Dion. [338c] I therefore answered both of them, that I was an old man, and that nothing which was done at present was according to the agreement. But it seems that after this Archytas¹² had betaken himself to Dionysius: for, before I set sail from Sicily, I had made Archytas, and certain other Tarentines, the guests and friends of Dionysius. There were likewise certain others among the Syracusians who were the auditors of Dion, and among these some wh were full of depraved doctrines respecting philosophy, and who appeared to me to endeavour to discourse with Dionysius about things of this kind, as if Dionysius had heard all such particulars as were the subject of my thoughts. But he was not naturally unapt with respect to learning, and was ambitious in a wonderful degree. Perhaps, therefore, he was pleased with the discourse of these men; and he was manifestly ashamed that he heard nothing from me when I went to see him. Hence he was at the same time inflamed with a desire of hearing me more clearly, and stimulated by ambition. But on what account he did not hear me discourse, when I first came to Sicily, I have related above.
[338d] After therefore I had [338e] returned home safe, and refused to comply with his second invitation, Dionysius appeared to be perfectly ambitious, and through his desire of renown to be afraid lest I should seem to certain persons to despise him, and that my dislike of his disposition, habits, and mode of living, had induced me to refuse complying with his request. But it is just that I should speak the truth, and endure with equanimity, if any one on hearing the past transactions should despise my philosophy, and think that the tyrant was endued with intellect: for Dionysius sent to me, the third time, a three-ranked galley, for the sake of procuring me an easy passage. He sent also Archidemus, whom he thought I most esteemed of all the familiars of Archytas that were then in his dominions, together with other illustrious persons in Sicily. But all these announced to us the same thing, viz. that Dionysius was wonderfully given to philosophy. Besides this, he sent me a long epistle, knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and that Dion was desirous I should set sail and come to Syracuse. The letter, therefore, was composed with a view to all these particulars, and the beginning of it was as follows:
[339a] Dionysius to Plato: after which followed such things as are usual, and he said nothing after this, except that complying with his request I should now come to Sicily. [339b] He then proceeded: “In the first place the particulars respecting Dion shall be accomplished according to your wish; but I know you wish for moderate measures, and that I would accede to them. However, unless you come, your desires respecting Dion will not be gratified, nor yet respecting other things pertaining to yourself.” This is what he wrote. But the other parts of his letter were prolix, and foreign to the purpose. Other letters likewise came to me from Archytas, and other Tarentines, praising the philosophic disposition of Dionysius, and adding, that unless I now came their friendship with Dionysius, which had been effected through me, and which was of no small consequence with respect to political affairs, would be entirely destroyed.
[339c] As therefore, at that time, I was thus incited to comply with the request of Dionysius, some drawing me from Sicily and Italy, and others at Athens impelling me, as it were, by their prayers; [339d] and again reason proclaiming, that I ought not to betray Dion, together with the guests and others belonging to [339e] Tarentum:—when I likewise considered, that it was nothing wonderful, if a young man who was formerly unwilling to hear respecting things of great moment should become docile, and be inflamed with a desire of the best life, and that it was proper to prove clearly, in what manner he was affected, and not by any means betray him, nor become myself the cause of a disgrace so truly great, if the case with respect to Dionysius was in reality such as it was reported to be;—screened by this reasoning as with a veil, I commenced my journey, fearing many things, and prophesying as it seems not altogether well. I came therefore to Sicily the third time under the protection of the saviour Jupiter. And this voyage I actually accomplished, being again fortunately saved. But for these things I return thanks to Dionysius, after divinity; because when many were willing to slay me, he prevented them, and conducted himself with some degree of moderation in my affairs.
[339e] When therefore I came to Sicily, I thought it was proper, in the first place, to try whether Dionysius was in reality enkindled by philosophy as by a fire, or whether the report concerning him at Athens was entirely vain. But there is a certain method of making an experiment about things of this kind, by no means ignoble, but truly adapted to tyrants, and especially to those that are full of depraved doctrines, which, as soon as I arrived, I perceived was very much the case with Dionysius. But to such as these, it is requisite to show that philosophy is a thing of the greatest consequence, and that it it only to be obtained by great study and mighty labour. For he who hears that this is the case, if he is truly a lover of wisdom, and is adapted to and worthy of its acquisition, being a divine person, will think that he hears of an admirable way, that he ought immediately to betake himself to this path, and make it the great business of his life. After this, he will not cease exciting both himself, and the leader of this way, till he either obtains the consummation of his wishes, or receives a power by which he may be able to conduct himself without a guide.
[339e] Such a one, therefore, will so live, that all his actions may accord with these conceptions. But before all things he will be perpetually intent on philosophy, and will daily procure for himself such nutriment, as may especially render him docile, of a good memory, and able to reason; living soberly, and hating intoxication.
[339e] But those that are not lovers of wisdom in reality, but are coloured over with opinions, like those whose bodies are burnt by the sun, when they perceive what a multitude of disciplines, what mighty labour, and what temperate food are requisite, to the acquisition of philosophy, such as these, thinking that philosophy is a thing difficult and impossible for them to obtain, cannot be brought to make it the object of their pursuit. But some of these persuade themselves, that they have sufficiently heard the whole of philosophy, and that they require nothing further. This mode of experiment is perspicuous and most safe, when employed upon the effeminate, and such as are incapable of enduring labour; for thus they can never accuse him who points out to them the arduousness of the undertaking, but must blame themselves as unable to engage in all that is requisite to the acquisition of philosophy.
[341a] This method of examination I employed upon Dionysius; but I neither enumerated all the requisites, nor did Dionysius require that I should. For there were many things, and those of the greatest consequence, in which he pretended to be sufficiently knowing, through the depraved doctrines which he had heard from others. But I am informed that he afterwards wrote about the things which he then heard, as if the composition was the result of his own art, when at the same time it contained nothing of his own. However, I am entirely ignorant as to the truth of this report. But I know that certain others have written about the same things, though without understanding what they wrote.
