The Extant Fragments — Numenius
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Translation/edition: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie (1917)
Language: English
Read in Plato Scroll: https://plato-scroll.com/s/numenius-fragments/
This file: https://plato-scroll.com/text/numenius-fragments.txt
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Numbers in [brackets] are the edition's reference loci (Stephanus, Bekker, book.line, page...). Superscript numerals refer to the Notes at the end.


## From the Treatise On the Good


## First Book

(God as Improver of Matter.)
(This consists of a Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Stranger, see 29.18. The first Fragment begins in the midst of a sentence.)
9a. Numenius Is a Comparative Student of Religion.
Philosopher: In respect to this matter he will have to teach and interpret in the (best) Platonic tradition, and fuse it with the teachings of Pythagoras. Then (but only) so far as they agree with Plato, will he have to cite (the religions of) the famous nations quoting the mysteries, teachings and conceptions of the Brahmins, Hebrews, Magi, and Egyptians.
9b. Numenius Investigates Comparatively and Allegorically.
Than Celsus, how much less of a partisan is the Pythagorean Numenius, who, by many proofs, has demonstrated that he is most estimable, in that he investigated still other opinions, and from many sources gathered .what to him seemed true. In the first book of his treatise on the Good he also mentions, among the, nations that believed God was incorporeal, the Webrews, not scrupling to quote the expressions of the prophets, and expounding them allegorically.
13. Prato as A GREEK Mosss. Numenius, the Pythagorean philosopher, says outright, “What else is Plato than a Moses who (speaks Greek, or) reveals Greek tendencies ?”
10. The Road to Understanding of the Good (or, the Path to Ecstasy).
Bodies have to be perceived by tokens which reside in contiguous objects. But not from any cognizable. object can the Good be deduced. (Only by an illustration can we explain how to achieve an understanding of the*Good. It is) as if one were sitting on an observation-tower, and watching intently, and should, at a glance, discover a little solitary fishing-boat, sailing along between the waves. Thus, far from the visible world, must he commune with the Good, being alone with the alone (solitude), far from man, or living being, or. any body, small or great, in an inexpressible, indefinable, immediately divine’ sofitude. There, in radiant beauty, dwells the Good, brooding over existence in a manner which though solitary and dominating, is both peaceful, gracious and friendly.
To imagine that one sees the Good floating up to oneself is entirely wrong; and to suppose that he has approached the Good, is nothing less than impudent, so long as he dallies with the sense-world. For the approach to the Good is not easy, but what you might call divine(ly difficult). The best way is to neglect the whole visible world, courageously to attack the sciences, and to contemplate numbers; thus is achieved meditation on what is the One.
11. Real Being Inheres Neither in the Elements, Nor in Matter.
Stranger: Asking myself the nature of Existence, I wonder whether it could be the four elements,— earth, fire, and the two intervening natures (of water and air)? Could it possibly consist of these, either together or separate? ‘
Philosopher: Impossible! For these were generated,
‘and therefore transitory. This you can even observe when they arise one out of the other, and transmute, which shows that they are neither (genuine) elements nor compounds.
Stranger: If we then grant that Existence could ifs consist of any single body, is there not the alternatitethat it mght be matter (in general)?
Philosopher: Neither is this any more likely,” fot matter is incapable of stability; it is as undefined as:q swift flowing stream of infinite depth, breadth and length
12. The Soul as Savior of the Body.
Philosopher: Correct, therefore, would be the falft ing statement. Since matter is unlimited, it is indefi and this entails incomprehensibility, which results ‘tf knowability. But as order facilitates compréf®nsion, this unknowability means disorder; and a jumb{e-carthot stand or survive; (and this can be proved by: its contrary), for it is improbable that any one would attempt to demonstrate existence from a characteristic of instability.
4. This is the very point about which we ‘greed above, namely, that it would be irrational to apply ‘such predicates to existence. a
Stranger: That is surely self-evident; and it ig convincing, at least to me. a
Philosopher: Consequently I assert that neither matter as such, nor (matter made up into) bodies really exist.
5. Stranger: This being granted, it remains to ask whether within the nature of the universe exists a: ythigg else. Begs ie
Philosopher: Surely! I shall show you that egsif¥, : though we shall have to agree on some preliminage.
6. Since, by nature, bodies are dead and unstabledjn as they tend to alter, will we not, to explain gieie #éx perimental consistence, have to assume: some prineigle of coherence? i
Stranger: Of course!
Phildsopher: Without such a principle could they’ endure?
Stranger: Surely not!
Philosopher: What then is the nature of this principle through which they endure?
Stranger: If this principle of endurance itself were a body, it seems to me that, as the body (by itself, naturally) tends to become dispersed, it would need a savior that was a divinity. ’
8. Philosopher: If then this principle of endurance must be freed from the body’s tendency to become dispersed, so as to be able to hold the body together, and forefend it destruction, (especially) at times when they are born (or tested by strain), then it seems to me that it can be absolutely nothing else than the incorporeal. For, among all other natures this incorporeal nature alone can stand (or endure); it is the only self-adjysted (or poised, nature); and in no way (is it subject to the tendencies of other) bodies. For it is not generated, nor is it increased, nor disturbed by any sort of motion. On this account, it seems to me, we are justified in reserving for the Incorporeal the highest rank.
14. God’s Power as Solution of the Eleatic Puzzle.
(Of course, you know) Numenius, who came out of the school of Pythagoras, and who asserts that the teachings of Plato agree with those of Pythagoras, and who uses the latter teachings to confute the views of the Stoics about the principles of existence.
(Well, he) says that Pythagoras applied the name of Unity to the divinity; but to matter, the name of Doubleness (or manifoldness). (Evidently, says he), if this doubleness is indeterminate, then it cannot have been generated, which could have been the case only if determinate or limited. In other words, it was unborn and ungenerated before it was (created or) adorned; but when so (created and) adorned, or irradiated by the adjusting divinity, it was generated. However, inasmuch as the fate of being generated must surely fall into a time that is posterior, then must that (uncreated and) unadorned, and ungenerated, be considered as contemporary with the divinity by which it was organized (or, put in order). (Numenius also insisted that) some Pythagoreans had not correctly apprehended this statement, for they thought that even yon indeterminate and
incommensurable doubleness (or manifoldness) had been organized by yon single unity, through the following process. This unity receded from its singleness, and was transmuted into the form of doubleness (or manifoldness). This is wrong. For thus would unity have ceased to be unity, and would have been replaced by a premature doubleness (or manifoldness). Thus would’ matter be converted out of divinity, and incommensurable and indeterminate doubleness (or manifoldness) out of unity. Such an opinion would not seem plausible to people of even mediocre education.
Further, the Stoics held that matter was defined and limited by its own nature; while Pythagoras asserted that matter was infinite and unlimited. So the Stoics held that what was by nature undeterminate could not be organized naturally; but Pythagoras held that this organizing resulted from the energy and power of the Only God; for what is impossible to nature, that is easily possible to God, who is more powerful and excellent than any Power soever, and from whom nature herself derives her powers. ,
15. Providence as the Cure of Dualism.
On that account, says Numenius, does Pythagoras consider Matter a fluid lacking quality; but not, as the Stoics thought, a nature intermediary between good and evil, which they call indifferent, for he considers it entirely of evil. According to Pythagoras, the divinity is the principle and cause of the Good, while matter is that of evil; and Plato thinks likewise. That would be indifferent, which would derive from both the Idea (of the Good}, and matter. It is therefore not matter, but the world, which is a mixture of the goodness of the Idea, and the badness of Matter, and which, after all, arose from both Providence and Necessity, which is considered indifferent, according to the teachings of the ancient theologians.
16. The Origin of Evil, according to Various Thinkers.
The Stoics and Pythagoras agree that Matter is form-
less, and lacking in qualities. Pythagoras, however,
considers it evil; the Stoics, however, as neither good nor °
evil. But if you ask these same Stoics for the origin of any misfortune that may have overtaken them among’ the vicissitudes of life, they are wont to assign as its cause the perversity of its germs. Nevertheless, they gre unable to go further and in turn explain this (alleged) perversity, anasmuch as their teachings allow only for two principles of the world: God and matter; God, the highest and supereminent Good and indifferent matter.
Pythagoras, however, does not hesitate to defend the truth, even if he has to do so with assertions that are remarkable, and that contradict the universal eopinions of humanity. For he says that evils must exist necessarily, because of the existence of Providence, which implies the existence of matter and its inherent badness. For if the world derives from matter, then must it necessarily have been created from a precedingly existing evil nature. Consequently Numenius praises Heraclitus, who finds fault with Homer for having wished that all evils might be so eradicated from life as to evanesce (as he says in Odyssey 13, 45:
“Oh that the Gods would endue us with all sorts of
virtues,
“And that there were no evil in the world!”)
Unfortunately, Homer seems to have forgotten that evil was rooted in matter, and that in thus desiring extermination of evil he was in realty evoking the destruction of the world.
The same Numenius praises Plato for having taught the existence of two world-souls:—the one being very beneficent, and the other malevolent, namely, matter. For if nature is in even only moderate motion, then must it necessarily be alive and animated, according to the laws of all things whose motion is innate.
This (matter) is also the cause and director of the passible part of the soul, which contains something corporeal, mortal and similar to the body, just as the rational
part of the soul derives from reason and God. For the’ world is created out of (a commingling of) God and matter. .
17. Providence Cures the Reluctance of Matter.
Therefore, according to Plato, does the world owe its good qualities to the generosity of a paternal divinity, while its evils are due to the evil constitution of matter, as a mother. This fact makes it evident that the Stoics, when they assert that everything arises from the motion of the stars, in vain attribute the cause of evil to a certain “perversity.” For even the stars are of fire, and are heavenly “bodies.” Matter, however, is the nurse or feeder; and consequently, whatever disturbs the motion of the stars so as to confuse its purposefulness or efficiency, must derive its origin from matter, which contains much unmoderated (desire) and unforeseen (impulse), chance, and passion.
If then, as is taught in the Timaeus (10) of Plato, God so perfects matter as to effect order out of disordered and turbulent motion, then must it have derived this confused contrariness from chance, or from an unfortunate fate, not from the normalizing intentions of Providence.
Therefore, according to Pythagoras, is the Soul of Matter not without substance, as is believed by a majority; and it opposes Providence, plotting how to attack its decisions by the power of its maliciousness:
On the other hand, Providence is the work and function of the Divinity, while blind and fortuitous “rashness” derives from matter; consequently it is evident that, according to Pythagoras, the whole world is created by the commingling of God and matter, and of Providence and chance. However, after matter has been organized,
it becomes the mother of the corporeal and nature-born divinities. Her own lot, (however, is said to be), preponderatingly happy, but not entirely so, inasmuch as her native malice cannot be entirely eliminated.
18. How God Perfects the World.
God therefore (created or) adorned Matter with a certain magnificent virtue (or strength), and corrected its faults in every possible way, without, however, entirely eliminating them, lest material Nature should entirely perish. Still, he did not permit her ‘to extend herself too far in all directions, but he transformed her whole condition by enlightenment and adornment so as to leave a nature which might be turned from inefficiency to efficiency; and this he accomplished by introducing system into its disordered confusion, proportion into its incommensurability, and beauty into its repulsiveness.
Very rightly does Numenius deny the possibility of finding any flawless condition, whether in human works of art, or in nature, in the bodies of animated beings, or in trees or fruits; no, nor in the blowing of the wind, in the flowing of the water, nor even in heaven. Everywhere does the nature of evil mingle with Providence, as some flaw.
As (Numenius) strives to represent an unveiled image of Matter, and to bring it into the light, he suggests, (as a suitable method to attain such a conception), that one’ should think away all single bodies, that continually change their form (as it were) in the lap of matter. That which remains after this abstraction should bé' contemplated in the mind; this residuum he calls “matter,” and “necessity.” The whole world-machine arose from this (residuum) and God, in that God persuaded (to goodness), and necessity (matter) yielded.
This teaching of the origin of all things (Numenius ascribes) to Pythagoras. (However, it is Platonic, as may be seen in Timaeus, 10, 14).

