Commentary on the First Alcibiades — Olympiodorus
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ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΝ
Translation/edition: Michael Griffin
Language: English
Read in Plato Scroll: https://plato-scroll.com/s/olymp-alc1/
This file: https://plato-scroll.com/text/olymp-alc1.txt
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Numbers in [brackets] are the edition's reference loci (Stephanus, Bekker, book.line, page...). Superscript numerals refer to the Notes at the end.


## Lecture 1


### The goal of the Alcibiades according to Proclus: seven supporting arguments

[3] Now then, the target (skopos)² of the present dialogue, according to Proclus,³ is self-knowledge: and this is confirmed by a plurality of arguments.
[3] [5] First by the title: for the dialogue is entitled the ‘Greater Alcibiades, or On the Nature of a Human Being’. (It is ‘greater’ since there is another ‘lesser’ Alcibiades by Plato,⁴ just as there is a ‘greater’ and a ‘lesser’ Hippias).
[3] Next [he establishes that the target is something like this] on the basis of certain expressions in the dialogue; for example, it is stated in it ‘But, my good [10] friend, being persuaded by me and by the inscription at Delphi, “Know Thyself”. ’⁵
[3] And in addition in the dialogue before us the following three designations are distinguished:⁶ ‘me’, ‘what belongs to me’, and ‘what belongs to my belongings’. And [he argues] from the statement that all who were in love with the body of Alcibiades did not love Alcibiades [himself], but rather one of his [15] possessions, and it was Socrates alone who loved Alcibiades himself.
[3] Furthermore [he argues] from the assertion that the just and the advantageous are in this work interchangeable, from which it is clear that this discussion is about the soul: for to [the soul] alone is the just advantageous, since it is not advantageous to the composite [of soul and body]: for example, the death of Menoeceus⁷ was just, since he died on behalf of his fatherland, but it was not advantageous to the body that perished.
[4] And [he also argues] from the fact that [Plato] concludes the discussion once he has demonstrated, at the end of the dialogue, that the human being is the soul, on the ground that all of the prior assumptions are made for the purpose of establishing this [conclusion].
[4] [5] And also because Socrates strives not only to lead his beloved (paidika) upwards, but to do so along the very path by which he has himself been led upwards: for it is reported that he came to philosophy from the Pythian inscription, ‘Know Thyself’.
[4] And, further, from the use in the work of the following expression – ‘self’, ‘the self itself.’ Now Proclus takes this [expression] one way, and Damascius another. For Proclus says⁸ that ‘self’ is the tripartite soul (hê trimereia tês psukhês), or simply the soul, and that ‘the self itself’ is the rational soul: but Damascius approaches this differently and says that ‘self’ is the rational soul, while ‘the self itself’ the highest and most intellectual part of the soul.
[4] This is the goal [of the dialogue] according to Proclus.

### The target of the Alcibiades according to Damasciu s

[4] But Damascius⁹ conveys its goal more exactly and more truly when he says that it is not about knowing oneself unqualifiedly, but about knowing oneself as a civic person (politikôs).¹⁰ And he establishes this from the definition of the human being in this dialogue as a rational soul (psukhê logikê) that uses the body as an instrument. Only the civic person uses the body as an instrument, [20] since he is sometimes in need of spirited emotion (thumos), for example [in fighting] on behalf of his country, but also of an appetite (epithumia) for doing his citizens good.¹¹ But neither the purificatory person (kathartikos) nor the contemplative person (theôrêtikos) need the body. For a purificatory person is [5,1] the soul freeing itself from the body, though the ‘chains’ nevertheless remain and are not released as [they were] from the Ambracian youth;¹² instead, they are released through sympathy.¹³ For it is possible for beings even here [sc. in the perceptible world] to exist above [sc. in the intelligible world] in a contemplative manner, because of a certain kind of sympathy, and also for [5] beings above to exist here, when the soul sheds its wings, descends here and becomes aflutter about [this world], because of its love of the body. And the contemplative person is a soul that has been released from the body, while again here [in this world] we become intellectually aware (noein) of a release on account of the independence [of the soul from the body]. For the soul of the contemplative person, by being active (energousa) in accordance with that which is most divine within it, is in this way freed from its shell-like, pneumatic vehicle.¹⁴ And on this subject the Poet says
[5] Adroit Odysseus then stripped off his rags...¹⁵
[5] In other words, the contemplative person who has separated himself from such ‘rags’ is truly ‘adroit’ (polumêtis).¹⁶
[5] So, then, the target of the dialogue concerns knowing oneself as a civic person, if indeed the body is an impediment to the purificatory and contemplative person, and the pure person (kathartikos) is distinguished by [15] moderation of the passions (metriopatheia), and the contemplative one (theôrêtikos) by freedom from them (apatheia). That is Damascius’ position.

### The target of the Alcibiades according to the commentators: a reconciliation of the views of Proclus and Damascius

[5] Now if it is necessary for us, who plead Proclus’ cause, to bring Damascius into agreement with him, then [Damascius] does say that the target [of the dialogue] is civic self-knowledge primarily (proêgoumenôs), [but not exclusively].¹⁸ And we should explain this in a plausible way. For when Socrates was watching Alcibiades ‘dashing into civic life (ta politika)’¹⁹ he realised that he would not readily tolerate questioning about knowledge of his soul (i.e. himself), unless [Socrates] also discussed his present appetite. [5] This is what the Platonic philosophy is like, and in this it possesses a great superiority over the other [schools]: for Socrates’ admonishments are like painless purifications, or medicines drenched in honey. For [Socrates] does not heal (epanorthoun) souls by [applying] the opposites [of their current conditions], as Hippocrates²⁰ prescribes for bodies when he says ‘opposites are cures for opposites’; nor in the way that Aristotle²¹ exhorts us to check spirited emotion (thumos) with appetite (epithumia), and appetite with spirited emotion, inasmuch as these are opposites; nor as the Pythagoreans do, through the ‘tasting’ of the passions, i.e. ‘with the tip of the finger’, as they put it:²² for one could never heal the person who is aflame with the passions, they say, without some small concession to them. (And this is also why in the Poet [sc. Homer], Athena is depicted as urging Pandarus to break his oath,²³ on [7,1] the ground that he is painfully eager to do so – for if we reasoned otherwise, it would be very strange to suppose that the god was issuing a summons to wrongdoing – and this is why the Poet also depicts [Pandarus] being punished through his tongue, [as the spear enters] into that [organ] with which he broke his oath.)²⁴
[7] And so Socrates does not heal souls in this way, like those we have just [5] mentioned, but rather by [applying medicines] that are similar [to the soul’s current condition]:²⁵ if someone is a lover, by saying ‘learn what the love of beautiful things is’; if one is a lover of wealth, we say ‘learn what self-suffi ciency is’; if one is a lover of pleasure, ‘learn what the easy life truly is, which the Poet even attributes to the gods by speaking of “the gods who live at ease”. ’²⁶ Therefore Socrates, by also being such [a teacher] to Alcibiades, converses with [10] him about civic self-knowledge, and incorporates [a conversation] about purificatory and contemplative [self-knowledge]. For he says in the present work, ‘Just as, if the Demiurge had told the eye, “Look at yourself”, it would have been unable to do so on account of its not being self-moving, but would have looked [instead] at another eye, and not at any random part of it, but at the one entrusted (empepisteumenon) with optical activity (which is also called [8,1] the “pupil” (korê), because of the appearance of little images in it), so too should you, Alcibiades, since you have blinded the self-moving in you by giving yourself over to non-rational activities, look away to me – that is, to the soul of Socrates – and not to any random part of this, but to the highest part, and you shall see in me intellect and god.’²⁷
[8] Now by saying ‘look away to me’, he has indicated that the target of the dialogue is self-knowledge in a civic sense; and by saying ‘not to any random part,’ that it is also [self-knowledge] in a purificatory sense, for self-purification is the province of the highest part of the soul; and by saying ‘you shall see in me intellect’, [he has indicated] that it is also [self-knowledge] in a contemplative sense, for engaging with the realities in accordance with his intellect befits the [10] contemplative; and through saying ‘and god’, [he has indicated] that it is also [self-knowledge] in an inspired sense, for we are inspired according to the divine in us, which is simple, just as is the divine itself. After all, it is through being independent and simple that children and country-dwellers experience inspiration to a greater degree:²⁸ inspiration cannot be captured by imagination (aphantasiastos), which is why it is undone by imagination, because that is its opposite.²⁹
[8] [15] And since we have mentioned the Delphic inscription, ‘Know Thyself’, it should be realised that it was not inscribed before the inner shrine to no purpose, but since it beheld everyone as they arrived – whether they came to inquire about their children, like Laius, or about offi ces of state, like Cylon, or about wars, like Croesus, while, in line with that [famous] Megarian saying,³⁰ leaving oneself out of the reckoning – it was therefore set in writing that they [20] think about themselves and get to know themselves first, and the other things [about which they inquired] subsequently.
[9] [9,1] And through the injunction, [the Delphic inscription] revealed what was enjoined: that the human being is the rational soul. For [the inscription] says ‘Know Thyself’, and this was addressed to the soul, which has a capacity for knowledge (gnôstikos). Consider that the body does not gain knowledge, nor does the combination [of soul and body] in respect of the body. Nor does the vegetative [soul] come to know.
[9] But someone might object that even if this [sc. the vegetative soul] does not [5] [gain knowledge], still the non-rational soul [as a whole, i.e. spirited emotion and appetite] does. But the inscription is not discussing this [level of soul], for it adds on ‘Thyself’, whereas the non-rational soul cannot get to know itself, since it cannot revert upon³¹ itself, but only the rational soul does that. Yet [it is further objected] the heavenly [beings] also have knowledge, and indeed know themselves, since they turn back [upon themselves]. But the phrase ‘Know Thyself’ does not apply to them either, for in saying ‘Know’, [the inscription] [10] speaks of being transformed from ignorance to knowledge, namely a [process of] fulfilment (teleiotês) for the soul, whereas those [heavenly beings] always know [and so their knowledge is already complete]. So it is speaking only with reference to the rational soul.
[9] Equivalent, then, to this inscription at Apollo’s [shrine] are the mirrors in Egyptian temples, since they are set up before the holy places and possess the same power as the Pythian inscription (for they set them up for self-knowledge, [15] since [the Egyptians] always indicate realities through riddles, just as the Greeks do through written words).
[9] And again, what the first treatise (kephalaion) in the Enneads is for Plotinus – [the one called] What is the Living Being and What is the Human Being [Enn. 1.1 (53)], in which [Plotinus] demonstrates that the combination [of body and soul] is a living being (zôion) and the soul a human being (anthrôpos) – that is what the Alcibiades is for Plato, and it has the same kind of target.
[9] That is the content of the lecture (praxis).

## Lecture 2

[9] With the god’s favour
[9] Soc. Son of Clinias, I think that you are wondering...³³
[9] After [our discussion of] the target, which is threefold – including the views adopted by Proclus, by Damascius, and by the commentators (i.e. the view shared by the commentators)³⁴ – come, let us also get into detail about the usefulness (to khrêsimon) of the present dialogue, which is also threefold.³⁵

### The usefulness (khrêsimon) of the dialogue

[10] [10,1] For us, the present dialogue contributes in the first place to [grasping] the soul’s immortality (athanasia) and everlasting nature (aïdion); and this follows naturally. For if [Plato] is discussing the process of getting to know oneself in this [dialogue], and it is by reverting upon ourselves that we get to know ourselves,³⁶ and the philosophers have demonstrated in countless treatises that everything which reverts upon itself is eternal and immortal, then here [in this dialogue] we shall get to know that the soul is immortal.
[10] Second, it also contributes to our knowledge (gnôsis) of all beings (panta ta onta): for if we know the soul, we shall also know the formulas (logoi)³⁷ that it holds within itself; and it holds the formulas of all beings and their patterns [10] (tupoi), since it serves as their image (indalma); and therefore the knowledge of the soul contributes for us to the [knowledge] of all beings.³⁸
[10] Third, [it contributes] to knowing what is good for the soul and what is harmful to it.³⁹ For consider that if the human being (anthrôpos) happened to be a body, it would find fulfilment (teleiotês)⁴⁰ in size and beauty; and if it happened to be spirited emotion (thumos), in the love of honour; and if it happened to be appetite (epithumia), in the love of pleasure: by the same token, since it is [in fact] reason (logos), i.e. the rational soul (logikê psukhê), excellence of character (aretê)⁴¹ is solely suffi cient for its well-being (eudaimonia), while defectiveness of character (kakia) [suffi ces] for its ill-being (kakodaimonia). For, as Plato says, the soul shall go forth into the next world possessing nothing except its excellence and defect of character.⁴²
[10] So much for the usefulness [of the dialogue].

### The position (taxis) of the dialogue

[10] As for its position (taxis) [in the curriculum], it should be said that [this dialogue] must come first in order of all the Platonic [works]. For as [Plato] says in the Phaedrus,⁴³ it is laughable for someone who is in a rush to know [11,1] everything else to remain ignorant of himself. Secondly, [this dialogue must come first] since it is necessary to learn the [views] of Socrates in a Socratic way, and Socrates reportedly came to philosophy from the [utterance] ‘Know Thyself’. Also, one should consider that this dialogue is similar to the fore-gates [of temples], and just as those [fore-gates] lead on to the Holy of Holies [5] (aduton), so one should liken the Alcibiades to the fore-gates, and the Parmenides to the Holy of Holies.⁴⁴

### The division (diairesis) of the dialogue

[11] As for the division (diairesis) [of the text] into sections (kephalaia), it should be recognised that this dialogue is divided into three: [a section of] refutation (elenktikon), [another] of exhortation (protreptikon), and [a third] of midwifery (maieutikon).⁴⁵
[11] In the [section] of refutation [106C–119A], [Socrates] demonstrates that [Alcibiades] is doubly uneducated: both because he is ignorant of civic affairs (ta politika), and because he thinks that he does understand them. For he is [10] ignorant because he has neither learned from a teacher nor inquired into (zêtêsas) [knowledge] by himself. [That follows] because knowledge arises in two ways, either by the learning which comes through teachers (didaskaloi), or by inquiry on our own part: and it is better to know by inquiring oneself than by learning from someone else, considering that the self-moving is also superior to that which is moved by another (as Aristotle says in the Rhetorical Arts),⁴⁶ and the self-originated (autophuês) to that which is taught by another. Thus he demonstrates that Alcibiades, as we have explained, does not understand civic affairs (ta politika) in even one of these ways. For he did not study [this] under teachers: he learned only reading and writing, music, and wrestling, and moreover there was clearly never a time when, considering himself to be ignorant, he approached a teacher (for even when he was a child and very young, when playing dice he used to say to the others, swearing an [20] oath, that ‘I’m being cheated!’ (adikoumai), as though he knew exactly what was just (dikaios): nor, clearly, did he inquire [into it for himself]. As a result, he did not know the goal (telos) of the civic person from these [sources] – namely, the just, the advantageous (sumpheron), and even the beautiful. So much for the [section] of refutation.
[12] [12,1] The [section] of exhortation [119A–124A] is the one in which Socrates exhorts him to conquer his antagonists by wisdom (sophia), for it was an ancestral tradition among the Athenians to conquer by wisdom. (The enemies of the Athenians were the Lacedaimonians and the Persians, as the Peloponnesian and Persian [wars] demonstrate).
[12] [5] The [section] of midwifery [124A–135D] is the one in which Socrates, through a line of questioning appropriate to [Alcibiades’] nature, makes Alcibiades prove that the human being is the soul, so that he himself is his own teacher: here, then, is the [Platonic] doctrine (dogma) that the answerer is the speaker.⁴⁷ For this is the sort of person that Socrates is, acting as midwife to souls for the birth of ideas (logoi): which is also why they say that he is the son of Phainarete, who was a midwife (maia) – like Hermes [the son of Maia].⁴⁸ For just as the doctor merely removes discharges from eyes, and [so removes] impediments to the functioning of vision, and just as midwives bring babies into the light but do not put them into the persons who give birth, similarly Socrates acts as a midwife for souls (psukhai), and does not put theories into the young, as though into lifeless (apsukhos) vessels.⁴⁹ As a matter of fact, he [15] himself says in the Theaetetus that ‘the god has made me act as midwife, and prevents me from producing’.⁵⁰
[12] Then at the end of the dialogue he finishes by exchanging their roles (to skhêma tês tukhês), and makes himself, who was previously the lover, the beloved and Alcibiades, who was previously the beloved, the lover. For this is the goal of the art of love, namely, the reciprocation of love.⁵¹ And Socrates has [20] a lover’s disposition (erôtikos), as he also says in the Phaedrus to Love (Erôs): [13,1] ‘that art of love which you gave me, Master, please do not take away from me, nor disable through some anger or other cause’.⁵² Alexander too, after seeing a certain army in a miserable state, reportedly said, ‘May the man who put so many in this condition come to a bad end (apoloito kakista)’.⁵³ At the end, too, [5] [Socrates] concludes the dialogue by comparing his love to the storks: since the storks too, having first been nourished by their parents, finally nourish them in their old age, and in this way they change [their respective positions].
[13] That is the content of the lecture.

## Lecture 3

[13] With the god’s favour
[13] [10] Soc. Son of Clinias, I think that you are wondering why I, who was the first [[103A]] person to become your lover, am the only one who doesn’t abandon [you] now that the others have left off, [and also why I never even spoke to you in so many years, when the others mobbed you with conversation. The cause of this isn’t human; I was prevented by some daimon, whose power you too [[103B]] will later learn. But now, since it doesn’t oppose me any longer, I have come to you. And I have good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future].
[13] Because the dialogue is about love (erôtikos), [Plato] uses the proem to explain three differences between the divinely inspired (entheos) lover and the crude (phortikos) lover.⁵⁴

### The differences between the crude and divine lovers

[13] The first difference is that the crude lover wonders at his beloved (ta paidika), whereas the divinely inspired lover is the object of [his beloved’s] wonder. And [15] [Socrates] illustrates this in the words, ‘Son of Clinias, I think that you are wondering...’ – that is, ‘at me’.
[13] The second difference is that the crude lover coordinates his passion with the bloom of youth⁵⁵ and soon abandons his beloved, whereas the divinely inspired lover accompanies his beloved from swaddling-clothes to grave, provided that the physiognomic signs⁵⁶ of the begotten declare him worthy of love. And [Socrates] makes this clear when he says, ‘I, who was the first man to become your lover, am the only one who doesn’t abandon you now that the others have left off ’, indicating that he follows his beloved before they do, alongside them, and after them.
[13] And the third difference is that the divinely inspired lover is present (sunesti) with his beloved in a godlike way (theoeidôs), that is, without physical presence: [14,1] for just as the radiance of the divine (to theion) is present in every place, yet its essence (ousia) is in no place (since it is not confined in place), the divinely inspired lover is present in a way that imitates this same mode [of presence]. But the crude lover is present with his beloved [only] when he wants to engage [5] in acts (energein) at the level of bodily sensation, at the lowest level [of sensation] at that, namely, touch. He has made this clear in his statement, ‘Since the others mobbed you, but I didn’t say a word over so many years’ [103A], showing that he is absent insofar as he is silent, but present insofar as he follows and loves [Alcibiades].
[14] These are the differences [presented] here, but [Plato] also presents a fourth difference of the same kind (toiautên) in the Phaedrus:⁵⁷ namely, that the presence of the crude lover injures the beloved, in body and soul and outward [possessions]: in body, because [the lover] wants to make him effeminate and unmanly; in soul, since he wishes him to be unintelligent (anoêton), with a view to making him suggestible about doing what [the lover] wants; in outward [possessions], since he also [wants him] to be poor, so that he is dependent on [15] [the lover] and willing [to provide] him with pleasures. In fact, he even wants him to be fatherless, motherless, and unloved, so that he has no one to keep him from his company. But the divinely inspired lover is not like this. He is present, not for these kinds of reasons, but [to bring about] the good for his beloved, by reverting [his attention] to fine and beautiful things (ta kala).
[14] [20] Since, then, we have learned the differences between the inspired lover and the crude lover, we should examine why they are called by one and the same name [“lover”] in spite of the stark differentiation and opposition between them, and not [by different names] as the [other] opposites are – for example, ‘moderation’ (sôphrosunê) and ‘indulgence’ (akolasia).⁵⁸ Well, we reply that Love, thanks to the superabundance of his power, has been able to shape⁵⁹ even [these] opposites for his own purposes. For ‘all love is madness straining’,⁶⁰ insofar as both [kinds of lover] want to ‘give birth in beauty’⁶¹ – the inspired [lover] to learning in the soul, and the crude [lover] to living beings in the body.

### The daimoniccause of Socrates’ presence and the order of daimons

[14] But [Socrates] says that the cause of his godlike presence, and of his not [15,1] speaking to [Alcibiades] until now, ‘is not human’, but is ‘some daimonic opposition’ [103A5]; and this makes sense. For if the effect (namely, the godlike presence) is more than human, surely the cause of the presence is divine to a much greater degree.⁶³
[15] [5] Because the ‘daimonic’ was mentioned in this passage, the commentators have been obliged to pay close attention to the theory (logos) of daimons.⁶⁴ It should be understood that there are three divisions (diaphorai) of daimons,⁶⁵ because some are daimons by analogy (kat’ analogian), others by essence (kat’ ousian), and others by relation (kata skhesin).⁶⁶
[15] Now those that are essentially daimonic are really the standards (gnômones) for those that are analogically and relatively so, because those that are superior [10] to essential daimons are daimonic in an analogical sense, while those that are inferior to them are [daimonic] by relation [to them].⁶⁷
[15] [Those that are] analogical are so called because, inasmuch as these are primary,⁶⁸ they possess the formulas (logoi)⁶⁹ of the essential daimons: in other words, they are daimons in a causal way (kat’ aitian), because what [has a property] causally is necessarily prior to what [has that property] existently.⁷⁰ The orator Isocrates also demonstrates that these [sc. gods] are called daimons, [15] when he says, ‘honour the daimonic, always, and especially when the city does’;⁷¹ and Homer [says] ‘[Athena returned] into the midst of the other daimons’ [Il. 1.222];⁷² and Orpheus portrays Zeus as saying to his own father,
[15] Make straight our race, glorious daimon.⁷³
[15] For in these cases, the name ‘daimon’ is bestowed on the divine.
[16] [16,1] The souls of those who have lived well are called ‘daimons’ by relation – for instance, the souls of the golden race, which depend upon (skhetikôs ekhousai) daimons, and which are themselves addressed as ‘daimons’. Thus Hesiod, too, says about them:⁷⁴
[16] They are called holy daimons dwelling upon the earth (epikhthonioi),
 [5] noble, warders-off of evil, guardians of mortal humans.
[16] As we said, then, the name ‘daimon’ is threefold.
[16] We should also investigate how they [sc. the commentators] arrived at the concept (ennoia)⁷⁵ of claiming that daimons exist. We assert, then, the following:⁷⁶ [1] Our soul, which streams with life and bubbles over with it, is unable to
[16] exist without engendering life (zôopoiein).
[16] (a) For there are times when [soul] is inactive with respect to its
[16] cognitive [faculties] (kata tas gnôstikas), for example when it is
[16] [10] overcome by lethargy, but this is never the case with respect to the
[16] life-engendering [part of the soul].⁷⁷ [2] The ovoid (ôioeidês) or luminous (augoeides) vehicle was invented
[16] (epenoêthê) for [the soul at a time] when the shell-form (ostreïnos) body
[16] was not always attached to it.⁷⁸ This vehicle has two names:
[16] (a) [It is called] ‘ovoid’ on account of its shape (skhêma), for it is not
[16] altogether spherical like the heavenly [bodies], but less spherical
[16] [than them], and for this reason they say that it sometimes suffers
[17] [17,1] ‘distortion’ (diastrophên), but certainly isn’t destroyed; because it is of
[17] the same essence (ousia) as the heavenly bodies, that is, of the fift h
[17] body, and therefore also everlasting (aïdios);
[17] (b) it is called ‘luminous’ from its essence (ousia), because it is
[17] transparent and aetherial. [3] Just as they assigned this luminous vehicle to the soul,⁷⁹ in order that,
[17] [5] being fastened all through it (dia pantos), it might always engender life,
[17] in the same way, in the case of the heavenly bodies, which cannot cease
[17] from activity (energein), they fastened this essentially daimonic race to
[17] them. (For our souls are not always fastened to them on account of our
[17] shedding our feathers and descending into becoming). [4] This [daimonic race], then, being intermediary, is the interpreter for
[17] [people] here [on earth] of [messages] from the gods.⁸⁰ [10] But since [this race] interprets every attribute of the heavenly beings, because there are six things [to be distinguished] in the heavenly beings, it – I mean the race of essential daimons – has also been divided into six. In the heavenly beings, then, are [found]: Divinity (theotês), Mind (nous), Rational Soul (psukhê logikê), Non-Rational Soul (psukhê alogos), Form (eidos), and Matter (hulê),⁸¹ [and] therefore the different types of daimons are equal in number.⁸² [18,1] Those [daimons] who link us to the Divinity of the heavenly [beings] are called ‘divine’ (theioi), who preside over (ephestêkasin) [divine] inspirations.
[18] Those who link us to the Mind [of the heavenly beings] are called ‘intellective’ (noêroi): they preside over common concepts (koinai ennoiai), by means of which, beyond demonstration, we know certain [truths] among the common concepts even without demonstration (anapodeiktôs).⁸³
[18] [5] Those that [link us] to the Rational Soul are called ‘psychic’. Concerning them, the poet [Homer] says,
[18] And a daimon will advise you on the rest,⁸⁴
[18] and
[18] First a daimon breathed it in my mind, [to weave] a great web.⁸⁵
[18] [10] Those that link us to the Non-Rational [Soul] of the heavenly beings [are called] ‘non-rational’ (alogoi).
[18] Those [that link us] to the Form of the heavenly [beings] are called ‘formal’ or ‘form-like’. That our forms are linked to the forms of the heavenly, is clear from their growing and shrinking along with the heavenly [beings], for the [15] humours wax and wane with the moon (selênê), and so do hairs, for which reason we see that those who live a priestly life do not cut their hair while the moon is waxing. And epilepsy (to selêniakos pathos) also makes this clear, and [19,1] heliotropic plants, and moon-stones too, by waxing and waning with the moon; and similarly oysters, and just about everything. For this reason, this saying was well addressed to the moon:
[19] You build everything up when you are waxing,
and crush everything when you are waning.⁸⁶
[19] Next, the [daimons] who fasten this matter here to the matter of the heavenly [beings] are called ‘material’. Since they stand guard over [this matter] [5] by doing this, they do not allow it to be utterly destroyed, although it is in a state of flux (rheustos). For Orpheus, too, speaks
[19] of matter heavenly, starry, and boundless deep,⁸⁷
[19] on the basis that matter is threefold and that one kind, which functions as the substrate for the seven spheres, is ‘heavenly’; another, which functions as that for the stars, ‘starry’; and [a third], which he has called ‘boundless deep’ [10] (abussos) because it is lowest (eskhatos) and in flux, earthly (khthonios).
[19] But since we have stated that the first form in the heavenly [beings] is the divine (to theion),⁸⁸ we must understand that among the gods, some are beyond the cosmos (huperkosmioi) (to which our souls are fastened, but no body of any kind), and others within the cosmos (enkosmioi) (to which only bodies are fastened). And of the [gods] within the cosmos, some are heavenly [15] (ouranioi), others aetherial or fiery, others airy, others watery, others earthly, and others under Tartarus (hupotartarioi), as the poet also says,
[19] And they call those under Tartarus...⁸⁹
[20] [20,1] And of the earthly ones, some rule the regions of the globe (klimatarkhai), while others maintain the cities (polioukhoi), and others belong to the house (katoikidioi).

### Our allotted daimon

[20] But we should ask which of the aforementioned six types of essential daimons they say is allotted to each person.⁹⁰
[20] Well then, they say that those who live according to their own essence (kat’ [5] ousian) – that is, as they were born to live (pephukasi) – have the divine daimon allotted to them,⁹¹ and for this reason we can see that these people are held in high esteem in whatever walk of life they pursue (epitêdeuein). Now [to live] ‘according to essence’ is to choose the life that befits the chain from which one is suspended:⁹² for example, [to live] the military life, if [one is suspended] from the [chain] of Ares; or the life of words and ideas (logikos), if from that of Hermes; or the healing or prophetic life, if from that of Apollo; or quite simply, [10] as was said earlier, to live just as one was born to live.
[20] But if someone sets before himself a life that is not according to his essence, but some other life that differs from this, and focuses in his undertakings on someone else’s work – they say that the intellective (noêros) [daimon] is allotted to this person, and for this reason, because he is doing someone else’s work, he fails to hit the mark in some [instances].⁹³
[20] But so much about the allotted daimon of each person.