[341a] Thus much however I shall say respecting all those who either have written, or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my study, (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they [341b] have discovered them themselves,) that they have not heard any thing about these particulars conformable to my opinion: for I never have written, nor ever shall write, about them. [341c] For a thing of this kind¹³ cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself. Indeed, thus much I know, that things which have been written or said by me, have been said in the best manner; and I do not feel the smallest degree of pain from things being ascribed to me that are badly written.
[341d] But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude [341e] by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. [342a] But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they should now learn certain excellent things. I intend, therefore, to speak further about these particulars: for thus perhaps I shall say something clearer respecting them than I have yet said. For there is a certain true discourse which is adverse to him, who dares to write about things of this kind, and which has often been delivered by me before, and as it seems must be delivered by me at present.
[342b] There are three things belonging to each of those particulars through which science is necessarily produced. But the fourth is science itself. [342c] And it is requisite to establish as the fifth that which is known and true. One of these is the name of a thing; the second its definition; the third the resemblance; the fourth science. [342d] Now take each of these, desiring to learn what we have lately asserted, and think as follows concerning them all. A circle is called something, whose name we have just expressed. After this follows its definition, composed from nouns and verbs. For that which every where is equally distant from the extremes to the middle, is the definition of that which we signify by the name of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. [342e] But the third is the circle which may be painted, or blotted out, which may be made by a wheel, or destroyed. None of which affections, the circle itself, which each of these respects, suffers, as being of a different nature. [343a] But the fourth is science and intellect, and true opinion about these. And the whole of this again must be established as one thing which neither subsists in voice, nor in corporeal figures, but is inherent in soul¹⁴. It is therefore manifest, that this fourth is different from the nature itself¹⁵ of the circle, and again different from the three we have previously mentioned. But among the number of these, intellect, by its relation and similitude, proximately adheres to the fifth, while the rest are more remote from its nature. The same may likewise be affirmed of a straight and crooked figure, of colour, and of the good, the beautiful, and the just. And again of every body, whether fashioned by the hand, or the work of nature, whether fire or water, and the rest of this kind; likewise of every animal, and the manners of souls; and of all actions and passions. For unless among these some one after a manner receives that fourth, he will never perfectly participate the science about the fifth. For, in addition to what has been said, these four no less endeavour to evince about every thing the quality which it possesses; but likewise its being, through the imbecility of reasons. On this account, no one endued with intellect will ever dare to consider as equally immutable, things which are the objects of intellectual vision, and such as have a subsistence in corporeal figures.
[343b] But again, it is requisite to attend to what we have just now said. Every circle, which by the hands of men is either painted, or fashioned by a wheel, is plainly contrary to our fifth: for it every where participates of the right line. But we must affirm that the circle itself has neither more nor less of any thing whatever; that is, it possesses in itself nothing of a contrary nature. Besides, none of these is endued with any stability of name: for nothing hinders our applying the appellation of straight to that which we now denominate round, and calling the straight by the denomination of the round; nor will there be any less stability in these, when their names are changed into the contrary. The same reasoning is likewise true of definition, since it is composed from nouns and verbs which possess no stability. And in a variety of ways it may be proved, that no one of these four is certain and firm. [343c] But the greatest thing of all, as I just before observed, is this, that since there are two things, essence and quality, when the soul seeks to know not the quality of a thing, but what it is, unless it first investigates each of these four, and sufficiently discusses them by a reasoning process and sensible inspection, and this continually through every thing which is asserted and shown, it will be filled, as I may say, with all possible ambiguity and obscurity.
[343d] In such things therefore, as through a depraved education we are not accustomed to investigate the truth, but are contented with an image exhibited to our view, we do not become ridiculous to each other, when being interrogated, we are able to discuss and argue about those four. [343e] But in such particulars as we are compelled to separate that fifth from other things, and evince its nature, he who wishes to subvert what we have evinced, vanquishes, and causes him who explains this fifth, either by speech, or writing, or answers, to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of the things about which he attempts either to write or speak; men sometimes being ignorant, that it is not the soul of the writer or speaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of the above-mentioned four particulars, when it is badly affected. But the procession through all these, and the transition to each upwards and downwards, scarcely at length produces the science of that which naturally subsists in an excellent condition, in the soul of one naturally well affected. But when any one is naturally ill affected, as is the case with the habit of soul possessed by the multitude, who are badly disposed, with respect to learning, and whose manners are depraved, not even Lynceus himself can enable such as these to see. [344a] But in one word, neither docility nor memory will confer on any one the power of perceiving things of this kind, who is not allied to them: [344b] for they are not inherent from the first in foreign habits. So that those who are not naturally adapted and allied to what is just, and other things that are beautiful, though they may be docile, and of a good memory with respect to other particulars; and again, those that are allied to the just and beautiful, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will never learn, as far as it is possible to learn, the truth pertaining to virtue and vice. For it is necessary to learn this, and at the same time the falsehood and truth of the whole of essence, with all possible exercise, and a great length of time, as I said in the beginning. But after agitating together the several names and reasons, and sensible perceptions of these things, confuting in a benevolent manner, and employing questions and answers without envy, then striving as much as is possible to human power, prudence and intellect about each of these will scarcely at length shine forth.
[344c] On this account, every worthy man will be very far from writing¹⁶ about things truly worthy, as he will thus subject himself to envy and ambiguity. But, in one word, it is requisite to know from these things, that when any one sees the writings of another, whether of a legislator on the laws, or on certain other subjects, he will see that these are not such writings as are considered by him to be the most worthy of all others, if he is himself a worthy character: but the objects of his pursuit are situated in a most beautiful region. And if he should find in writings such things as truly deserve the highest regard, it might then be said, that not the gods indeed, but men destroy the intellects of men. And thus much for this fable and digression, which he who acutely follows will well understand.
[344d] Whether therefore Dionysius has written any thing about the highest and first natures, or any other person inferior or superior to him, according to my decision, he has neither heard nor learnt any thing sound respecting these natures; [344e] for otherwise he would have venerated them in the same manner as I do, and would not have dared to hurl them into incongruity and indecency. For he could not write about them, for the sake of recalling them to his memory; as there is no occasion to fear that any one will ever forget them, when they are once comprehended by the soul: for they lie in the shortest space of all things. But perhaps he did this for the sake of base ambition, either asserting that these doctrines were his own, or as partaking of discipline of which he was unworthy to partake, loving the renown which arises from such participation.