## Second Book

(Theological Metaphysics.)
19. The Existent as Timeless, Motionless and Permanent.
1. Philosopher: Very well! Let us approach as near as possible to Existence and let us say: “Existence never was, nor ever became; but it is always in definite time, namely, the present moment” (see Plot. Enn, 3.7.3).
2. Should anyone desire to name this present moment “aeon” (or eternity), I would agree with him; for, on the one hand, we shall have to assume about past time, that it has fled, and has disappeared into Whatno-longer-exists. On the other hand, the future docs not exist yet, and all we can say about it is that it has the potentiality of coming into existence. For this reason it will not do to think of existence, in a single expression, as either not existing, or as existing no longer, or as not yet existing. Such an expression would introduce into our discussion a great contradiction: namely, that the same thing could simultaneously exist and not exist.
4. Stranger: Were this the case, and did Existence itself not exist, in respect to existence, then indeed could anything else hardly exist.
Philosopher: Therefore the Existent is eternal «and firm, ever equable, or identical; and it neither arose nor passed away, nor increased nor diminished; never did it become more or less, and it entails no spatial or other kind of motion. For it does not lie in its nature to be moved, the Existent will never be displaced backwards
or forwards, up or down, right or left (the six Platonic kinds of motion); nor will it ever turn on its axis, but it will stand self-poised and (still) standing, ever remaining self-similar and identical.
20. True Existence Is Supersensual.
6. Philosopher: So much as introduction. I myself shall make no further evasions, claiming ignorance of the name of the Incorporeal.
Stranger: Jalso think it is more suitable to express it, than not.
Philosopher: Of course, I do acknowledge that his name is that which we have so long sought; and let no one ridicule me if I assert his name is “Being and Existence.” The reason of this name “Existent” is that he neither arose nor decayed, and adinits of no motion whatever, nor. any change to better or worse; for he is always simple and unchangeable, and in the same idea (or form?), and does not abandon his identity either voluntarily, or compulsorily. 8. Then, as you remember Plato said in the Cratylos (587D), names are applied according to similarity with the things.
Stranger: We will then accept it as demonstrated that the Incorporeal is the Existent.
21. Existence and Growth, or Conception and Perception.
9. Philosopher: 1 said that the Existent was the Incorporeal, and that this was intelligible. : Stranger: So far as I remember, that is what I said.
Philosopher: 1 will now proceed with the further investigation, premissing, however, that if this does not agree with the teachings of Plato, it must be assumed that
it is derived from another great and powerful personality, such as Pythagoras. It is Plato, however, who says,— stop, I remember the passage literally (Timaeus 9): .
“What is the Ever-existent, which has nothing to do with Becoming? On the other hand, What is,the Becoming, but which is never-existent? The first is ine telligible to the understanding by reasoning; ever remaining the same; while the other is perceptible by perception, by unreasoning sensation arising and passing away, but never really existing.”
tt. So he asked, “What is the Existent?” and designated it unequivocally as the Unbecome, (or that which was not due to growth). For he said that this could not affect the Existent, which in this case would be subject to change; and what is changeable would of course not be Existent.
22. the Unchangeable Is the Incompreiuensible.
12. Philosopher: Ynasmuch as the Existent is wholly eternal and unchanged, and in no way jutting out over itself, for, (according to Plato, in Phaedo 62) “it stands fast similarly,” this must surely be comprehensible by intellect and reason. But as the Body flows, and suffers change, consequently it passes away, and is no more; so that it would be sheer folly to deny that this (Body) was not the Indefinite, perceptible only by sense-perception, and, as Plato says (Tim. 9): “becoming and being destroyed, but never really existing.”