### The allotted daimon of Socrates

[21] [21,1] Concerning the allotted daimon of Socrates, [the commentators] say that three points are important to pick out (exairetos).⁹⁴
[21] First, that it always used to turn him aside [from a course of action], and that whenever it did not turn him aside, this was a sign of encouragement.⁹⁵ That is, since Socrates was beneficent and always eager to help everyone, like a spirited horse eager for the race, he needed the bit rather than the whip.
[21] Second, that his allotted daimon was divine,⁹⁶ and he makes this clear: for he says in the present dialogue that ‘My guardian is better and wiser than yours’ [124C], and when the young man asks, ‘Who is that?’ he replies, ‘A god, Alcibiades, a god.’⁹⁷
[21] Third, that he seemed to hear the voice [of the god], not because [the god] [10] was actually talking, but [because] a kind of emanation (ellampsis) of [the god] was present in the region of his acoustic organs, and he took this to be a voice.⁹⁸ In the same way we observe even now in common usage (sunêtheia)⁹⁹ that those who live the priestly life, when they suddenly catch the scent of a sweet fragrance, will say (since in their case too an emanation is present in the region of the olfactory organs) that it is ‘the presence of an angel’.

### Our allotted daimon in contemporary religious practice

[21] [15] But since we have discussed our allotted daimons, it is necessary to recognise that these matters are also recognised in common usage (koinê sunêtheia), albeit not by the same names. For instead of the ‘daimon’ they speak of the ‘angel’ of each of us; thus you can hear them refer to ‘your angel’ when they address those who lead the life most pleasing to god.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Plato would [22,1] have made use of a word like ‘angel’, except that he left this [entire] expanse (platos)¹⁰¹ [of the daimonic realm], from the heavenly [beings] to the sublunar, undivided and didn’t divide it up as the Chaldaeans¹⁰² do. For they divided [the expanse] into three, angels, daimons, and heroes; and they said that the [region] close to the greater [beings] contained angels, the one close to us heroes, and the one in the middle daimons, the intermediaries [thus] being in the middle.¹⁰³
[22] Moreover, [Plato] calls Love (Erôs) a ‘god’ at one point in the Symposium, but elsewhere ‘a great daimon’.¹⁰⁴ And the reason why he says ‘god’ is clear; but he addresses him as ‘daimon’ because he is an intermediary, as Love is intermediate between essence (ousia) and activity (energeia), between the beloved and the lover; and [he addresses him] as ‘great’, since he acts beyond sensation [10] (aisthêsis), intellectively (noerôs). And for this reason Orpheus, too, says,
[22] shepherding our thinking, eyeless and fleet, Love,¹⁰⁵
[22] for Love is eyeless, in that he sees and hears by mind (nôi), if you consider the saying that
[22] mind sees and mind hears.¹⁰⁶
[22] That, then, is what the commentators say concerning daimons and their allotments; but we, for our part, will attempt to run through all this in a manner that leads to reconciliation (sumbibastikôs) with the [views] that are current.¹⁰⁷ (After all, Socrates was condemned to the hemlock for introducing new daimonic [beings] (daimonia) to the youth, and believing in gods that the state (polis) did not consider gods.)¹⁰⁸
[23] So it should be noted that the ‘allotted daimon’ is really the ‘conscience’ (to suneidos);¹⁰⁹ this is the ‘crowning peak’¹¹⁰ of the soul, that which is faultless (anhamartêtos)¹¹¹ in us, an unswerving judge and witness before Minos and Rhadamanthys to what [has happened] here [on earth].¹¹² This even becomes [5] the cause of our salvation, because it always remains faultless, and is not condemned alongside the soul for the latter’s faults, but even ‘recoils’ because of them¹¹³ and ‘reverts’ [the soul] back to the right.¹¹⁴ And just as a child weeps in the wake of a dream because of some phantasm (phantasia) [that he saw there], even so does the conscience lead the soul back upward in the wake of its errors [10] (plêmmelêmata), as when [Menelaus] says [in Euripides, Orestes 395–6],
[23] What ails you? What sickness is wasting you?
[23] and [Orestes] replies,
[23] My conscience (sunesis), as I know I have done terrible things.
[23] And from the opposite perspective, the lyric poet [Pindar] says,
[23] [For the person who is conscious of no injustice], hope is a nurse and a good
nourisher in old age.¹¹⁵
[23] [15] Thus you would not go wrong (hamartois) by naming the allotted daimon ‘conscience’. (But it should be recognised that the [species] of ‘consciousness’ (suneidos) concerned with our cognitive faculties (gnôstikai dunameis) is called <‘attention’, but the [species] concerned with our faculties of desire (orektikai dunameis) is called>¹¹⁶ ‘conscience’ (suneidos), equivocally with the genus).¹¹⁷
[23] [That is the content of the survey.]¹¹⁸ [103A] Son of Clinias. This can be interpreted in three ways.¹¹⁹ (1) Either the patronymic (hê ek patros klêsis) is used as an archaism, as the Poet [describes when he writes]:
[23] [20] calling each man by his father’s name and his lineage, doing honour to all,¹²⁰
[23] or else, (2) since the young man cares for his reputation (philotimos) and takes [24,1] pride on account of his father (who demonstrated his excellence at the battle of Coronea¹²¹ and died there), he wanted to be named from him (enteuthen) because of the praise associated with that; or else, (3) it is because a patronymic is lively (diegêgermenos) and appropriate to lovers – because they are the way [5] they are and have a lot of manliness (after all, love (erôs) is either so named from strength (rhôsis) and being strong itself, or from heroism (to hêrôikon)).¹²²
[24] Accordingly, by addressing [Alcibiades] by his patronymic, [Socrates] all but exclaimed
[24] do not shame the generation of your fathers,¹²³
[24] turning him from this [world] toward knowledge of himself, [of] what sort of [10] person he is and from what [causes he has sprung], and urging him towards what is noble (kalos). I think that you... This [language] seems unworthy of Socrates’ knowledge, since it makes Socrates appear ambivalent and limited to guesswork about his proposed subject from the very start. So what can we say about this? That it indicates ignorance? Not at all, but instead [that it indicates] the highest [level of] knowledge, to approach [different] personalities (prosôpois) using a method that is appropriate [to each].¹²⁴ In this [15] case, since every young man (neos) cares about controversy and reputation – not least when it comes to standing up to strong claims – Socrates approaches Alcibiades cautiously, much as bird-catchers approach birds in a roundabout way (meth’ hupostolês) in order to avoid scaring off their quarry. Similarly, when Socrates characteristically begins the conversation in an open-ended way (dia tou distaktikou), he is aiming for the young man to be persuaded by [20] himself, and not to [approach the conversation] with a contentious attitude (enantioumenos). Are wondering... The phrase is suitable to the target (skopos) [of the dialogue], as wonder is ‘the beginning of philosophy’.¹²⁵ For once we wonder ‘ that it is’, we move on to ‘ why it is (dioti)’: and this is [what it is to do] philosophy, [25,1] to express the causes (aitiai) of things – assuming that philosophy is the knowledge of beings (onta) insofar as they exist.¹²⁶ And [this is so] in another way too – for Iris [‘Rainbow’] is philosophy since she speaks about beings, and the poets tell the tale that she is the daughter of Wonder.¹²⁷ And Iris herself [5] causes wonder when she appears in the air; [namely] wonder at how a mathematical shape, the circle, emerges in such material [as air]. And a certain shape is also called ‘wonder’ (thauma) among the geometers who work on linear [shapes].¹²⁸ Why I, who was the first person to become your lover... He uses the words ‘one’ (heis) and ‘first’ (prôtos) and ‘only’ (monos) of himself, but ‘multitude’ (polloi) and ‘last’ (teleutaioi) and ‘mob’ (okhlos) of the others. [10] And we should understand that the ‘people’ (dêmos) rank before the ‘mob’, and the ‘chorus’ (khoros) before the ‘people’. For the ‘people’ are better organised (eutaktoteros) than the ‘mob’ (which is also why Paeanieus, to slander the people [of Athens], says, ‘if the people are a mob, it’s the most unstable thing of all’, etc., using the word ‘mob’ for the people).¹²⁹ But [15] the chorus is better organised than the people, since it has much unity (henôsis) and attends only to one chorus-teacher. So too Socrates, as a single individual, is on the side of good order, but he refers to the others as ‘mobbing’ [Alcibiades] (di’ okhlou).
[25] Moreover, it was appropriate for him to comment that [Alcibiades] ‘wondered’ that his first lover had not yet abandoned him, even after a long time. For the majority of people (hoi polloi) do not judge [the qualities of an individual] by referring to his [actual] condition (hexis), but by referring to the [20] time [that he has spent in achieving it]. For instance, they actually suppose that those who have spent the most time in school are wise, rather than those who have spent less time, even if the latter are really wiser. Thus [Socrates] means that ‘you find yourself in a state of wonder when you reckon up the time that has passed since I first fell in love with you, and it’s clear that [you do this] like one of the majority’.¹³⁰ But I never even spoke to you in so many years: It is an Attic figure [of speech] (skhêma) to say ‘in so many years’ (tosoutôn etôn).¹³¹ This means that ‘I said nothing for such a long time’. And the cause of this isn’t human: Of what? Clearly, of loving without [physical] presence. For it is not the cause of love unqualifiedly (haplôs), but of [5] godlike love, because [Socrates] comments that the cause of the lover’s failure to speak to [the beloved] (i.e. godlike love) is something daimonic and not human. And he is right to say so; for the cause of a godlike effect also has to be divine. Whose power you too will later learn: [That is, the power] of the daimonic [being]. This statement is meant to help the listener: because [Socrates] knows that [Alcibiades] is after power, he causes [Alcibiades] to [10] expect that he will discuss matters dear to his own heart (oikeios autôi), namely, what he wants.
[26] In the phrase ‘too... later’, the word ‘too’ (kai) is [grammatically] superfluous. That is, it isn’t part of the syntax (sumplektikos) here, but it functions as an expletive;¹³² for [Alcibiades] did not ‘both’ (kai) learn about his power before this, so that he could ‘also’ (kai) learn about it later. The poet [sc. Homer] also uses it in this way, in the [line],
[26] [15] Eurytus, to whom Apollo himself gave too a bow [Il. 2.827],
[26] For the ‘too’ is there not because [Apollo] had also handed over some other thing [earlier]; it’s just an expletive.
[26] Also, [Socrates]’ use of the word ‘later’ is explained by his remark, a little later on [105E–106A], that ‘When you were younger, for sure, and you were not yet full of such high hopes, I think the god prevented me from conversing with [20] you, so that I would not converse in vain – but now he has put me on the job, because now you may be ready to hear me’. But now, since it doesn’t oppose me: We should investigate why the daimonic power does not also oppose his approach to Alcibiades now, considering that [Alcibiades] is going to commit mistakes after this. For he deserted and then advised the Lacedaemonians to fortify Deceleia in his homeland,¹³³ and before this he personally urged Pericles to wage the war through the writing of the decree against Megarians,¹³⁴ in order to avoid rendering an account of the [27,1] funds spent for the [sacred statue of] Athena by Pheidias – for this was his responsibility.¹³⁵ And another point: he caused the Mysteries to be mimed in the house of Polytion.¹³⁶
[27] [1] We offer the following reply [first]:¹³⁷ just as the sun does not shine selectively,¹³⁸ but shines even upon those who do not see it – even if, on account of their own unfitness, they fail to enjoy its rays – so too the daimonic power [5] did not prevent Socrates from conversing with Alcibiades, even if he was unfit.¹³⁹ (But against this [interpretation], I think, is the fact that the daimonic power continued its opposition until the present moment:¹⁴⁰ for why did it not allow him to converse at the very start?)
[27] [2] Xenophon’s solution [Mem. 1.2.24–5] is rhetorical, and here it is: that Alcibiades would have been worse than he [actually became], if he did not spend time with Socrates.¹⁴¹
[27] [10] [3] But the third solution is actually truer, that even if the [discussions] of Socrates were not going to benefit him in this life, then nevertheless in another life (en heterôi biôi) he would recollect these and be benefited,¹⁴² recognising as true what was said before, and almost saying aloud,
[27] I did not let him persuade me, and that would have been far better¹⁴³ –
[27] [15] The same applies when, even in one and the same life, we observe certain people thinking along these lines once their passions have subsided, and only giving in to them while they are in a rage. So I have come to you: In fact, [Socrates] was present the whole time; so how can he say that ‘now I have come to you, since the daimonic power did not oppose it’? Well, we reply that ‘I have come’ evidently refers to his perceptible [presence] and not, as before, his solely godlike [presence], which also lacked any [perceptible] presence.¹⁴⁴ And I have good hopes that in the future: This also belongs to love (erôtikos), to regard benefiting the young man as a case of ‘good hope’ (euelpistia) on his behalf.¹⁴⁵ And the [word] ‘good’ is used here on account of Socrates, while [28,1] ‘hope’ [is here] on account of Alcibiades. For hope is unstable, as Herodotus also remarks, and is the ‘waking man’s dream’.¹⁴⁶ It will not oppose: This is a fair statement; for if [Socrates] experienced no opposition before [Alcibiades] heard the words from his conscientious (sôphrôn) lips, it is clear that he will experience no opposition after Alcibiades has heard him out.¹⁴⁷

## Lecture 4

[28] With the god’s favour
[28] [[103B]] Soc. Now I have been making a study of you all this time, and have just about come to understand (katanenoêka) [how you handle your lovers. Even though quite a few big-minded men sprouted up, there was not one of them who was not overwhelmed by you, through your spirit (phronêma), [[104A]] and has now fled and gone. And I would like to run through the train of reasoning (logos) in virtue of which you are high-spirited. Now you say that you need no man for anything: because the resources available to you (huparkhonta) are vast, to the point of needing nothing, beginning (arxamena) from the body, and ending (teleutônta) at the soul. For you think in the first place that you are the most beautiful and great – and on this front, it is certainly plain to everyone that you tell no lie – and next, you belong to the most vigorous¹⁴⁸lineage in your own state, which is itself the [[104B]] greatest of the Hellenic states, and from there, through your father, there are available to you a multitude of the finest people as friends and family, who would do you service if any need arose; and those such on your mother’s side are no worse, nor fewer. And you count on a greater power than all of these I have mentioned together, I mean, Pericles, son of Xanthippos, whom your father left as Guardian for you and your brother – Pericles, who not only holds power in thiscity to do whatever he wishes, [[104C]] but in all Hellas, and in many and great races of alien peoples. And I will add also the advantage of your wealth: but you seem to me to act proud about this least of all. On all these fronts, then, you make yourself big, and you have overpowered your lovers, and they, being inferior, have been overpowered; and this has not escaped you: for that reason, I know very well that you wonder what in the world I have in mind (dianooumenos) when I do not let go my love, and with what hope in mind I’m remaining when the others have fled].
[28] Socrates is making two points here, one of which is human, the other divine. Naturally it is human to be in love, since this is common to all human beings: but it is divine to love without being [physically] present (aparousiastôs erân). He presents the cause of the second [kind of love] first, when he says that it is a god or a daimon.¹⁴⁹ (In doing this he adopted the ancient [rhetorical device] of ‘making the end of the last into the beginning of the next’ [sc. chiasmus].¹⁵⁰ So Homer also says:¹⁵¹
[28] [She bore three children], Isander and Hippolochus and Laodameia:
with Laodameia lay Zeus of the counsels...)
[28] [15] But now he will return to the first [kind] and express the cause of this – I mean, of [human] love. For he loves [Alcibiades in this first, human sense] because he looks down on the others, and he looks down on them for four reasons: [1] because of the beauty of [his] body, [2] because of his good birth, [3] because of his many friends, and [4] because he is proud of having Pericles as guardian. For [1] that he was beautiful in body is clear from the saying that he was ‘beloved in common of all Hellas’; from the [saying] that the Herms were [20] sculpted at Athens according to his image and likeness; and from the comment of the Cynic Antisthenes about him, ‘if Achilles was not like this, he was not in his bloom’¹⁵² – about whom the Poet [sc. Homer] says, when he wants to praise Nireus for his beauty:¹⁵³
[28] Nireus, the most beautiful man who came beneath Ilion,
 [25] Beyond the rest of the Danaans next after perfect Achilles.
[29] [29,1] And [2] he was proud on account of his lineage, since on his father’s side he was descended from Ajax, and on his mother’s side from Alcmaeon, which was regarded as the greatest and foremost lineage in Athens and all Hellas. And [3] he was proud on account of his friends, because – since he was ‘beloved in common of all Hellas’ (as the saying goes) – he acquired plenty of friends as a consequence. And [4] it was certainly with justice [5] that he revered Pericles as well, considering that he was his guardian, and that he held the greatest power in his country – about whom the historian (sungrapheus) [sc. Thucydides]¹⁵⁴ says: ‘[Athens] came to be a democracy in name, but in fact a rule by the first man’. And the comic [Eupolis] says about him that
[29] [10] He beat the orators by sixteen paces in speaking.¹⁵⁵
[29] It is thanks to these [sources of pride], then, that [Socrates] says that Alcibiades looked down on the others.
[29] But if we consider that praising the youth gives him a cause for pride (huperopsia) (since this makes him even more headstrong), and praising someone to his face is the mark of a flatterer (for certain people flatter others by praising them to their face), and praising a beloved, again, makes him [15] proud – [if we consider all of this], why does Socrates praise Alcibiades on these grounds, despite the fact that he is a young man, and face-to-face, and his beloved?
[29] Well, we reply [first] that what appear to be words of praise now, as they are uttered by Socrates, are in reality remonstrations and refutations (elenkhoi). It was necessary for [Socrates], after all, before he offered refutations that were unmixed [with praise] and plain, to offer some that were mixed, in order to [20] avoid arousing and frightening off his quarry; instead, he had to approach his [30,1] quarry noiselessly, as competent bird-catchers do. Moreover, that kind of [harsh behaviour] would diverge from the Socratic character (êthos); for, as we have often remarked,¹⁵⁶ Socratic encouragements are like purifications drenched in honey and are unlike the [purifications] of others, for instance, doctors’ incisions and burnings.
[30] Again, when [Socrates] tallies up natural kinds of excellence (phusikai [5] aretai) in the course of his praises [of Alcibiades], these too are objects of both praise and criticism:¹⁵⁷ [1] [they are objects of] criticism, on the one hand, because they arise from nature and not from discipline (askêsis) (which is why they are frequently available even to slaves, so that Plato called these kinds of excellence ‘slavish’);¹⁵⁸ but [2] [they are also] praiseworthy insofar as even [merely natural excellences] are named ‘excellences’ (aretai), since all excellence [10] is praiseworthy. It is clear from this, too, that [Socrates’] refutations are offered mixed with praise.
[30] For again, [Socrates] remarks at the beginning of his praises, ‘as you say’ [sc. ‘that you need no man for anything’, 104A], and by this he means, ‘as you say and not I ’, just as the Tragedian [Euripides writes]:¹⁵⁹
[30] You hear this from yourself, and not from me.
[31] [31,1] And next, that ‘you also say that you need nothing from anybody’: for through these [words], he hints at Alcibiades’ rashness,¹⁶⁰ since this [sc. complete selfsuffi ciency] lies beyond the weak reach of human beings, and especially of Alcibiades, who is fond of his reputation and always keeping an eye on everyone [for praise].¹⁶¹ For only a god needs nothing.
[31] [5] And third, that he says: ‘you think your resources are great and you are proud of these’, by which he means, ‘your reverence isn’t of yourself, but what lies outside of you, since you have left yourself “out of the reckoning (logos)”, as the Megarian [oracle] goes’.¹⁶²
[31] And fourth, that ‘your pride starts with bodily goods and ends with the [goods] of the soul, which was a mistake. For you suppose’, he means to say, ‘that you are incomparably beautiful, but it was unfitting to revere yourself for [10] your beauty, which will pass with the season (opôrâi)’. For Plato also writes in the Epigram of Laïs:¹⁶³
[31] [She dedicated] her mirror to the Paphian [sc. Aphrodite] – for she was
unwilling to behold herself as she was, but she was unable to behold herself
as she used to be.
[31] Here, he shows that one should not be proud on beauty’s account alone.
[31] [15] Again, [Socrates] comments that ‘You are also proud on account of your good birth’, as if to say, ‘If we adopt your standards for self-reverence, it’s possible that your ancestor was a slave twenty-five generations back.’¹⁶⁴ Another refutation comes when he remarks that ‘You think your friends are your servants’: for if, as the Pythagoreans have it, ‘friendships are equalities’,¹⁶⁵ and according to Aristotle ‘a friend is another self’,¹⁶⁶ why should [friends] be our ‘servants’ any more than we ourselves are? And ‘you are mistaken to be proud of Pericles as a guardian’, since this man had been shown in the Gorgias¹⁶⁷ not to be a [true] statesman (politikos). For he made his citizens neither noble nor good, but on the contrary, he made them worse: for he made them arrogant when they were angry, by providing them with dockyards, harbours, and allies; [5] consider, too, that the comic poet praises Aristides alone [among statesmen], since nobody good came after him.¹⁶⁸
[32] But since every false belief takes its start from a true one (for the false, as a ‘falling away’ from the true, draws substance from it (parhuphistatai autôi) and depends upon it, lacking the power to exist in its own right: for the true, [10] through its abundance of power, influences even its contrary the false, and there is no such thing as a total darkening (amaurôsis) of the common concepts)¹⁶⁹ – [for all these reasons] we need to articulate Alcibiades’ grounds for thinking that what appeared good was [in fact] the greatest good, and then becoming proud about it.¹⁷⁰
[32] We say, then, that when he was boasting about beauty, he had intelligible beauty in his mind, and he held onto an image (phantasia) of it, but since he lacked the power to obtain it truly, he started ‘fighting over shadows’,¹⁷¹ over the perceived and apparent – as the poetic verse has it,¹⁷²
[32] And all about this image (eidôlon) brilliant Achaians and Trojans hewed at
each other, and at the ox-hide shields strong circled guarding men’s
chests...
[32] [20] Again, he revered himself for his good birth, since also in the All (to pan), what emanates from ‘better-born’ causes is treated as more deserving of honour, and superior. Thus Plato, too, comments that what derives from an unmoved cause is eternal and imperishable.¹⁷³
[32] Likewise, [Alcibiades revered himself] on account of his friends, because [33,1] the origin (arkhê) of all things, which is one and single (mia kai hen), is also a unity: and friendship is like this, since, as a process of unification (henôsis), it is directed toward the One (to hen).¹⁷⁴ And [he revered himself] for his guardian (epitropos) Pericles, since he had in mind the concept (ennoia) of his allotted [daimon] – for that is our true ‘guardian’ (epitropeuei).
[33] And finally (teleutaion), Socrates says that ‘you are wealthy, too, Alcibiades, [5] but because you despise money and care about your reputation, you don’t think it’s worthwhile to be proud over your wealth’. Indeed, it is clear that [Alcibiades] despises [money], for the story goes that once, when the Athenians were summoned to the Assembly concerning their revenue, he voluntarily handed over ten talents from home.¹⁷⁵
[33] Now caring for one’s reputation (to philotimon) is superior to caring for money and caring for pleasure, because spirited emotion (thumos), from which [10] the love of honour derives, has a purpose which is separable [sc. from the body]. For it provides a motivation (orexis) that resists grief, and a drive (ephesis) to defend [ourselves] against anyone who previously wronged [us]. But the purpose of appetite (epithumia) – which is the source of our care for money and pleasure – is not separable, but it has been smothered by the body, either by filling up whatever it’s missing, like food and drink and other such things imported from outside, or else by letting out whatever is overflowing, like semen [15] in sexual [activities]. There are also other ways in which spirited emotion is more honourable than appetite: for when reason (logos) and appetite (epithumia) engage in battle, spirited emotion becomes the ally of reason, and, like a noble and well-born soldier, it takes up arms against appetite on reason’s behalf.¹⁷⁶
[33] [That is the content of the survey.] [103B] So I have just about come to understand: The text of the passage [20] supports (sumphônos) our comments. For Socrates is present, and through these words he expresses the cause of the first – I mean, of [the first kind] of love: and so ‘just about’ was said on Alcibiades’ account, but ‘understand’ is said on Socrates’ own account. For if we do not interpret it along these lines, then the force of his words ‘just about’ and ‘understand’ will be reversed: for this [former language] does not fit [Socrates’] knowledge (epistêmonikos), but the [34,1] [phrase] ‘just about’ does suit Alcibiades, since he is young. (Alternatively, it might make for more effective persuasion, considering [Alcibiades’] character (êthikôs), like the phrase ‘I think’ above.) How you handle your lovers: Here it is clearly [necessary] to understand (noein) the second cause [sc. human love], since Socrates says that he loves Alcibiades on account of the latter’s scornful treatment of his other [5] lovers. Even though quite a few great-minded men sprouted up: We need to investigate why he calls the crude lovers ‘great-minded’ (megalophronas).¹⁷⁷ Well, we reply that the [reason] is just what we said the other day (prôên)¹⁷⁸ about Love (Erôs), namely, that he influences even his contrary through an abundance of power, with the result that both [the divine and crude kinds] are [10] called ‘lovers’ by a common name; likewise, here too we say that greatmindedness (megalophrosunê) has also provided a share of itself to its opposite, with the result that even the crude lovers are called ‘great-minded’.
[34] It is also worth noting that [Socrates] has used appropriate language to address the young man in each case. Since he knows that [Alcibiades] is practically bursting to enter public life (ta koina) and rushing after a military command (stratêgikos), he describes him using words that reflect [the very [15] qualities] by which the young man hopes to achieve the positions that he seeks. For here he says ‘great-minded’, then ‘overwhelmed by your spirit’, and again ‘have fled’, and each and every one of these [phrases] suits the statesman (politikos). [104A] I’d like to explain the reason (logos) why you felt yourself so superior:¹⁷⁹ Socrates uses these words to acclimatise the young man to a life lived with [20] purpose (kat’ aitian). Consider that Alcibiades might have scorned his other lovers, not due to pride and great-mindedness, but rather due to an empty conceit (khaunotês) of the soul.¹⁸⁰ But instead [Socrates] addresses him as someone who scorns them for a reason, not out of ignorance, but rather due to a kind of knowledge that can’t be articulated (aporrhêtê epistêmê), thus drawing him toward life lived with a cause, as we have already remarked. For when [25] [Socrates] says, ‘the reason why you felt yourself so superior...’, it was not entirely because of some ‘reason’ or other that [Alcibiades] looked down on them. [35,1] You say [that you need] no one: These appear to be words of praise, but refutations (elenkhoi) are intermingled with them. For at the beginning he says, ‘as you say... ’. That you need no one for anything: A second refutation: for it does not belong to human power (dunamis) to need no one for anything, and especially [not to the capacity] of Alcibiades, who wants to be a statesman and a leader of people [5] (dêmagôgos), and hence needs many [things]. For your resources: A third refutation. Beginning from the body: A fourth refutation, if at least he demonstrates through this that [Alcibiades] honours bodily goods before goods of the soul. For youthinkthat you: He means, ‘for you do not know with precision (akribôs), but you only surmise’.¹⁸¹ In the first place are the most beautiful and great: This is the first of the four indictments described in [our preceding] survey (theôria), on the strength of which Alcibiades proudly looked down on his lovers – namely, that he is beautiful. And it is plain to everyone to see, that you do not lie: Here he secretly refutes [15] Alcibiades, and does not praise him (which is what he appears to do). For just as the good in the god cannot be articulated in words, likewise the good in us participates in something beyond articulation. And if now he says, concerning [the good that is] present to Alcibiades, that it is ‘clear to everyone to see’, it is plain that this is a base thing and not truly ‘good’, so that even in these [words] there is a refutation. [20] And next, you belong to the most vigorous lineage: This is the second [indictment] on the strength of which Alcibiades proudly looks down on his other lovers. And we have pointed out¹⁸² that there is a refutation here as well: after all, what if his ancestor twenty-five generations back was a slave? [5] [104B] [Friends and family] who, if anythingwereneeded, would come to your aid: Here again is another refutation: for we will come to the aid of our friends no less than they will come to ours, at least if ‘friendships are equalities’, according to the Pythagoreans, and ‘a friend is another self’, according to Aristotle. And you count on a power greater than all I have mentioned: Note that here [10] too, following everything that has been said, he has offered a speech that is appropriate (oikeios) to the young man, since he says ‘you count on a power...’: that befits a military commander’s work, and the young man is rushing to become one of these. And we have often pointed out¹⁸³ that Socrates tries to guide his conversations in the necessary direction by using [topics] that are similar (tôn homoiôn) [sc. to the interlocutor’s existing interests]. So he is all but shouting aloud, ‘Learn what is true power: knowledge (epistêmê)!’ (For as he says in the Theaetetus,¹⁸⁴ ‘there is nothing more powerful than knowledge existing in soul’; for this alone, and the good life, can’t be seized by tyrants nor taken away.) And I will also add the advantage of your wealth: Socrates offers this second reason for his love of Alcibiades, after the first, which was divided into four. [20] This [second reason] is that Alcibiades is also ‘great’ in regard to his wealth, and actually greater than many wealthy people are. And he takes this up right away in the next [sentence], commenting, ‘and you seem to be proud of this least of [37,1] all’. For he means that ‘you aren’t proud at all of your wealth, since that you don’t revere yourself over this, because you don’t care about money (philokhrêmatos)’. You have conquered your lovers: In these [words] too, Socrates again entices [5] the young man with the appropriateness of his language, in order to elevate him. For he says ‘you have conquered’ and again, ‘being no match for you, they were conquered’: and Alcibiades welcomes all of these [remarks]. And these [facts] have not escaped you either: With these words, Socrates turns Alcibiades back toward himself and toward self-knowledge, acting to the advantage of the dialogue’s target (skopos).¹⁸⁵ And in general, just as selfknowledge has a recurrent nature (apokatastatikos), likewise this discussion is recurrent, thanks to the present sentence and the following one: for at the beginning, [Socrates] said that ‘I think that you wonder’; and now he says this, that ‘it has not escaped you’.¹⁸⁶
[37] Then Socrates’ arguments converge in the sentence, ‘ From this, I know very clearly that you are in a state of wonder ’.¹⁸⁷ And it is certainly fair to wonder at how, at the beginning (prior to the demonstrative arguments) he made the phrase ‘you wonder’ less certain by adding ‘I think’, but now (after the demonstrative arguments) he said ‘I know well’, unambiguously: for he used the [language] that was most useful in each case.