[345b] Perhaps, however, we may allow that Dionysius has written about these things, if what he has asserted was produced by one conversation. But, O Jupiter, says the Theban, how was it produced! For I discussed these things with him as I have said, and only once; but never afterwards. In the next place, he who is anxious to find out the cause of what then happened respecting these things, ought to know why we did not discuss them a second and a third time, and often: [345c] whether it was that Dionysius, having only heard them once, thought that he knew them, and knew them sufficiently, or that he discovered them himself, or had formerly learnt them from others. Or was it that he thought the things that were said were trifling? Or did a certain third thing happen to be the case, viz. that they were in reality too great for him, who was solicitous to lead a life of prudence and virtue? For if it is said that he considered the things about which he wrote as trifling, this will be opposed by many witnesses who assert the contrary, and who are much better judges about things of this kind than Dionysius. But if he invented them, or learnt them, and they deserve to be made subservient to the discipline of a liberal soul, is it not wonderful that he should so readily despise the leader and master of these things?
[345c] But how he despised him I will now relate. Not long after this he would not permit the procurators of Dion to send that portion of his wealth to Peloponnesus, which some time before he had suffered him to possess and enjoy, as if he had entirely forgotten the letter which he wrote to me. For he asserted that this property did not belong to Dion, but to Dion’s son, who, as he was his own grandson, was according to law underr his protection. And such were the transactions of that time.
[345d] From hence, however, we may accurately see how Dionysius was affected towards philosophy; and it is lawful for me to be indignant whether I am willing or not: for it was then summer, and the time for ships to sail. But it seemed that I ought not to be more offended with Dionysius than myself, and with those who compelled me to come the third time to the strait about Scylla, and
[345e] “Dire Charybdis measure o’er again¹⁷.”
[345e] I was therefore forced to tell Dionysius, that it was impossible for me to stay with him while Dion was used so ignominiously. [346a] But he consoled me, and requested me to stay; thinking it would not be well for him that I should be so swift a messenger of such transactions as these: and when he could not persuade me, he said he would prepare my dismission. However, being enraged, I was determined to depart in a fleet of ships, thinking that I ought to suffer every thing, if he should attempt to stop me; [346b] as I was manifestly injured, though I had done no injury. But when he found that I could not by any means be induced to stay, he devised the following mean to retard my departure. On the day after these things had taken place, he thus plausibly addressed me: Dion, says he, and the affairs of Dion, about which we have often disagreed, shall be entirely removed from you and me; [346c] for on your account I will act as follows towards Dion. I think it fit that he shall take up his residence in Peloponnesus, not as an exile, but as one who may come hither, when it shall seem good to him, to me, and to you who are his friend. This shall take place, if he forms no stratagems against me; and you, your familiars, and the familiars of Dion, that are here, shall be bound for his fulfilling this agreement. But the money which he may receive shall be deposited in Peloponnesus and Athens, with those you shall think fit: Dion too shall enjoy the benefit of this money, but shall not be authorized to take it away without your consent; for I should not very much believe that justice would be done to me, if he had the entire possession of this wealth, which is not inconsiderable. But I have greater confidence in you and your familiars. See, therefore, whether these things are agreeable to you, and stay for the sake of them this year, at the expiration of which you shall receive this money and depart. I well know, indeed, that Dion will be greatly indebted to you for acting in this manner on his account.
[346d] When I heard [346e] these things, I was perfectly indignant, but at the same time I said that I would consider the affair, and give him my opinion on the following day. This was our compact at that time. I therefore consulted with myself after this, but in a very confused manner; but the following consideration first presented itself to me, as the leader of my consultation: What if Dionysius intends to do nothing of what he promises to do, but on my departure both he and many others should write in a plausible manner to Dion, what he has now said to me, that he indeed was willing, but that I was unwilling he should act in this manner, and that I entirely neglected his concerns; and besides this, if Dionysius, being unwilling I should depart, should give no orders to any pilot, but should easily signify to all men, that he did not consent to my setting sail, what sailor would be willing to take me on board, from the palace of Dionysius? For, in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden which surrounded the palace; from whence the porter would not be willing to dismiss me, without an order from Dionysius. But if I stay another year, I can indeed send an account of these transactions to Dion, and acquaint him with my situation and conduct. And if indeed Dionysius should do any thing of what he promises to do, my conduct will be not entirely ridiculous: for perhaps the property of Dion, when rightly estimated, does not amount to less than a hundred talents¹⁸. But if the issue of affairs should be such as it is likely to be, I shall be at a loss how to act. At the same time, it is perhaps necessary that I should stay a year longer, and endeavour in reality to frustrate the machinations of Dionysius.
[347a] Thus thinking with myself, I told Dionysius, on the following day, that I thought it best to stay; but I said he ought not to consider me as possessing absolute authority over Dion. [347b] I added, that he should write to Dion in conjunction with me, acquainting him with the compact we had made, and asking him whether he was satisfied with these things, and with me, and whether he wished for any thing further. Lastly, that he should write to him as soon as possible, and should not make any innovation in his affairs. This is what was said, and these are nearly the things in which we agreed.
[347c] But after this the ships sailed, and therefore it was no longer possible for me to depart. [347d] Dionysius, therefore, as if recollecting something he had omitted, said that the half of Dion’s property ought to remain with his son, and that the other half should be sent to Dion. This property, he said, he would sell, and when he had sold it, deliver one half to me to be sent to Dion, and keep the other half for his son; for he added, it will be most just to act in this manner. [347e] I therefore, being struck with what he said, thought it would be entirely ridiculous to say any thing further. At the same time, however, I observed to him, that we ought to wait for an answer from Dion, and again send him an account of these particulars. But Dionysius, after this, in a very juvenile manner, sold the whole of Dion’s property to whom and for what he pleased, without making any mention of it whatever to me: and again I in like manner said nothing to him respecting the affairs of Dion; for I thought I should be able to do nothing further in them. And thus far I gave assistance both to philosophy and my friends.