## Third Book

(Allegoric expounding by comparative religion?) 23. Legend of the Opponents of Moses.
2. Further, we have Jamnes and Jambres, Egyptian priests and savants, men whom fame credited with being able to perform incantations as well as any one else, at the time of the exodus of the Israelites out of Egypt.
2. The Egyptian people considered them worthy to enter into the lists against Moses, who led the Israelites away, and who, through prayer, had much influence with the Divinity; and it was seen that they were able to turn aside the worst plagues that Moses brought over Egypt.
24. A Story about Jesus Allegorized.
In the third book of his treatise about the Good, Numenius relates a story about Jesus, without, however, mentioning his name, and he interprets it allegorically. Whether he interpreted it rightly or wrongly, must be discussed in another place. He also relates the story about Moses and Jamnes and Jambres.
65. Numenius as Allegorical Student of History.
This however does not fill us with pride, even if we do approve of Numenius, rather than of Celsus or of any other of the Greeks, in that he voluntarily investigated our histories out of thirst of knowledge, and in that he accepted them (at least) as stories that were to be received allegorically, and not as stupid inventions.
The fourth book is entirely missing.

## Fifth Book

(Philosophical Theology?)
25. Theory of the Divine Development.
3. If it be granted that Existence, and the Idea, is intelligible, and that Mind is older than this, as its cause, then it must be concluded that this Mind alone is the Good. For if the Creating Divinity is the principle of Becoming, then surely must the Good be the principle’ of Being. Inasmuch as the Creating Divinity is analogous to him, being his imitator, then must Becoming (be analogous) to Being. because it is its image and imitation.
But if the Creator is the Good of Becoming, then must the Creator of Being be the Good-in-itself, being cognate as to Being. But as the Second (Divinity) is double, he himself produces the Idea of himse?f, and the World, inasmuch as his nature is that of a, Creator; although he himself remains intelligible. '
As we now have deduced the name of four things, there results these four: The First God, (who is) the Good-in-itself; his imitator, the Good Creator; but there is one Being of the First, and another of the Second; whose imitation is the Beautiful World, which is beautified by the participation (in the Being) of the First.
26. Life-process of the Divinity.
1. Philosopher: Whoever wishes to make himself a correct idea of the communion (or relation) between the first and the second, will first have to coordinate logically everything in correct sequence; only then, when it seems to him that he has done this correctly, has he any right to try to speak formally; but not otherwise. He however, who undertakes the latter before the First has become (clear), will experience, in the words of the proverb, his whole treasure turning to ashes.
2. But may this not happen to us! On the contrary, first having (as Plato and Plotinos ever did), invoked the Divinity, that we may become his own interpreter in the Investigation (about the Logos?), that we may show up a treasure of thoughts; and so, let us begin. Stranger: So let us pray, and begin (the investigation).
3. Philosopher: (Good!) The First God, who exists in himself, is simple; for as he absolutely deals with none but himself, he is in no way divisible; however,
the Second and Third God are One. When however this (unity) is brought together with Matter, which is Doubleness, the (One Divinity) indeed unites it, but is by Matter split, inasmuch as Matter is full of desires, and in a flowing condition. But inasmuch as+He is not only in relation with the Intelligible, which would ‘be more suitable to his own nature, He forgets himself, while He gazes on Matter, and cares for it. He comes into touch with the Perceptible, and busies Himself with it; He leads it up into His own nature, because he was moved by desires for Matter.
27a. The Mutual Relation of the Two First Divinities.
The First God may not undertake creation, and therefore the First God must be considered as the Father of the Creating Divinity. If, however, we should conduct an investigation concerning the Creating (Power), and should say that, first granting his existence, that creation specially characterizes him, then we would have a suitable starting-point for our investigation, or, to their relation (about the Logos?); but if the investigation is not about the Creator, but about the First God, I retract what I said (out of religious reverence); and I will undertake to ferret out this relation (or Logos?) from another side.
8. But before we can run down (?) this relation (the Logos?) we must agree unequivocally about this point: that the First God is free from all labor, inasmuch as he is King; while the Creator rules in that he passes through the heaven. A
27b. The Vitalizing Influence of the Divinity.
g. For through this one comes our Progress (?), in that on this passage (of the Creator through the heavens)
the (divine Mind) is shed upon all who were appointed (or who make an effort?) to participate in it.
10. Now whenever the Divinity glances on any one of us, and turns towards us, there results life, and animation of bodies; (and) this occurs whenever the Divinity occupies himself therewith even only from 2, distancé. But whenever the Divinity turns again towards his watchtower, then all this (animation) again is extinguished; but the (divine) Mind itself tranquilly continues its blissful existence.
28. God as Cosmic Sower.
The relation between the farmer to the sower is exactly that between the First God and the (Becoming) -Creator. For this (Second God?) is himself the seed of every soul, and sows (himself) in all the (receptive?) things (of Matter) which are allotted to him. The lawgiver (the Third God or Creator?) plants, distributes, and transplants in each of us that which has been sowed from there.
29. The Divinity Is Undiminished in the Distribution of Knowledge to Men. “How the Second (God) Is Subordinated to the First Cause.”
Everything that passes over to the Receiver, and leaves the Giver, during the act of Giving, is such as service (healing ?), riches, or coined or uncoined money; this is the process with human and earthly gifts.
When, however, the Divine is communicated, and passes over from the one to the other, it does not leave the Giver while being of service to the Receiver; not only does the Giver not lose anything thereby, but he gains this further advantage, the memory of his giving (or generosity).
16. This beautiful process occurs with knowledge, by which the Receiver profits, as well as the Giver. This can be seen when one candle receives light from another by
mere touch; the fire was not taken away from the other, but its component Matter was kindled by the fire of the other.
17. Similar is the process with knowledge, which by both giving and taking remains with the Giver, while passing over to the Receiver.
18. O Stranger, the cause of this process is nothing human; because the Shaper of things as well as the Being which possesses the knowledge, are identical; as well with the Divinity, which gives (the Shaping element, and knowledge), as with you and me, who receive it. That is also why Plato (Philebus 18) said that Knowledge (or, wisdom) had descended to humanity through Prometheus, as by a radiating light.
30. Salvation Streams from the Standing God.
20. Philosopher: This is the manner of life of the First and Second Gods. Evidently, the First God is the Standing One, while, on the contrary, the Second is in motion. The First God busies himself with the Intelligible, while the Second One deals with the Intelligible and the Perceptible.
21. Do not marvel at this my statement; for thou shalt hear (of things) far more marvellous still. In contrast to the motion characteristic of the Second God, I call that characteristic of the First God, a standing still; or rather, an innate (motion). From this (First God) is shed abroad into the universe the organization of the world, eternity, and salvation.