## Lecture 5

[37] With the god’s favour
[37] [20] Alc. As a matter of fact, Socrates, perhaps you don’t realise that you just [[104D]] beat me to the punch. [I had already decided to come and ask you that very question: what in the world do you want? What do you hope to achieve when you crowd in on me, always making sure you’re present wherever I am? Yes, I really do wonder what you’re up to, and it would be a great pleasure to find out.
Soc. Then you’ll listen to me with full attention... and I have in you a [[104E]] listener who will stay to hear me out? Look out: it would be no wonder if I found it as diffi cult to stop as it was to start.
Alc. By all means... Speak, good man, and I will listen.
Soc. Speak I must, then. It is diffi cult to play the lover with a man who doesn’t give in to lovers; all the same, I must dare to speak my mind. Alcibiades, if I saw that you were content with the advantages that I just [[105A]] mentioned... I would have set aside my love long ago; at least, that’s what I persuade myself. But now I’m going to show you your own, rather different plans. From that, you’ll realise that I’ve had you constantly in mind.
[37] You see, as you seem to me, if one of the gods asked you, ‘Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now possess, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater?’ – it seems to me that you would rather die. But now I’ll tell you exactly what your real [[105B]] hope in life is. You think that as soon as you present yourself before the Athenian people, as indeed you expect to in a very few days, by presenting yourself you’ll show them that you deserve a greater reputation than Pericles himself, or anyone else who ever was. Having shown that, you’ll be the most influential man in the city, and if you’re the greatest here, you’ll be the greatest among the other Hellenes, and not only among the Hellenes...
[37] And if that selfsame god were then to tell you that... you weren’t [[105C]] permitted to cross over into Asia... I think you’d rather not live with only that to look forward to; you want your reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind, to so speak. I don’t think you regard anybody as ever having been much to speak of, except perhaps Cyrus and Xerxes. I’m not guessing that this is your ambition – I know it well.]
[38] [38,1] Since we have finished learning from Socrates’ words of reason (logoi), come, let us examine Alcibiades’ utterances (phônai) too.¹⁸⁸ Now, it is appropriate that we have attributed ‘words of reason’ to Socrates, but ‘utterances’ to Alcibiades. For ‘words of reason’ are appropriate to human beings, but ‘utterances’ to irrational (alogos) [animals].¹⁸⁹ Since, then, Socrates has more in common with reason (logoeidesteros), [5] whereas Alcibiades is less rational, let us treat their respective speeches accordingly.
[38] We have [so far] learned two things from Socrates’ words: first, that Socrates loves Alcibiades, and second, that he loves him in a godlike manner (theoeidôs), that is, by attending him silently. And [we have learned] that – using an archaic style¹⁹⁰ – [Socrates] articulated the cause of the second [divine kind of love] first, namely, that it is a daimonic or divine opposition. Then, in conclusion [10] (teleutaion), he introduced two causes of the first [human kind of love]: one, that [Alcibiades] looks down on his other lovers (which, as [Socrates] says, he does for four reasons: beauty, good birth, friends, and [having] Pericles as his guardian); and second, that he has not been captured by the affection of caring for money (philokhrêmaton pathos). For caring for money, although superior to caring for pleasure (for that – I mean caring for pleasure – is the lowest (eskhatos) affection of all), is nevertheless inferior to caring for one’s reputation.¹⁹¹ For the lover of reputation does exactly the same things that the good person (spoudaios) does, but the lover of reputation does them for reputation’s sake (dia timên), whereas the good person does them for the good – just as the empirical doctor does exactly what the scientific (logikos) doctor does,¹⁹² even though one acts with reason (logos), the other without reason or cause (aitia).
[38] Since, then, in these [lines] we have learned about Socrates’ arguments, as [20] we have already remarked, let us now get into detail about the remainder, i.e. Alcibiades’ utterances. And these utterances express wonder at four [features] of Socrates: [1] the good timing (eukairia) of his words; [2] his essence (ousia); [3] his power (dunamis); [4] his activity (energeia).¹⁹³

### Four causes of Alcibiades’ wonder at Socrates

[38] [1] Now [Alcibiades wonders at] the good timing of [Socrates’] words when he says this: ‘You just beat me to the punch’ – as if to say, ‘if you hadn’t just beaten [25] me to it, I would have asked you first why in the world you’ve been following me around for so long’. And consider: were there no need for the daimonic and [39,1] divine to lead the human (but [they do, for] this is what it amounts to for [the daimon] to encourage Socrates to approach Alcibiades and converse with him, by not dis couraging him); and if the actual were not prior to the potential (which it is in principle,¹⁹⁴ <even if not in time>;¹⁹⁵ and Socrates operates at the level of actuality, but Alcibiades at the level of potentiality) – if all that had not been so, then (he says)¹⁹⁶ he would not have just beaten Alcibiades to the punch. So [Alcibiades] expresses wonder at [Socrates’] good timing on these grounds.¹⁹⁷
[39] Now, good timing (eukairia) has the potential to achieve the very greatest results. Consider that ‘opportunities (kairoi) are the souls of therapy’,¹⁹⁸ and as Aristotle puts it, ‘opportunity is time as it seizes the moment of need (to deon)’, and ‘time as it seizes the right [moment] (to eu)’;¹⁹⁹ and just as nature defines [10] the appropriate place (topos oikeios) for each body, so too she assigns a time to each action (praxis), which is called its ‘opportune’ moment (kairos).²⁰⁰ (On another note, an [entity] that needs fulfilment (teleiôsomenon)²⁰¹ must maintain a suitable attitude toward the agent that fulfils it, just as if it were present, even if it is not present; and conversely, the agent of fulfilment should maintain such an attitude to that which is to be fulfilled, just as if it is present, even if it is not present.²⁰² But this is a matter of attitude, not of timing, or rather, good timing).
[39] [2] Second, [Alcibiades] expresses wonder at [Socrates’] essence when he says, ‘what do you want?’ [104D]: for what we want is good.²⁰³ Through this phrase, then, he has expressed wonder at the similarity of [Socrates’] essence to the Good (agathoeides).²⁰⁴ For we all want good things: and if we also do things that are bad (kaka), it is not because we want them, but because they seem [desirable] to us, as [Socrates] remarks in the Gorgias:²⁰⁵ in that dialogue, with the god’s favour (sun theôi),²⁰⁶ we will also discover (gnôsometha) the distinction of what we want from what seems [to be wanted].²⁰⁷ Subsequently in our passage too, he calls [Socrates] ‘good’.
[40] [40,1] [3] Third, he expresses wonder at [Socrates’] power (dunamis) when he says, ‘always making sure you’re present, wherever I am’. Now this belongs to a power that is sleepless and unwearied, which is also why Athene is called ‘Unwearying’ (Atrutônê).²⁰⁸ Hence it is an indication of the greatest degree of power to be present everywhere, always.
[40] [4] Fourth, he expresses wonder at his activity (energeia), when he says ‘you [5] crowd in on me’ (enokhleis): and this – I mean ‘crowding’ him like this – amounts to unhindered and unceasing activity. For the [phrase] ‘you crowd’ (enokhleis), used just now, is not identical with the [phrase] ‘in a mob’ (di’ okhlou), used earlier [103A]: consider that there, he described the crude lovers, those who wanted to act on him by means of touch (haptikôs), as being ‘in a mob’; but here, he uses the words ‘you crowd’, meaning ‘you obstruct me [10] (aporein)’, which derives from the metaphor of people walking in a crowd and being at a loss about how to move forward, just as if they are prisoners.²⁰⁹ For ‘obstruction (aporia) is a prison of the soul’,²¹⁰ which is why its remedy (iasis), like the remedy of imprisonment, is called ‘release’ (epilusis). And Aristotle also comments in On Interpretation [17a35–7], ‘And this much is said in reply to the sophists as they crowd in (enokhlêseis)’, in other words, to ‘obstructions’; [15] and he also labelled obstruction a ‘crowding’ (okhlêsis), using the metaphor of a crowd. So ‘you crowd’ [does mean] ‘you obstruct me’ (aporia). This, then, is what Alcibiades has to say.

### Socrates’ reply

[40] Next, Socrates imitates the leader of the philosophical chorus (koruphaios) – he who requires the fewest words, because he develops his first principles (arkhai) from the non-hypothetical.²¹¹ (For [his principles derive] from our common concepts (koinai ennoiai), which have been agreed as a consensus,²¹² whereas the other skills (tekhnai), drawing their principles from hypotheses, demand many arguments: for instance, the medical [skill] takes its principles (arkhetai) from the hypothesis that human bodies are [composed] from the four elements; but it is the job of the first philosopher [i.e. metaphysician] to prove that hypothesis, namely, first that [the elements] are four and secondly that our bodies are [composed] from them).²¹³ Hence Socrates, imitating the leader of the philosophical chorus (koruphaios), as we have said, and taking his principles from the non-hypothetical, demands little from Alcibiades, and what [he does request] is nothing too costly: first, to hear what he has to say, and then to answer his questions.²¹⁴ Next, with the young man nodding his agreement to do this, Socrates adds that ‘if you do this, it is in my ability to bring you that power which your other lovers did not have the power to [provide]’.²¹⁵
[41] Next, we should look into the third reason why he is in love with [Alcibiades], namely, because the lover kindles Love and is lift ed up to this [condition], in [10] order that he can keep the young man paying even closer attention to his words. Hence he explains that the elements and marks of the divinely inspired lover are the following two: namely, it is necessary for the divinely inspired lover to possess both judgement (krisis) and compassion (sumpatheia). For if he lacks either of these, he will not be like this [sc. a divine lover]: for if he has judgement but not compassion, he will be a knowledgeable but not a truly good (spoudaios) lover; and conversely, if he has compassion but not judgement, [15] he is only a crude lover. Thus it is necessary that both be present.
[41] And where does [Socrates] state this? In the passage where he says, ‘It would be no wonder if I found it as diffi cult to stop as it was to start’ [104E]. For the [phrase] ‘diffi cult to start’ indicates judgement (since he knew that Alcibiades was unprepared [before now]), whereas the [phrase] ‘diffi cult to stop’ indicates [20] compassion, and [Socrates’] longing for more of his beloved. Aside from this (allôs), the diffi culty in starting was due to Alcibiades himself, since (as we have remarked) he was unprepared: but Socrates’ diffi culty in stopping is due to himself. For Socrates, who is always longing to help youths and to do them good,²¹⁶ will not stop until he brings his beloved to fulfilment.²¹⁷ So he says that ‘it was diffi cult (khalepon) even now to approach you’: and he is right to use the [42,1] word ‘diffi cult’ instead of ‘easy’ or ‘impossible’. For it was not easy, since it was not feasible for [Alcibiades] to divert Socrates in the same way as he scorns his other lovers; nor, for the same reason, was it impossible. That is, once he began [5] to scorn the other [lovers], Socrates’ approach was no longer impossible; for it had been impossible for him to hear Socrates out without looking down on the others.
[42] Having said this, and having kindled love to this point, [Socrates] reveals the third reason [for his love] when he adds that, ‘because I scorn your resources, I love you, and I have not abandoned you for all this time – because [10] I know you really don’t desire these appearances’.
[42] Now it is not the case that all human beings desire the same experiences (pathê) – for example, one cares for reputation, another cares for money and riches, another cares for pleasure.²¹⁸ And the pleasure-lover longs for divine ease, about which it has been said, ‘the gods who live at ease’²¹⁹ – that is the kind of idea that this person has in mind, but since he is unable to attain it, he fights over shadows (skiamakhein), the reflections and expressions of this [higher idea].²²⁰ And the money-lover longs for fulfilment and self-suffi ciency,²²¹ because self-suffi ciency and fulfilment are divine – and so he desires this; but since he is unable to attain [the real thing], he grasps after it by loving money. And again, the reputation-lover longs for the god who is suffi cient and freely giving, even if he is unable to attain this. (But being fulfilled (teleion) and being suffi cient (hikanon) are not identical; for fulfilment is just needing nothing [43,1] from another, whereas suffi ciency is a matter not only of having no needs, but also being able to give freely to others. And the reputation-lover wants to appear to be such a person). And since Alcibiades thinks little of his own [5] resources, this is the approach that Socrates deploys. For he introduces the god [into the conversation] when he asks him ‘whether you prefer, Alcibiades, to let the life of great works fall by the wayside and to be content with what you have, or to die?’, and then, offering an answer himself on Alcibiades’ behalf, [replies that he would] ‘prefer to die’.
[43] After this, he divides up Alcibiades’ entire life, and says that ‘you hope to [10] approach the people in a few days and to advise the Athenians’. Now this was at the stage just preceding adolescence (ephêbias); in ten days, as Proclus relates, [Alcibiades] was to be enrolled among the Ephebes (ephêboi),²²² and it was the custom that no one could give advice to the Athenians before being enrolled among them. ‘And so,’ [Socrates] continues, ‘you are about to offer advice, and you suppose that on this basis you will get a reputation, and then [15] be honoured in the city, and not only here, but also in Attica and Hellas, then among the Hellenes and throughout all Europe – and not here alone, but even in Asia and through the whole earth: and you will count no other person as worthy of notice and wonder beyond yourself, save Cyrus and Xerxes.’ So says Socrates.

### The god questions Alcibiades: 105A–C

[43] [20] But come, let us look into the god’s questions, and the philosopher’s answers to the god on behalf of Alcibiades, [and consider] what lessons (dogmata) we should take away from the god’s questions and the philosopher’s answers. And first of all, let us articulate the reason why [Socrates] made a god question Alcibiades, and then made himself answer on [Alcibiades’] behalf.
[43] Well, then, he made a god pose the questions for three reasons:²²³ [1] first, in order that the young man might not deny his own words, since we have all learned to trust that the divine is aware of even our chance movements, if indeed it is true that
[43] All things are full of god, and he hears all things, right through rocks and
 [44,1] through the earth and within a man himself, who has concealed his thought
(noêma) in his breast.²²⁴
[44] [2] The second explanation would be that Socrates staged this scene because of his fondness for tragedy. Certainly [Socrates] is keen on this kind of thing: hence, just as the [tragedians] often produce a ‘god from the machine’ (mêkhanê) to resolve disasters²²⁵ (as in the Alcestis of Euripides, the playwright put Apollo in the house of Admetus),²²⁶ so Socrates similarly introduced a god in this case. [3] According to a third explanation, it is because Socrates, who is a lover, wants to bring himself into union with his beloved, both as a consequence of his compassion [for him], and because the divine is a unity (henas) beyond being; meanwhile, he wants to [10] fulfil his beloved according to his judgement (krisis), and the divine also acts for fulfilment (teleiôtikos).²²⁷ And he made himself answer for Alcibiades, since the interval (meson) between god and Alcibiades was wide, and it would have been empty (kenon), had Socrates not placed himself in this [mediating] position.²²⁸
[44] But let us look at the remainder [of the lemma], what lessons (dogmata) [15] emerge from the god’s questions. (For the questions and answers themselves have already been stated). From the questions, then, it emerges that lives (bioi) [45,1] [come about] by choice (kath’ hairesin) and not by the compulsion of necessity: for he says, ‘What do you want?’ So too in the Timaeus responsibility (aitia) lies with the one who chooses, but ‘the god is blameless (anaitios)’ [Republic 10, 617E; cf. Timaeus 42D];²²⁹ and again in Republic, ‘you will choose a daimon; a daimon will not be allotted to you’. For it is up to us (en hêmin)²³⁰ to choose a life of a certain kind; but it is not up to us whether we who made the choice will act out (prattein) the consequences of that life, but this is compelled by necessity – just as it is up to us (eph’ hêmin) to throw a stone, but the stone’s landing, once it is released, is not up to us.²³¹ So we must express it in the poetic verse,
[45] ... Yet I am not responsible (aitios),
 [10] But Zeus is, and Destiny, and Fury the holy wanderer...²³²
[45] And the following lessons [emerge] from the [god’s] answers: [1] that it is more profitable not to exist than to exist badly;²³³ for he says, ‘You, I think, would choose to die rather than live like this.’ [2] Second, that the body is an impediment to obtaining excellence (aretê), from the same [sentence] – for if he prefers to die, it is clear that he chooses this because the body is an [15] impediment to what he desires (epithumei). [3] And the third lesson is that you should not give advice (sumbouleuein) to your advisees with a view to your own reputation (timê), but instead, with a view to benefiting²³⁴ those who listen to you. Alcibiades, on the other hand, wants to approach the people with [his own] reputation in view (dia timên). [4] Fourth, that you should judge the reputation-lover by the quality of the people who honour him, and not by those who happen to find him worthy of wonder – just as Alcibiades wants to be an object of wonder to Hellenes and barbarians and all human beings.²³⁵ [5] Fift h, that the examples (paradeigmata) which he introduced were dissimilar (anomoia) [from one another], namely, Cyrus²³⁶ and Xerxes:²³⁷ for Cyrus was called ‘father’ on account of his gentle character and tolerance toward his subjects, whereas Xerxes [was called] ‘despot’ on account of his extreme irascibility and use of overpowering force (for this man was aroused [to anger] [46,1] not only against human beings, but even against nature herself and the elements: as Aristides says, ‘he strode on the sea by yoking the Hellespont, and he sailed the land by cutting Athos, and he hid the sun when he gave the order to fire’);²³⁸ and Darius²³⁹ was a mean between these, who was called ‘the dealer’ on account of his love of money. For he ordained the tribute for the Persians, as Herodotus says, and he was the one who secured his own throne by a horse’s whinny,²⁴⁰ since it was the Persian custom for children to succeed to kingships.
[46] That is the content of the survey (theôria). [10] [104C] As a matter of fact, Socrates, perhaps you don’t realise that you just beat me to the punch... See how the text agrees with what was said in the survey (theôria).²⁴¹ In these words, you see, Alcibiades expresses wonder at Socrates’ good timing – which has the greatest power (dunatai) in all things, as has been demonstrated. For Socrates would not have just beat him to the punch, were it not for the reasons we have explained. [15] [104D] What in the world do you want? Here he expresses wonder at the essence of [Socrates], which is good: for what we want is good. And we have commented²⁴² that what is [truly] wanted is not the same as what appears to be [wanted], as had been explained in the Gorgias [467C–468D]. What do you hope to achieve when you crowd in on me? He made [Socrates’] activity (energeia) clear in the phrase, ‘you crowd’. But the phrase ‘you crowd’ (enokhleis) used just now, and the phrase ‘in a mob’ (di’ okhlou) used earlier do not come to the same thing, as we have learned.²⁴³ And next he expresses wonder at [Socrates’] power (dunamis). Always making so sure you’re present, wherever I am.²⁴⁴ See how he has also conveyed [Socrates’] power here. For it belongs to a power that is sleepless and unwearied to be present and accompanying everywhere. [25] And it would be a great pleasure to find out. It has also been explained in the survey²⁴⁵ that even the pleasure-lover does not long for this apparent pleasure, but rather for true [pleasure]; not, however, being able to obtain it, he fights over a shadow, namely, its appearance. And the phrase ‘a great pleasure’ has provided us with the opportunity to make this observation (epistasis): for the passage is appropriate to the pleasure-lover. [5] Then you’ll listen to me... Here Socrates imitates the leader of the philosophical chorus and asks for little, in keeping with the philosophy that does not rely on hypotheses.²⁴⁶ And he says here that ‘it is in my ability to bring you that power which your other lovers did not have the power to [provide]’, in order that [Alcibiades] will listen to his words now, and answer him a little later on.²⁴⁷ [10] And I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out? This was intended as a question, and it ought to be read this way [sc. interrogatively].²⁴⁸ The reply to him makes this clear: for [Alcibiades] adds ‘by all means’ after [Socrates] has asked the question. [104E] Look out: it would be no wonder if I found it as diffi cult to stop as it was to start. Here we should articulate the third reason [for Socrates’ love],²⁴⁹ [15] but he has not done so, in order that he might kindle his love for the young man even more; nonetheless, he does explain the elementary features of the divine lover. He does not do so plainly, but they are [deducible] from what follows on his words: for he says, ‘just as diffi cult as it was for me to begin’, and reveals from this his quality of judgement (krisis) – for it stems from judgement not to begin at random, or by chance.²⁵⁰ And then he adds, ‘it may be just as [20] diffi cult for me to stop’, and this clearly displays his compassion (sumpatheia), since when [a lover] remains close to his beloved for a long time, that stems from compassion.²⁵¹
[47] In fact, this is just what the divine is like: it begins gradually and stops gradually, furnishing abundant goods for human beings [with a view] to the recipients’ suitability (epitêdeiotês). For we see that those who are successful (eutukhountas) struggle to succeed at first, but remain successful for a long [25] time; the same goes for those who are unfortunate (dustukhountôn) and those who receive corrective treatment (kolazomenôn).²⁵² It should be recognised, you see, that the divine is really always productive of goods, and does not act intermittently, but is a constant fount of such [results]. Also, the goods that [48,1] derive from it are divided, since some are primary, others secondary. Goods produced in the primary sense, then, are those that the genuinely successful possess – I mean in [their] children, words, wealth, and basically everything like this; and secondary goods are those that [function as] corrections (kolaseis) of errors (hamartêmatôn).²⁵³ Yes, these are also good things, for we should not countenance the idea that the divine would ever do a bad deed: those who shrink from their sentences resemble children trying to escape medical incisions. Thus the divine is constantly providing goods, and the recipients, based on their suitability, have the benefit of either the primary goods or the secondary; and these both begin and stop gradually. [10] Speak, good man, and I will listen. Also notice how in the text he calls [Socrates] ‘good’: he has expressed wonder at his essence as similar to the Good (agathoeidês) [by saying this, and] not only by [saying] ‘you want’.²⁵⁴ It is diffi cult to play the lover with a man who doesn’t give in... We have already observed that he neither used [the words] ‘impossible’ nor ‘easy’, and we have recognised that he was right to do this.²⁵⁵ All the same, I must dare... He speaks well when he calls the procession [from the primary] to the secondary ‘daring’ (tolman): the Pythagoreans likewise called the Dyad ‘daring’, as first having dared to separate itself from the Monad.²⁵⁶ It is also necessary that the soul, descending into genesis, which is a labyrinth (laburinthos), should make use of the monad as a thread for its [20] wandering here [on Earth], just as Theseus [made use of] the thread of Ariadne for [navigating] the Cretan labyrinth.²⁵⁷ For if I, Alcibiades, [saw that you were content with the advantages that I just mentioned]: Here is the third reason why Socrates is in love: for he says that he thinks little of [Alcibiades’] resources and does not really prize (agapan) the four [resources] that he listed off a little earlier [i.e. beauty, good birth, friends, and Pericles]. This will be shown, you see, from the god’s subsequent [25] questions and [Alcibiades’] answers to them. I would have set aside [my love] long ago: [The philosopher] Harpocration got involved at this point;²⁵⁸ by paying close attention to the language, he proved that the words require Socrates to be a divinely inspired lover. It is clear that he is a divinely inspired lover because he says here, ‘I would have put aside [my love] long ago’, but the crude lover does not set aside [his love] whenever he wishes, because he is experiencing this state [of love] due to an affection (pathos): and we do not set aside our affections whenever we wish, any more [5] than we begin experiencing them [whenever we wish]. Now this man [Socrates] begins when he wishes, and he wishes [to begin] when his beloved is worthy of love. So he also stops when he wishes, just as here, too, he remarks that ‘had I observed you really going after apparent goods, I would have set aside my love long ago’. [10] [105A] But now I’m going to show you your own, rather different plans: He means, ‘Since you do not truly desire these things, but other, greater things, and you fight over shadows because you are ignorant about the latter, I will tell you the arguments by means of which I will prove that you do not really long for these things.’²⁵⁹ And he added the [phrase] ‘you your own’, demonstrating that he knows what belongs to [Alcibiades] better than he does himself. That’s also [15] why he added, ‘From that, you’ll realise that I’ve had you constantly in mind’ – meaning, ‘[you’ll realise this] from my telling you the truth about yourself’. And the [phrase] ‘I have spent all this time thinking about you’ also has to do with love. You see, as you seem to me, if one of the gods asked you... Here begin the [20] questions of the god. The reason why he introduced a god to question Alcibiades has been stated in the survey. Would you rather live with what you now possess: From this one can derive the doctrine, which we have also stated, that lives are according to choice, and not according to necessity. And this is clear in the Republic as well. [25] It seems to me that you would rather die: This is the answer given by the philosopher on the young man’s behalf: and we should notice that, although he is just one actor ‘on stage’ (en heni prosôpôi), he preserves the form of dialogue [50,1] here, himself introducing the questions as if they came from a god, and the answers as if they came from Alcibiades. And there are two lessons to be drawn from the speech: that it is better not to exist than to exist badly, and that the body is an impediment to the acquisition of excellence. [5] But nowI’ll tell you just what your real hope in life is: From this point begins the division of Alcibiades’ life: for Socrates unfolds his entire chain of reasoning in the following words. [You think that as soon as you present yourself before the Athenian people,] [105B] as indeed you expect to in just a few days... Proclus relates that after twenty days [Alcibiades] was to be enrolled among the Adolescents (ephêboi), and then was to advise the Athenians.²⁶⁰ That you deserve a greater reputation than Pericles himself: Another lesson emerges from this point: one should not give advice for the sake of reputation, as Alcibiades does now, but for the benefit of one’s hearers. And we should recognise that [Socrates], by saying ‘greater than Pericles himself’, begins from the source (hestia) of [Alcibiades’] ambition,²⁶¹ and what is dearest to his heart (oikeios). [15] And if you’re the greatest here, you’ll be the greatest among the other Hellenes, and not only among the Hellenes: [Socrates] has his speech (logos) proceed like a ladder: for he adds, ‘you want to be famous (eudokimein) not only among the Hellenes, but all through Europe too, among foreigners, and across the whole totality of the Earth’, and ‘you think no one worth speaking of, except Cyrus and Xerxes’.
[50] [20] And I say that [Alcibiades] will not stop caring about his reputation even when he reaches this point, but he will want even more – as the comic poet puts it:²⁶²
[50] even if he achieves this, he wants forty times as much.
[50] For as we remarked before, it is not the case that all human beings long for just the same affections (for these are unlimited), but they long for more, because they possess a concept (ennoia) of certain other [sc. higher] things that they are unable to secure.²⁶³
[50] [25] We should also investigate why the affection of caring for reputation is the most diffi cult of all to wipe out (dusekniptos).²⁶⁴ Consider: it is so [diffi cult] [51,1] that even those who decide not to care about their reputation, do that out of care for their reputation, that is, in order not to appear to care about their reputation. We assert, then, that the affection of caring for reputation is diffi cult to wipe out for the following reason: it is closer to reason (logos) than other [affections] are,²⁶⁵ and is sibling to it, and reason is not something we can cast [5] aside; therefore what is close to reason is also diffi cult for us to cast aside.
[51] Or here is an alternative reason: the soul, when it descends here and flees slavery to its superiors, but wants to rule over its inferiors, first clothes itself in care for reputation from among the affections; and then, when [in ascending again] it casts [the affections] aside, it discards this one last of all. Since it is also said of [the soul],
[51] [10] Then he stripped off his rags.²⁶⁶
[51] And we should recognise that among our vital (zôtikais) capacities, the reputation-loving affection is diffi cult to cast aside, while among our cognitive (gnôstikais) capacities it is imagination (phantasia) that is diffi cult to cast aside. For imagination is always available to our soul, as our soul is constantly fashioning impressions (tupous) of what it does not know, and bestowing [15] shapes, sizes, and bodies on the non-bodily, and confining [even] the god in terms of place (topôi).²⁶⁷ That selfsame (autos) god... It was fitting for him to locate ‘self’ (autos) on the level of the god, since the god is the unit (henas), and unitary in form (henoeidês).²⁶⁸ But he spoke in the plural about the realities (pragmata) that Alcibiades is questing after, because the [entities] that follow and extend from the divine and the monad are many, and every person quests for these.²⁶⁹ That [20] he spoke in the plural about these is clear also from his introducing [the phrase], ‘to add something to the realities (pragmata) that are there’. And the word ‘add’ also suits Alcibiades.²⁷⁰ Except Cyrus and Xerxes: It has been pointed out that he made use of dissimilar examples:²⁷¹ for these [two] were not selected for the same reason, [25] considering that one was called ‘father’, the other ‘despot’. [52,1] I’m not guessing (eikazô) that this is your hope – I know it well. It was fitting that he placed the [phrase] ‘I know well’ after the demonstrations (apodeixeis), as he did at the beginning too [104C].²⁷² It is like the Homeric [verse] to say, as Diomedes said to Athena, ‘Nor do I escape your notice when I move,’²⁷³ but Socrates [says it] from the opposite point of view [i.e. the god’s]: ‘nor do you [5] escape my notice’, since he says: ‘I know well, then, and am not just guessing that you have this hope.’