[348a] But after this, I and Dionysius so lived together, that I like a bird was always looking out, and longing to fly away, but he was devising after what manner he might prevent my flight, and gave up no part of the property of Dion. At the same time, however, we were said to be sociable through the whole of Sicily. [348b] But at that period, Dionysius endeavoured to diminish the pay of the mercenaries, contrary to the custom of his father; and the soldiers being enraged, assembled in a body, and declared this should not take place. Dionysius therefore endeavoured to force them to submission, and for this purpose shut the gates of the acropolis: but the soldiers immediately marched to the walls, vociferating a certain barbarous and warlike pæon; at which Dionysius being terrified, granted the soldiers all they desired, and those that carried crescent shields more than their usual pay. But a report was rapidly spread that Heraclides was the cause of this disturbance; upon hearing which, Heraclides immediately disappeared. Dionysius therefore endeavoured to take him; [348c] but not being able to discover his place of retreat, he ordered Theodotes to attend him in the gardens, in which at that time I happened to be walking. Other parts, therefore, of their discourse I neither known or heard; but what Theodotes said to Dionysius before me I both know and remember. For he said, Plato, I am persuading Dionysius, that if I were able to bring Heraclides hither, he would answer to the crimes which are now laid to his charge: [348d] and if it does not appear fit to Dionysius that he should dwell in Sicily, yet I think it is proper that, receiving his wife and son, he should be permitted to set sail for Peloponnesus, and there reside, not injuring Dionysius in any respect, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore, prior to this, sent, and shall again send for him. But whether he complies with my first or second citation, I think it proper that he should receive no injury, either here or in the suburbs, but that he shall be sent out of the kingdom, till Dionysius shall think fit to recall him; and I request Dionysius to accede to these terms. Do you accede or not? says he, speaking to Dionysius. He answered, I do accede; nor shall he suffer any thing worse than what has now been mentioned, though he should make his appearance in your house.
[348e] However, on the [349a] evening of the following day, Eurybius and Theodotes came to me in great haste and wonderfully alarmed: and Theodotes said to me, Plato, was you not a witness yesterday to the compact which Dionysius made with me and you respecting Heraclides? To which I replied, Undoubtedly I was. But now, says he, the soldiers with crescent shields are running every where in order to take Heraclides, and there is reason to fear that he is concealed at no great distance. Attend us therefore to Dionysius with every possible artifice. In consequence of this, we followed and came to him; and they indeed stood silent and weeping; [349b] but I said, These men, Dionysius, are afraid lest you should make some alteration respecting Heraclides, contrary to your compact yesterday: for it appears to me that he is evidently at no great distance from hence. But Dionysius on hearing this was violently enraged, and his countenance exhibited all various colours, such as anger produces: but Theodotes falling at his feet, and taking his hand, wept, and suppliantly implored him not to do any such thing. Then I, resuming the discourse, consoled him and said, Take courage, Theodotes, for Dionysius dares not to act contrary to the compact which he made yesterday. But he looking at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, says he, I made no compact, neither great nor small. To which I replied, By the gods, you promised me, that you would not do the very things, which this man now requests you not to do. Having thus said, I turned from him and left the place.
[349b] After this Dionysius endeavoured to find Heraclides: [349c] however, Theodotes sent messengers to him, and exhorted him to fly. But Dionysius sent Tisias and the soldiers with the crescent shields, and ordered them to pursue him. Heraclides, however, as it is said, escaped their pursuit, and in the small part of a day fled into the dominions of the Carthaginians. But now, from the enmity towards me which this occasioned, Dionysius appeared to have a pretext for doing that which, for a long time, he had been attempting to accomplish by stratagem, I mean, withholding the property of Dion. [349d] And in the first place he sent me from the acropolis, pretending it was requisite that the women should perform a sacrifice, which lasts for ten days, in the gardens in which I resided. He therefore ordered me at that time to take up my residence, out of the acropolis, with Archidemus: but when I was there, Theodotes sending for me, was indignant at many of the then transactions, and complained of Dionysius. But Dionysius hearing that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext of enmity towards me, similar to the former, and sent a certain person to ask me, whether I had really been with Theodotes at his request. To which I readily replied, I had. The messenger therefore said, Dionysius ordered me to tell you, that you by no means do well, in always preferring to him Dion and the friends of Dion. This is what was said; and after this Dionysius never again sent for me to his palace, as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theodotes and Heraclides, and an enemy to him; and he no longer considered me as well affected towards him, because the property of Dion was entirely consumed.
[349e] After this I dwelt out of the acropolis among the mercenary soldiers: but as well others as certain Athenian citizens, who acted as servants to Dionysius, came to me and informed me that I was calumniated by the soldiers. And besides this, certain persons threatened to kill me, if they could apprehend me. I devised therefore the following means of preservation: I sent to Archytas, and other friends at Tarentum, and informed them of my situation: [350a] but they, under the pretext of a certain embassy from the city, sent Lamiscus, who was one of my friends, with a galley of thirty ranks; and he, on his arrival, informed Dionysius that I wished to depart, and desired him by all means to grant my request. To this Dionysius assented, and dismissed me with a passport. However, I neither asked for the money belonging to Dion, nor did any one give it me.
[350b] But when I came to Peloponnesus to the Olympic games, I there met with Dion, who was beholding the celebration of them, and informed him of the past transactions; but he, calling Jupiter to witness, immediately declared to me, and my domestics and friends, that he would prepare to punish Dionysius, both on account of his deceiving me, while I was his guest (for thus he said and thought), and expelling and banishing him unjustly. [350c] On hearing this, I persuaded him to call his friends if he were willing. [350d] But I said, as to myself, since you have forced me after a manner, together with others, to become the companion and guest of Dionysius, and a partaker with him of sacred rites, he will doubtless think that I ought to conduct myself as an equitable medium between both parties, especially since, when I was accused by many of forming stratagems in conjunction with you against him and his tyranny, he did not put me to death, though he was not prevented from doing so by fear. To this I added, that my age rendered me unfit to engage in the concerns of war; and that I should act as a mediator between them, if at any time their friendship would require the assistance of a conciliator. But I informed them, that as long as they were averse to each other, they must call others to their assistance. I said these things, in consequence of hating my wandering and adverse fortune about Sicily.