## Sixth Book

(Spiritual Interpretations?)
31. Everything Is Only Signification of Higher Things.
‘22. Philosopher: Since Plato knew, that the Creator alone was known among men, and that, on the contrary, the First Mind, which is called Self-existence, was entirely unknown to them, he spoke as if some one said:
23. “O Men, the Mind which you dimly perceive, is not the First Mind; but before this Mind is another one, which is older and diviner.”.
32. Tur Demriurce as Pitor.
Philosopher: A Pilot, who sails along in the midst of the sea, sits high on the rowing bench, and directs the ship by the rudder; his eyes and mind are directed upwards through the ether to the constellations, and he finds his way on high through the sky, while below he is faring along through the sea. Similarly does the Creator adjust Matter, that it should not be injured nor broken up, by the harmony; he himself sits over this (matter) as over a ship on the sea (of matter); he directs this harmony (of adjusted matter) which sails along over the chaos, according to the Ideas; heavenwards, he looks up to the God in the height, directing his eyes upon him. So he derives the critical (power of discernment) from the contemplation of the Divine, and the impulsive (motion) from his desire (for matter, see
33. Everything Is Dependent on the Idea of the Good.
6. Philosopher: Whatever participates in him, participates in him in nothing but in thought; in this manner alone will it profit by entrance unto the Good, but not otherwise. This thought is characteristic of the First alone. Now if this is to be found only in the Good, then would it betray foolishness of soul to hesitate in the matter from whom the other derives its color and goodness.
7. For if the Second (Divinity) is good, not from itself but from the First, how then would it be possible that he (the First) is not good, if the latter derives his goodness from participation with the (other, the First), especially as the Second participates in him (the First) specially because he is the Good?
8. So Plato taught the sharply observant (auditor) by his statement, “That the Good is One.”
34. Even the Creator Dependent from the Idea of the Good.
That this is so, Plato has expressed in different ways; for in the Timaeus (10) he used the popular manner of expression, and said that he was “good;” but in his Republic (vii.14), he speaks of the “Idea of the Good.” Thus the Good would also be the Idea of the Creator, because he appears to us good through participation in the First and Only.
10. Just as one says, that men are formed according to the Idea of Man, and cattle after the Idea of Cattle, and the horses, after the Idea of the Horse, so is it also probably with the Creator; for if the latter is good only because of his participation in the goodness of the First Good, then would the First Mind, as the Good-in-itself, be its Idea (or model).
35a. Birth as Wetness.
For they believed that, as Numenius says, the souls hovered over the divinely inspired water. That is why the Prophet (Moses, Gen. i. 2) said, “The Spirit of God hovered over the Water.” Similarly, for this reason, did the Egyptians (believe) that all the demons did not stand on firm ground, but all on a ship. This applies to the sun, and to all the Demons who (should?) know that all the souls that descend towards birth have a hankering for wetness. That is why Heraclitus said that “Tt was not death, but an enjoyment for souls to become humid.” So the fall into generation was a delight for them. In another place he says that we lived the death of those souls, and that those souls lived our death. Likewise the Poet (Homer, Odd. vi. 201; ix. 43) named the (souls) which were in generation wet (dieros means both living and wet), because they had souls wetted through,—seeing that water serves as nourishment for one part of the plants. 35b. Homer Should Be Interpreted Allegorically.
Tt seems to me also that the partisans of Numenius are not far from the truth in their assumption that in Homer’s
Odyssey Odysscus is the representation of a man who has passed through repeated generations (or incarnations), and thus has progressed to those who are beyond the wave and the infinite ocean (Od. xi. 122, 123):
“Until you have reached the men who da not know
the Sea,
And eat no food mingled with salt.”
(Evidently) “sea” and “salt” denote, even with Plato, material substance.
36. Tur Cosmic Triunity.
Numenius, who teaches three Gods, calls the First Father; the Second Creator, and the Third Creature; for, according to his opinion, the world is the Third God. According to him, therefore the Creator is double, (consisting) out of the First and Second God; but the Third is the Created; for it is better to speak thus, than as yon (Numenius), poetically, Fore-father, Offspring, and Descendant.
36b. Numenius Unites the Super-Existence with Existence.
Further does Numenius group together (1) that which is free from all difference, and (2) what stands beneath and thereafter. 36c. Numenrus Distincuisnes Tur First anp SECOND
Divinity.
(Numenius) asserts a double’ Creating Divinity, the one I’ather, but the other Creator.
37. Inner Relationship between God and the World.
Numenius, Kronius and Amelius teach that everything that is intelligible and perceptible participates in the Ideas; but Porphyry asserts this only of the Perceptible.
38. Existence Itself Not Mingled with Matter.
Among all those who defend the birth of the Divinities, we may say that they either teach that Existence is mingled with Matter, ... or that Existence is not mingled with Matter, the mingling being limited to its dynamic (Powers), and energies, as teach the partisans of Numenius.
63. The World of Ideas Is Located within the Second God.
But if, as writes Amelius, and before him, Numenius, there is participation (in true Existence, not only in the Perceptible), but also in the Intelligible, then would the Forms exist in the latter also.
39. Mutual Relation of the Triad. Numenius relates the First (Mind) to that which is really alive; and says, that it thinks, out of desire to the Second (God). The Second Mind he relates to the First, and asserts that it becomes creative out of desire for the third; and the Third he relates to the (human) Thinking.
40. Life Is Concatenation among the Laws of Life.
Numenius, who believes that everything is thoroughly mingled together, considers that nothing is simple.

## Concerning the Mystery-Teachings of Plato

41. The Problem of Sincerity.
If Plato had undertaken to write about the theology of the Athenians, and then, in bitterness, had accused* them of the mutual discord of the Divinities, and their incests, and devouring of their own children, and of deeds of vengeance of fathers and brothers;—if Plato had brought up all this in open and unreserved accusations,
then according to my opinion he would have given them an occasion to commit another wrong, and to kill him, like Socrates. :
2. Now (Plato) did not indeed desire to retain hte more than to tell the truth; but as he saw that he might live in security, and also tell the truth, so he represented the Athenians under the form of Eutyphro, a boastful and foolish man, who spoke about the divinities as badly as anybody else; but his own teachings he laid into the mouth of Socrates, whom he represented in his genuine form, as he was wont to confute every person with whom he associated. .
59. Numenius as Revealer of the Eleusynian. Mysteries.
Among the philosophers Numenius was one of the most eager for Mysteries. A dream announced to him that the Divinities were offended, because he had published the Eleusynian mysteries by interpretation. He dreamed, namely, that the Eleusynian divinities, garbed like prostitutes, stood before a public house of ill fame; and as he was wondering how the Goddesses came to such an ignominious attire, they had angrily answered that by himself they had been violently torn out of the sanctuary of their modesty, and had been exposed for hire to every passer-by.

## The Initiate (or, The Hoopoe)

(Or, the Hoopoe, the Bird of Prognostication. See Phaedo, 77.)
42. Strained Etymological Interpretations.
Apollo is called the Delphian because he enlightens with clear light what is dark, and demonstrates it in the clear light, ek tou deloun aphane: or, as Numenius pre-
fers the one, and only. He asserts, indeed, that in the ancient Greek language adelphos meant only; and from this is derived the word for brother, adelphos, because he is no longer the only one.
43. The Soul Is Retained in the Body as in a Prison, by Impulsive Passion.
According to all these rules, we will easily be able to demonstrate that neither does the Good signify the prison (of which Plato speaks in Phaedo 16), as some say, nor impulsive passion, as says Numenius (Crat. 43).