## Lecture 6

[52] With the god’s favour

### Soc. Since you know what I say is true, maybe you’ll say,] ‘Well then, Socrates,

[52] [[105D]] what’s this got to do with your point (logos)? You said you were going to tell me why you haven’t abandoned me’. [Yes, I will tell you, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. It is impossible to put any of these plans of yours into effect without me – that’s how much power I think I have for your practical affairs and you yourself. I think this is why the god hasn’t allowed me to talk to you all this time; and I’ve been waiting for the day he allows me.
[52] [[105E]] Consider how you hope to demonstrate in public that you’re indispensable to the city – and after that, to win unlimited power. It’s just like that with me: I hope to win the greatest power over you by demonstrating that I’m worth the world to you, and that nobody has the power to give you the power you crave, neither your guardian nor your relatives, nor anybody else except me – with the god’s support, of course. When you were younger, before you were full of such ambitions, I think the god didn’t let me talk to [[106A]] you because the conversation would have been pointless. But now he’s told me to, because now you will listen to me.
Alc. Really, Socrates, now that you’ve started talking you seem much stranger... Well, on the question of whether or not these are my ambitions, you already seem to have your mind made up, and no denial of mine will do anything to convince you otherwise. Fine. But supposing I really do have these ambitions, how will they be achieved through you, and not without you? Have you got something to say?
 [[106B]] Soc. Are you asking if I can say some long speech like the ones you’re used to hearing? No, that sort of thing’s not for me. But I do think I’d be able to show you that what I said is true, if only you were willing to do me just one brief service.
Alc. Well, as long as the service you mean is nothing onerous, I’m willing.
Soc. Do you think it’s onerous to answer questions?
Alc. No, I don’t.
Soc. Then answer me.
Alc. Ask me.
Soc. Then I question you as someone who has this plan in mind?
 [[106C]] Alc. Let’s say I do, if you like, so I can find out what you’re going to say.]
[52] [10] Two [questions] had been advanced in the proem [103A–104E]: first, why does Socrates love [Alcibiades]? And second, why does Socrates accompany him by loving in silence (that is, why does he love him without being present with him)? In answer to the second [question], the cause has been attributed to a daimonic or divine entity. In answer to the first [question], three causes have been stated: [1] that Alcibiades looks down on the other lovers, [2] that he cannot be conquered by love of money, and [15] [3] that he thinks little of his resources. Since the proem encompassed not only these two [questions], but also a third – [why is it] that Socrates does not abandon [Alcibiades] after the other lovers have ceased? – Socrates is now in position to impart the cause of this. And so he explains, ‘Here is why I do not abandon you: it is because I am the [20] only person who has the power to give you the power that all of your other lovers could not give’.

### Three puzzles (aporiai) 1. Why does Socrates vaunt himself?

[52] Now first of all, we raise the puzzle (aporoumen), why is Socrates boastful here? – he who is everywhere ironic,²⁷⁴ and about whom it is said, ‘this is your habitual irony, Socrates’;²⁷⁵ who is always claiming that he knows nothing, and teaches nothing, which is also why the god at Delphi said about him that
[53] Socrates is wisest of all men²⁷⁶
[53] – since it was not only by striking the air, by vocal expression, that [Socrates] used to say this sort of thing, but [he also expressed himself] through his [5] manner of living, and in his divine inspiration. We ought to investigate, then, how it could be that such a person thinks [of himself] like this in the present case, announcing that he alone is able to deliver power to the youth.²⁷⁷
[53] Well, we reply, first, that the philosopher boasts at the right moment (kairos): for before this, it was crucial that he not boast, since Alcibiades scorned him just as he scorned his other lovers. So Socrates understood the right moment for [10] boasting. In fact, he has often done this: for example, in the Theaetetus, after establishing himself as a judge between ‘genuine’ and ‘wind-egg’ theories (logoi), he says, ‘For no god ever has ill-will toward a human being, nor do I do this out of any ill will, but it is never lawful (themis) for me either to agree to falsehood or to suppress truth.’²⁷⁸ (Notice how he ranked himself with the god here, by saying, ‘For no god ever has ill-will... ’) And again in the Apology he boasts when he says, ‘It is not permissible (themis) for a better person to be ruled by a worse one’;²⁷⁹ and again in the same dialogue when he says that ‘Anytus and Meletus have the power to kill me, but not to do me any harm at all’ (in the first part of this sentence, he [20] uses the word ‘me’ in the more ordinary way, referring to the composite (sunamphoteron) [of soul and body]; but in the second part, he uses it in its strict sense (kuriôs), referring to the soul alone).
[53] So that is one solution [to the puzzle], that he knows how to be boastful at the right moment. A second solution is that he is not [really] being boastful [54,1] (megalorrhêmonei) when he prefers himself to base people with a herd mentality (agelaioi). For it is nothing to boast about (mega) when the philosopher achieves what worthless people lacked the power to achieve.
[54] And here is a third [solution]: for someone who pays precise attention (akribôs ennoêsêi) to the words used here, it does not seem as if Socrates is [5] boastful at all. For he says, ‘with the god’s support, of course’ [105E], and ‘It is impossible to put any of these plans (dianoêmata) of yours into effect without me’ [105D]. (The word ‘without’ is a material (hulikos) preposition, and suitable to matter (hulê), since ‘without’ matter there is nothing here [sc. in the perceptible world] to think about).²⁸⁰

### 2. Why does Socrates vaunt Alcibiades?

[54] Second, we raise the puzzle, why does Socrates make the young man arrogant [10] by holding out such hopes and pronouncing that he will deliver power to him?²⁸¹ Well, we say that just as the doctors do not apply themselves to the causes of a disease until they have made it less acute (for which reason it was well said by Hippocrates, ‘[One should] medicate and attack [the disease] when it is ripe, not raw nor at the beginning’),²⁸² likewise Socrates does not apply himself to the affections (pathê) before he has ameliorated [15] them, nor does he extirpate them ‘by burning and incisions’, as the saying goes.²⁸³
[54] For we need to understand that – just as we said at the beginning²⁸⁴ – there are three methods (tropoi) of purification, the Pythagorean, Socratic and Peripatetic or Stoic.²⁸⁵ Now, the Stoic [method] heals opposites by opposites, introducing appetite (epithumia) to spirited emotion (thumos), thus soft ening [the former], and introducing spirited emotion to appetite and so strengthening [the latter], encouraging it to mature into manhood (anagôn pros to [20] andrikôteron). This is analogous to heated rods: if someone wants to straighten one, he bends it backwards, in order that symmetry might occur when it curves back in the opposite direction: in the case of souls, similarly, it was their custom [55,1] to foster harmony by using this method [of purification].
[55] But the Pythagorean [method] urges us to ‘concede a little’ to the affections (pathê), and to taste them as if ‘with the tip of the finger’: the doctors talk about this as ‘a little worse’ (smikrôi elatton).²⁸⁶ What they meant to convey was this: [5] those who are swelling up with an affection will be unable to stay in control of it, unless they act on it. For this is also what Athena did in the case of Pandarus: when he wanted to break his oath, she conceded [this] to him, which is also why he received corrective punishment (kolazomenos) through his tongue, since this became the instrument of his oath-breaking.²⁸⁷
[55] But the Socratic method of purification converts likes to likes: by saying to [10] someone who loves possessions, ‘learn what true self-suffi ciency is’, or to someone who loves pleasure, ‘[learn] what divine ease is’, and basically everything that we stated earlier.²⁸⁸ And this method is superior to the others: for the first [sc. Stoic or Peripatetic method] heals one trouble by another, since [it heals] an affection by an affection, while the second [sc. Pythagorean method] does not allow the soul to remain spotless, on account of its contact with the affections.

### 3. Why does Socrates claim that he can deliver power to Alcibiades?

[55] [15] Third, then, we raise the puzzle (aporoumen), why does Socrates claim that he has the power (dunasthai) to provide power (dunamis) to Alcibiades?²⁸⁹
[55] Well, we should reply to this²⁹⁰ as follows: he means that he will provide knowledge (epistêmê) to him, and knowledge is a kind of power, since elsewhere he remarks that ‘nothing is more powerful (dunatôteron) than demonstration existing in the soul’ (and ‘demonstration’ is of knowledge), and that knowledge is invincible to a tyrant.²⁹¹
[55] [20] Or [second, we should reply] that Socrates, who is an outstanding person (spoudaios), is self-suffi cient (autarkês) and is kin (sungenês) to the self-suffi ciency of the god, and therefore here, as a lover, he applies outstanding effort (spoudazei) to providing this kind of self-suffi ciency to his beloved, to completing him, and to guiding him upward toward the god’s self-suffi ciency.
[55] Or thirdly, [one should reply] that, according to the boastful talk of the Stoics, only the ‘ruler’ (arkhikos) – that is, the person who knows how to rule (arkhein) – is in control (arkhôn), even if he lacks the tools to exercise the ruler’s knowledge;²⁹² and only the wise man is wealthy, that is, the man who knows how to make use of the wealth that is available, even if no [material] wealth is in fact available. This is the kind of ‘power’, then, that Socrates announces to the youth as [necessary] for his statesmanhood (politikos); for it is true that [Socrates] alone, and none of the others, had the ability to [5] provide this. Toward the end of the proem (prooimion) [106B], he makes the second of [the requests] that we pointed out²⁹³ – I mean, that [Alcibiades] answer his questions. And here we ask again, why in the world does the philosopher ask Alcibiades to do this?
[56] We reply that Socrates did not want to draw dead and unbreathing words [10] (logoi) from him, but (so to speak) active and living [words], suitable to people engaged in dialectic; and this is what he is hunting for in the answers.
[56] Alternately, [we reply] that Socrates, being a lover, wants to embrace (periplokê) his beloved; and the dialogue form is similar to an embrace, as the interaction through brief exchanges becomes a process of question and answer.
[56] [15] Alternately, [our third reply is] that, as he says in the Phaedrus, ‘it is necessary for the speech (logos) to resemble a living being (zôiôn)’;²⁹⁴ and it follows that the best-constructed speech must resemble the best of living beings. And the best living being is the cosmos:²⁹⁵ just as this [world] serves as a meadow for a diversity (poikilôn) of living beings, the speech should likewise be full of all kinds of characters (prosôpôn).²⁹⁶ And [this is also the case] in other ways, since, just as in this [cosmos] all things speak and act (for the activities of beings are like their voices),²⁹⁷ so too in the speech it is appropriate for all of its characters to speak, just as it is for everyone to act (energein).
[56] Fourth, [we answer] that the form of question and answer is stimulating and tends to revert [the soul back upon itself] (epistreptikos).²⁹⁸ Naturally, the orators too, when they wish to stimulate the audience or turn their attention to the speech, have used this [form of question and answer]: for example, ‘answer [25] me, by the gods!’ But a speech that drones on at length makes the audience fall [57,1] asleep: as Aischines says, for instance, ‘dreaming over the pronouncement of justice’.²⁹⁹ So Socrates, who wants to revert Alcibiades [to attend to his own soul], asks him to answer his questions.
[57] That completes our survey (theôria) and [our discussion of] the proem (prooimion) of the dialogue; here, then, commences the remainder of the first part (prôton meros), which is the refutative [part].³⁰⁰ [105C] ‘Well then, Socrates, what’s this got to do with your point (logos)? You said you were going to tell me why you haven’t abandoned me.’ Notice that Alcibiades himself asks Socrates to explain the third point that he mentioned in the proem, namely, why ‘when the others have stopped, he alone [10] does not abandon him’ – and, a little later, Socrates will answer this too. [105D] Yes, I will tell you, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. It is neither untimely nor excessive to address [Alcibiades] by his father’s and mother’s names here,³⁰¹ as someone might have supposed. Rather, considering the young man’s noble birth on both sides, it is appropriate to use these words to express the point that ‘neither your relatives on your mother’s side, nor those [15] on your father’s side, can offer you the power that I can provide’. It is impossible to put any of these plans (dianoêmata) of yours into effect without me. ‘This’, he means, ‘is the reason why I do not abandon you, since you cannot obtain what you hope for without me.’
[57] And he uses the word ‘plans’ (dianoêmata) about the [goals] that he described earlier, when he said that ‘you think that you will approach the [20] Athenians quite soon, and show them that you deserve a reputation even greater than Pericles himself, and you will prove your importance among Hellenes and foreigners’,³⁰² and basically everything that we have discussed in that passage.³⁰³ And the phrase ‘without me’, as a preposition indicating materiality, shows that the philosopher is not boasting, as has been stated in the lecture (theôria).³⁰⁴ For your practical affairs (pragmata) and for you yourself... He says ‘for [25] your practical affairs’ meaning ‘for your activities (energeiai)’, and ‘for you yourself (autos)’ meaning ‘for your soul’,³⁰⁵ just as he used the word ‘me’ most strictly of the soul in the Apology when he said, ‘but they do not have the power to harm me ’.³⁰⁶ [58,1] I think this is why the god hasn’t allowed me to talk to you all this time, meaning: ‘if the god used to turn me away before in order that I did not speak in vain, then now, since he does not turn me away, I will provide you with the power that you desire by any means at my disposal’. For if the god turned him aside then (when it was appropriate to do so), it is not in vain that the god does [5] not do so now. For if the good man (spoudaios) does nothing in vain, and neither does nature (phusis),³⁰⁷ then the god must [do nothing in vain] to an even greater degree.³⁰⁸ For just as you hope to demonstrate in public... Here Socrates offers an analogy: ‘for the rank that you hold in relation to the citizens, Alcibiades – surpassing them to the degree that an adviser surpasses those whom he advises [10] (for the [good] adviser must be like this) – this is [the rank] that I hold in relation to you, and the god in relation to me’.³⁰⁹ [105E] Demonstrating that I’m worth the world to you... We should notice that the philosopher always associates ‘demonstration’ (endeixamenos) with the dialogue form, but ‘display’ (epideixamenos) with extended speech;³¹⁰ this is also the reason why he always distinguishes these from one another. So here too, he utilises this [distinction], when [he says], ‘I will prove (deixô) to you, [15] using question and answer, the magnitude of power that will come to you through me.’ With the god’s support, of course... Notice, again, a sign that Socrates is not boasting; for he did not only say that he himself was able, but ‘with the god’. [20] When you were younger... Here he repeats what he said above. For he [59,1] was saying then, ‘I think this is also why for a long time the god has not allowed me to converse with you’:³¹¹ and that is also what he means now. He hinted riddlingly (êinitteto) at this remark in the beginning, as we noticed there, when he said, ‘the power of which you will also learn later’: here, then, [5] is the follow- up to that remark, namely, that ‘[the god] prevented me so that I would not converse with you in vain’. That’s also why he added, ‘but now he sent me [to you], for now you might listen to me’, using these words to urge [Alcibiades] even more strongly to listen to him, since the god, by not turning [Socrates] aside, sent him to talk with [Alcibiades] so that the latter might be persuaded.³¹² [106A] Now you seem much more strange (atopos)... [By which he means], more paradoxical and more worthy of wonder.³¹³ And it is appropriate that Socrates seems more wondrous to Alcibiades now, after he has conversed with him, than when he was silent. For in our case too, we wonder more at the divine when we are visibly illuminated³¹⁴ and inspired than when we are not. Well, on the question of whether or not these are my ambitions, you already seem to have your mind made up. Since Alcibiades is naturally gift ed (euphuês), he neither denies absolutely that he has in mind what Socrates [15] stated, nor does he grant it, but he creates a middle ground (khôrei) in between [these extremes] by using hypothetical language (dia tou hupothetikou skhêmatos).³¹⁵
[59] He does not grant [Socrates’ claims], because in a democracy it was customary for the speaker not to appear keen on power, and so he shrank from this; but he does not deny it either, because he wished (since he wanted to become a politician) to hear from Socrates what kind of words such a person would need to use to be appointed to power over the people. Thus he [20] says, ‘Even supposing I do have in mind what you say, how will you provide it for me?’ How will they be achieved through you...? Here the philosopher Iamblichus got involved, and raised the puzzle (aporein) that Alcibiades appears more fulfilled (teleioteros)³¹⁶ than Socrates. For [Alcibiades] said ‘ through you’, a [60,1] preposition that suits an instrumental cause, whereas [Socrates] said ‘ with the god’, a preposition suitable to a productive (poiêtikos) cause, and he put himself on the level (sunetaxen) of the god; but [Alcibiades] said ‘through you’ as if Socrates were an instrument of the god.³¹⁷
[60] And [Iamblichus] solved this absolutely beautifully (pankalôs) by pointing [5] out that Plato, in his other [works], claims that more fulfilled souls watch over [works] in this world (têide) jointly with the god, and jointly set them in order,³¹⁸ but less fulfilled souls have the function of an instrument, and so the god uses them with a view to [works] here (entautha). (In fact, [the god] does not only use less complete [souls], but there are even times when [he uses] bad [souls], for instance, [using] murderers with a view to the rendering of the proper, just penalty (dikê) for those who owe it).³¹⁹ Thus Socrates, with reference [10] to his own, more fulfilled capacities (dunameis), said ‘ with the god’; but Alcibiades was referring to his less complete [capacities], and so he said ‘ through you’ and again added ‘and without you’, the preposition suitable to matter (hulê). Then are you asking if I can say some long speech, like the ones you’re used [15] to hearing? By this [remark], Socrates aims to prepare Alcibiades not to expect long speeches from him.³²⁰ For he was sure that Alcibiades, who is disposed to oratory, would expect him to converse this way, which is why he says ‘such as you are accustomed to hear’. And he implants the concept (ennoia) that he will speak dialectically (dialogikôs): for he adds, ‘this sort of thing is not my [habit], [20] but [rather] to demonstrate to you...’, meaning, ‘to converse by question and answer’. If only you were willing to do just one brief service... Here Socrates makes a different request of Alcibiades, that is, to answer. And he says ‘brief’ because he practises the philosophy that does not require hypotheses, and does not require many words.³²¹ We have stated in the survey (theôria) the reasons why he asks him to answer. At this point it should also be noted that [Alcibiades’] answers will make him appear to be set straight by his own, self-moved activity (autokinêtôs) – i.e. through cross-examination (elenkhos) by himself. For we [5] need to understand that we act in a self-moving way when we revert upon ourselves,³²² needing no one else to be set straight and to achieve relief from the affections (pathê) in us; but whenever we put a stop to our affections through others ’ cross-examination, then that amounts to being moved by another (heterokinêtôs). This is also the case in the Gorgias [sc. Republic 1]³²³ – for there, through Socrates’ cross-examination of the spirited emotion (thumos) of Thrasymachus, we learn (ennooumen) how to put a stop to the Thrasymachus [10] in us. And likewise by [studying] Callicles’ love for pleasure and Polus’ love for reputation [in the Gorgias].³²⁴ So too by [studying] Protagoras’ [theory about] appearance (phantasia):³²⁵ for Protagoras is a sophist, and appearance is quite similar to the sophist, since it misrepresents (sophizein) and remodels realities. And so Socrates, who wants Alcibiades to act with self-movement here, [15] prepares him to give answers: and he calls this ‘doing a service’, in order that the person who desires rule over all should be shown, in this case, to be Socrates’ servant.³²⁶ Well, as long as the service you mean is nothing onerous (khalepos): The young man gives an appropriate answer to this sort of request from Socrates, considering that [Socrates] will provide to him a power which the others were not able [to provide], and he supposed the request would be a large one.³²⁷ This is why he replies, ‘If you mean nothing onerous’: for he imagined that the request would match the magnitude of the results promised. But notice, he nevertheless agrees to do the service for Socrates, on the condition that it would not be burdensome (baru).
[61] And [Socrates] answers, ‘If it seems onerous to give answers’, in order that [62,1] [Alcibiades], agreeing that it is not onerous, will readily give answers. Of course the young man replies, ‘It is not onerous’; and this is well said. For if Aristotle were the questioner³²⁸ – or some other combative [conversant] (eristikos) who looks just to victory and on that account delights in the speaker’s mistakes in conversation – then it would be diffi cult and onerous to give answers;³²⁹ but [5] since it is Socrates, the ‘midwife’ who aims to benefit youths and set them straight, it is suitable [to say] ‘not onerous’.³³⁰ On the contrary, it is the [work of] questioning that is onerous, just as on a journey [it is more onerous] to lead than to follow. Then I question you as someone who has this plan in mind? We must take [10] this as a question, since the answer, again, makes it plain that it is [interrogative]. For [Alcibiades] answers, ‘Let’s say that I do.’ We should recognise that in his present response, Alcibiades is again offering a hypothetical answer – with rhetorical brilliance, since he was manifestly well educated in [rhetoric] by Pericles, who was also brilliant, and his guardian. Therefore he says, ‘Let’s say I do, if you like, so that I can find out what you’re going to say.’ (The phrase ‘if you [15] like’ (ei boulei), you see, is hypothetical.) As for the rest [of Alcibiades’ statement], it suits his character (êthikôs) as a person who does not resist agreement.
[62] With that, the proem (prooimion) of the dialogue is completed, and the beginning of the refutative [section] follows.

## Here Begins the First [sc. Refutative] Section


## Lecture 7

[62] With the god’s favour
[62] [20] Soc. Come on, then: I say that you intend to come forward and advise the [[106C]] Athenians [in the near future. Well, then, suppose that I caught you as you were about to mount the podium, and said, ‘Alcibiades, what are the Athenians intending to deliberate about, that you should get up to advise them? Is it something that you understand better than they do?’ What would be your answer?
 [[106D]] Alc. Yes, I suppose I would say it was something that I know better than they do.
Soc. So it’s on matters you know about that you’re a good adviser.
Alc. Of course.
Soc. Now the only things you know are what you’ve learned from others or found out for yourself, isn’t that right?
Alc. What else could I know?
Soc. Could you ever have learned or found out anything without wanting to learn it or work it out for yourself?
Alc. No, I couldn’t have.
Soc. Is that right? Would you have wanted to investigate or learn something that you thought you understood?
Alc. Of course not.
 [[106E]] Soc. So there was a time when you didn’t think you knew what you now understand.
Alc. There must have been.
Soc. But I’ve got a pretty good idea what you’ve learned. Tell me if I’ve missed anything: as far as I remember, you learned letters and lyre-playing and wrestling, but you didn’t want to learn flute-playing. These are the subjects that you understand – unless perhaps you’ve been learning something while I wasn’t looking; but I don’t think you have been, either by night or by day, on your excursions from home.
Alc. No, those are the only lessons I took.
 [[107A]] Soc. Well, then, is it when the Athenians are taking counsel about how to spell a word correctly that you’ll stand up to advise them?
Alc. By Zeus, I’d never do that!
Soc. Then is it when they’re taking counsel about the notes on the lyre?
Alc. No, never.
Soc. But surely they’re not in the habit of discussing wrestling in the Assembly.
Alc. Certainly not.
Soc. Then what will they be discussing? I presume it won’t be housebuilding.
Alc. Of course not.
Soc. Because a builder would give better advice on these matters than you.
 [[107B]] Alc. Yes.
Soc. Nor will they be taking counsel about prophecy, will they?
Alc. No.
Soc. Because then a prophet would be better at giving advice than you...]
[62] There are three basic components of being a good adviser, as follows:³³¹ good intentions (prohairesis agathê), exact knowledge (gnôsis akribês), and expressive ability (dunamis apangeltikê) (for the adviser must have goodwill for his [63,1] audience, or else he is no good [for them]; and obviously he also needs exact understanding about the subject he is going to discuss, since he is not about to give advice out of ignorance; and moreover, he also must be able to express what he had in mind and put it into words, or else the first two are useless). Given these [basics], then, Socrates demonstrates that Alcibiades is not a good adviser on the grounds of exact knowledge. He begins by using the following proof:³³² 1. The good adviser understands the subject of his advice, and [understands
[63] it] better than those whom he advises.
[63] a. For [his understanding is] not on an equal footing [with theirs] (for
[63] it would be pointless to teach people what they already know);
[63] b. But it is also not inferior (for it would be madness for someone who
[63] doesn’t know something to explain it to people who do);
[63] [10] c. It follows by necessity that the good adviser understands the subject
[63] of his advice better than his audience. 2. The person with superior understanding [of something] either learned
[63] or discovered it.
[63] a. Because knowledge is twofold, being divided into learning and
[63] discovery. For we ‘learn’ when the movement comes from someone
[63] else (heterokinêtôs), and we ‘discover’ when the movement comes
[63] from ourselves (autokinêtôs).
[63] i. This is also how the poets portray Hermes, who is the overseer
[63] of knowledge, as both a messenger (angelos) and the son of
[63] Maia:³³³ he is ‘messenger’ as a learner, because the messenger
[63] announces things he learns from others; and he is the son of
[63] [15] Maia as a discoverer, because the midwife (maia) does not
[63] herself place infants into the women who give birth to them, but
[63] she brings into the light [the children] that are already there. In
[63] the same way, then, the discoverer brings to birth the
[63] explanations (logoi) that are within him.
[63] ii. And if learning is sometimes superior to discovery – for
[63] [20] instance, when we learn from gods through dreams – we
[63] should recognise that in this situation, activity motivated
[63] by another is actually preferable to activity motivated by
[63] oneself: for it benefits us to be led by a god rather than by
[63] ourselves. [64,1] 3. Next, the learner or discoverer either conducted an investigation or
[64] received instruction (for the ends are learning and discovery, but the
[64] means are investigation and receiving instruction); and someone
[64] who has either conducted an investigation or received instruction
[64] can tell of a time when he didn’t think that he understood and so³³⁴
[64] either studied with teachers or toiled at [his own] investigations. [5] 4. The good adviser, then, is able to state the time at which he thought he
[64] did not understand. But obviously Alcibiades is not able to make this
[64] statement. For when he was just a young man playing at dice with his
[64] age-mates, he swore that they were cheating him (hup’ autôn adikeisthai),
[64] as if he had a precise fix on justice (to dikaion). That is how the proof proceeded synthetically.³³⁵ But it is also possible to [10] present it analytically, as follows: 1. The good adviser is able to state the time at which he did not think he
[64] understood. 2. Such a person either conducted an investigation or received instruction. 3. Such a person either learned or discovered. 4. Such a person understands the subject of his advice better than those
[64] whom he advises. 5. The good adviser, then, understands the subject of his advice better than
[64] his audience. [15] The first proof resembles a descent of the soul that is continually assuming, or clothing itself in, affections (pathê), the second an ascent that is continually casting affections off. Hence one might also recite the poetic verse about this,
[64] Then he stripped off his rags...³³⁶
[64] But Socrates tests Alcibiades not only by the proof [just] described, but by another such which goes like this:³³⁷ ‘What would you advise the Athenians about? [1] About something that you know and think you understand, like wrestling or playing the cithara or writing? For these you learned. But they don’t hold assemblies about these matters or debate them³³⁸ – or if they do, not about how one should play the cithara or wrestle, but about whether they [25] should welcome (paralambanein) teachers of gymnastics or of the cithara or of [65,1] reading and writing in their city.’ (Thus, for instance, in Homer, Achilles, being a politician, did not prophesy to the Hellenes himself, but advised them to make use of a prophet;³³⁹ and again, Themistocles did not have the triremes built on his own initiative (autos), but proposed the building of a fleet after interpreting the oracle,
[65] [5] [Zeus] grants to Tritogeneia [Athene] a wooden wall...³⁴⁰ –
[65] And this is appropriate. For higher-level skills don’t do away with those that come under them by pre- empting what belongs to them, but, on the contrary, actually bolster them, with the consequence that philosophy can remain the ‘skill of skills, and science of sciences’,³⁴¹ while the skills posterior to it remain intact, and thus can provide them with their principles (arkhai).)
[65] [10] ‘So you wouldn’t give advice about what you know and think you understand, for it’s not about these subjects, as we said, that they deliberate. [2] But nor would you about subjects on which you’re ignorant and which you don’t suppose you understand, for simple ignorance³⁴² is not a cause of error. [3] And nor indeed about matters of which you’re ignorant, but which you imagine you understand; for this is the characteristic of double ignorance: “advice is [the prerogative] of the person who understands a subject and not that of a wealthy person”. ’
[65] [15] The remaining leg [of the division], I mean [4] understanding but thinking one does not understand, or not knowing that one knows, is incoherent; for knowledge, being [a kind of] light, does not escape the notice of the person who has it. Such, then, is the division by means of which Alcibiades is once more convicted of being a poor adviser in respect of his knowledge.
[65] [20] Now these three [disciplines] were learned in Athens – reading and writing, playing the cithara,³⁴³ and wrestling – for the organisation of the tripartition of [66,1] the soul, as we said at the beginning; the reason (logos) was organised by means of reading and writing, spirited emotion (thumos) tamed by means of playing the cithara, and desire (epithumia) strengthened and made tough by wrestling. And he adds that ‘You refused to practice the flute.’ There were a number of reasons that they did not cultivate the study of the flute: first, because this [instrument] [5] has to do with ecstasy and has more to do with inspiration and not with education.³⁴⁴ For in cithara-playing, it is possible to use reasoned speech (logos) as well,³⁴⁵ but in flute-playing that is not at all the case: not only is [the performer] himself unable to use speech or to sing, but he can’t even hear someone else singing, for this is a noisy [instrument];³⁴⁶ which is why we talk about ‘citharasong’, but not ‘flute-song’.³⁴⁷ And Athena threw away her flute on this account, as [10] an impediment to reason (logos). (The goddess is the overseer of wisdom. [Or] as the poets say, it was because she saw that her face looked unbecoming. Or perhaps this is to be understood in the following way: that ‘the face of sound is language’, but the flute is hostile to it.) Also, the poet³⁴⁸ is always attributing cithara-playing to the Hellenes, but nowhere portrayed them playing the flute; but to the Trojans, [15] as they are foreigners, he assigned the flute, and he also said of them that
[66] the Trojans came on with clamour and cry like birds...’³⁴⁹
[66] And it was appropriate that he assign the flute to these people, since they are [67,1] Phrygians – for reportedly the flute was invented in Phrygia, in the context of mysteries and inspirations.³⁵⁰ There too [lived] Marsyas, who competed in music with Apollo and was bested, he using a flute, the other a cithara. And Alcibiades himself said about the Thebans, ‘Let the children of the Thebans play the flute,³⁵¹ because they don’t know how to have a conversation.’³⁵²
[67] That is the content of the survey (theôria). [106C] Come on, then: I say that you intend... We should investigate why Socrates examines the young man based on knowledge alone, and not on the other criteria [that determine a good adviser, described above].
[67] We say, then, that he could not do so on the basis of his ability to express [10] himself, because he knew that he had this from Pericles, with whom he had lived earlier, [and] as a consequence he was a natural (tên phusin) orator.³⁵³ And [it could not be] on the basis of good intentions (prohairesis) either: for [Alcibiades] was good on account of his immunity to the affection of caring for money, his generosity with his possessions, and the fact that he looked down on his other lovers.³⁵⁴ Well, then, [suppose that I caught you] as you were about to mount the podium... Since he is addressing a person with oratorical aspirations (rhêtorikos), he uses rhetorical jargon throughout, as he does here.³⁵⁵ He furnishes [Alcibiades] with an audience and a theatre, you see, and lays out the podium (bêma) with [Alcibiades] rushing toward it, and he adds himself as the bit [in his mouth], so that he can rein in the young man’s affections and his passionate longing to advise [the people of Athens]: for he says, ‘Supposing I took you aside and asked...’ [20] Is it something that you understand better than they do? Here is the first premiss, that ‘The good adviser knows the subject of his advice better than those whom he is about to advise: since his knowledge isn’t worse, for that would be crazy; nor is it equal, for that would be useless.’ [106D] Now the only things you know are what you’ve learned from others [25] or discovered yourself... [Here is] the second premiss, that ‘The one who knows better either learned or discovered [his knowledge]’: for understanding is twofold, as we have learned.³⁵⁶ Is that right? Would you have wanted to investigate or learn [what you thought you understood]? [Here is] the third premiss, that ‘The person who has learned or discovered something, either investigated it or was taught: the latter are the means, the former the ends.’ (By ‘being taught’ [didakthênai] here, one should understand ‘learn’ [mathein]).³⁵⁷ [68,1] [106E] So there was a time when you didn’t think you knew... [Here is] the fourth and final premiss, that ‘the person who has investigated or been taught something is able to state the time when he did not think he knew it’.
[68] We should understand that the prosyllogism³⁵⁸ is in the first figure, the syllogism in the second figure.³⁵⁹ For here is the prosyllogism: ‘The good [5] adviser knows better about the subject of his advice than those whom he advises; such a person either learned or discovered [his knowledge]; such a person either investigated or was taught; such a person is able to state a time when he did not think he knew; therefore the good adviser is able to state the time when he did not think he knew [about the subject of his advice.]’ And the syllogism, assuming the last proposition demonstrated in the prosyllogism, [10] proceeds in the second figure as follows: ‘The good adviser is able to state a time when he did not think he knew; Alcibiades is not able to state the time when he did not think he knew; therefore Alcibiades is not a good adviser.’ (We should understand that [Plato] himself unfolded the syllogism at greater length, but we re- organised it into syllogistic form.) [15] Actually, I myself know just about everything that you have learned... He was right to add ‘just about’ (skhedon ti): for it’s likely that Alcibiades was aware of some knick- knack (skeuarion)³⁶⁰ in his house that Socrates didn’t know about! But you didn’t want to learn flute-playing... True enough: [Alcibiades], you see, is the one who said of the Thebans, ‘let the children of the Thebans play the flute, because they don’t understand how to converse’.³⁶¹ But I don’t think you have been [learning something while I wasn’t looking], either by night or by day, on your excursions from home... That is, ‘You did not learn anything other than these subjects, assuming you never escaped my notice.’³⁶² This resembles what Diomedes³⁶³ says to Athena, when he tells her, ‘Nor do I escape your notice when I move’.³⁶⁴ For Socrates was always present with Alcibiades, like our conscience,³⁶⁵ which attends each of our actions. [107A] Well, then, is it when the Athenians take counsel about reading and writing...? Here begins the second refutation, which we reduced to a division,³⁶⁶ to the effect that [Alcibiades’] advice either concerns [1] what he knows and thinks he understands, or [2] what he does not know, but thinks he understands, or [3] what he does not know and does not think he understands; [69,1] and we stated that the fourth, and incoherent, leg [4] is to know, but think one does not know. For each and every one of these alternatives, we have demonstrated that it is impossible for him to be a good adviser. But the text mentions only two, namely, [1] that he knows and thinks that he knows (and about these [objects of knowledge] the Athenians never deliberate in assembly, [5] if in fact [Alcibiades] has only learned cithara-playing, wrestling, and reading and writing), and [2] things he doesn’t know about and knows he doesn’t know about (for [Socrates] adds that ‘you also will not advise them about housebuilding’, and Alcibiades, who is ignorant about this, knows that he does not know). I presume it won’t be house-building... We should understand that it is not [10] because advice about house-building has a low value that Socrates said ‘Then you will not give advice when they deliberate about house-building’, but rather because Alcibiades is ignorant about house-building. (For he added that ‘The house-builder will surely advise better about this than you will?’, meaning he ‘will give accurate advice about what pertains to house-building’.)³⁶⁷ To guard against that [sort of misinterpretation], he also introduced an example from a [15] skill with more status (with the words, ‘nor surely when [they are deliberating] about prophecy’), to show that it is not the status or lack of status of a subject that makes one equipped (or not equipped) to give advice, but accurate knowledge of the matters at hand. For as [Socrates] also mentions next, ‘Giving advice, I think, belongs to the person who knows about each subject, and not to [20] the wealthy person’. [107B] Nor will they be taking counsel about prophecy... The prophetic skill is twofold in Plato, one kind being a kind of madness, as he says in the Phaedrus,³⁶⁸ and this is inspired and divine; the other is, so to speak, ‘investigative’ and ‘searching’, which is indeed a ‘skill’ – about which he says now, that ‘about this the prophet will advise better than you’. For no one will give advice about the former [kind of prophecy], since it is not teachable.³⁶⁹