[350e] However, as they were not persuaded by the arguments which I adduced, they have been the causes of all the evils that exist at present. Indeed, if Dionysius had given to Dion the property which was his due, or if he had been perfectly reconciled to him, we may say, as far as the condition of human affairs permits us to judge, that nothing adverse would have happened: for I could easily have kept Dion from hostile measures, both by my will and power. But now, being impelled against each other, they fill all things with evils; [351a] though indeed Dion had the same wish, which I should say both I and every other moderate person ought to have, respecting his own power, and that of his friends, and respecting his own city, I mean the wish to benefit when in authority, and when in the greatest power to impart the greatest benefits. But this will not be effected by him who endeavours to enrich himself and his friends, who forms stratagems against the city, and being poor collects together conspirators, and having no dominion over himself is through timidity vanquished by pleasure: who besides this slays those that are wealthy, calling them enemies, seizes their wealth, and at the same time proclaims to his adjutants and associates, that no one ought to accuse him, as he is poor. [351b] After the same manner, he who benefits his city will be honoured by it, in consequence of distributing by decrees the property of a few among the many. And this will likewise be the case, when any one governing a great city, and at the same time many lesser cities, unjustly distributes to his own city the wealth of the lesser. For after this manner, neither Dion, nor any other person, would ever voluntarily take upon them an authority, which would always be pernicious to himself and posterity; but he will endeavour to establish such a polity, and such laws, as are the most just, and the best, and which can be affected by the fewest deaths and banishments.
[351c] This conduct indeed was now adopted by Dion, who preferred suffering things impious to the commission of them; but who, at the same time that he was cautious lest he should suffer them, fell, after he had arrived at the summit of advantage over his enemies. [351d] Nor did he in this suffer any thing wonderful: for the soul of a pious man will never be wholly deceived respecting things impious, temperate, and prudent. But neither perhaps is it wonderful, if the same thing has happened to him as to a good pilot, from whom the future storm is not entirely concealed, but who may be ignorant of a sudden tempest, which is of an unexpected magnitude, and by which he may be violently overwhelmed. [351e] After the same manner, through the fewest circumstances, was Dion deceived: for he was not entirely ignorant that his enemies were bad men, though he was unacquainted with the profundity of their ignorance, and of the rest of their depravity and voracity. Through being deceived in this he fell, and by his fall involved Sicily in infinite grief. What therefore I advise you to do, after the present relation of these particulars, I have already nearly mentioned. [352a] But it appeared to me necessary to show on what account I came a second time to Sicily, through the absurdity and irrationality with which this circumstance seems to be attended. If, therefore, what has been now said shall appear to any one to be reasonable, and if he should think that I had a sufficient pretext for undertaking this voyage, the contents of this Epistle will also be sufficient.

## Epistle VIII

[352b] Plato to the Kindred and Familiars of Dion—Prosperity.
[352b] As I perceive that affairs are in a very prosperous condition, I will endeavour, as far as I am able, to send you a true account of them. But I hope I shall not only, in the first place, give you salutary advice, but, in the second place, all those that are in Syracuse; and, in the third place, your enemies and adversaries, except some one of them shall have been guilty of an impious deed. For these things are incurable, and can never be expiated. But consider what I now say.
[352c] The tyranny being dissolved, all Sicily is at strife about these very things: And some wish to restore again the former government, but others to bring the tyranny entirely to an end, while in the mean time the [352d] several plans about things of this kind appear to the multitude to be right, so long as they tend to injure their enemies, and benefit their friends, in the highest degree. It is however by no means easy for him who inflicts many evils on others not to suffer many himself. Nor is it necessary, in order to see this clearly, to search for examples at a great distance, since the circumstances which have now taken place about Sicily are sufficient for this purpose: [352e] for some attempt to injure, and others to take vengeance on the injurers. But you are sufficiently acquainted with these particulars, to be able to teach them to others. In these things, therefore, there is nearly no difficulty. But what is advantageous to all enemies and friends, or what is the least noxious to both, this it is neither easy to perceive, nor, when seen, to accomplish. Indeed this consultation and inquiry appears to resemble prayer. Let it therefore be in every respect a certain prayer. For it is requisite to begin every thing from the gods, both in speaking and understanding. But when brought to a conclusion, it will signify to us the following discourse.
[353a] From the time that the war began to the end of it, one alliance nearly ruled over both you and your enemies; [353b] an alliance which your fathers once established, in consequence of being involved in the greatest difficulties, at that time when the Sicily of the Greeks was exposed to the extreme danger of becoming the prey of Barbarians, through being entirely subverted by the Carthaginians. [353c] For then they chose Dionysius, as being a young man, and strenuous in such warlike affairs as were properly adapted to him. But they gave him as an adviser Hipparinus, who was his senior: and for the safety of Sicily, investing these two with absolute power, they denominated them, as they say, tyrants. And whether any one is willing to think that a divine fortune and a god, or the virtue of the governors, or both, together with the citizens of that time, were the cause of the safety of Sicily, let this be just as he pleases. [353d] Safety, however, to the men of that time, was thus obtained. As therefore they conducted themselves in this manner, it is just that those who were saved should return them thanks. But if the tyranny afterwards improperly used any gift of the city, for this it has partly been accused, and partly has suffered punishment. Certain punishments, therefore, have necessarily been properly inflicted on them for their conduct. For if you could either avoid them, without great danger and labour, or they could easily recover the antient government, we should not advise you to do such things as we shall persuade you to do hereafter. But now it is proper that both of you should understand and call to mind, how often you have been in hope of obtaining your desire, and have thought that but little was wanting to the accomplishment of all things according to your intention. However, this little that was wanting became every where the cause of great and infinite evils, and has not yet arrived at any end. [353e] But the antient evils always adhere together, and though the end presents itself to the view, yet a new beginning continually springs forth. The whole too of the tyrannic and popular genus appears to have perished under this circle. But if that which it seems reasonable to expect, though of an execrable nature, should take place, all Sicily nearly will become destitute of the Greek tongue, in consequence of being transferred to a certain Phœnician or Opic¹⁹ dynasty and power. All the Greeks, therefore, with all possible diligence and earnestness, ought to bring a remedy for these things. If indeed any one can give better advise than that which I shall give, he may with the greatest rectitude be called a lover of Greece.