## Concerning the Indestructibility of the Soul

44. The Soul Is Immaterial and Incorporeal.
(Because) bodies, according to their own nature, are changeable, inconstant, and infinitely divisible, and nothing unchangeable remains in them, there is evidently need of a principle that would Icad them, gather them, and bind them fast together; and this we name Soul. If then the soul were a body of any kind of constitution, even if it were as small as (an atom,) what would then hold that together? For we said that every body needed some principle that would hold the body together, and so on into infinity, until we should reach the incorporeal.
If however one should say, as the Stoics do, that a certain tension inhered in the bodies, which moved them simultaneously inward and outward, the outward motion effecting size and quality, while the inward motion effected unification and Being, then we still would have to ask, inasmuch as every motion derives from some force, which is this force, and in what does it consist? Now if this force also is any sort of matter, we would still need the same arguments. But if it were not matter
as such, and if it were only material,—for what is only material is something different from matter, for we call material that which only participates in matver,—what then is this in which Matter participates? Is it itself again matter, or not matter? If it is matter, how could it be material and still not be matter? But if it is not matter then it surely is immaterial. If then it is immaterial, then is it no body, for all bodies are material.
Should it be said, however, that because bodies have three dimensions, then must also the soul, as it penetrates the whole body, be of triple extension, and therefore in any case be a body, then would we have to answer that although every body has three dimensions, yet not everything that has three dimensions is a body. Jl*or quantity and quality, which in themselves are incorporeal, may under certain circumstances be reckoned quantatively. Likewise the soul, which in itself is non-extensive, might be considered as tridimensional in case that by chance it had happened into something tridimensional.
Further, every body is either moved from within or from without; if from without, then is it inanimate; but if from within, then is it animated. Were the soul a body, and were it moved from without, then it is inanimate; but if from within, then it is animated. But it would be sheer nonsense to call the soul both animate and inanimate. Therefore the soul is no body.
Further, if the soul is fed, then is it fed from the incorporeal, for the sciences are its food. But no bovly is fed from the incorporeal; therefore also is the soul no body; this was the deduction of Xenocrates. But if it is not fed, and the body of every living being is fed, then also is the soul no body.
45. Numenius Tells Marvellous Stories.
That men have, at times, experienced incredible and improbable experiences, has been the statement of many Greeks; not only of such of whom it might be suspected that they were indulging in myths, but also of such as have demonstrated that they have carried on philosophy seriously, and relate the truth of what has actually happened to them. Such have we read in the works of Chrysippos of Soloi, and the Pythagorean Numenius, in the second book of his treatise on the Indestructibility, of the Soul.
46. The Soul Is Explained Mathematically.
Before those, who earlier than we have attempted to explain the nature of the soul mathematically as some medium between the natural and the supernatural, it is asserted by those who call the soul a number, that it consists of unity, as something indivisible, and of the indefinite doubleness (manifold) as something divisible — Others, however, who conceive of the soul as of a geometrical figure, insist that it consists of a point and the divergence (either a locus and the divergence of two lines, or a centre and the radius of a circle); of which the first is indivisible, and the second divisible. Of the first opinion are the partisans of Aristander, Numenius, and the majority of the expounders; of the second opinoin is Severus,
47. The Legend of the Atlanteans Only Allegorical.
Several refer the story of the Atlanteans and the Athenians to the separation of the more beautiful souls, which receive their life from Athene (the goddess of wisdom), and the other creative souls, who are related to the (Neptune), the divinity which presides over birth. Thus does Numenius explain it.
p. 26. Origen asserts that the whole story is an invention and thus much did he grant the companions of Numenius.
62a. Soul-Struggle Before Incarnation. These theologians and Plato teach that before .the souls descend into material bodies, they must go through a struggle with the physical demons who are of western nature, inasmuch as, according to the belief of the Isgyptians, the West is the abode of harmful demons.
62b. Porphyry Follows the Teachings of Numenius.
Of this opinion is Porphyry, of whom we would be very inuch surprised if he asserted any teaching differing from that of Numenius.
64. The Evil Demons Delight in Sacrificial Smoke.
I remember having read in the book of a certain Pythagorean, where he was expounding the hidden meanings of the Poet (Ilomer), that the prayer of Chryses to Apollo, and the plague which Apollo sent down upon the Greeks, were proofs that Ilomer knew of certain evil demons, who delight in sacrificial smoke; and who, as reward to the sacrificer, grant them the ruin of others as answer to their prayers.
61. Numenius as Vulgarizer of the Serapis. Mysteries.
In the books of the Pythagorean Numenius we read a description of the formation of (Serapis). The latter was said to participate in the being of everything that is produced by nature, animals and plants. So one could see that he was erected into a divinity not only by the sculptors, with the aid of profane mysteries, and magic means that evoke demons, but also by magicians and sorcerers, and of the demons evoked by their incamtations.
48. All in All.
Some (philosophers) locate in the divisible soul the
whole intelligible world, the Gods, the Demons, and the
Good, and everything that deserves reverence; likewise do they assert that all is in all; but this is in a manner such that each thing is in each in a manner suitable to its nature. Of this opinion is undoubtedly Numenius.
49a. Life Is a Battle.
Even among the Platonists many differ; for some, like Plotinos and Porphyry, comprehend the forms and the organic parts of life, and the energizings (of life?) into a single system and idea; but others, like Numenius, strive to conceive of it, as a battle.
49b. Evil as an External Accretion.
p. 896. Of those who think otherwise are Numenius and Kronius, who think that evil is somehow added or grown to from the outside, and namely, from Matter.
50. All Incarnations Are of Evil.
Some of the younger (philosophers) do not make this distinction. As they possess no distinguishing characteristic, they confuse indiscriminately the incarnation of all things, and assert boldly that they are all of evil; and especially the companions of Kronius, Numenius, and Harpocrates.
51. The Soul Is Indiscerptibly One with God.
Numenius seems to teach the unification and the indiscerptibility of the soul with its source.
52. Presentation a Casual Consequence of the Synthetic Power of the Soul.
Numenius, who says that the synthetic power (of the soul) is receptive to energies; but that its power of presentation is a casual consequence; not its function
or result, but a by-product.
53. Numenius Assumes Two Souls, Not Soul-Functions.
Others, among whom is also Numenius, do not assume three parts of the soul, or at least two, namely, the rational and the irrational parts; but they think that we have two souls, a rational one, and an irrational one. Some of these again consider both immortal; others, only the rational.
54. Allegory of the Cave of the Nymphs.
Numenius and his companion Kronius consider the Cave (of the Nymphs) an image and a symbol of the World. (They hold that) in the heaven there are two extremities; there being nothing more southern than the winter-tropic, nor more northern, than the stummertropic, the summer-tropic being that of Cancer, and the winter-tropic, that of Capricorn. Because the tropic of Cancer is in the greatest proximity to the earth,: it was very properly ascribed to the moon, because the latter is nearest to the earth; but inasmuch as the southern pole is still invisible, to the tropic of Capricorn is ascribed the most distant and highest of the planets (Saturn).
Cap. 22. That is why the theologians asserted that these two, the Cancer and the Capricorn, are in reality two gates; For Plato asserted (Rep. +. 13) there were two openings, that of Cancer, through which souls descended, and that of Capricorn, through which they ascended, Cancer is northern, and descending, Capricorn to the south, and ascending. The northern opening is for the souls that descend to birth, ’
55. Immortality of the Forms of Matter.
Some, like Numenius, represent as immortal everything, from the rational soul, to the soulless forms o/ inorganic nature (or habit, a Stoic term).
56. All Souls Are Immortal.
Among those who have spoken of the divisibility of the soul from the body, some declare that it is divisible from the body; the rational, the irrational, and the vegetative. So thought Numenius, who permitted himself to be misled by some expressions of Plato who (Phaedr. 51) said, “every soul is immortal.”
57. Process of Human Degeneration.
(In contrast to an allegorical interpretation of the Platonic teaching of Metempsychosis, in Phaedo 70), it is assumed by Plotinos, Harpocrates, Amelius, Boethus, and Numenius, that when Plato speaks of a kite, he means nothing else than a kite; and likewise, when he speaks of a wolf, an ass, a monkey, or a swan. For they assert that it is possible that the soul should fill itself up with badness from the body, and become assimilated to the irrational creatures; to whomsoever it has assimilated itself, to it does it strive; and the one enters into this, the other into the other animal.

## Concerning Space

(See Fragment 11, and Plato, Timaeus.)
58. Numenius Allegorizes out of Hebrew Scriptures.
But I know that Numenius, a man who has supremely well interpreted Plato, and who placed confidence in Pythagorean teachings,—in many passages of his writings expounds utterances of Moses and the Prophets, and has interpreted them allegorically in a not improbable manner; as in his treatise On the Initiate, and in those

## About Numbers

(See Fragments 10, 25, 44, 46, and Plato, Timaeus, 14.)
60. Perhaps Numenius Taught Pythagorean Numerical Cabalism about the Soul.
Theodorus, the philosopher of Asine, was permeated with the teachings of Numenius. He spins dreams about the birth of the soul in a rather original manner, busying himself with letters, their form, and numbers . . . making the universal or geometrical number out of the (fourfold) soul, inasmuch as the group of seven finds itself in the name of the soul.

## Fragments from Nemesius (Numenius and Ammonius)

(Attributed jointly to Numenius and Ammonius Saccas.)
66. On the Immateriality of the Soul.
It will suffice to oppose the arguments of Ammonius, teacher of Plotinus, and those of Numenius the Pythagorean, to that of all those who claim that the soul is material. These are the reasons: “Bodies, containing nothing unchangeable, are naturally subject to change, to dissolution, and to infinite divisions. They inevitably need some principle that may contain them, that may bind and strengthen their parts; this is the unifying principle that we call soul. But if the soul also is material, however subtle be the matter of which she may be composed, what could contain the soul herself, since we have just secn that all matter needs some principle to contain it? The same process will go continuously to infinity until we arrive at an immaterial substance.”
VIII. References from Plotinos. 67. Derivation of “Apollo.” (See Fr. 42; Enn. v. 5, 6.)