## Lecture 8

[70] With the god’s favour
[70] [[107C]] Soc. Then what will they be considering when you stand up to advise them, assuming you’re right to do so?

### Alc. They’ll be discussing their own business, Socrates.

[70] Soc. You mean their shipbuilding business – what sorts of ships they should be building?
Alc. No...
Soc. I suppose that’s because you don’t understand shipbuilding... So [[107D]] what kind of ‘their own business’ do you think they’ll be discussing?
Alc. War, Socrates, or peace, or anything else that is the business of the city.
Soc. Do you mean they’ll be discussing whom they should make peace with and whom they should go to war with and how?... But shouldn’t they do [[107E]] that with the ones with whom it’s better to?... and when it’s better... and for as long a time as it’s better?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Now supposing the Athenians were discussing who they should wrestle with and who they should spar with and how, who would be a better adviser, you or the trainer?
Alc. The trainer, I guess.
 [[108A]] Soc.... Let’s take another example: when you’re singing, you should sometimes accompany the song with cithara-playing and dancing... when it’s better to... as much as is better...
Alc. I agree.
 [[108B]] Soc. Really? Since you used the term ‘better’ in both cases – in wrestling and in playing the cithara while singing – what do you call what’s better in cithara-playing, as I call what’s better in wrestling ‘athletic’?... Try to follow my example. My answer was, I think, ‘what is correct in every case’ – and what’s correct, I presume, is what’s done according to the rules of a skill (tekhnê), isn’t it?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Wasn’t the skill athletics?
Alc. Of course.
 [[108C]] Soc. I said what’s better in wrestling, was ‘athletic’... Come on then, it’s your turn. It’s partly up to you, surely, to keep our conversation going well. Tell me what the skill is for singing and dancing and playing the cithara correctly... What is it called as a whole? Aren’t you able to tell me yet?
Alc. No, I can’t.
Soc. Well, try it this way. Who are the goddesses to whom the skill belongs?
Alc. Do you mean the Muses, Socrates?
 [[108D]] Soc. I do indeed. Don’t you see? What’s the name of the skill that’s named after them?
Alc. I think you mean music.
Soc. Yes, I do. Now what is ‘correctly’ for what takes place in accordance with this skill?... How does it take place?
Alc. Musically, I think.]
[70] Again Alcibiades, who is a naturally gift ed individual (euphuês) disposed toward oratory, evades Socrates’ questions [107C]. For once Socrates has demonstrated that he is not worth much as an adviser, neither about [1] subjects he really knows and imagines that he knows, such as reading and [10] writing, cithara-playing, or wrestling (for the Athenians don’t deliberate [in the democratic assembly] about these [skills], that is, about how one should make use of them, but rather about whether in general one should receive teachers of reading and writing or athletes or citharists in one’s own city); but it is certainly not [2] about subjects on which he has no knowledge, nor supposes that he has knowledge (for simple ignorance [i.e. when we know that we do not know something] does not cause us to make mistakes); but again it will not be [3] about subjects that he does not know, yet supposes that he does know (‘for [15] in each case it’s the knowledgeable person who gives good advice, not the wealthy person’ [107B–C]); and [4] the other leg [of the division] has been proven incoherent, namely, that he knows but thinks he does not (for knowledge, which has the character of light, does not escape the notice of its possessor) – so then, after it has been demonstrated that in these respects Alcibiades is not worth much as an adviser, and after he has been asked by [20] Socrates, ‘what will they be considering when you stand up to advise them, assuming you’re right to do so?’, and after he has realised that the division is inescapable, he grants it, but he gives an answer from outside [the division] when he says, ‘When they deliberate concerning their own affairs.’
[70] Now if he had said ‘their own’ according to philosophers’ principles, referring to their souls and their real essences (ousiai), and ‘affairs’ referring to their [25] activities (energeiai), then his answer would have been a good one, even if he was unable to give advice about these issues;³⁷⁰ but in fact he gives an answer without clearly defining [his terms] (adioristôs). So Socrates asks him again, [71,1] ‘What sort of affairs? Is it about shipbuilding, then?’ And his choice of example was a good one: of course shipbuilding is not appropriate to the statesman, but advising [the state] about shipbuilding is – for example, about the proper kind of ship, whether narrow and long, like triremes, or rounded and broad, like [5] merchant-ships. For this is also the kind of thing that Themistocles did: he was not himself a shipbuilder, but gave advice about naval business, when he interpreted the oracle.³⁷¹
[71] Now Alcibiades replies, ‘When they deliberate concerning war and peace’. And it should be understood that advice is offered about five species of subjectmatter, as Aristotle taught us in the Rhetorical Arts,³⁷² and these are worked out in pairs: for [political advice] concerns [1] the introduction of laws and the [10] appointment of governments (for after all the law is a sort of inanimate government, just as conversely the government is a living law), or [2] income and expenditures, or [3] imports and exports, or [4] the security of the city and country, or [5] war and peace. But [Alcibiades] himself disregards the rest and says ‘Whenever [they deliberate] concerning war and peace.’
[71] There are three reasons why he [might have] said this. [1] He may have said [15] ‘concerning war and peace’ because he is a person who enjoys conflict (philoneikos), someone who lives according to the conflict-loving way of life. For if he had an aristocratic character,³⁷³ he would have spoken about the [72,1] introduction of laws and the appointment of governments; and if he were oligarchic, he would have spoken about the next two in the sequence [of five kinds of political advice listed above], about income and expenditures or imports and exports (for oligarchs think about these in particular); and if he were democratic, he would have spoken about the fourth, that is, about the [5] security of the city and the country (for they exert themselves about this on account of their equal freedom of speech and capacity to do everything equally); but as it is, since he is a lover of conflict, he spoke about war and peace.
[72] [2] So either it was for this reason or because, as a [natural] general, he turned his thoughts to his own proper business: for war and peace are proper to a general. [3] Or it was for a third reason, that he observed the Athenians [10] frequently deliberating about war at this juncture, at one point against the Megarians, at another against the Aeginetans, and many others.³⁷⁴
[72] Alcibiades, then, makes three kinds of mistakes in giving this answer. [1] First, he did not refer to the more holistic aspect of the adviser or statesman, to the shared essence of the five kinds [of political advice] that we mentioned earlier³⁷⁵ – namely, what is advantageous (sumpheron). Instead, he referred to justice, assuming, as we will show,³⁷⁶ that war always arises on account of [disputes about] what’s just. [2] And second, again with a partial perspective, he did not make this claim from principle, but instead based his view on current affairs (peristatikos) [in Athens]: for it is [when we base our views on] current affairs that we go to war. [3] And third – again speaking from the standpoint of current affairs – he did not begin from the [condition] that is superior and natural, namely peace, but from war, which is inferior and [20] contrary to nature. That is also why Socrates, when he sets him straight, begins from the superior [condition] when he speaks next: ‘You mean about peace and war....’ (In fact, even our bodies make it clear that war is contrary to nature: after all, when the elements are at peace, we find ourselves in a natural condition; but whenever they conflict with each another, with any one of them [25] taking too much, then we are in a condition contrary to nature). Thus Alcibiades makes three kinds of mistakes.
[72] It also stands to be proven that the goal of war is justice, and that human beings go to war because they desire justice: and we demonstrate this through three dialectical proofs.³⁷⁷ [1] First, consider that the greatest wars are generally agreed to arise on account of [disputes over] what’s just, such as the Trojan War and the Persian War.³⁷⁸ [2] Second, consider that even in nature war arises on account of justice, since the contraries do battle with one another over the underlying place as their subject, with each one wishing to possess this as its spoils.³⁷⁹ [3] Third, consider that when human beings are wronged, they think themselves worthless and as good as dead, which is why they start wars. For justice is not like any of the other kinds of excellence (aretê), each of which attaches only to one part of the soul (for instance, self-control (sophrosunê) to the desiring part, practical wisdom to the rational part, and courage to the spirited part),³⁸⁰ since justice does not stand still,³⁸¹ but ranges through the entire tripartition of the soul, which is also why each particular part chooses to go to war on its own behalf, striving for its equal share of justice. [4] Fourth, consider that, just as the soldier, the orator, and the general all have their own respective goals, so the statesman too has another goal of his own.³⁸² For the soldier’s goal is to grow wealthy from the spoils [of war]; and the orator’s goal [15] is to persuade using words before arms, so that, if he fails to persuade, he’ll prepare the general to overpower the opposing forces with arms to bring about justice (for likewise, the orators in Homer, Odysseus and Menelaus, were made ambassadors for war against the Trojans):³⁸³ but the general’s goal is victory and conquering enemies.
[73] [20] Moreover, it is clear that victory alone is not the goal of every one of them: for if victory belongs to the community as a whole, and the general is the leader of the community, it clearly follows that the community looks to him for its success – that is, its victory. And that is why this was well said:
[73] But the general wins the honour.³⁸⁴
[73] But the statesman’s goal is making his citizens good and effective,³⁸⁵ not gaining victory (for ‘Cadmean victories’ are common,³⁸⁶ and defeats befall many): so, then, he makes [his people] good by keeping enemies who do injustice at bay, [5] ensuring that the victors receive their just deserts and not depriving them of what is rightly theirs, and ensuring that the defeated do not rule over what is not properly theirs: for this too is just.³⁸⁷
[74] Thus it has been proven that justice is the goal of war. And so much [for the discussion of material] from outside [our current reading].
[74] Socrates shows the young man that he is not a competent adviser about these matters, using his own previous words to do it [107A–C]. (There is no [10] reason, after all, to worry that words might wear out, like old utensils given away as a hand—me-down after long use.)³⁸⁸ Now he proves that Alcibiades is not a good adviser about war and peace, since he never learned nor discovered nor investigated the just, which is the goal of war. Socrates introduces two [15] examples for this purpose, namely exercise and music, which are relevant and clear.³⁸⁹ (For it is necessary that examples be both clearer than those things of which they are examples, and relevant to these. And that is the case here: these examples are clear, since Alcibiades already had an education in them, and they are relevant, since wrestling is a ‘small war’, while music is also itself suitable to peace, since it is pleasing to both sides.)
[74] [20] As for these [two fields of study], Socrates does not teach [Alcibiades] both (for he did not want to be a teacher only, but also a midwife [of Alcibiades’ own ideas]); nor does he merely ask after both (for if the young man had learned nothing in advance, the midwife’s skill would have yielded no child);³⁹⁰ but on some points [Socrates] teaches lessons, and on others he asks questions. And he offers teaching first,³⁹¹ before he questions, not [because it has greater value] [75,1] in and of itself, but in order that his midwifery, beginning from this startingpoint (enteuthen), might bear fruit. Now, he teaches one [lesson, i.e. about physical exercise], and asks Alcibiades about two more (since he adds a third case too, namely, what is the goal of the statesman): and he does not ask about two cases for no particular reason, but rather in order that midwifery might bear more fruit than teaching.³⁹²
[75] [5] [1] Hence he teaches the first [lesson] by saying that ‘as I describe “performing correctly from the athletic standpoint” or “the goal of athletics” as “performing athletically” (gumnastikôs), can you tell me the goal of music in the same way?’ [2] After this, the youth answers that it is performing ‘musically’. (And it should be understood that ‘musical’ performance falls into three parts, namely, song (ôidêi), rhythm (rhuthmôi), and melody (melei).³⁹³ Now song is studied in [10] metre: for song is nothing but metrical speech, and its goal is either lyrical or metrical performance. Again, ‘rhythm’ is observed in the rising and falling [of the beat], and its goal is rhythmical performance. And melody lies in harmony, and its goal is melodious or harmonious performance.) [3] Again he asks what is the goal of the statesman, and likewise after much [discussion, Alcibiades] answers that it is ‘the just’.
[75] [15] Now the philosopher Proclus raises a puzzle (aporein) here, namely, how it happens that in the other cases [Socrates] talked about the goals paronymously, e.g. performing ‘athletically’ from athletics, or performing ‘musically’ from music,³⁹⁴ but in the case of the statesman, he did not do it this way: for he did not say that his goal was to perform in a ‘statesmanly’ (politikôs) way. And [Proclus] himself offers a very elegant resolution of the puzzle, arguing that here too [Socrates] spoke paronymously – not literally paronymously, but rather in the manner of [words] that derive from a single, focal meaning (aph’ henos):³⁹⁵ in their case, the similarity or difference of the vocalisations is not relevant, but only [the similarity] or difference of the actual fact referenced (pragma) matters. Indeed, there is no difference between [the facts of] justice (dikaiosunê) and a constitution (politeia), whether small or large: for the constitution of a state is exactly what justice is in a soul. That is also why Plato entitled the Constitution [i.e. Republic], ‘ Constitution, or Concerning the Just ’.³⁹⁶
[75] [25] That is the content of the survey. [76,1] [107C] Then what will they be considering, etc.? Since it’s been shown through the previous comments that there is no aspect of the stated division in which the young man is a competent adviser, Socrates now asks him: ‘What kinds of subjects, then, will you stand up to advise them on – since you say that it’s not going to be about these subjects that we just discussed?’ And [5] [Alcibiades], with his natural gift [for rhetoric], does not choose an answer from the division, knowing that it is inescapable, but he isn’t at a loss for an answer, either; instead, he offers one from outside [the division], without providing a definition: ‘Whenever they deliberate concerning their own [affairs]’. You mean their shipbuilding business? After the young man has responded [10] to the question without providing a definition, Socrates asks him this. And he chooses his example well: it is relevant, since it is perfectly conceivable that the statesman would offer advice about the construction of ships, even if he doesn’t build the ships himself.
[76] Alcibiades denies it with the words, ‘By no means, Socrates!’ And we should recognise that it is not because the example is off the mark that he denies that [15] he offers such advice, but because of [his own] ignorance. In fact, he already had Socrates’ help, in the form of his remark that ‘advice comes from the knowledgeable person, and not from the wealthy person’ [107B]. It is also clear from what is added next that [ignorance] is the reason [for Alcibiades’ surprised denial]: for when Socrates asked, ‘Is that because you do not know how to build ships?’ the young man agreed. [20] [107D] War, Socrates, or peace, or anything else that is the business of the city: Notice that Alcibiades not only claims that he will offer advice about war, but also about the other four [concerns] that attach to it [in the list of five subjects of political advice cited earlier]:³⁹⁷ for he adds these on when he says, [77,1] ‘Or anything else.’ And it should be investigated why he spoke about the others without naming them, whereas in the case of war he not only spoke of it by name, but even located it directly at the beginning of his account. Well, we say this: we utter our first words according to the kind of life that we live; for our first words disclose which kind of life belongs to us, and which things give us [5] pleasure. Since, then, everyone has agreed that he was an undefeated military general, he introduced his speech in this way. (For history has it that wherever [Alcibiades] had influence [in a battle], he was victorious; and he exercised a great deal of influence.)³⁹⁸ Thus it is reasonable that he gave an answer here that referred to what was more familiar to him, to where his own strength lay. Do you mean they’ll be discussing whom they should make peace with and [10] whom they should go to war with and how? We should understand that in setting the young man straight, Socrates, as we have already commented, prioritises what’s natural, by saying ‘With whom they should make peace’ [first, before mentioning war].³⁹⁹ And he takes up all the circumstantial points here, such as the character [of the enemy], against whom one must wage war, neighbours or foreigners: and the means, by naval fighting or by infantry fighting; in and what sort of territory, our own or the enemy’s; and in what sort [15] of time, summer or winter; and the right moment, by night or day. [107E] Now supposing the Athenians were discussing who they should wrestle with and who they should spar with: Socrates begins offering examples here, and again he takes up all of the circumstantial points. And it [20] should be understood that Socrates’ examples are like a spark: that is, just as the spark that falls in a heap of chaff sets off a huge conflagration, so too the universal formulas (logoi) of the soul shine forth from Socrates’ examples. [108B] And what do you call [what’s better in cithara-playing]? I don’t know: Now that Socrates has taught the goal of athletic skill, he uses midwifery [25] on the youth to help him to state the goal of musical skill. But Alcibiades [78,1] replies that he is at a loss. And we should investigate why Alcibiades, in spite of his natural gift s, is unable to answer the question, even with the aid of midwifery. Now some offer the following explanation: consider that the [entire] musical skill has a general goal, namely, to perform musically, but the same also holds in specific cases (for instance, the goal of song is to perform in tune and [5] time, while percussion aims at a rhythmical or harmonious performance, and lyric aims for a good melody). Alcibiades was uncertain whether Socrates wanted the common goal or each specific goal, and that’s why he replied ‘I don’t know.’
[78] But this interpretation is not in tune with the text, since a little later in the reading, when Alcibiades is asked to state the goal of the entire musical skill [108D], he does not answer like this.⁴⁰⁰ So the right solution is that Socrates [10] understood the three species [of music] in a unified way, and questioned the youth about a single thing, but Alcibiades, who had learned these species as three different things, was uncertain about what kind of answer to give, that is, whether to answer in terms of song or melody or rhythm. (That Socrates understood the three in a unified way is clear from the fact that he is a statesman (politikos). When the statesman encounters a person who wants to learn courageous habits somehow, he first implants the right kinds of [courageous] [15] concepts (ennoiai) in him, then adds words that are useful for these, along with the metre (for song is ‘speech in metre’), and finally adds the right kinds of melodies, and from all of this he produces courageous habits.) And what’s correct, I presume, is what’s done according to the rules of a skill (tekhnê), isn’t it? We should recognise that [Socrates] does not make ‘what’s correct’ into the more valuable subject [i.e. more valuable than beauty]. For ‘what’s done by the rules of the skill’ is not the same as the most beautiful [20] thing: even when the subject is base and ugly, if it comes about according to the skill’s rules, it’s ‘correct’. For example, when a painter portrays Thersites, he is not painting the most beautiful subject, but he paints ‘according to the skill’s rules’; again, the painter who portrays the eye does not use the most precious colour, like azure blue.⁴⁰¹ But then it is fair to point out that these are ‘correctly’ done, since someone paints Thersites skilfully, even though he is ugly, and [25] renders the eye using the appropriate colours, though by no means from the most precious. Come, then, it’s your turn: We find the [imperative] ‘come’ used frequently in Plato. This word is appropriate for a soul that thinks about different things in sequence (metabatikôs), rather than thinking all at once, like intellect (nous).⁴⁰² The [following] phrase ‘it’s partly up to you, surely, to keep our conversation going well’, leads [Alcibiades] on: it means, ‘it suits you, as a beautiful person, to speak about things beautifully’. [5] Tell me what the skill is for singing and dancing and playing the cithara correctly... What is it called as a whole? Notice here that when Socrates asks Alcibiades to articulate the common goal of the three kinds [of music], he does not say it. Now, he did say that cithara-playing is for the melody, singing for the song, and dance for the rhythm (since that is the common name for stepping up and down, when they belong to rhythm). So why is he unable to [10] state the goal of musical skill as a whole? Perhaps this should be settled according to the second interpretation mentioned above.⁴⁰³ Also, it should be recognised that the ‘whole’ in Plato is threefold, being either prior to the parts, or in the part, or among the parts.⁴⁰⁴ Now, the whole prior to the parts is that in virtue of which a person discards his tooth then grows (phuei) another tooth anew, employing the natural formula (logos), since [his] nature (phusis) possesses the formulas in a universal way (katholou).⁴⁰⁵ But the whole in the [15] part applies when a person recognises the whole on the basis of its parts, as for instance the sons of Pelops [recognised him] from his ivory shoulder, or as in the saying ‘know the lion from his claw’, since each part has the patterns of the whole. And the whole among the parts is observed (theôroumenon) in the assemblage of parts and in the synthesis of them all, which would not subsist if a part were removed.
[79] [20] Here, then, in the case of the musical skill, Socrates speaks [of the whole] before the parts, and what is in the part as a whole, when he uses the words ‘as a whole’. For certainly even in separation from one of its [particular] kinds, the remaining kinds are still called ‘music’. Who are the goddesses to whom the skill belongs? – Do you mean the Muses, Socrates? With the young man totally at a loss (polu aporountos), Socrates practises midwifery upon him, so that he can bring forth from himself [25] [the answer to the question] what is the goal of musical skill: he leads him to remember the Muses, and through them Memory,⁴⁰⁶ so that, on this basis, he might stir up the memory in the young man’s soul and, leading him by the hand and using the name of the Muses, Alcibiades might express that the goal of musical skill is excellent musical performance.