[354a] But I will now endeavour, with all possible freedom of speech, and making use of a certain common and just mode of discourse, to evince to you what appears to me to be the truth. I shall however for this purpose speak in the character of an arbitrator, and according to my antient custom give advice both to him who tyrannizes and him who is subject to tyranny. And now, in the first place, I advise every tyrant to fly from the appellation, and the thing itself, and change his tyranny, if possible, into a kingdom. [354b] But it is possible, as the wise and good Lycurgus evinced in reality: for he, when he saw that the race of his kindred in Argos and Messene had arrived from the power of kings to that of tyrants, and that they were destroying both themselves and the city,—he, I say, fearing both for his country and race, applied a remedy, by introducing the government of elderly men, and the division of the Ephori, as the means of preserving the royal government. And it is owing to this that it has been preserved for so many generations with glory; since here law became the proper king of men, and men did not tyrannize over the laws. To effect this indeed my present discourse persuades all men, exhorting those that aspire after tyranny to turn and fly, with an unwearied celerity, from the felicity of hungry and stupid men, and endeavour to transfer themselves to a royal form of government, become subservient to royal laws, and thus obtain the greatest honours with the consent both of men and the laws.
[354c] But I advise [354d] those that pursue free manners, and avoid a servile yoke as an evil, to be cautious lest, through an insatiable avidity of a certain unseasonable liberty, they fall into the disease of their ancestors, who, through an unmeasured love of freedom, suffered all the evils of extreme anarchy. For those that governed in Sicily before Dionysius and Hipparinus, lived as they thought happily, because they lived luxuriously, and governed even governors themselves. They likewise dissolved the authority of the twelve military chiefs prior to Dionysius, and judged no one according to law, that they might not be subject to any one who governed either with justice or law. But they were in every respect entirely free, and on this account they became subject to tyrannic governments. [354e] For both slavery and freedom when they are transcendent, are attended with every evil. [355a] But when they subsist according to measure, they are attended with every good. And the service of divinity is attended with measure, but that of men is without measure. Divinity too is the law to temperate men, but pleasure to the intemperate.
[355b] Since these things, therefore, naturally subsist in this manner, I exhort that the advice which I give to the friends of Dion be given to all the Syracusians, as the common advice of Dion and myself. But I will unfold what he while living and able said. Though perhaps some one may inquire what the advice of Dion has to do with the present affairs. Hear:—“O Syracusians, receive before all things such laws as appear to you to be neither conducive to gain, nor the gratification of your desires; [355c] but as there are three things, viz. soul, body, and riches, it is requisite that the care of the soul should rank in the first place; that of the body in the second place, situated under the care belonging to the soul; and, in the third place, the honour pertaining to riches, as in a state of servitude to both body and soul. The divine institution effecting these things, will be a law rightly established for you, and rendering those by whom it is used truly happy. But the discourse which calls the rich happy, is itself miserable and stupid, is the discourse of women and children, and renders those that are persuaded by it like itself. Indeed, that these things to which I exhort you are true, you will know in reality, if you have tasted of what has now been said by me respecting laws. [355d] But a most true examination appears to have taken place respecting all things. However, such laws being received, since Sicily is in danger, and you neither sufficiently vanquish, nor are remarkably vanquished, it will perhaps be just and advantageous to all of you to pursue the middle path, as well for those of you that avoid the severity of government, as for those of you that desire its restoration. For your ancestors formerly, which is a thing of the greatest consequence, preserved the Greeks from the Barbarians; so that it is now lawful to discourse concerning the present polity. For if at that time the Greeks had perished, we could neither have discoursed in any respect concerning them, nor would any hope whatever have remained. Now therefore to some let there be liberty in conjunction with a royal government; but to others in subjection to it; the laws at the same time having dominion not only over the other citizens, but over kings themselves, whenever they are found to act contrary to law. But in all these affairs, establish kings in conjunction with the gods, with a mind sound and free from guile.
[355e] And, in the first place, establish my son²⁰ on a two-fold account, viz. for my sake, andfor the sake of my father. For he at that time freed the city from the Barbarians: [356a] but I freed it twice from tyrants, as you yourselves can testify. But, in the second place, make him a king, who has the same name²¹ with my father, I mean the son of Dionysius: and this do for the sake of the assistance which he now affords, and on account of his pious manners; for though he is the son of a tyrant, yet he has voluntarily liberated the city; and has thus procured for himself and his race ever-living honour, instead of the transient and unjust renown of a tyranny. In the third place, it is proper to invite willingly to the kingdom of the Syracusians, the city also being willing, Dionysius the son²² of Dionysius, who is now the general of the enemy’s army, if he assents to the kingly form of government, fearing the changes of fortune, commiserating his country, and paying due reverence to temples and sepulchres; lest through a love of contention he should involve all things in ruin, and thus gratify the Barbarians by the destruction of his country.
[356b] These three kings, therefore, whether you give or deprive them of a Lacedæmonian power, you should by common consent establish after the manner which I have before mentioned to you, and which now again hear. If the offspring of Dionysius and Hipparinus are willing, for the safety of Sicily, that the present calamities should cease, and are thus desirous to procure honours for themselves and their race, both for the future and present time, on this condition, as I have before said, call them to the government, investing with the power of making a reconciliation, such ambassadors as they shall think fit for the purpose, whether they are chosen from among yourselves, or from other cities, or from both; and besides this, as many as they shall choose to allow.