## References from Plotinus

That is why the Pythagoreans were accustomed, among each other, to refer to this principle in a symbolic manner, calling him Apollo, which name means a denial of manifoldness.
68. Pythagorean Theology of the Cosmic Genesis. (See Fr. 15–17; Enn. v. 4, 2.)
This is the reason of the saying, “The ideas and numbers are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the One;” for this is intelligence.
69. Numenian Name for the Divinity. (See Fr. 20; Enn. v. 8, 5.)
That is why the ancients said that ideas are essences
and beings. 70. Evils Are Unavoidable. (See Fr. 16, 17; Enn. i. 8, 6; also i, 4, 11; iii. 3, 7.)
Let us examine the opinion that evils cannot be destroyed, but are necessary. forefend us destruction (especially) at times when they

## History of the Successors of Plato, or Why They Diverged from Him


## First Book

1. Why the Successors of Plato Diverged from Him.
1. Under Speusippus, Plato’s nephew, and Xenocrates, his successor, and Polemo, who took over the school from Xenocrates, the character of the teachings remained almost the same, because the notorious teaching of the “reserve of judgment” and the like, did not yet exist.
Later, however, much was declared differently, and was twisted, and the (teachers) did not remain with the first tradition. Although they all began with Plato, they all left him, some more quickly, some more slowly, purposely or unconsciously and sometimes even out of ambition.
2. My object, however, is not to oppose men like Xenocrates, but to save the honor of Plato. For it makes me indignant that they did not prefer to suffer and do any and all things, merely to save their agreement (with Plato). Plato, who though he was not better than the great Pythagoras, but also probably no worse, surely deserved it of them, that they should have followed and honored him; and they would also have had good reason to have highly esteemed Pythagoras.
3. On the contrary, there was no great necessity that the Epicureans should have preserved the teachings of their master so scrupulously; but they understood them, and it was evident that they taught nothing that diverged from the doctrines of Epicurus in any point. They agreed that he was the true Wise-man, remained unanimously with him, and therefore were fully justified in bearing his name. Even among the later Epicureans it was an
understood thing, that they should contradict neither each other nor Epicurus in any material point, and they consider it an infamous piece of outlawry; it is forbidden to promote any innovation. Consequently, none of them dared such a thing, and those teachings have always remained unchanged, because they were always unanimous, The School of Epicurus is like a properly administered state in which there are no parties who have the same thoughts and opinions; hence, they were genuine successors, and apparently, will ever remain such.
4. In the School of the Stoics, however, beginning from the very leaders, has ever reigned discord, which, indeed, has not ceased yet. It is with preference that they hold disputations, and (exercise?) themselves over any argument that is difficult to refute. Some have remained in the ancient teachings, others have already introduced changes. [Even the first were similar to oligarchs, and were disagreed; and it was really their fault that the later Stoics criticised the earlier ones so much, even to the extent that some claimed to be more stoical than others; especially those who disputed about externalities, and were petty. [For it was the latter who especially exceeded the others, and faulted them for being busybodies and quibblers.
5. But this fate far more overtook those who in different ways, each in his own manner, derived his teachings from Socrates,—Aristippus, Antisthenes, the Megarians, the Eretrians, and others.
6. The cause was that Socrates asserted the existence of three Gods, and philosophized about them in expressions suited to each single auditor. His auditors, however, did not understand this, but believed that he uttered all these expressions on chance, in accordance with the oppinion which happened to have the upper hand with him at the time.
7. Plato, who followed Pythagoras (in teachings or method) knew that Socrates had derived his teachings
from no other person, and agreed with him entirely,— built himself his own system also. (But he taught) neither in the usual manner, nor did he make his teachings very clear; but he treated each point just as he thought wise, leaving it in twilight, half way between clearness and unclearness. He did indeed thus attain security, in his writing; but he himself thus became the cause of the subsequent discord and difference of opinions about his teaching. (This discord therefore) did not originate in malice, or envy; for I would not utter any inauspicious words about men of ancient time.
8. Having understood this, we must now return to the original point at issue, and, with the aid of the Divinity, we shall have to differentiate him now from the Academy, just as it was our purpose, at the beginning, to differentiate him from Aristotle and Zeno. We shall, therefore, grant that, in his real nature, he was a Pythagorean. Now, however, his members suffer, torn as he is with greater ferocity than a Pentheus. No one however attempts to restore the whole body, (as indeed we are going to try to do here).
Plato seemed more popular than Pythagoras, and more reverend than Socrates, because he stands in the midst between them softening the greater severity of the one to philanthropy, and raising the mockery and jocularity of the other, from irony to dignity and reputation; and this he accomplished specially hereby, that he mingled Pythagoras and Socrates.
2. The Iliad of Arcesilaos and Zeno.
10. But it was not my object to investigate this more minutely, as it is not my professed object; so I will now return to my theme, from which I seem to have wandered far, lest I stray from the right road.
11. The successors of Polemo were Arcesilaos and Zeno; I shall return to them at the close. I remember that I said that Zeno first studied with Xenecrates: then with Polemo, and at last became a Cynic, by associating with Krates. To this we must now add that he was an auditor of Stilpo, and that he busied himself with the teachings of Ileraclitus.
12. For while they (Zeno and Arcesilaos) were fellowstudents of Polemo, they became jealous of each other, and in their struggle (Zeno) used Heraclitus, Stilpo and Krates as allies,——the influence of Stilpo making him eager for battle; through the influence of Heraclitus he became obscure and severe, and through Crates he became a Cynic.
On the other hand, Arcesilaos made use of Theophrastes, the Platonist Krantor, and Diodorus; further, Pyrrho also. The influence of Krantor made him an adept in persuasion; Diodorus made him sophistic; through the influence of Pyrrho he became Protean, impudent, and independent of all.
13. It was concerning him that circulated the ribald saying:
(“Like the Chimera of Theognis. vi. 181; Diog. Laert, iv. 33. he was)
“Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, and Diodorus in the middle.”
Timon asserts that he also derived love of strife from Menedemus, and so perfected himself in it that people sang about him,
“There he comes running, with the leaden ball of Menedemos, hiding under his cloak vitriolic Pyrrho, or Diodorus.”
14. Combining the quibbles of Diodorus, who was a dialectician, with the sceptical expressions of Pyrrho, he made of himself a vain chatterer, by the fluency of speech of a Plato. He asserted, and contradicted himself, and rolled hither and yon, on all sides, just as it happened
to suit him; recalled his own expressions, was hard to.
interpret, was unstable, untrustworthy, and at the same time rash, for he claimed that he himself knew nothing, as he was of noble lincage. Then again (Chapt. vi. 1) he would become like a wise man, so that his plays with words gave him great apparent breadth, or many-sidedness. Just as it was impossible to see on which side the Homeric Tydides was, during the battle, whether among the Trojans or the Greeks, as_ little could one tell that of Arcesilaos. It was not in him to say the same thing twice, or to remain with a single assertion; indeed, he did not even believe that this was the part of a worthy man. Hence he was called
“A mighty sophist, who slaughtered the undisciplined.”
2. Just as the Furies, did he bewitch and throw spells with words in his sham fights, through the resources of knowledge, and his training; for neither did he have any element of definiteness in his knowledge, nor did he admit that such could be the case with others. He terrified and confused; and while he took the medal for twisting words from their meanings, he took a malicious joy in the defeat of his interlocutors. He assumed a marvellous appearance; for he knew that in itself nothing was either shameful or handsome, good or bad; he insisted that (the moral quality of a thing depended) on the manner in which it was conceived by anybody. Then he would turn it hither and yon, or guided it in prepared (paths).
3. Therefore he was like an eel, which cut itself in two, and was cut in two by itself, at different times differently explaining both (opposites, like beautiful and ugly); in a manner hard to differentiate, more obscurely than was permissible; if only he pleased his auditors,—for ‘it was as great an enjoyment to gaze at him, as to hear him. He had, indeed, a fine voice, and a handsome appearance. That is the reason his auditors were disposed to accept his teachings, because his speeches came from a beautiful mouth, and were accompanied by friendly glances.