## Lecture 9

[80] With the god’s favour
[80] [5] Soc. Come on, now, what do you call what’s better in going to war [and [[108D]] keeping the peace? In these last two cases, you said that what was ‘better’ [[108E]] was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now try to tell me what’s better in this case, too.
Alc. I really can’t do it.
Soc. But surely it’s shameful if when you’re speaking and giving advice about food – saying that a certain kind is better than another, and better now and in a certain quantity – and someone should ask you, ‘What do you mean by “better”, Alcibiades?’ you could tell him in that case that ‘better’ was ‘healthier’, though you don’t even pretend to be a doctor; and yet in a [[109A]] case where you do pretend to understand and are going to stand up and give advice as though you knew, if you aren’t able, as seems likely, to answer the question in this case, won’t you be embarrassed? Won’t that seem shameful?
Alc. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Then think about it, and try to tell me what the better tends towards, in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right people.
Alc. I’m thinking, but I can’t get it.
Soc. But suppose we’re at war with somebody – surely you know what treatment we accuse each other of when we enter into a war, and what we call it?
 [[109B]] Alc. I do – we say that they’re playing some trick on us, or attacking us, or taking things away from us.
Soc. Hold on – how do we suffer from each of these treatments? Try to tell me how one way differs from another way.
Alc. When you say ‘way’, Socrates, do you mean ‘justly’ or ‘unjustly’?
Soc. Precisely... Who will you advise the Athenians to wage war on? Those who are treating us unjustly, or those who are treating us justly?
 [[109C]] Alc. That’s a hard question you’re asking. Even if someone thought it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us justly, he wouldn’t admit it.
Soc. Because I think that wouldn’t be lawful (nomimos).
Alc. It certainly wouldn’t.
Soc. Nor would it be considered a noble (kalos) act.
Alc. No.
Soc. So you would also frame your speech in these terms... Then does this ‘better’ I was just asking you about – when it comes to waging war or not, on whom to wage war and on whom not to, and when and when not to – does this ‘better’ turn out to be anything other than ‘more just’?
Alc. It certainly seems like that’s what it is.
 [[109D]] Soc. But how could it be, my dear Alcibiades? Don’t you realise that this is something you don’t understand? Or perhaps, when I wasn’t looking, you’ve been studying under some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. Have you... Well, and who is he? Tell me who he is so that you can introduce me to him as a pupil too.
Alc. Stop teasing me, Socrates.
Soc. I’m not – I’ll swear by Friendship, mine and yours, whose name is the last I’d break an oath by. So tell me who he is, if you can.
 [[109E]] Alc. And what if I can’t? Don’t you think I might know about justice and injustice in some other way?
Soc. Yes, you might – if you found it out.
Alc. Well, don’t you think I might find it out?
Soc. Yes, of course – if you investigated the matter.
Alc. And don’t you think I might investigate it?
Soc. Yes, I do – if you thought you didn’t know.
Alc. And didn’t I once think that?
Soc. A fine answer. Can you tell me when this was, when you didn’t think [[110A]] you knew about justice and injustice... Well, was it last year?... Answer me truthfully, or else our conversation will be a waste of time.
Alc. Yes, I thought I knew... two years ago... three... four...
 [[110B]] Soc. But surely before that you were a boy... [then] I often observed you, at school and other places, and sometimes when you were playing knucklebones or some other game, you’d say to one or another of your playmates, very loudly and confidently – not at all like someone who was at a loss about justice and injustice – that he was a villain and wasn’t playing fairly...
Alc. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me like that?
Soc. Do you mean, what should you have done if you didn’t actually know then whether or not you were being cheated?
 [[110C]] Alc. But I did know, by Zeus!...
Soc. So it seems that even as a child you thought you understood justice and injustice... At what point did you find it out? Surely it wasn’t when you thought you knew... then when did you think you didn’t know? Think about it – you won’t find any such time.
Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, I really can’t say.
 [[110D]] Soc. So it isn’t by finding it out that you know it... but surely you just finished saying that it wasn’t by being taught, either, that you knew it. So if you neither found it out nor were taught it, how and where did you come to know it?]
[80] Alcibiades has been asked to state the goal of war [108D], and he ought to answer ‘justice’. We go to war for the sake of justice, just as doctors tackle illnesses for the sake of health, that is, in order to bring the elements into a blend or harmony. (After all, it is in a sense ‘just’ to prevent the excess of [10] one element over another.) Alcibiades, however, doesn’t give this answer; instead, he says that we go to war ‘because they’re playing some trick on us, or attacking us, or taking things away from us’ [109B]. And he makes a triple error here.⁴⁰⁷
[80] First, he erred in answering one question three times.
[80] Second, he erred because these [three actions are not unjust] unconditionally, but in a conditional way – that is, somebody could put all of these means to a [15] good end. For example, suppose that someone handed a sword over to us on deposit, and then he went mad, and when he demanded it back at the height of his insanity, we refused to hand it over,⁴⁰⁸ and tricked and deceived him by swearing oaths. (For we should not accept the poet’s view when he says
[80] You will not utter a lie,⁴⁰⁹
[80] [20] but rather when he says
[80] He excelled in the art of lies,⁴¹⁰
[80] and
[80] He was honoured in his land as a god is.⁴¹¹)
[80] But it’s also the case that we do not lie when we swear that we never received it [81,1] from him. In reality, when he handed it over, a sane person handed it over, but now a madman demands it back; again, what he left to us then as a deposit, he now demands to put to use (hôs organon): the result is that neither the giver nor the object are identical, but they are both different [from their former selves]. And when, under compulsion, we take things away from someone in this condition, we do so for a good end.
[81] [5] Third, [Alcibiades] erred when he introduced as three distinct things ‘being tricked’, ‘being attacked’ and ‘being deprived of property’, although it is possible to use the common name ‘injustice’ for each of them. After all, when we go to war as a consequence of being tricked, we do so because we have been treated unjustly; the same holds in the cases where we are placed under compulsion or deprived of our property. Hence [Alcibiades] should not have introduced these as three distinct things, [especially] when he had already stated the common [10] name for them. Thus he erred in three ways.
[81] But there are also two senses in which we should accept the young man’s choice of answers.⁴¹² The first is that he touched on the entire tripartition of our soul in the course of his answer: that is, when he mentioned ‘being tricked’, he touched on reason (logos) (for knowledge also belongs to this); and when he mentioned ‘being attacked’, he touched on spirited emotion (thumos) (for ruling also belongs to this); and when he mentioned ‘being deprived’, he [15] touched on appetite (epithumia) (for the love of possessions also belongs to this [part of our soul]). The second is that he is correct in his answer insofar as he preserved the necessary order of the three [parts]: since just as reason presides over spirited emotion, and spirited emotion over appetite, so too the young man mentioned being tricked before being attacked, and being attacked before being deprived.
[81] [20] Next, Socrates proves that the young man is ignorant of justice, using his own words. (For as we remarked before,⁴¹³ there is no need to worry that words heard frequently will wear out, like old utensils.) Hence he says that ‘You neither learned nor discovered’, et cetera. For there are two routes to knowledge (tropoi gnôseôs), namely learning and discovery, as we have often remarked.⁴¹⁴ We ‘discover’ something as self-moved actors (autokinêtôs [25] energountes), but we ‘learn’ something when we are moved by another (heterokinêtôs). For we should understand that just as the soul imparts a trace of its self-movement to the body, likewise the soul takes over (metelaben)⁴¹⁵ a trace of the body’s property of being moved by something else.⁴¹⁶ You might see this from other examples, too: for instance, time imparts to motion something of its own property of being measurable, and [in turn] takes over [82,1] from motion something of its property of extension; or again, form imparts something of its structure (morphê) to matter, and despite being partless, takes over something of the extension of matter – which is why we often apply the saying ‘as the feet, so is the head’.⁴¹⁷ But the more naturally gift ed (euphuês) [5] souls, which are self-moving, tend more to discovery and bringing [ideas] to birth, than to learning, just as conversely the less gift ed souls, which are moved by another, tend more to learning than to discovery. And these points reveal the median point of our soul’s essence: for it is neither consistently incomplete, since it is in the process of discovery, nor is it consistently complete, since it is in the process of learning.
[82] [10] We raise two puzzles (aporiai) about these [passages]. First, why does Alcibiades, who is ignorant of what is just, imagine that he has that knowledge? And second, why, when Socrates asks him to state the time at which he did not imagine he knew justice, is he at a loss and unable to say when that was?
[82] Now, we reply to the first puzzle⁴¹⁸ that he imagined he knew justice without having that knowledge because he was beguiled by the universal formulas (logoi) implanted in his soul⁴¹⁹ (and so it seems to those who are rich in their dreams and who wake up and find their hands empty).⁴²⁰
[82] As for the second puzzle, we should reply that he is at a loss because it was with a view to actual knowledge that Socrates asked him to state the time when he did not imagine himself to know, but it was with a view to passively possessed (kath’ hexin) knowledge that [Alcibiades] found himself at a loss, [20] since he had been present with his own soul forever, and on that account he couldn’t refer his ignorance back to a time.⁴²¹
[82] That is the content of the survey. [108D] Come on now, what do you call what’s better in both going to war [and keeping the peace]? As we also remarked in the earlier [discussion],⁴²² [83,1] Plato has used the [imperative verb] ‘come’ because it is appropriate to a soul that understands facts in sequence (metabatikôs), and not at one grasp, as intellect (nous) does. Thus Socrates says here that ‘Just as you articulated the goals in the two previous examples (admittedly requiring midwifery’s aid in [5] one case, and teaching in the other), now likewise state the goal of war’: for this is what [the phrase] ‘what you call what’s better’ amounts to.⁴²³ For the goals of actions are either to be chosen or avoided, and it is for the sake of the goals that we either carry out the actions or do not. [108E] You explained what was better in each [of the kinds of music, that it was the ‘musically performed’, and in the other case too, that it was the ‘athletically performed’. Now try to tell me what’s better in this case, too.] Understand ‘in each’ to refer to the kinds of music. For there were three kinds, [10] and their goals were correspondingly three, namely, successful performances in song, melody or rhythm. Seeing that he also spoke of a single goal of musical skill,⁴²⁴ namely musical performance, well then, all three kinds are embraced in this shared, general [name].⁴²⁵ Here, we need to understand the word ‘each’ as applying to [the kinds of music], and not to the two examples [of music and athletics],⁴²⁶ since the lesser [unit] in a group of three is called ‘each’.⁴²⁷ For it’s [15] clear that he took one of the examples, music, and said ‘each’ to refer to its kinds, since he adds about the other example, athletics, the following: ‘and in the other case too, that it was the “athletically performed” ’. I really can’t do it: The speaker is sinking and blushing to be at a loss (aporein) concerning the matters about which he claimed to be a counsellor. This is clear [20] from the phrase ‘really can’t’, which is uttered by the young man out of shame at being at a loss.⁴²⁸ But surely it’s shameful if when you’re speaking... Socrates is about to rebuke the young man (epitiman) for what he does not know, namely the goal of war, but he is concerned about the ill-will that could arise from the critique (elenkhos), so he does not come to his rebuke in a direct or obvious way, but by juxtaposing a different field where the young man does have knowledge, and using this to soft en the sharpness of his critique.⁴²⁹ So, then, he says that ‘It’s a shame if you know how to give advice about certain medical subjects, about which you make no pretence to be a good counsellor, nor are you a student of them; but you turn out to be ignorant about just what you suppose you know, and you’re about to give advice on.’ And he was right to use the word ‘shameful’; for shame is the contrary to someone who is fond of his reputation and vaunts himself for his beauty and dazzling appearance.⁴³⁰ ... [and giving advice about food – saying that a certain kind] is better than another, and better now and in a certain quantity... He refers to the circumstances: by saying ‘better than another’, he means the kind of food, whether it is cooked rather than raw, whether it goes down easily and is easy to [5] digest or the contrary; and by the word ‘now’, whether it should be eaten in the evening but not at night, because of its proper time for digestion; and by saying ‘in a certain quantity’, he means that one should not serve a lot of it, on account of Hippocrates’ saying ‘hunger is the mother of health’.⁴³¹ [109A] [But suppose we’re at war with somebody –] surely you know what treatment we accuse each other of when we enter into a war, and [10] what we call it? Since Alcibiades continues to flounder at a loss, Socrates acts like a daimon (daimôniôs) and redirects his midwifery toward a plainer approach.⁴³² Because the participants are plainer than what they participate in, and composites are plainer than simple things, he says: ‘Surely you know what the accusation is on each side when we enter into a war’, that is, ‘as behaving unjustly’. And the unjust actor participates, and hence is composite, but injustice is participated, and hence is simple.⁴³³ For that reason too, he puts [injustice] at the end, when he said ‘And what do we call it?’, i.e. ‘injustice’: and by ‘it’ he means the condition (pathêma) [of injustice]. And he also adds to this that ‘These are the three accusations we make when we go to war: they’re playing some trick on us, or attacking us, or taking things away from us.’ [20] [109B] Hold on (ekhe) –howdo we suffer from each of these treatments? This [imperative] (ekhe) imitates epic style:
[84] But hold (ekhe) this in your thoughts;⁴³⁴
[84] And we should understand that he does not charge [Alcibiades] with the first [of the three errors described above, 80,12–81,10] (namely, giving three answers to one question), nor the third (for he also granted this point, namely, that we do not go to war because we suffer these injuries, but because of what [25] they share: namely, injustice): so he charges [Alcibiades] with the second error, that these things he said are not unambiguous (hapla), but ambiguous (epamphoterizonta). At any rate, he asks ‘ how we suffer from each of these’ – [85,1] that is, unjustly or justly: then he asks him, whether these differ from each other, for this is the force of the phrase ‘Try to tell me how one way differs from another way.’ And when the young man answers ‘When you say “way”, Socrates, [5] do you mean “justly” or “unjustly”?’, and Socrates agrees, Alcibiades adds that these differ ‘totally, every bit’ (holon te kai pan)⁴³⁵ [in this way].
[85] And we should understand that the saying ‘totally, every bit’ assimilates two very different and distinct things: for the words ‘whole’ (to holon) and ‘every’ (to pan) are logically distinct from one another.⁴³⁶ Granted that both refer to the universal (katholou), still, ‘whole’ refers to something continuous (sunekhes), [10] and ‘every’ to something discrete (diôrismenon). And someone could be superior in respect of the whole, but inferior in respect of every part, as for instance when we say of the ‘whole’ that the male class (genos) is ‘as a whole’ better than the female class, but of course not every individual [man] is better than every individual [woman], for neither Thersites nor Coroebus were better than Theano.⁴³⁷ [86,1] [109C] Even if someone believed it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us justly, [he wouldn’t admit it]. Callicles and Thrasymachus kept on maintaining in the Gorgias [and Republic, respectively]⁴³⁸both that they believed it was necessary to wage war on those who treat us justly, and that they [themselves] did wage war [on such people] in practice (en ergôi polemein). Socrates, on the other hand, maintained that he believed no such [5] thing at all, and that he did not do so in practice. And Alcibiades, as the man in the middle, maintains that he believes it, but does not do so in practice. For he says ‘Even if someone believed...’ showing that he agrees, but he adds that not even someone who believes this agrees to it [openly].⁴³⁹ Because I think that wouldn’t be lawful. – It certainly wouldn’t. – Nor would [10] it be considered a noble act. ‘Lawful’ (nomimos) is what is just by convention, but ‘noble’ (kalos) is what is just by nature. So Socrates says that it is not proper, either lawfully (‘just’ by convention), or nobly (‘just’ by nature), to wage war on those who practice justice. And the young man agrees to these points because he is making progress (prokoptôn) toward the goal.⁴⁴⁰ [15] Then does this ‘better’ that I was asking you about – when it comes to waging war or not, [on whom to wage war and on whom not to, and when and when not to] – does this ‘better’ turn out to be anything other than ‘more just’? After agreement has been reached through many arguments, to the effect that the goal of war is the just, and that one must not make war on those who act justly, but clearly on those who act unjustly (for obviously in that case, we would go to war for a just cause), Socrates reminds the young [20] man of the question that he was unsure how to answer. And this was, what is the goal of war? (The phrase “this ‘better’ ” shows that the [subject of the question] is the same, as was remarked earlier). Thus he says, ‘which I was asking you about... turns out to be anything else?’, meaning ‘if not this?’ For in Plato’s style, ‘anything else’ stands by paraleipsis for ‘if not this’.⁴⁴¹ And using the present circumstances, he reminds him of what is better in war, by saying ‘on [25] whom’ and ‘when’. [109D] But how could it be, Alcibiades my friend? Don’t you realise that this is something you don’t understand? [Or perhaps, when I wasn’t looking, you’ve been studying under some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. Have you?] The phrase ‘my friend’ (ô phile) isn’t included here by accident, but because (as we have often remarked)⁴⁴² Socratic exhortations and refutations are like medicines drenched in honey.⁴⁴³ But he expects to aggravate the youth on [87,1] account of his ignorance about justice, and drive him to distraction, and so he conciliates him first by calling him ‘friend’, and again a little later by swearing ‘the [god of] Friendship, mine and yours’ [109D].
[87] Now at this point, they [sc. the commentators] investigate which god he calls ‘Friendship’.⁴⁴⁴ Some of them say it’s Love (Erôs), but this is incorrect. For ‘friends are dear to their friends’, but in this case Socrates is in love with the youth, while the youth does not love Socrates in return: that occurs only at the end of the dialogue, where Alcibiades’ reciprocal love (anterôs) is given over. Whom, then, does he call [the god of] ‘Friendship’? Well, we say that it is Zeus, since he befits both [Socrates and Alcibiades], on account of his function as a [10] ruler (arkhikos). First, Zeus befits Socrates because Socrates is a philosopher – for philosophy is the leader of all the other skills. Also, as the Stoics have it, the person who understands how to rule is the ruler, even if he does not exercise that power,⁴⁴⁵ and philosophers are such people: that is also why Socrates says in the Phaedrus, ‘and I am with Zeus’.⁴⁴⁶ Second, Zeus befits [15] Alcibiades because he loves rule and leadership in battle. So the words ‘... mine and yours’ are not trivial. Rather, it is fitting for these [words] to have been said in the sequel; for here Socrates says, ‘have you failed to notice that you do not know justice’ (and ‘failure to notice’ is kin to ignorance, for both mean the absence of understanding),⁴⁴⁷ ‘or did I fail to notice that you learned’, instead of ‘how were you likely to escape my notice, when I follow you around like [the] conscience that is present for each of our actions?’⁴⁴⁸ And studying under a teacher... Here we should recognise that even students who learn from someone else possess some self-motivation (ti autokinêton), namely, choosing for themselves to learn and to study under a teacher, and not [88,1] to get hold of their studies by force or by having training imposed upon them, even if their understanding comes to them from someone else. And who is he? Tell me who he is, so that you can introduce me to him [5] as a pupil too. Since a philosopher’s uses of irony necessarily also carry truth, we should inquire why Socrates – who understands justice – at this point says to the youth ‘Tell me from whom you learned about justice, so that I may study under him as well.’⁴⁴⁹ Well, we reply that it is necessary for the lover both to play dumb with (sunagnoein) his beloved, and to play along with him (sunagesthai); so, insofar as Socrates is a lover, he kept pretending not know about justice, insofar as the boy was ignorant about justice; but as a teacher, he [10] understood it.
[88] Or there is a second solution: Socrates would either have gone to a teacher than himself and been helped; or to a worse one, whom he would have helped; or to a teacher as good as himself – in which case ‘friends share’ (koina ta philôn).⁴⁵⁰ [I swear by Friendship...] whose name is the last I’d break an oath by: Here we should inquire what he means by the words ‘I would in no way break an oath by’. Does it follow that he would break an oath that he took by some other [15] name? Instead, we respond [to this puzzle] that we need to specify in addition ‘an oath to you ’ (pros se):⁴⁵¹ for it is more reasonable to break an oath made to unfamiliar people or to strangers, than to friends. Alternatively, it might be that it is more serious to swear falsely by gods who have a particular sphere [of responsibility] than by the others. For the ‘spheres’ and ‘specific [epithets]’, when they are transgressed, make the transgression more serious, and [in this case] the epithet ‘friendship’ is in question. Likewise in the Cratylus [sic],⁴⁵² [20] [Plato] says that one must not forswear oneself by Zeus of Strangers (xenios) or Zeus of Kinship (homognios), and plainly this is because their specific areas [of concern] should not be transgressed. Alternatively, it may be that the word ‘whom’ is not being used here to set up an opposition [with other gods] (pros antidiastolên).⁴⁵³ [89,1] [109E] And what if I can’t? Don’t you think I might know [about justice and injustice in some other way?] Here he presents in an analytical way the argument that he previously advanced synthetically.⁴⁵⁴ After Socrates remarks that ‘you would have known about the just, if you had studied with a teacher’, and the young man replies ‘don’t you think I might know in some other way?’, [5] Socrates adds another premise: ‘if you found out’, then again ‘if you looked into it: but you would only have looked into it if you thought that you didn’t know. But in fact, you’re not able to say when you supposed yourself to be ignorant’. And he takes full account of the young man’s age, and from that he proves him ignorant about justice. [10] Yes, of course – if you investigated the matter. The phrase ‘of course’ is not merely [complimentary] here, but shows that Socrates trusts Alcibiades’ natural gift s (euphuïa): if he had investigated it, he would by all means have found out about it.⁴⁵⁵ Answer me truthfully, or else our conversation will be a waste of time. Earlier, when the premises had a generic character, he did not ask the youth [15] to answer truthfully: after all, if he had lied, he would have been refuted on the basis of other premises, thanks to their generality. But as it is here, since the premises are particular and drawn from personal history,⁴⁵⁶ he asks him to tell the truth, since if he answers falsely, the argument will proceed in vain.⁴⁵⁷ And one should recognise here the Platonic doctrine that nothing [20] follows necessarily from false premises, but the argument will be empty: for he says here, ‘or else... it will be a waste of time’. For even if true conclusions sometimes follow from false premises, that does not happen because the premises require the conclusion by necessity, but because the material of the argument allows it.⁴⁵⁸ But surely before that you were a boy, weren’t you? There is a difference between a boy (pais) and a little boy (paidion): one is a ‘little boy’ up to the age [90,1] of seven, then a ‘boy’ from one’s seventh year until the fourteenth year – then one becomes an adolescent (ephêbos) in and after that year.⁴⁵⁹ So Socrates said correctly that the boy was a ‘child’ five years earlier, if he was not yet twenty years old then [sc. at the time of this conversation]. [When you were a boy I often observed you at school... say to one of your playmates, very loudly and confidently – not at all like someone who was at [5] a loss about justice and injustice – that] he was a villain and wasn’t playing fairly. It is a sign of the youth’s magnificent and noble nature, that from boyhood he considered cheaters to be villains, and grasped this from his [innate] common concept (apo tês koinês ennoias) alone.⁴⁶⁰ For at this time, he had not yet studied with teachers who had the ability to teach him the nature of the just. What should you have done if you didn’t actually know then whether or not [10] you were being cheated? What does he mean here? After the young man has said ‘But what should I have done when I was cheated, other than say that I was being cheated?’, Socrates replies, ‘Do you mean, what should you have done if you were thoroughly ignorant of whether or not you were being cheated (since at that time you didn’t know the nature of justice)? Clearly it was an option for you to take joy in learning.’ When the youth responds by again swearing that [15] he was not ignorant, but knew clearly that he was being cheated, Socrates has again used the same argument, namely, the question ‘at what age did you find it out? When, after admitting that you were ignorant, did you look into it? But if you neither found out by looking into it, nor learned (since you had not studied with a teacher, which you admitted above), it is clear that you do not know the nature of justice.’
[90] [20] We should understand what was said earlier [110B], that ‘I often observed you with teachers’, as referring only to the teacher of music, reading and writing, and exercise, since the young man was educated in these subjects alone. [110D] How and where did you come to know it? He says ‘how’, meaning ‘not by having looked into it and found it out’, and ‘where’, meaning ‘not by having studied with anyone else and learned it’.