[356c] These, in the first place, should establish laws and a polity, in which it will be requisite that the kings should be lords of the sacred, and such other concerns as ought to be entrusted to the benefactors of their country. Guardians of the laws too should be created, thirty-five in number, and these, together with the people and senate, should be the governors of war and peace. There should likewise be different courts of justice: and the thirty-five guardians of the laws should be the judges of death and banishment. [356d] And besides these, judges should be chosen from those that acted last in the capacity of governors; so that one who appears to be the best and the most just should be chosen from each government. These too, on the following year, must judge such of the citizens as deserve death, or imprisonment, or exile. But the king shall not be permitted to be a judge of these decisions, as being a priest, and consequently purified from murder, bonds, and exile. While living, I conceived that these things should take place, and I think so at present. And then indeed, in conjunction with you, I should have vanquished my enemies, if foreigners and the furies had not prevented me from effecting what I intended to effect.
[356e] In the next place, if the event of things had answered my expectations, I should have caused the rest of Sicily to be inhabited, after having expelled the Barbarians [357a] from the places which they now occupy, such of them however being excepted as fought for the common liberty against the tyranny. I should likewise have restored the former inhabitants of Grecian places to their antient and paternal abodes. [357b] I therefore advise and call upon all of you to conceive and act in the very same manner at present: and let him who is unwilling to do so, be considered in common as an enemy. But neither are these things such as it is impossible to accomplish: for he who judges those things to be impossible, which subsist in the souls of two persons, and which from reasoning will readily be found to be the best of things, is by no means wise. But by the two, I mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius, and the soul of my son. For I think if these two agree, the other Syracusians, and all those who are lovers of their country, will likewise be unanimous. [357c] But paying due honours, and praying to all the gods, and to those other natures whom it is proper to reverence in conjunction with the gods, and besides this persuading and inciting both your friends and enemies, benignantly, and in every possible way, do not desist, till [357d] by what we have now said, urging you in the same manner as divine dreams urge those that are awake, you obtain clear evidence and prosperous fortune in perfection.”

## Epistle IX

[357e] Plato to Archytas the Tarentine—Prosperity.
[357e] The familiars of Archippus and Philonides came to us, bringing with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the state of your affairs. Such things therefore as pertain to the city, they accomplished without difficulty; for they were not in every respect laborious. But as to what relates to yourself, they said that you are indignant because you cannot be freed from an attention to public concerns. That it is indeed the most pleasant thing in life, for a man to attend to his own affairs, especially if he chooses to act in the same manner as you do, is nearly obvious to every one; but you ought also to consider this, that each of us is not born for himself alone; [358a] but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents another part, and our friends the remaining part. Much too must be given to the occasions which occupy our life. As your country, therefore, calls upon you to attend to public affairs, it would perhaps be absurd not to obey its call: for at the same time too, it happens that a place is left for depraved men, who apply themselves to politics, not from the best motives. But of these things enough.
[358b] At present we take care of Echecrates²³, and shall do so in future; and this for your sake, and that of his father Phrynion, and for the sake of the young man himself.

## Epistle X

[358c] Plato to Aristodorus—Prosperity.
[358c] I hear that you are now in the most eminent degree the associate of Dion, and that you are at all times most wise with respect to those manners that are subservient to philosophy. For I say that firmness, faith, and integrity, constitute true philosophy. But I think that other wisdom and skill, which tend to other things, when denominated elegant subtilties, will be rightly named. But now farewell; and continue to abide in the manners in which you now abide.

## Epistle XI

[358d] Plato to Laodamas—Prosperity.
[358d] We have before written to you, that your coming to Athens is of great consequence with respect to all you say. But as you declare you cannot come, if either I should be able to come, or Socrates, as you mention in your letter, this will be the second plan to be adopted. [358e] Socrates however, at present, labours under the infirmity of the strangury; and it would be disgraceful for me to go thither, if the particulars, for the sake of which you incite me to make this journey, are not accomplished: but I have not much hope that they will be accomplished. However, to discuss every particular would require a long epistle. And at the same time my body, through age, is not able to bear the fatigue of wandering, and to encounter all those dangers with which the land and sea are surrounded; [359a] especially at the present time, when travelling is full of danger. But I give you as advice, that which Hesiod, through me as the relator, says, “that to opine is vile, but to understand is difficult.” For if there are any who think that a city can be well established by the mere promulgation of laws, without some one endued with authority presiding in the city, and [359b] attending to the conduct of its inhabitants, in order that both slaves and the free born may be temperate and brave,— those who entertain this opinion do not think rightly.
[359c] But again, if there are men among you who deserve this authority, let them obtain it. But if there is occasion for some one to instruct them, I think that neither he who can teach, nor those who are capable of being instructed, are with you. All that remains, therefore, is to pray to the gods: for cities, prior to the present time, have been nearly constituted in this manner. And after they have been well peopled, through the intervention of great concerns, which have taken place through war and other transactions, then at such like seasons an illustrious and good man has obtained a mighty power. But prior to this, it is proper and necessary to bestow great attention on these things. Consider what I say, and do not act imprudently, in consequence of thinking that something ought to be done with expedition. May prosperity attend you.

## Epistle XII

[359d] Plato to Archytas the Tarentine—Prosperity.
[359d] It is wonderful with what pleasure we received the commentaries which came from you, and how very much we were delighted with the genius of their author. To us indeed, he appeared to be a man worthy of his antient progenitors. For those men are said to have been ten thousand in number; and according to the fable, they were the best of all those Trojans that were excited by Laomedon.
[359d] With respect to the commentaries by me, about which you write, they are not yet finished. [359e] However, such as they are, I have sent them to you. With respect to guardianship, we both accord in our sentiments, so that in this particular there is no need of exhortation²⁴.

## Notes

[1] This and the fifth Epistle appear to have been written by Dion, the celebrated but unfortunate disciple of Plato, though the Aldine edition ascribes them to Plato.
[2] What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery.