4. This (attractiveness) however, must not be considered so simply; but its (wider effects) must be expounded further. While he was still a boy, he associated considerably with Theophrastes, a mild, kindly man, who was not opposed to love. As he was still beautiful in the time of his bloom, he found in the Academician Krantor a lover, and associated with him. As he was not lacking in natural talent thereto, and made use of this superficially, and because his love of strife made him rebellious, he associated also with Diodorus, and (it was from these associations) that he learned his deceitfully convincing subtleties. Further, he had dealings with Pyrrho, who derived his scholarship from Democritus, in all regards. So (Arcesilaos) received also instructions from (Democrittts?), and, except for the name, remained with Pyrrho in his (teaching of the) abrogation of all things.
5. That is why the sceptics Mnaseas, Philomelos and Timon call him a sceptic, as they themselves also were; inasmuch as he abrogated truth, the false, and what was probable.
6. Although he was called a Pyrrhonian by the Pyrrhonians, yet he allowed himself to be called an academician, out of consideration for his lover (Krantor). He therefore was a Pyrrhonian, without bearing that appellation, and of the academicians he had only the name. For I do not believe Diocles of Knydos, who, in his book entitled “Entertainments” insists that Arcesilaos enunciated no distinct teaching out of fear of the followers of Theodorus, and the sophist Bion, who made it a business to attack philosophers, and did not scruple to discredit’ them in any way, and that Arcesilaos therefore was on his guard, lest he fall into some perplexity; and that, like the squib, who hides himself within his own black juice, so he hid himself in his (doctrine of) the reserve of judgment.
7. Both of these, Arcesilaos and Zeno, started out from the (school of Polemo); but forgot it. Proceeding with
different methods (Arcesilaos with the Pyrrhonic, and Zeno with the Cynic), and fighting with such weapons, they forgot that they originated in the school of Polemo. They separated, fighting with each other (Homer, II. iv. 447-9; xiii. 131; iv. 472, 450): “shield struck shield; the lances met, and the forces of men, armed in metal, measured each other. The bossy shields strike together; mighty noise arises, shicld strikes against shield, helmet against helmet, man downs man. Then arises sighing and moaning of the killing and dying men!”
8. That is, of the Stoics; for they did not attack the Academicians; inasmuch as they did not know how much easier (than the Stoics) they’ might have been upset. For they might (easily) have been conquered, had it been demonstrated to them that their teachings did not agree with those of Plato; and that they would lose their footing were they to have changed even in a single point their definition of the (doctrine of the) incomprehensibility of presentation.
g. T shall not elaborate this further here, but shall return to it in another place, which shall be devoted to this. (Now let us return to our two fighting cocks):
They separated publicly, and fought each other; but the wounds were not the lot of both,—only that of Zeno, (inflicted) by Arcesilaos. For Zeno, when he was in battle, bore a grave and reverend aspect and his experience resembled that of the rhetorician Kephisodorus.
For as this Kephisodorus saw that his pupil Tsocrates was attacked by Aristotle, he did not sufficiently know Aristotle himself. For he saw that the teaching of Plato was well reputed, and he assumed that Aristotle philosophised according to Plato; so the antagonized Aristotle, but hit Plato, and disputed his whole teaching, beginning with the Ideas, without knowing them sufficiently, taking his conception of them from the popular estimate of them.
10. So this Kephisodorus fought with him. whom he did not at all wish to antagonize, and antagonized him with whom he did not wish to fight. :
Now as Zeno gave up the fight with Arcesilaos, so would the former, according to my judgment, have behaved as a true philosopher, if he, for the sake of peace, had not undertaken to antagonize Plato. As it is, perhaps he did not know Arcesilaos, but he certainly did not know Plato, as appears from his anti-Platonic writings; and he injured not him whom he should have injured, while he treated Plato, who had certainly not deserved it at his hands, in the most disgraceful manner, and worse than any dog.
11. This (anti-Platonic polemic) proves that he did not leave off from Arcesilaos from generosity; for either out of ignorance of his teachings, or out of fear of the Stoics, he turned the “wide open jaws of war” so that they glanced off from himself on to Plato. As to the innovations which Zeno introduced into the Platonic doctrines most irreverently, I will treat of them at some time, when I take a rest from Philosophy; but, except as a joke, may I never have leisure for such a purpose!
12. As Arcesilaos recognized in Zeno an opponent who was worth overcoming, so he attacked his teachings regardlessly.
13. Concerning the other points about which they fought, perhaps I know but little; and if I did know more, this might not be the time to record them. But (I do know that Arcesilaos) by every means in his power, opposed the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of presentation, which was first taught by (Zeno), because he saw that this doctrine, as well as its name, was famous in Athens. .
But as Zeno was weaker, and remained silent, and yet did not wish to suffer wrong, he did indeed cease the struggle with Arcesilaos; and he was not willing to speak out, though he had much to say. (So he started in a different manner.) He fought with the shadow of
Plato, who was no longer among the living, and ridiculed him in every possible way, as occurs in public plays, as Plato could no longer defend himself, and .as no.one had any interest to appear as defender for him. (If indeed he could have induced) Arcesilaos to undertake (?) such a réle, then would Zeno have achieved some gain from these (tactics), for he would thus have distracted Arcesilaos from himself. He knew, indeed, that the tyrant Agathocles of Syracuse had employed this trick against the Carthaginians.
14. The Stoics listened to all these polemics with amazement, for even at that time their Muse was no friend of graceful philosophical disquisitions. By means of such, Arcesilaos confuted them convincingly, while secretly removing and lopping off (part of their doctrines), and substituting other points. So (?) his opponents were overcome, overwhelmed by his oratory. It was, indeed, agreed by his contemporaries, that no word, circumstance, or even the smallest deed, nor even its contrary, could hope for approval, if it had not first been approved by the (persuasive?) Arcesilaos of Pitane. He himself, however, considered nothing true, and taught openly that everything was mere talk and verbiage.
3. The Comic Experience of Lakydes. (Also to be found in Diogenes Laertes iv. 59.)
1. I would like to tell a rich story about Lakydes. He was rather miserly, and resembled the proverbial economical housekeeper, who enjoys a reputation among the people, and who himself opens and closes his store-room. He himself selected what he needed, and everything else of the kind he did with his own hands, not indeed because he thought so highly of moderation, and not out of poverty, or lack of slaves, for he had as many of them as he desired ;—you may imagine the cause yourself!
2. Now I come to the promised story. As he was his own manager, he did not consider it necessary to carry
the key around with himself; but, when he had closed up, he laid it in a hollow-tablet. Having sealed this with his finger-ring, he rolled the ring back through a ‘crack into the interior of the house (?), so that later, when he again wanted to open with the key, he could pull back the ring, open again, then seal it up again, and once more throw the ring through the key-hole.
3. The slaves of course observed this sly manoeuvre. As often as Lakydes early in the morning took a walk, or went anywhere else, they would open (the store-room), eat and drink, and carry off as much as their heart desired. Then they would again close up, seal the writing-tablet with the ring, and then, to the accompaniment of hearty laughter and ridicule, they would throw the ring back through the key-hole within (the house ?).
4. But as Lakydes left dishes full, and found them again empty, he did not know what he should think about it. But as he now heard that Arcesilaos was philosophizing about the incomprehensibility he suspected that such a process had occurred in the matter of the store-room. (He went to the school) of Arcesilaos, (and from then on) began to philosophise, that one could not see or hear anything distinctly or clearly. One day he invited one of his acquaintances into his house, and positively asserted the doctrine of the reserve of judgment, “I can demonstrate this unequivocally, as 1 myself have experienced it, and have not merely derived it from other persons.”
5. Then he told the whole story, from the beginning, as to what had happened to him in his store-room. “Now what could Zeno answer to such a demonstrated case of the incomprehensibility of presentation?” “For with my own hands I closed up everything, I sealed it, myself, and threw the ring within; when however I returned and opened, I saw the ring within, but not the other things. How then should I not rightfully take a distrustful at-
titude towards things? For I could not admit that anybody came and stole the contents.”:
6. His auditor, who was a mocker, had had considerable trouble, while listening to the tale, in reserving his selfcontrol, Finally he broke out into loud laughter, and with continuous hilarity demonstrated how foolish he had been. From that time on Lakydes no more threw his ring within, and no more used his store-room as demonstration of the incomprehensibility of presentation; but took up again his earlier views, and philosophised along aimlessly.