## Lecture 10

[91] With the god’s favour
[91] Alc. But maybe I gave you the wrong answer,⁴⁶⁴[when I said I knew it by finding out on my own.
Soc. Then how did it happen?
Alc. I suppose I [[110E]] learned it in the same way as other people... from ordinary people (hoi polloi).
Soc. When you give the credit to ‘ordinary people’, you’re falling back on teachers who lack competence (ouk... spoudaios)... they can’t even teach you which moves to make, or not to make, in knucklebones. Yet that’s a trivial matter, I suppose, compared with justice... So although they can’t teach trivial things, you say they can teach more serious things?
Alc. I [[111A]] think so... for example, I learned how to speak Greek from them; I couldn’t tell you who my teacher was, but I give the credit to the very people you say are no good at teaching.
Soc. Yes, my noble friend, ordinary people are good teachers of that... Don’t you see that somebody who is going to teach anything must first [[111B]] know it himself?... If people disagree about something, would you say that they know it?
Alc. Of course not.
Soc. Then how could they be teachers of it?
Alc. They couldn’t possibly...
Soc. Now if we wanted to know not just what men and horses are like, but which of them could and couldn’t run, would ordinary people be able to teach this as well?
Alc. Of course not.
Soc. Isn’t the fact that they disagree with each other about these things enough to show you that they don’t understand them, and are not helpful (krêguoi) teachers of them?
Alc. Yes, it is...
 [[111E]] Soc. Very well, then – does it seem to you that ordinary people actually agree among themselves or with each other about just and unjust people and actions?... Do they disagree with each other a huge amount about [[112A]] these things?
Alc. Very much so.
Soc. I don’t suppose you’ve ever seen or heard people disagreeing so strongly about what is healthy and unhealthy that they fight and kill each other... but I know you’ve seen this sort of [[112B]] dispute over questions of justice... at least you’ve heard about it from many other people – especially Homer, since you’ve heard theIliadand the Odyssey, haven’t you?... I suppose the same is true of those Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians who died at... Coronea, including your own father. The disagreement that caused those battles and those deaths was none other than disagreement over justice and injustice, wasn’t it?... Are we to [[112D]] say that people understand something if they disagree so much about it that in their disputes with each other they resort to such extreme measures?]⁴⁶⁵
[91] Now that Alcibiades has been proven ignorant of justice (since he neither learned it nor found it out, as [Socrates] demonstrated earlier), he uses his natural talents⁴⁶⁶ to reply, by rejecting the premiss⁴⁶⁷ that he knows about justice because he found out about it [by himself]. Since that premiss has been systematically refuted [110D], he suggests that he answered poorly: ‘because my knowledge comes not from finding it out, but from learning about it’. And when Socrates is about to deploy the same arguments [as before] – namely, ‘When? From which teachers?’, and so on⁴⁶⁸ – Alcibiades offers ‘ordinary people’ (hoi polloi) as his teachers, and explains that he has learned about justice from ‘ordinary people’. In support of this, he observes that ordinary people teach, not only justice, but also how to speak the Greek language (hellênizein).⁴⁶⁹
[91] Now, [Alcibiades] thought that ‘ordinary people’ have knowledge about both [justice and language], and are competent teachers in both areas, because he reckoned that both are matters determined by general convention (thesis). (After all, ‘ordinary people’ are masters of matters determined by convention: for instance, they know which convention they have established when it comes to [the meaning of] nouns).⁴⁷⁰ In reality, however, justice is far from being a matter determined by convention.⁴⁷¹ That’s why Socrates accepts the one [assertion], that ordinary people are teachers of the Greek language, but rejects the other, that they are teachers of justice.
[91] In the first place, then, he says: ‘How can people who are ignorant about relatively trivial and humble (kheirô) subjects – like [how to win at] a game of knucklebones⁴⁷² – know enough about more advanced subjects, like justice and injustice, to teach about them?’ Now this argument presents a puzzle (aporos), namely, how Socrates can claim that ordinary people are ignorant about justice on the grounds that they’re ignorant about humbler things. (Consider: Hippocrates’ ignorance of carpentry didn’t also render him ignorant about the four elements, from which, he says, human bodies are made:⁴⁷³ but this latter [20] [knowledge] is more advanced than carpentry). Well, Proclus offers the following solution: he says that people who are ignorant about trivial subjects that are more familiar to them (oikeioteros) are also ignorant about more advanced subjects.⁴⁷⁴ But Damascius doesn’t [solve the puzzle] like this, because on his view, there’s no need for this addition of the words ‘more familiar’; instead, he resolves it as follows. Those who lack the capacity to learn about more trivial issues also lack knowledge of more advanced ones:⁴⁷⁵ and [winning] a game of knucklebones is more trivial than knowing about justice, and [ordinary people] are ignorant about the former: therefore, it is clear that ordinary people are also ignorant about justice.
[92] [92,1] Next, Socrates continues his argument that ordinary people are ignorant about justice, by pointing out that they disagree with each other: in other words, different people take different positions about what is just. And failure to agree (asumphônia) is evidence of ignorance and a lack of understanding. [5] Now it’s not always the case that people who agree with one another [about a subject] understand it (consider the case of the Democriteans,⁴⁷⁶ who agree among themselves that the void exists, but are mistaken for this very reason, because in fact it does not);⁴⁷⁷ but those who do understand do agree with one another, as we can see by conversion by contraposition of the following premiss, that those who do not agree are ignorant.⁴⁷⁸
[92] [Socrates] also draws attention to the vehemence of the disagreement, [10] pointing out that ordinary people get into civil strife (stasiazein) over justice, and not only that, but the most important conflicts have been fought over it. For civil strife is a limited conflict (even though it is worse than warfare [between states], since it’s fought against those near and dear to us), whereas warfare [between states] is a large-scale conflict. But in fact, as we have already pointed out,⁴⁷⁹ since justice permeates our entire being (ousia) and the three [15] parts of our soul, it’s for this reason that people who have been treated unfairly reckon themselves as good as dead and non-existent (anousios) unless they can win just [compensation]: that’s why they start the greatest wars [over it]. And [Socrates] uses the Iliad and the Odyssey as examples of wars waged for justice. For the Iliad is nothing other than an epic about barbarians⁴⁸⁰ and [93,1] Greeks seeking justice (dikaiologia), with the barbarians maintaining that they suffered the first injustice, when Jason, a Greek, captured Medea, a barbarian,⁴⁸¹ whereas the Greeks claim that they suffered the greater injustice when Helen was captured. Herodotus narrates these events right at the beginning of his own History.⁴⁸² And in the Odyssey, the suitors and Telemachus seek justice,⁴⁸³ as the suitors maintain that a widow must not refuse the noblest men of Ithaca when they woo her with plentiful bride-gifts, while Telemachus claims that it is not yet clear whether his father has died, and that it is unjust for them to be plundering his father’s house.
[93] And [Socrates] presents the Battle of Coronea⁴⁸⁴ as another example, since it was also waged for justice – and although he could introduce another, more important war than this, he doesn’t, and so he adds variation to his lesson. (That is, he described the Trojan war because of the greater fame of the subject, but he described the Battle of Coronea because it came closer to home for the young man,⁴⁸⁵ since Alcibiades’ father Clinias distinguished himself there and lost his life). And he did this in imitation of the poet [Homer]: for in the poet, Nestor in conversation with Achilles recalls the war with the Lapiths, where Peleus distinguished himself,⁴⁸⁶ as Isocrates also remarks in his Euagoras.⁴⁸⁷ So also Priam says to Achilles:⁴⁸⁸
[93] [20] Godlike Achilles, remember your father.
That is the content of the survey (theôria).⁴⁸⁹
[93] Alc. But maybe I gave you the wrong answer, when I said I knew it by finding out on my own. Here, as we have pointed out, [Alcibiades] rejects one of the premisses, suggesting that he gave a poor answer when he said that he knew about justice by finding out about it. ‘For it’s not by finding out [on my own]’, he explains, ‘but by learning about it, that I have knowledge on this subject’. And when Socrates presses him to name his teachers (so that he might [94,1] study with them himself), the young man says that he’s learned ‘from ordinary people’. Then Socrates proves that these are not teachers in the proper sense of justice, and in fact they’re not even ‘helpful’ (krêguos), as he puts it a little later [5] in the passage [111E1]. (He uses the word ‘helpful’ to mean ‘good’ (agathos), as this [verse] from the poet [Homer] makes clear in its contrast [of ‘helpful’] with ‘bad’ (kakos):⁴⁹⁰
[94] Seer of bad news (kaka), never yet have you told me something helpful
(krêguon),
[94] adding,
[94] it’s always dear to your heart to prophesy bad news...
[94] [10] That is, he contrasts ‘bad’ with ‘helpful’, because the latter is ‘good’). When you give the credit to ‘ordinary people’, you’re falling back on teachers who lack competence (ouk... spoudaios)... The saying of the Seven Sages⁴⁹¹ hints at the same point:
[94] The more, the worse.⁴⁹²
[94] Now we investigate how, if the natural occurs more frequently than the unnatural (for all human beings are, by nature, five-fingered, and this occurs more frequently,⁴⁹³ but [some] are unnaturally six-fingered, and this is rarer) – how, then, if the natural occurs more often than the unnatural, can ‘more’ be described as ‘bad’?⁴⁹⁴
[94] Well, we reply as follows: just as it’s no surprise to us when most people dwelling in a plague-spot fall ill, but we’re surprised when a few remain healthy, so too in this case we ought to suppose that souls, after they descend here,⁴⁹⁵ fall [20] sick rather than remaining healthy because they are dwelling in an alien country (anoikeios), and this is why most of them are in bad shape (kakoi). For our father, and our true country, lie above alone.⁴⁹⁶ [95,1] Yet that’s a trivial matter, I suppose, compared with justice...
[95] Here is the puzzle that we took up earlier in the survey,⁴⁹⁷ as well as the two solutions to it offered by Proclus and Damascius. [I think they can teach] more important (spoudaioteros) things than knucklebones. —Like what? —Like how to speak Greek. The youth explains [5] that ‘ordinary people’ are not only [able] to teach justice, but they also teach how to speak Greek, even if one allows that they don’t have knowledge about more trivial things, like knucklebones. Now it’s in imitation of the Pythagoreans (zêlon) that he singles out ‘speaking Greek’ in the first place, when he says that they’re able to teach ‘more important things’, and goes on to specify that he means ‘speaking Greek’.⁴⁹⁸ For you should know that the Pythagoreans used [10] to express wonder and admiration (ethaumazon) for the people who first discovered numbers, claiming that they had insight into the essence of Intellect (egnôkenai... ousian tou nou) (since they used to call the Ideas ‘numbers’, and the Ideas are in the Intellect). They also used to express wonder and admiration at those who first laid down names for things: for these, they explained, had insight into the essence of the Soul (since it belongs to the soul to lay down names, and not to Intellect, since Intellect produces all things by nature, but the soul by convention, and names are established by convention).⁴⁹⁹ So too, then, [15] Alcibiades praises ‘speaking Greek’ first, when he is about to explain that ordinary people are teachers of it – from whom, he claimed to have learned about justice.
[95] And note that ‘speaking Greek’ (hellênizein) has two meanings: it can simply mean ‘using only the Greek tongue’, which is what ‘ordinary people’ teach; or it can mean ‘conversing flawlessly’, which lecturers in literature (grammatikoi) teach, for their discipline (grammatikê) trains cultured Greek (hellênismos).⁵⁰⁰ Yes, my noble friend, they are good teachers of this... Since ‘ordinary [96,1] people’ have no family standing (agenês), Socrates sets the young man ahead of ordinary people by calling him ‘noble’ (gennaios). And notice here how, as we have seen already, Socrates has granted that ordinary people are teachers of the one subject (speaking Greek) but not by any means of the other (justice). For he convicts them of ignorance on this count in the following words, since he praises them for their agreement on the subject of the Greek language in order [5] that he can prove them ignorant about justice, since they disagree about that. Don’t they agree on [what wood and stone are] and reach for the same thing...? The verb ‘agree’ here relates to understanding (gnôseôs esti), and the word ‘reach’ relates to life (zôê). Now, he linked and joined these both together, showing that [one’s way of] life generates philosophical beliefs (dogmata), while at the same time, beliefs generate [one’s way of] life.⁵⁰¹ After all, the person [10] who believes that pleasure is the good strives to experience pleasure, and lives his life according to it, and conversely, the person who lives for pleasure also expounds beliefs to this effect, that pleasure is the good.⁵⁰² I think I’ve pretty well learned that this is what you mean by understanding Greek, haven’t I? Notice how clear it is here, too, that ‘speaking Greek’ has two meanings.⁵⁰³ For after the youth has said that everyone knows in the same way [15] what to call stone and wood and things like that (and it’s not the case that some people call them this, others that – which shows only that they are using the Greek language), then, on this basis (loipon ek toutôn), Socrates says that ‘I think I’ve pretty well learned that this is what you mean’. This doesn’t refer to the other sense of ‘speaking Greek’, namely, that with which lecturers in literature (grammatikoi) are concerned; for this latter sense doesn’t have to do with calling the right things by the right names, but with using the established [20] names flawlessly. [Now if we wanted to know not just what humans and horses were like], but also which of them were racers and which weren’t, [would ordinary people be able to teach this as well?] Socrates is about to move on to his proof that ordinary people are ignorant about justice, and so he secures agreement to this [point] first.⁵⁰⁴ He says, ‘If we wanted to know not merely what humans and [97,1] horses were like’ (this is just like the previous question about stone and wood, referring to speaking Greek) ‘but also which of them were racers’ (and, as he adds later, which of them is healthy), ‘do ordinary people know about this too?’
[97] And the youth answers ‘Of course not’. For it’s clear that these questions belong to the skills of experts (tekhnai), which are beyond ordinary people: [5] medicine when it comes to health, physiognomy when it comes to recognising racers, and so on. (On that note, we should be aware that ‘runner’ (dromeus) doesn’t mean the same thing as ‘racer’ (dromikos): the former names a state (hexis), that of running, but the latter is the name of a fitness (epitêdeiotês), namely, of being fit for [competitive] racing. And ordinary people may possibly be able to teach about runners – for instance, which horses are swifter on foot, [10] and which slower, and likewise when this is a matter of gymnastics; but even if they do know this, nevertheless they can’t identify the racers among them, since it’s a matter for a very challenging area of expertise, physiognomy, to state which will be racers or boxers and so on). [Very well, then – does it seem to you that ordinary people actually agree... about just and unjust people and actions?] —Yes by Zeus (nê Dia), far from it, Socrates... Since the word ‘not’ (ma) is negative, while the word ‘yes’ (nai) [15] is affirmative, he [normally] ought to have said ‘not by Zeus’ (ma Dia); but he cancelled the positive force of the ‘yes’ in ‘yes by Zeus’ nonetheless by adding ‘far from it’, which stands in for ‘by no means’ (oudamôs), which itself is clearly negative.⁵⁰⁵ [But I know you’ve seeen this sort of dispute over questions of justice and injustice; or even if you haven’t seen it], at least you’ve heard about it from many other people – especially Homer... Since we assert that Alcibiades
[97] [20] knows only three subjects – namely letters, cithara-playing, and wrestling – we
[97] should investigate why Socrates now claims that he also knows about poetry.⁵⁰⁶
[97] Well, we reply that he knows those three subjects as skills (tekhnai), but if he
[97] has also ‘heard’ some poems, that’s certainly not something he learned in the
[97] manner of a skill.
[97] Well, then, given that your opinion wavers like this... After it’s been proven
[97] that ordinary people are ignorant about justice, and after the youth has agreed
[97] to this, Socrates asks ‘how can it be plausible that you have knowledge about
[97] justice, when your opinion about it wavers like this?’ (And the youth indeed
[97] did waver on this subject, when he said at first that ‘ordinary people’ knew
[97] about justice and that he had learned from them; but now, thanks to Socrates’
[97] [5] cross-examination, he acknowledges that they are ignorant). Again, [Socrates
[97] points out] that ‘earlier, we saw that you hadn’t found it out for yourself, but
[97] now we see that you haven’t learned it either, since you had no teachers’.

## Lecture 11

[97] With the god’s favour
[97] 112D–
Soc. Well, then, given that your opinion wavers so much, and given that you
[97] [[114B]] obviously neither found it out yourself nor learned it from anyone else,
[97] how likely is it that you know about justice and injustice?
Alc. From what
[97] yousay, anyway, it’s not very likely...
[97] Because Alcibiades has been proven doubly ignorant⁵⁰⁷ about justice (for he
[97] didn’t know about justice, and despite his ignorance, he thought he did know
[97] about it; moreover, he registered ‘ordinary people’ as his teachers, even though
[97] they knew nothing about justice, as their disagreement on this subject revealed)
[97] – [because of all this], given his natural talent as an orator, he replies, ‘From
[97] what you say, it’s plausible that I don’t know about justice’. And when he uses
[97] the words ‘plausible’ (eikos), and ‘you’, he displays his own character, one that
[97] [15] cares for reputation (philotimos). Now care for reputation is a difficult affection
[97] to discard, as we have frequently pointed out,⁵⁰⁸ because whatever the soul put
[97] on first, it casts offlast.⁵⁰⁹ For the other affections come to an end swiftly, much like the love of pleasure in old age; in fact, the quotation of Sophocles in the Republic makes that clear: as [Cephalus] puts it, ‘I am very pleased to have [20] escaped all that’ [1, 329C].
[97] Now, Socrates says that Alcibiades hasn’t spoken well, since it was himself who bore witness to his own ignorance about justice. That’s because in general, when there are questions and answers [between two people], it’s the respondent who says [whatever’s said], not the questioner.⁵¹⁰ Now because in dialectical [99,1] questioning the questioner and the respondent both say the same things (for instance, ‘Is the soul immortal, or not immortal?’, to which the respondent responds either ‘immortal’ or ‘not immortal’), in this case it escapes us which of them asks the questions and which answers them; but in interrogative questioning (pusmatikôn erôtêseôn),⁵¹¹ where the questioner says one thing, but the respondent says something different (because some explanation (logos) is required), <it does not escape us>;⁵¹² [because of this, then], he sets out more clearly the argument that the respondent is the one who speaks.
[99] But we will show that in dialectical argument as well [as interrogation] the respondent is the one who says [whatever’s said], rather than the questioner. [1] [First], if the respondent alone speaks truth or falsehood (for he is the only one who makes declarations, whereas the questioner speaks interrogatively, and declarative speech is different from interrogative speech, and [the former] alone [10] among speeches says something true or false), then it’s also clear that he alone speaks: for the person who speaks neither truly nor falsely does not say [anything].⁵¹³ [2] Second, if the whole syllogism is made up from the questions put to the respondent, the person who is questioned is the speaker. [3] Again, consider that the respondent often asserts premisses that the questioner would [15] not endorse, and the syllogism is made up of these. [4] Moreover, consider that even if the questioners are the speakers in other cases, nonetheless Socrates, in his capacity as a midwife (hôs maieutikos),⁵¹⁴ is not the speaker, since his case is just like the midwife who does not give birth, but prepares those in labour to deliver.
[99] So where does that leave us? Does the questioner say nothing? No: he speaks in his own right, but he doesn’t assert premisses; instead, he supplies the construction [of the syllogism] and its conclusion.⁵¹⁵ For the conclusion is not [20] in the questions, since it follows necessarily from the premisses. That’s why we assign blame to the respondent for giving poor replies, if falsehood follows from what he has said (for falsehood would not have followed, unless he had provided one false premiss); but if nothing at all follows from the premisses, we blame the questioner for failing to derive any conclusion from the questions.
[99] But if the questioner is also a speaker, in what sense does Socrates say that [25] the respondent is the only one who speaks? It’s not in an unqualified sense that he says ‘the questioner does not speak’, but he says that it’s ‘in the context of question and answer’ that the respondent is the [only] speaker: for he does not question what the questioner does say, namely, the construction and conclusion of the syllogism, since that isn’t interrogative, since it isn’t posed as a question. Moreover, Plato himself was hardly ignorant of both perspectives, and he [30] knows that the respondent speaks here (‘in the context of question and answer, the respondent is the speaker’), yet in what follows he says something different, namely, ‘Show me that you know about justice, either by asking your own [100,1] questions, or by presenting an argument at length’ – since he knows that the questioner is sometimes a speaker as well. And that, as we have pointed out, is why we assign blame to [the questioner] when he fails to draw any conclusions.
[100] After [Socrates] has said this, and so completed the third syllogism⁵¹⁶ (for [recall], there was the first, where he was striving to show that [Alcibiades] was doubly ignorant about justice, because in his ignorance he supposed that he had [5] knowledge; then the second, where he was establishing this based on ordinary people, since [Alcibiades] proclaimed them to be his own teachers; then the third, where [Socrates] proved that in general, in the context of question and answer, it is the respondent who speaks, not the questioner) – after [Socrates] has finished the third, then, the young man changes the remaining premiss, thanks to his natural talents. For not long ago, he shifted his attitude to the other premiss, [10] when he said that ‘I was wrong to say that I didn’t learn, since I learned from ordinary people’; and again now [he shifts his attitude] to the remaining premiss, when he says that ‘I gave the wrong answer when I said that the Athenians deliberated about justice, for it’s not about what’s just that they deliberate, but about what’s advantageous’; and he says this from an orator’s perspective (hôs rhêtorikos), since he knew that the adviser’s goal is advantage, not justice.⁵¹⁷
[100] [15] Again, Socrates says, ‘But you will be proven, through the same arguments, to be ignorant about what’s advantageous, since you either learned it, or found out about it. (For there’s no need to fear that arguments will wear out, like equipment worn down by time).⁵¹⁸ After all, either the just and the advantageous are one and the same, in which case when you were proven ignorant about justice, you were simultaneously proven ignorant about the advantageous as well; or they are different, and you’ll be proven ignorant about two things in [20] place of one. For you can’t state the time when you didn’t think you knew what the good was, for all things aim at the good’.⁵¹⁹
[100] That is the content of the survey. From whatyousay, anyway, it’s not very likely... Notice how Alcibiades [101,1] reveals his care for reputation (to philotimon), when he says ‘not very likely’ and ‘from what you say’, since he’s unable to bear simply acknowledging that he’s ignorant about justice. For this affection is a difficult one to discard – so much so, that even when we develop the desire not to care about our reputation, [5] we fail to notice that we’re slipping through that very act into this same affection, namely, acting out of care for our reputation – so that we are despising our reputation because doing so bolsters our reputation!
[101] It’s just as Epictetus the Stoic (who became a [genuine] Stoic in his soul) explains: ‘It is the part of an uneducated person to blame others for his own [10] faults (eph’ hois autos prassei kakos); to blame himself, but not others, is the part of one whose education has begun; to blame neither another nor his own self is the part of one whose education is now complete’.⁵²⁰ Likewise Alcibiades – since he lacks education – blames Socrates by saying ‘as you say, I don’t know about justice’; but later, when he begins to be educated, he will blame himself; and had he arrived at fulfilment in the present dialogue, he would have blamed [15] neither himself nor anyone else. And in the poet [Homer], we have a verse about blaming others, here [Il. 19.86–87]:⁵²¹
[101] ... yet I am not responsible
but Zeus is, and Destiny, and Fury the holy wanderer...⁵²²
[101] What? Aren’t you saying... Socrates employs Phaedra’s saying here: for when [102,1] her nurse says, ‘Do you mean Hippolytus’?, she replies ‘You heard it from yourself, not me!’⁵²³ Likewise Socrates: ‘You said this, not me’. And this marks the opening of the third syllogism, where he uses geometrically compelling [5] proofs to show that the respondent, not the questioner, is the speaker. If I ask you [which is more], one or two... Notice how he introduces interrogative questions,⁵²⁴ saying ‘If I ask you which is more, one or two, you
[102] will say “two”; and if I ask you “more by how much”, you will say “by one” ’. For
[102] in [replies] where a sentence (logos) is unavoidably necessary, and it’s
[102] inadequate to respond by saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or by shaking or nodding the head,
[102] [10] here we have an ‘interrogative’ answer rather than a dialectical one.
[102] That two is more than one by one... Socrates combines the young man’s two
[102] answers. 112E–Clearly I am. —And what if I ask you how to spell ‘Socrates’? Notice from
[102] the phrase ‘clearly I am’ how the young man has manifestly been benefited: for
[102] he is plainly assigning blame to himself; but if he had been fully benefited, he
[102] [15] would have blamed neither himself nor anyone else.
[102] Next, [Socrates] uses a different interrogative question, namely, ‘If I ask you
[102] how to spell “Socrates”, perhaps you will agree that you are the one giving the
[102] answer in this case?’ And he replies, ‘Yes’.
[102] Come then, put it [all together] in a single argument... He means, ‘State it
[102] in a general way: in the context of question and answer, who is the speaker?’
[102] [20] And he replies, ‘The respondent’. And he’s right to use the words ‘in the context
[102] of question and answer’, since even if the questioner also has something to say,
[102] this is not part of the question-and-answer process.
[102] It appears, Socrates, [that it was me...] Notice again how his fondness for
[102] reputation makes it unbearable for him to fully acknowledge his ignorance,
[102] but instead he says ‘it appears’.
[102] [25] And surely what was said is that Alcibiades, [the beautiful son of Clinias
[102] doesn’t understand] justice... That is to say, ‘Wasn’t it said’ (insert ‘by
[102] Alcibiades’) ‘that the beautiful Alcibiades doesn’t understand’? At the critical
[102] moment, since [Alcibiades] admitted his ignorance about justice, [Socrates]
[102] has launched a series of criticisms of Alcibiades (katadromêi elenkhôn).⁵²⁵ And
[103] [103,1] since it’s vulgar to present one’s criticisms in propria persona – well, consider,
[103] it’s the same way in the poet [Homer], when Phoenix wants to mount a series
[103] of criticisms against Achilles, but doesn’t introduce the arguments in propria
[103] persona, instead introducing Peleus and criticising him that way;⁵²⁶ and
[103] [5] similarly, again, when Demosthenes wants to criticise the Athenians, he delivers
[103] his charges as if they are presented by all the Greeks;⁵²⁷ but it doesn’t satisfy Socrates to use another persona, but instead, he actually puts the criticised party himself to use for a more effective charge, saying that ‘it’s been said by Alcibiades that, lacking any knowledge of justice, he is about to advise [the Athenians] on a subject that he doesn’t understand’.
[103] Now, Alcibiades fell short of three primary hypostases, Intellect (nous), God (theos), and Soul (psukhê).⁵²⁸ [1] [He fell short] of Soul, first, since he lacks knowledge (ouk oiden), and understanding (gignôskein) is a distinctive feature of Soul. [2] He fell short of Intellect since while he lacks knowledge, he supposes he has it; for it is a distinctive feature of Intellect to revert [upon oneself] (epistrephein). (That’s because Intellect is analogous to a sphere, as it makes each point both origin and limit). [3] [And he fell short] of God because he is producing harmful results (kakopoios): for he is on the verge of giving advice [15] about what he doesn’t know, so that he may bring those who take his advice to harm; but God is characterised by goodness. For consider the case of a person who is ignorant about medicine and doesn’t give advice about medical matters and [thus] doesn’t make mistakes, whereas the opposite holds of a person who tries to give advice in his ignorance; and likewise, it’s the person who gives advice about carpentry without knowledge of this subject who makes mistakes [20] (for the cause of error isn’t simple ignorance, but double): the same applies to Alcibiades.
[103] And Alcibiades is like madmen:⁵²⁹ for his case is analogous to that of Ajax in Sophocles, who supposed as he slew the flocks that they were the Greeks;⁵³⁰ likewise [Alcibiades] here supposes that he knows about justice, in spite of his ignorance, so he too brings those who take his advice to harm (kaka). And just as the presence of a teacher is useless in the face of double ignorance, for a [25] teacher is no help to the person who supposes he knows [all about the subject], it’s the same way with the doctor and the madman: that’s why [Socrates] calls [Alcibiades] ‘mad’ (manikos) [113C5]. [104,1] The beautiful son of Clinias... This drives home the point that ‘None [of this] helped you toward knowing about justice: not beauty, nor wealth, nor noble birth’.⁵³¹ Apparently. – Then it’s just like in Euripides: Plato teaches us how one ought to paraphrase poetic passages (parôidein khrêseis), namely, that one shouldn’t quote the passages themselves (since that’s tedious and deprives the words of [5] force), but rather, [one should excerpt] some phrases: that’s why he doesn’t provide the entire passage.⁵³² He runs the risk [of being said to have heard this from himself]... Risk (kindunos) doesn’t lie only in deeds, but also in speech, where assent is generated through the force of the arguments and the examination: that’s why he uses the word ‘risk’. [10] And I’m not the one who says these things... [He says this] because an analogy holds between the questioner and the god who offers souls their choice of life,⁵³³ by offering them one or the other alternative (in any case, that’s how it is in the Republic: ‘You will choose your daimon; a daimon will not be assigned to you by lot’ [Rep. 10, 617E]); and in the analogy, the respondent corresponds to the soul as it chooses lives.⁵³⁴ [15] This scheme you have in mind is mad (manikos)... Notice how he calls him ‘mad’, as we pointed out before.⁵³⁵ Actually, Socrates, I think that [the Athenians and the other Greeks] rarely [discuss which course is more just or unjust]. Notice how he uses this speech to make his escape, in the spirit of orators:⁵³⁶ ‘The Athenians don’t deliberate about what’s just, but about what’s advantageous, since that’s the adviser’s [20] goal’. Now from the orators’ perspective, the just and the advantageous are different things,⁵³⁷ since⁵³⁸ they were in the habit of claiming that it is possible to obtain from unjust means something that is advantageous, but not just, whereas dying for one’s country was just, but certainly not advantageous, for it was no advantage to the body. That’s why Socrates, too, often solemnly cursed those who first distinguished these from each other,⁵³⁹ since they had [25] produced the worst sort of a snare for souls, and thrown both the essence (ousia) of the soul and our mode of fulfilment (teleiotês) into confusion. For if the just is proven interchangeable with the advantageous – such that [105,1] everything just is also advantageous, and vice versa – the result will be that the human being is the soul [as in fact it is], rather than the combination [of soul and body]. Thus [by denying this] they confused our essence, to begin with. Moreover, [the result will be] that excellence (aretê) is sufficient for well-being (eudaimonia), and defectiveness (kakia) is sufficient for ill-being (kakodaimonia): hence [by denying this] they confused our mode of fulfilment. Otherwise [if they were correct], there would have been no benefit for the man who said ‘pound!’⁵⁴⁰
[105] [5] But how did Alcibiades come to say that the Athenians didn’t deliberate about these matters, i.e., about justice?⁵⁴¹ It’s because (since he was inclined to oratory and had plenty of rhetorical preparation thanks to Pericles) he used to observe [the Athenians] saying that oratory in the courts of justice had one goal, but deliberation [in the Assembly] had another, namely the advantageous, based on the foci (kephalaia) [of rhetorical training]. For they used to say [10] that [rhetoric] takes its focus either from custom, or from justice, or from advantage.⁵⁴²
[105] Alternately, it’s because everyone supposes that justice is determined by convention, while what’s good is determined by nature:⁵⁴³ for no human being supposed that what’s good [for them] was determined by convention, except Clitophon alone in the Republic,⁵⁴⁴ which is why [Plato] did not deem it worthwhile to name him, but he says ‘one of those present said’,⁵⁴⁵ since he spoke contrary to the common concept.⁵⁴⁶ – So that’s why he thought there was a difference between the just and the advantageous. And furthermore, you’re quite right to say so... Democritus, surnamed 651 (because when his name is measured, it adds up to 651),⁵⁴⁷ takes the phrase [106,1] ‘you’re quite right to say so’ as spoken by Socrates, but Damascius takes it as spoken by Alcibiades. The second alternative is better, since, as we pointed out,⁵⁴⁸ Alcibiades was beginning to be benefited, and he is cricitising himself. They think that sort of thing is obvious: Alcibiades makes a good point: [5] for since they consider just [actions] to be so by convention, and [consider themselves] to be their inventors, they don’t think it’s worthwhile to teach or give advice about them, but instead they deliberate about advantageous [actions]. So? Even if just [and advantageous actions happen] to be completely different, [surely you don’t think that you know what’s advantageous for people and why, do you?]: He makes a start on the refutation,⁵⁴⁹ and proves [Alcibiades] ignorant about the advantageous based on [this] counter-objection, [10] because the objection (enstasis) [will] require many arguments to prove that the just and advantageous are one and the same, which he’ll show in what follows. But for now he says that ‘If the just and advantageous are one and the same, and you were proven ignorant of the just, surely it follows that you’re ignorant of the advantageous? And if they differ, and you were to be proven ignorant about the advantageous by the same arguments [as before], then you’ll be proven ignorant about two subjects instead of one’. What’s to stop me, Socrates? Unless you’re going to ask me all over again... [15] ‘What’s to stop me’, Alcibiades means, ‘from knowing about the advantageous, even if I am ignorant about justice? As long as you don’t question me with the same arguments again! If you do that, then I’ll be proven ignorant’. [The argument by which this will be shown is] that by which the former point [was shown]: [He says this] because Alcibiades resembles a gourmand [20] when it comes to arguments. Hence one proof doesn’t suffice, but he wants the same point to be demonstrated by many proofs, just as when it comes to food, gourmands aren’t satisfied by one kind of food. As if the previous ones were worn-out equipment... Plato makes clear that ‘equipment’ (skeuaria) doesn’t mean implements (skeuê), as our ordinary usage has it, since he adds ‘that you would refuse to put on again’; rather, he [107,1] uses the word ‘equipment’ to mean the costume of comic and tragic [actors]. But if you also want to understand how the word relates to costumes, then [you should learn that] ‘equipment’ has three meanings in Plato:⁵⁵⁰ either [1] costume, or [2] clothing (which is why he adds ‘that you would refuse to put on again’), or [3] luxury, since Alcibiades had the habit of a great deal of luxury, so that quite a few people have written lengthy tomes about ‘the luxury of Alcibiades’;⁵⁵¹ but all of these things are ‘costumes’ in the sense that they belong to the outside world. But why on earth does the soul want to employ the costume that lies outside itself, its clothing? Really, it’s after other, different things, and it’s wrapped up in other things: for it holds a concept (ennoia) of its inward wrappings, the luminous, pneumatic, and shell-like [vehicles];⁵⁵² by means of [10] this visible clothing, then, the soul demonstrates her desire to possess pure inward wrappings (so too the Poet writes [Od. 5.167],
[107] and dress you in garments):
She wants to have them, then, in a stainless condition.⁵⁵³
[107] [I’ll pass over] your sallies from your base... The word ‘sally’ (prodromê) is [15] used in cases where one side in war takes some secure base, from which he’s able to wage war from a position of security: Alcibiades, then, thought it was a [good] sally [to ask] not to be questioned by Socrates using the same arguments [as before]. From what source did you learn what is advantageous? Socrates pithily presents his questions from [his earlier discussion of] ‘Where did you learn or find out?’ [106C–110D].⁵⁵⁴ [He does so pithily] because he’s already gone [20] through these things, just as the Poet puts it [Od. 12.452–53]:
[107] It would be tedious
to tell again what’s clearly been told.
[107] [Why don’t you prove] whether the just and advantageous are the same... By these comments, he presents the objection that ‘You ought to show that justice and advantage are not the same: for if you don’t show this, you’ll be [108,1] proven ignorant of two things in the place of one’. You can question me, if you like, just as I questioned you, or else work it out yourself, in your own argument: Notice how he is aware that the questioner, too, speaks and he never adds ‘in question and answer’, since he recognises that the respondent is the speaker in a case of question and answer.⁵⁵⁵
[108] But why did Socrates want Alcibiades to ask questions or deliver an argument at length (apotadên)? Well, it’s because he knew that he was no longer willing to answer questions after he had been refuted by Socrates, and so he changed the mode of discussion to this. And [it can be delivered] at length, since if Socrates were the person giving the discourse, there would be cause to worry that he would deliver his speech to a sleeping audience (as [10] Aischines puts it: ‘the judges were dreaming as the speech at trial was being made’);⁵⁵⁶ but since in fact Socrates is [the audience], there’s no reason to worry that he will suffer this. [No], Socrates, [I don’t think I’d be able] to work it out when I’m facing you... He means, ‘I don’t know if I have the capacity to maintain a dialectical conversation with you’: and the phrase ‘facing you’ (pros se) had a warlike and combative character.⁵⁵⁷
[108] [15] That is the content of the lecture, with the god’s favour.