[3] The following observations, extracted from the second book of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, form an excellent comment on the present passage, which is no less deeply mystical than truly admirable: Plato here evidently neither connumerates the ineffable principle of things with the other principles posterior to him, nor does he coarrange it, as the leader of a triad, with the second and third powers. For in a triadic division, the first monad is the leader of the first orders, and which are coordinate with itself: but the second is the leader of second orders; and the third of those that are third. And if some one should apprehend that the first principle is the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments, yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension, is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And all things indeed are subject to the king of all things, according to one reason and one order: but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remaining kings. Is it not evident, therefore, that what is here said in a remarkable manner celebrates the exempt nature of the first cause, and his uncoordination with the other kingdoms of the gods? For Plato says, that the king of all similarly reigns over all things, that all things subsist about him, and that both essence and energy are present with all things for his sake. Observe too, that Plato calls the first god king, but he does not think proper to give this appellation to the rest. He likewise calls him the king not only of things first, as the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the cause at once of all being and of all beauty. Hence the highest god precedes the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and is neither celebrated by Plato as coordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad. But when Plato a little after says, “This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful things is as of a nature endued with a certain quality,” he clearly indicates that neither language nor knowledge is adapted to that which is first: for, as being unknown, it cannot be apprehended by intelligence, and as being uncircumscribed, it cannot be explained by words. But whatever you say of it, you will say, as of a certain thing; and you will speak indeed about it, but you will not speak it. For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend, through intelligence, what it is. Here, therefore, the addition of quality and the busy energy of the soul remove it from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligibles, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation of the good. And it is not only proper that the human soul should be purified from things coordinate with itself in the union and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and, exciting its own hyparxis, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of all things, and participate of his light as much as this is lawful for it to accomplish: but intellect also, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their highest unions, superessential torches⁴, and first hyparxes, are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-perfect transcendency; and through these establishes all things about himself, and being exempt from wholes, is ineffably present to all things. Every thing, therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, finds there the symbol of the father of all. All things too naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate mystic impression, divesting themselves of their own nature, and hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone, through the desire of his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, they become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcendently full. But that what is here said is concerning the first god, and that Plato, in these conceptions, leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I think, sufficiently evinced. Let us then in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend, by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato’s theology. Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature; which establishes all things about him, but does not assert that he generates or produces any thing, or that he pre-subsists as the end of things posterior to himself. For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him. Such then being this indication of the first god, and such the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which converts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists only for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for the sake of which all other things subsist: and all the natures that subsist between participate of these two idioms. Hence they genuinely adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings. The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to the preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to all beautiful things. For to celebrate him as the supplier of good, and as end preceding the two orders of things, is not very remote from the narration which says, that all causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from him, as well those which are paternal, and the sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not be said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we endeavour to ascribe to him the good and the one, we in like manner attribute to him cause, and that which is final or paternal, we must pardon the parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspiring to perceive him with the eye of intellect, and to speak about him; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of the one which is immense must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind. From these things, therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the first part of this sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity, transcendency, and in short the uncoordination with all things of the king of all. For the assertion that all things subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things posterior to it. But the second part celebrates the king of all things as prearranged in the order of end. For that which is the highest of all causes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause, and that for the sake of which all things subsist. This, therefore, is posterior to the other, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Platonic doctrine. Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause inferior to the final. Whence also Plotinus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first god the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the good, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of cause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed the good ineffable, as it is fit it should, but, from the habitude of things posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause: for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of the good, it excites in us the conception of the communion and coordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of all beautiful things. But this is to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and not to abide in the conception of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. For it is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from all things, and at another from the best of things: for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, is first participated by the best of things, and unfolds its own separate union through the idiom of these. We ascribe to it therefore the one and the good, from the donation from it which pervades to all things. For of those things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But the about which (το περι ὁ), the through which (το δι ου), the from which (το αφ’ ου), particularly subsist in the intelligible gods: and from these they are ascribed to the first god. For whence can we suppose the unical gods derive their idioms, except from that which is prior to them? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term about is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term through which pertains to the middle order of intelligibles: for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And the term from which is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles: for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly.
[4] Υπερουσιοις πυρσοις. Proclus thus denominates the superessential unities conformably to what is said of them by Plato in the 6th book of the Republic; for he there considers them as analogous to light.
[5] In all the editions of Plato that I have seen, κακων is here erroneously printed instead of καλων. I say erroneously, because not only the authority of Proclus but the sense of the passage proves it to be so.
[6] Plato means nothing more by this, than that what has been above said is conformable to the doctrine of Socrates.
[7] See the Phædrus of Plato, where the circumstance here alluded to is cited at length.
[8] By that god who is the leader of all things, Plato means Jupiter the artificer of the universe; and by the father and lord of this leader, the ineffable principle of things.
[9] Viz. by some one of those who are essentially dæmons or heroes.
[10] Viz. the union of the soul with this terrene body is not an immortal union.
[11] See the General Introduction prefixed to this work for the accurate meaning of this word.
[12] A famous Pythagorean philosopher.
[13] Plato here means by a thing of this kind, true being, the proper object of intellect.
[14] Viz. in the dianoëtic part of the soul: for the forms, or essential reasons subsisting in this part, are the objects of science.
[15] For the circle itself is an intellectual form, and is not to be apprehended by the discursive energies of the dianoëtic part, but by the simple projections of intellect.
[16] Viz. he will be unwilling to write perspicuously about the most sublime truths, unless the age in which he lives renders it necessary so to do, in order to preserve them to posterity.
[17] Odyss. lib. xii. v. 428.
[18] i. e. upwards of 13,300l.
[19] The Opici were the antient inhabitants of Campania.
[20] Dion, who is here supposed to be speaking, means his son Hipparinus.
[21] Viz. Hipparinus, the son of Hipparinus.
[22] Viz. the son of the second Dionysius.
[23] This is the person to whom the last discourse of Socrates was related by Phædo. See the Dialogue of that name.
[24] There is another epistle after this which is ascribed to Plato, but which I have not translated, because it is obviously spurious. That it is so, will be at once evident to the intelligent reader from the following sentence in it, της μεν γαρ σπουδαιας επιστολης θεος αρχει, θεοι δε της ηττον, viz. “The word god is the beginning of a serious epistle, the word gods of one that is not so.” Very properly therefore in all the early-editions of Plato is the reader admonished that this epistle is spurious by the word νοθευεται; and it is singular that Fabricius should doubt whether it might not be genuine, because Diogenes Laertius enumerates thirteen epistles of Plato, and this with the preceding makes thirteen. For of the thirteen which are extant, two, as the reader will perceive, are written by Dion. = THE END OF THE EPISTLES.