7. Now, the slaves were no fools, and (Plato, Sophist. 266a) not so easy to control. They were like the Getes and Dacians, who appear in comedies, and who even in Dacian stammer with light scorn. But when they heard of the sophisms of the Stoics, or whenever they perhaps received a (signal) from some other side, they directly made an attempt, and loosened his scals. They sometimes substituted another seal, and at other times they did not affix any, presuming that it would be incomprehensible for Lakydes, one way or another.
8. But Lakydes became angry, finding, on his entrance, the writing-tablet sometimes unsealed, or even sealed with some other seal. Against their assertions that it had been sealed with his own seal, he conducted an exact investigation, and demonstrated that it was not so. As they had to acknowledge the demonstration, they asserted that he must then have forgotten to affix the seal. But he insisted that he remembered it distinctly, having affixed the seal, demonstrated it to them in detail, and grievously complained of their thus making fun of him; and he swore besides.
g. They however took up his complaints, and took the
attitude of being ridiculed by him; inasmuch as Lakydes was a philosopher, and taught the incomprehensibility (of
presentation), he must simply be unable to remember it; for memory was a sort of presentation, as they had heard him himself lately asserting in a discussion with a friend.
10. As now Lakydes had confuted their attacks, and brought up (counter-arguments), that did not agree with the teachings of the Academicians, they went to a certain Stoic, and learned by heart responses thereto; and starting with this, they developed their arguments before him, and became his rivals as academic disputants. If, however, he accused the Stoics, then his slaves would oppose his complaints by appealing, not without a certain scorn, to the incomprehensibility of presentation.
11. They thus carried on arguments and counter-arguments, till nothing remained whole? (there remained no further object to fight about?), not a pot, nor its contents, nor any utensil suitable for a house.
12. For a long while Lakydes was in distress, seeing that there was no help for him in his own doctrines. But judging that soon his whole house-hold would break ap, if he did not control the slaves, he fell into helpless despair, crying alas! and woe is me! and by the Gods, and all other such senseless expressions that are resorted to in extremities (?); all this was uttered with cries as confirmation (?).
13. At last, forced into a wordy argument with his house-hold of slaves, he did, indeed, confute the Stoic doctrines to his slaves; but as the slaves then (turned around, and) advanced the arguments of the Academicians in order to obviate any further difficulties, he himself’ remained at home and guarded his own store-room. But as his utility was thus impaired(?), he finally discovered the source of his woes, and expressed it thus: ‘Children (?), in the school we argue about things in this manner; but it is different in life!”
(Paragraphs 14 and 15 seem to have been shortened by Eusebius from Numenius. Thedinga.)
14. So much about Lakydes. He had numerous auditors, among whom Aristippus of Cyrene was prominent. The direction of the Academy was, after him, taken: over by Evander and his successors.
15. After the latter, Carneades took over the school, and founded the Third Academy, He made use of the same method as Arcesilaos; for he also followed out the principle of arguments on both sides, and confuted everything that was taught by any one else. From Arcesilaos he differed only in the (doctrine of the) reserve of judgment, asserting that is was humanly impossible to refrain from judgment about all things. Ile also made a distinction between the Unclear, and the Incomprehensible; although everything was incomprehensible, yet not everything was unclear.
He busied himself also with the Stoic teachings, and his reputation increased through his polemic with them, for he did not seek the truth, but only what seemed plausible to the majority. This infuriated the Stoics exceedingly. About him Numenius writes as follows:
4. Carneades Follows Arcesilaos.
When Carneades took over the Academy, it seems to have been his duty, to preserve and distinguish carefully what of Plato’s teachings had remained unchanged, and what had been changed. But about that he cared nothing, but and for better or worse restored the condition of things in the time of Arcesilaos; and thus he renewed contentions for a long period.
5. Carneades as Consciencelfss Sophist.
2. He remodeled the Tradition (bringing to it new things, and removing old ?); scintillating in contention he united contradictions and over-refinements; he denied, and assented, and disputed for and against. When he
needed potent words, he roared like a rushing stream, inundating everything on both sides. By his howling he assaulted and deafened his hearers. :
3. Although he deceived all, he himself was never deceived ;—which was not the case with Arcesilaos. When Arcesilaos by his magic threw a spell over his auditors and fellow corybants, he never noticed that he deceived himself first, holding as true (?) what he had said, by the complete abrogation of all things.
4. Carneades was still worse than Arcesilaos, for he did not moderate at all (the doctrine of “incomprehensibility”) until he had paralyzed (?) his auditors (?) through his affirmative and negative imaginations (about the Life or the Not-life of Being?).
5. Like the wild animals, who give a little ground, only to rush the more furiously on to the lances of the hunters, he thought that because of some acknowledgment (from an interlocutor) he could attack (him) all the more violently. Whenever he had attained his object, he cared no more about his former assertions; and he did this from principle.
6. For he thus acknowledged that the Truth and Error was contained in the (mentioned) things, making out as if he wished to further the investigation in company with others, like an experienced wrestler he would give the investigation a master-grip and from there on he had the upper hand. For although he ascribed affirmative and negative arguments to the influence of Probability, nevertheless he insisted that neither of the two could be ' grasped with certainty. He thus showed himself a still more cunning robber (or plagiarizer) jnd imposter (than Arcesilaos ?),
7. He would class together something that was true, and something similar that was false (?) (which was similar only in external appearance (?) ); he would then equate them, and would not admit that the one presenta-
tion was truer or more false than the other, or that the one was more credible than the other.
8. So dream-fancies were equated with dream-fancies, because false presentations are similar to the true ones, just as the appearance of a waxen egg is similar to the appearance of a genuine egg.
g. Further evils result from this philosophy, for in his oratory Carneades certainly was a misleader of souls, and a kidnapper of men. Secretly a thief, he was publicly a pirate, who robbed the best prepared by cunning or violence.
10. Victory was achieved for every thought of Carneades, and none others were recognised, for his opponents were less skillful in oratory.
11. Antipater, his contemporary, wished to indite a controversial treatise against him. Although he was present daily at the discussions of Carneades, he never said anything publicly, neither in the school, nor on the walks. He allowed no sound to escape him, and no one heard a single syllable from him. In his retreat, however, he composed treatises against (Carneades), and left to his heirs books, which can neither accomplish anything now, any more than they had been: able to accomplish anything contemporaneously against a man like Carneades, who occupied so high a place in the esteem of his contemporaries.
12, Although Carneades (?) publicly confused everything, on account of the Stoic passion for contention, he nevertheless made a veridical confession to his pupils, in which he taught the same thing as others.
6. Why Mentor Opposed Carneades.
At first Mentor was a disciple of Carneades, but did not become his successor. When Carneades, while alive, caught him in intimate relations with his own concubine, he diti not consider it an optical illusion, and did not take
refuge in his doctrine of the incomprehensibility of presentation, but without more ado confided in the appearance presented to his eyes, and banished him out of his school. Mentor then fell away from Carneades, philosophised against him, and became his opponent, convicting of error his doctrine of Incomprehensibility,
7. CARNEADES AS Mystic, wuio SECRETLY TAUGHT Trot, ' Carneades, who philosophised in contradictory manner, adorned himself with lies, and hid the truth among them. He used lies as a curtain, behind which he doled out sparingly the truth. He resembled those plants whose empty portion swims on the surface of the water, and even projects, while the serviceable lower portion is out of sight.
8. Schism of Philo, and Foundation of the New Academy.
I. This Philo (of Larissa), as soon as he had taken over the school, was overcome with joy, and thankfully cared for the school. He broadened out the teachings of Kleitomachus, and against the Stoics he “armed himself: with the coruscating sword.”
2. But with the passage of time, as a result of habit, as the doctrine of the reserve of judgment had lost its force, he allowed himself to be misled by the clearness and unanimity of circumstances, and changed his course of life. As he attributed great importance to the faculty of judgment, he desired nothing better than to meet opponents who would be willing to oppose him, so that it might not appear that he was hitting them in the back, and desired to run away.
3. Antiochus (of Ascalon), an auditor of Philo, founded a new Fourth Academy. He associated with himself the Stoic Mnesarchus, taught the opposite of what had been taught by his teacher Philo, and introduced into the Academy a mass of strange doctrines.