## Lecture 12

[108] With the god’s favour
[108] 114B–
Alc. But I don’t know if I’d be able to work it out when I’m facing you,
[108] [[115A]] Socrates...
[108] Due to his natural talent, Alcibiades has withdrawn his endorsement of the
[108] remaining premiss [sc., that the Athenians deliberate about justice], by saying,
[108] ‘But the Athenians don’t deliberate about justice, but about advantage, since
[108] [20] the adviser doesn’t aim for justice, but for advantage’; and Socrates has refuted
[108] him with a counter-objection, saying that ‘Even if we do grant that there is a
[108] difference between the just and the advantageous, all the same you’ll be proven
[108] ignorant about what’s advantageous by the same arguments that proved you
[108] ignorant about justice’ (for there’s no reason to worry that arguments will
[108] wear out like equipment);⁵⁵⁸ beginning from this point, and aiming to refute
[109] Alcibiades, he also works up to his objection, in which he demonstrates that
[109] everything just is advantageous and everything advantageous just, in order
[109] that he may demonstrate the identity of justice and advantage by their mutual
[109] convertibility (dia tês antistrophês).
[109] [5] Now the present syllogism contributes both to our essence (ousia) and to
[109] our fulfilment (teleiotês).⁵⁵⁹ [It contributes] to our essence, first, because if the
[109] just and advantageous are proven to be one and the same, then wherever justice
[109] is, there is advantage too: and justice is in the soul, and therefore advantage, too,
[109] is in the soul. And since advantage consists in ‘being well-off’ (eu einai), and
[109] where there is well-being there is also being in general (pantôs), then it follows
[109] [10] that our being, too, lies in the soul. But he also demonstrates our fulfilment
[109] through this [syllogism]: for if justice and advantage are one and the same, then
[109] our goal is justice and, by that argument, excellence (aretê) is sufficient for well-
[109] being (eudaimonia), and deficiency (kakia) for being badly off (kakodaimonia),
[109] even if all the rest of one’s external situation were to be in good shape.
[109] [15] But in what sense does Plato mean all this, namely, that everything just is
[109] advantageous, and everything advantageous just, and that they are mutually
[109] convertible?⁵⁶⁰ And [why], in what follows [115A–116D], will he show that the
[109] beautiful or noble (kalon),⁵⁶¹ too, is convertible with [both of] these, and vice
[109] versa? Well, if we adopt Proclus’ rule,⁵⁶² then loftier [beings] do not end or begin at the same point as hollower [beings]: rather, their progression extends [20] further, like three archers of unequal power, and the stronger archers fire a great distance. And the advantageous corresponds to the Good (agathon), but the noble (kalon) to the Intellect (because beauty is the foam⁵⁶³ and flower of Form (eidos), and Form corresponds to Intellect as it reverts to its source; and that’s because what is partless reverts upon itself, since partition arises on account of matter (hulê), because all the formulae (logoi) exist in a partless way [110,1] in the seed – such that when a part is cast away, the remainder still fulfils its needed task),⁵⁶⁴ and justice begins from Soul. That’s why the Good descends even as far as matter (for [matter] itself is good, and fulfils its needed task for the all); but the gift of Intellect extends as far as anything made by Form; and [5] the gift of Soul extends as far as the non-rational soul (for justice is in the [non-rational soul] too, [for example] among the storks).⁵⁶⁵
[110] You might also grasp [Plato’s] meaning from different examples (paradeigmata). Consider: Being is prior to Life, but Life is prior to Intellect (as we will learn more precisely in the Sophist’s discussion of being);⁵⁶⁶ on this account, more [things] exist than live, and more [things] live than think.
[110] Well, then, how does he make these terms convertible, justice and advantage? [10] Of course, the conversion holds true in the case of the human good, advantage and beauty: just as, when both intellect and life are in the soul, these convert; for where there is one, there are also the others. That is the view of the philosopher Proclus. But the divine Iamblichus doesn’t distinguish the loftier from the [15] hollower [entities] in the extent of their contribution (for all [of them] descend to matter, because it’s his position that whatever the point might be from which a thing begins to act, it doesn’t stop until it reaches the furthest limits (eskhata); [111,1] for even if it’s stronger, nonetheless a balancing force can arise to weaken the effect through the distance of separation), but he does make a distinction in the more ‘striking’ nature (drimus) of the contribution of the loftier [entities]. For we aim for being more than for life, and more for life than for thinking.
[111] And once Socrates has offered Alcibiades the choice (since he doesn’t want to answer him) either to ask the questions or to deliver an account [of the [5] advantageous] on his own and at length, Alcibiades replies: ‘I don’t know if I’m able to produce the account of the advantageous when I’m facing Socrates’. Hence Socrates adds another syllogism, namely: ‘Well, how will you persuade the Athenians when you advise them? For someone who is persuasive to one person is also persuasive to many; and someone who is persuasive to many people also persuades one’. Through this syllogism, it’s made clear that our mode of fulfilment is something incorporeal,⁵⁶⁷ since the body is unable to give of itself to others without diminution, whereas the mode of fulfilment that belongs to the soul is able to give of itself without diminution, both to one [recipient] and to many: and perhaps it even adds a greater increase, since the teacher is fulfilled (teleioutai) by delivering his arguments.
[111] Now in what sense does Plato mean this? How are we to understand it?⁵⁶⁸ Does the person who is persuasive to one mindless person (anoêtos) also persuade a multitude of philosophers? Or does the person who is persuasive to a multitude of philosophers also persuade one mindless person? We reply that Plato resolves all of these questions in one phrase, when he says ‘each one by one’ (hena hekaston).⁵⁶⁹ For the person who persuades one also persuades many, since those ‘ones’ (ta hena), if I may say so, are part of the many, and he [20] made this clear by using the word ‘each one’ (hekaston). Moreover, since the many is made up from individuals (henades), the person who persuades the many also persuades the one [in it].⁵⁷⁰ And in addition to this, [he will be [112,1] persuasive] if he is knowledgeable about his subject: for the arithmetician is capable of being persuasive about numbers, to one and many alike, assuming that they are knowledgeable (epistêmonas).⁵⁷¹
[112] That is the content of the survey. But I don’t know if I’d be able (hoios) [to work it out facing you], Socrates: Notice that he refuses to answer facing Socrates. That’s why [Socrates] says [5] ‘Then how can you advise the Athenians? For someone who is persuasive to an individual, is also persuasive to many’. And he also introduces [talk about] the Assembly and the courtroom and the people, since the young man is inclined to oratory.⁵⁷² Even there, you know, you’ll have to persuade them each one by one. Notice the rule that the person who is persuasive to one is also persuasive to many: and by using the words ‘each one’, he makes clear that he must mean [‘one’ in [10] the sense] ‘part of many’. [If somebody knows something], don’t you think he can persuade people about it as individuals (kata monas), as well as all together? Notice again that by the phrase ‘as individuals as well as all together’, he shows that it belongs to one and the same person to persuade both many and one, at least where the plurality is constituted from individuals. So why does he repeat himself (adoleskhei)? For he said this earlier, too. Well, in one place he takes the one [15] as part of the many (as he does here), but in another place he takes the one individually as separated from the many – as he does above, [when Alcibiades refers to] ‘being able (hoios) [114B] [to persuade] Socrates about it (Sôkratê peri autou)’⁵⁷³ – for [Socrates] is separated from the many, though he can be counted among them. About things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster... Notice the second condition, that it’s necessary for him to know as well. For it’s the person who [20] knows about letters who will be persuasive, to one and many alike. And this person who knows is called an arithmetician? He wasn’t satisfied with mathematical necessity as an instrument of persuasion (for the arithmetician is a kind of mathematician), but he also added ‘the one who knows (ho eidôs) about these things’).⁵⁷⁴ [Is there any difference between an orator speaking to the people and an orator speaking in this sort of conversation, except] insofar as the former persuades them of the same things in a group while the latter persuades them one by one? Notice again how he juxtaposed ‘one by one’ with ‘in a group’: it’s clear that he means the same people, at one point taken individually, at another, as a group. [5] There’s a good chance (kinduneuei)... The phrase ‘there’s a good chance’ is used about [beliefs] which, thanks to a ladder of cogent arguments (dia klimaktêra anankês), are on the verge of being necessarily exchanged for the contrary belief. You’re being pushy (hubristês ei), Socrates... He labels his cross-examiner ‘pushy’. And Socrates admits this,⁵⁷⁵ and says: ‘Not only am I pushy, but the [10] most pushy imaginable, since I don’t only want to prove your arguments false, but also to prove the contrary position true, that everything just is advantageous, and vice versa’. For some propositions are false, not because they are refuted by their contraries [being proven true], but by the intermediate [being proven true], as holds in the case of the [proposition] ‘every human being walks’. For [15] that isn’t refuted by its contrary (which is also false), but by the intermediary [sc., ‘some human being does not walk’].⁵⁷⁶ Now, in fact, I’m going to be pushy and persuade you of the contrary... That is to say, ‘In being insolent, I’m not only refuting you, but I’m also going to persuade you of the contrary [of your position], if you would answer me’. But [Alcibiades] doesn’t want to answer, since – thanks to his natural talent – he was aware that wherever there’s question and answer, the respondent is the one who speaks, not the questioner.⁵⁷⁷ And [Socrates] in turn insists on his answering, for this kind of refutation (elenkhos) is the most efficacious of all, since we are better persuaded when we refute our own selves, and in dialectical questioning, the person who refutes relates to the person refuted more than snake’s bite to the body.⁵⁷⁸ No, you do the talking yourself... Plato uses ‘do the talking’ (lege) here to [25] mean ‘speak at length’. [114,1] What? Don’t you want to bereally(malista) convinced? Socrates says, ‘What else do you want, if not to be persuaded that everything just is advantageous, and vice versa’? That’s because two syllogisms will be proven through this argument. Then answer my questions; and if you don’t hear yourself say... ‘Answer my [5] questions’, he says; ‘and if you don’t hear yourself saying that everything just is advantageous and vice versa, don’t trust anyone else saying it...’ For whenever someone is benefited by an argument developed at length, they are obliged to say:
[114] How could you say what I ought to be saying [myself]?⁵⁷⁹
[114] For [Alcibiades] ought to have given these answers himself, so that his arguments would not be formed from without, like a lifeless vessel that holds [10] its water [poured] from outside: rather, the refutations (elenkhoi) ought to be presented from one’s own self. That way, learning is recollection.⁵⁸⁰ But I’d better answer: for I don’t think I’ll come to any harm... Thanks to his natural talent, he finds another escape route, namely, that ‘I am answering because I don’t think I’ll come to any harm’. But [Socrates] grants him this, and [15] says, ‘You’re inclined to prophecy’: for the person inclined to prophecy (mantikos), like the naturally talented person, hazards well-aimed guesses about the future.⁵⁸¹ Yet it wasn’t merely the case that [Alcibiades] would come to no harm, but he is actually going to be benefited. And [Socrates] didn’t say ‘you’re a prophet (mantis)’, since the prophet is knowledgeable, while the prophetically inclined person is unfulfilled [in the mastery of their talent]: just as the doctor (iatros) and the medically inclined person (iatrikos) are not the same. And Alcibiades didn’t make this statement with knowledge, but he offered his prediction based on opinion (doxa).
[114] [20] That is the content of the lecture.

## Lecture 13

[114] With the god’s favour
[114] Soc. Now tell me: are you saying that some just things are advantageous, 115A– [[116B]] but others are not?
[114] The present dialogue has ten syllogisms;⁵⁸² he lays out the fifth of these to prove [25] that the just and the advantageous are one and the same. He uses two syllogisms to demonstrate this: first, that everything just is also advantageous; next, that [115,1] everything advantageous is also just. For converting [the proposition] yields the identity [of the terms].⁵⁸³
[115] Now, he presents the syllogism as follows:⁵⁸⁴ ‘Everything just is noble (kalon):⁵⁸⁵ and everything noble is advantageous: therefore everything just is advantageous’. And the youth does not reject the minor premiss (the one stating that ‘everything just is noble’), as someone who cares about his reputation (hôs philotimos), because he considers just deeds praiseworthy. (That is also why he donated ten talents to the council of his own free will).⁵⁸⁶ But he resists the major premiss (the one stating that ‘everything noble is advantageous’), by arguing that some deeds are noble but bad, while other, shameful deeds are good.⁵⁸⁷ And [on his view] this isn’t a contradiction. For there are two contradictories: noble and shameful, and good and bad – and the noble is contradictory to the shameful, while the good is contradictory to the bad, but the noble is not contradictory to [10] the bad. For (as [Alcibiades] claims) a noble act can be a bad one: for instance, going to war on behalf of one’s country, and dying for a friend (philos) – this action is noble because it’s praiseworthy (for it’s done for a friend), but it’s not good, inasmuch as it brings no benefit to the body. And the converse holds of the shameful and the good, as in the case of refusing to give one’s life for a friend.
[115] Now the Oracle made both of these points very clear.⁵⁸⁸ On the topic of refusing to give one’s life for a friend, on the one hand, [she] said this:
[115] [15] You did not defend your friend, though you were at his side as he was dying:
You arrive impure: depart from my all-beautiful shrine.
[116] [116,1] On the other hand, when it came to a man who thrust out his arm to help his friend, but his spear⁵⁸⁹ struck [his friend by accident], she said this:
[116] You reached out to save your companion: the blood does not pollute you,
but you are purer of slaughter than you were before.
[116] Now [Socrates] might have refuted Alcibiades by saying the following:⁵⁹⁰ ‘But the human being is the soul, and harms (kaka) to the instrument don’t come back on its user. It’s true that harms suffered by parts do come back on the whole: if, then, the human being were compounded from soul and body, then harms to the body would come back on the whole. But since the one [10] [sc. body] is the instrument and the other [sc. soul] is its user, the errors (hamartêmata) of the instrument can’t come back on its user, just as the blunting of the adze doesn’t come back on its user’. But since these [arguments] are more philosophical (and the question would be begged right from the start, ‘On what grounds [do you claim] that the human being is the soul?’),⁵⁹¹ he [instead] employs three arguments to prove that the just and the advantageous are one the same: and the first argument is that everything noble is advantageous.
[116] The first argument runs as follows: ‘Two [different qualities] – say, nobility [15] (to kalon) and harm (to kakon) – don’t both attend on a single [subject] – say, courage. Rather, two [different qualities] attend on two [different subjects]. For nobility attends courage on behalf of one’s friend, but harm attends death: so courage and death are not identical, at least, not unless everyone who is brave in battle dies, or everyone who dies in battle is brave. The consequence is that the two [different qualities] – both the harm of death, and nobility – attend two [different subjects] and not one, courage’. And in saying this, [Socrates] [20] allows that death is something harmful, since he is crafting his words for Alcibiades.⁵⁹²
[116] The second argument: ‘Even if we do grant that two [different qualities] (nobility and the harm of death) follow [an act of] courage as such, nonetheless, they don’t follow in the same way: for nobility followed courage insofar as it is courage [i.e., essentially],⁵⁹³ but harm only followed by accident, by the [25] destruction of the underlying [body] and by allowing courage as such [to run its course]. For if one had destroyed courage insofar as it is courage, it would have been cowardice that followed for that person, not death; for it’s cowardice that destroys courage as such’.
[117] [117,1] Next, since he is conversing not in the Socratic manner, but as a teacher, and thus he is overstepping the instruction of the god, according to which ‘the god made me a midwife [of ideas], but prevents me from begetting’ [Tht. 150C] (for now he is teaching these lessons, rather than acting as a midwife, since [for midwifery] we would need to hear these statements from Alcibiades, not asserted by Socrates), and since he was a midwife’s son, he reverses the arrangement, and [5] makes Alcibiades the respondent by asking these same questions of Alcibiades. And he practices the argument with courage, since their conversation has taken a turn toward military matters; and he proves that courage is good, since it is something noble. (For consider, if he had been talking with Charmides, the ‘most temperate’ (sôphronestatos) – since that dialogue was actually entitled by him [sc. Plato] ‘Charmides, or Concerning Temperance’ – he would have practised the argument with temperance [rather than courage]).
[117] [10] He asks him, then, ‘whether you would choose to be a coward, or to die?’ And Alcibiades chooses to die, since he is courageous. And again, ‘Do you consider death and cowardice equally [harmful]’?⁵⁹⁴ And Alcibiades also agrees here, in error: for it is better to die than to be a coward, since courage causes us to exist well (eu einai), but life [only causes us to] exist: surely, too, the [one] drop (apoptôsis) is worse than the other, that is, existing in a bad condition [15] (kakôs) [is worse] than not existing. But since these matters are more philosophical, Socrates lets them go and uses [Alcibiades’] own words to prove that everything noble is good.
[117] Now earlier on, before his midwifery, [Socrates] proved that everything noble is good in the following way: ‘Courage is something noble’ (for the young man granted this also in the case of justice); ‘everything noble, insofar as it is noble, [20] is good’ (for the second syllogism showed this, the one which asserted that ‘the good followed courage insofar as it is courage, since it is noble, and it was [only] in an accidental way that death, which is harmful, followed something noble); ‘and since the phrase “insofar as” implies convertibility [between two terms], it is also noble insofar as it is good. And after we have made the same [25] arguments in the case of temperance’, he says, ‘and the other excellences (aretai), we will hold that everything noble, insofar as it is noble, is good, and thereby the same’.
[117] Following his midwifery, however, he devises a different kind of syllogism,⁵⁹⁵ asserting that ‘Courage is desirable to Alcibiades; everything desirable is good, [118,1] since desire waxes and wanes with the good (for the greater the good, the greater the desire); courage, then, is good; and the same goes for the other excellences; the consequence is that everything noble is good’. For if courage, as something noble, is desirable, and if it is also an object of love (erastos) (for [5] what’s noble and beautiful (kalon) is so relative to love), and if the desirable is good, then courage is good; and after we have done the same for self-control and proven that self-control is something good, and likewise for the other excellences, we will hold that everything noble is good, as we have said. And since the particular assertion is convertible with itself,⁵⁹⁶ and it’s been proven that everything noble (and the aggregate constructed from the particular assertions) is good, the entire aggregate is also convertible.⁵⁹⁷
[118] In addition to this, he also uses a third syllogism to prove that everything <noble> is good, and the converse:⁵⁹⁸ he has employed a proof that Aristotle found use for in On the Heavens [De Caelo]. That is, after he takes two contradictory terms (and each of their legs is convertible with the other leg), he proves that the terms on the diagonal cannot both be true.⁵⁹⁹ And here are [15] the two contradictory terms [that he uses]: generated, ungenerated; destructible, indestructible. Now, since he has demonstrated that the generated is convertible with the destructible (for everything generated is destructible, and vice versa), and likewise for the other pair (everything ungenerated is indestructible, and everything indestructible ungenerated), it’s impossible for both of the diagonal [20] terms to hold true [of something], e.g., destructible and ungenerated: for if both do hold true, then – since he has proven that everything destructible is generated – there will be something generated and ungenerated, and a contradictory proposition will hold.
[118] This is the [scheme of] proof that Plato has used here, taking the following as his two contradictory [sets of] terms: good, harmful; noble, shameful.
[118] And once he has proven that the good is convertible with the noble and the harmful with the shameful, he shows that it’s impossible for one and the same [25] thing to be both noble and harmful. For if it is, then, since he has proven that the noble is good, one and the same thing will be both good and bad, which is impossible.
[118] That is the content of the survey. [119,1] Now tell me: are you saying that some just things are advantageous, but others are not? What is the object (skopos) of the discussion (praxis)? To show, using three arguments, that the just and advantageous are one and the same: and he does this by the convertibility of the just and the advantageous. And notice that he did not ask [Alcibiades] whether he thought that no just things [5] were advantageous, but instead he posed the more persuasive question, whether he thought that some just thing was advantageous, but another was not. And he introduces that [aforementioned] syllogism, that ‘everything just is noble’, and [Alcibiades] grants this: but he resists the major [premiss], which states ‘and everything noble is advantageous’. What do you mean by that question? The young man wasn’t unsure without [10] cause, but because Socrates named two things, the just and the advatangeous, and then asked whether some of these are noble but others shameful, [Alcibiades] was unsure to which of these [i.e., the just or the advantageous] to refer his answer. Have you ever thought that someone was doing something that was both just and shameful? Notice how he asks him for the minor [premiss], and the young man, since he’s fond of reputation (philotimos), grants that everything just is noble. [15] [What I think, Socrates, is that] some noble [actions] are harmful. Notice how he resists the major premiss, that not everything noble is good, considering wounds suffered in war.⁶⁰⁰ Surely you call a rescue of this sort noble? He could certainly have said the same things about temperance (sophrosûnê),⁶⁰¹ but since this discussion is about warcraft, he mentioned a relevant example. (Consider, the temperance of Hippolytus was noble, but not good, since he died).⁶⁰² Now courage is one thing, but death is something else, right? Here is the first solution, that two [results] follow from two [different kinds of act], not two from one: for courage and death are not the same. [120,1] Now let’s see whether, insofar as it’s noble, it’s also good... Here is the second syllogism, the one which says, ‘Even if we allow that both nobility and the harm of death follow on one and the same act, namely [an act of] courage, it’s still not in the same way [that they follow]; rather, the noble follows from courage insofar as it is courage, while harm follows accidentally, by letting [5] [courage] go free and attacking its underlying subject [sc. the body]’. That is why he says: ‘Consider <whether>,⁶⁰³ insofar as it is noble, it is also good’⁶⁰⁴ (and he uses this phrase ‘insofar as’ (hêi) in cases of convertibility), ‘following our current model of courage. For it was claimed earlier that two results follow on two [different acts], but now [it’s said] that two follow on one: for nobility [10] in and of itself follows courage, but harm follows incidentally. So consider whether this nobility itself is good or bad’. Consider it like this: which would you rather have, good things or bad things? He changes the structure of the argument to midwifery, to avoid overstepping the injunction of the god: ‘the god made me a midwife [of ideas], but prevents me from begetting’ [Tht. 150C]. And he sets the argument out for [15] Alcibiades as follows, saying that ‘courage is desirable; everything desirable is good (because these two wax and wane together; for we have greater desire for the greater good); courage, then, is good’.
[120] And after we have practised the same arguments in the case of the other noble [qualities], since nobility is a collection of excellences – for example, in the [20] case of temperance: ‘for the temperance of Hippolytus is harmful incidentally, since death followed’⁶⁰⁵ – <we will conclude that everything noble is good>.⁶⁰⁶ [Cowardice is] on a par with death... Notice how the young man errs here: for existing in a bad condition is worse than not existing.⁶⁰⁷ [So you called] rescuing your friends in battle [noble]... Here begins the [25] first dialectical proof, to the effect that two [qualities] follow on two [different] acts, that is, nobility from courage and harm from death, through midwifery. [121,1] So we may fairly describe each of these acts as follows: [Here is] the second dialectical argument, to the effect that ‘the noble, insofar as it is noble, is good’. Isn’t it also noble insofar as it’s good? He employs conversion here, because (since the phrase ‘insofar as’ is used in cases of convertibility) [an act] is also noble insofar as it is good. [Then when you say that rescuing one’s friends in battle is] noble, but harmful... At this point he presents the third syllogism, the one that develops from two contradictories, which Aristotle also found useful.⁶⁰⁸ And he explains that that ‘in saying that the noble act is harmful, you are not uttering a contradiction on the face of it, but you are potentially contradicting yourself, since what you’re saying is actually that the harmful is good, given that the noble is convertible with the good, and everything noble is good’.

## Lecture 14

[121] With the god’s favour
[121] Soc. Now then, let’s take a new approach: people who act nobly do things 116B– [[118B]] well, don’t they?
[121] Since Socrates demonstrated that everything noble is good, using the example of courage (since he was explaining how ‘the noble, insofar as it is noble, is desirable; everything desirable is good; therefore, everything noble is good’), and Alcibiades granted that courage is noble, courage is therefore good. And [15] once we have established the same result for the other excellences (since nobility is, in a sense, a collection and flowering of the excellences), we will also conclude that everything noble is good.
[121] Now since he knew (even before Aristotle)⁶⁰⁹ that a demonstration relying on particular terms is weak, he wants to demonstrate this conclusion using a universal argument as well: so he takes universal propositions, and uses these to demonstrate that everything noble is good and the converse. And the syllogism goes like this: ‘The person who performs noble deeds, acts [20] well; the person who acts well has well-being (eudaimonia); the person who has well-being does good deeds; therefore, the person who performs noble deeds performs good deeds, and through this, it follows that the noble is good’.
[122] [122,1] Since Plato has advanced these arguments, people who want to disparage this syllogism enjoy a great deal of license for criticism, asking [1] ‘What differentiates the premisses from each other? That is, what differentiates “performing noble deeds” from “acting well”? [2] Or what differentiates “acting well” from “well-being”?’
[122] [1] Well, we reply to the first question that ‘performing noble deeds (kala)’ [5] and ‘acting well’ are not the same. For ‘well’ is a middle term between the good, and the noble or beautiful (kalon),⁶¹⁰ since ‘well’ is an outflowing and a kind of radiance of the good toward the beautiful (kalon), beginning from the good, and ending with the beautiful. For that reason, the beautiful is also described by the [adverb] ‘well’, for example when we say that those who speak beautifully speak well. But ‘well’ also refers to the good, since we also describe people [10] who are kind to us and wish us good things as ‘well-intentioned’ (eunous) toward us.
[122] ‘Well’ applies to each [of the beautiful and the good] because it is desirable. The beautiful, of course, is desirable because it calls [people] to itself (kaloun eph’ heauto), while the good (agathon) [is so called] because it causes all people to ‘rush with energy’ (agan thein) toward it. That is also why the extraordinary (daimônios) Aristotle conjectured as the first cause, not the [true] first principle (arkhê), but [the second], mind (nous).⁶¹¹ And when he discussed it in the Metaphysics,⁶¹² he described [the applicability of the word] ‘well’ as twofold, [15] applying in one sense to the military leader (stratêgos), and in the other to his army, and ‘wellness’ in the leader causes ‘wellness’ in the army. In this way, ‘well’ became assimilated with beauty, since beauty is akin to Intellect (nous).⁶¹³ For had his argument been made about the good, he would not have used [the word] ‘well’, because the first [i.e., the Good] stands above this.
[122] [2] And as for the second question, this is not the same, for it is one thing to act well and another to achieve well-being (eudaimonein): for the former befits [123,1] self-moved agents (since it is a distinguishing feature of self-movement to live with excellence [kata aretên]), but well-being has reached us from above, if we are beings who have lived in an excellent way; for the radiance that shines from divinity attends those who have made themselves suitable [to receive it], and this radiance is well-being, and this kind of movement deriving from another (heterokinêtos) is greater than self-movement; for being led by divinity is superior to being led by their own selves.⁶¹⁴
[123] Next, he attaches two premisses to what’s been said so far, and thus draws the conclusion that was proposed at the outset – one more general [premiss], and one more specific. The more specific premiss is that the person who performs good deeds, performs advantageous deeds (for the good and advantageous are the same); and the more general [premiss] is that the person who does just things, does noble things (for Alcibiades was already committed [10] to this, that ‘everything is just is noble’); and [Socrates] concludes that ‘surely everything just is also advantageous’.
[123] Next, he converts one of the premisses stated in the middle,⁶¹⁵ by saying that ‘the person who acts well also performs noble deeds’. And he accomplishes this by proving that all of the premisses convert, and on that account, the conclusion [15] also follows. For it had been proposed to prove not only that everything just is advantageous, but also that everything advantageous is just, so that this conversion would follow: ‘The advantageous is good: the good causes well-being: what causes well-being constitutes good action: it is such [good action] to perform noble deeds; to behave thus [sc. nobly] constitutes justice; therefore, the advantageous is just’.
[123] [20] Now after Socrates’ argument has proceeded that way, and after Alcibiades has been released from double ignorance (but he has not yet reached simple ignorance: rather, he is in the borderlands (methorios) between double and simple ignorance), [Alcibiades] grants that he does not know what sorts of statements he is agreeing to, one kind or another. For he says, ‘I have no idea what I’m saying (ho ti legô)... one moment things seem like this to me, and at another moment, they seem different’ [116E]. And this [state] lies between [25] simple ignorance (namely, knowing that one does not know) and double ignorance (namely, firmly supposing that one knows), that is, supposing at one moment that one knows, and at another not holding that supposition (just as opinion is a mean between double ignorance and knowledge. For the person holding an opinion who knows that it is so, but remains ignorant of why it is so, is so to speak ‘in the borderlands’ between those cases [i.e., double ignorance and knowledge] that are diametrically contrary to one another).⁶¹⁶ That is also why the argument was being made [in an earlier lecture, 38,16–18] that the person holding a [true] opinion differs from the knowledgeable person only in respect of the reason why: for he does exactly what the knowledgeable person does, just as the empirical doctor does exactly what the scientific doctor does.⁶¹⁷
[124] Next, since Socrates wants to free Alcibiades completely from double [5] ignorance, he attacks it and condemns it with dramatic flair (ektragôidei), claiming that it is the cause of our going astray (planê), the cause of error, the most shameful and ugly⁶¹⁸ thing of all (aiskhistotatos). That’s because simple ignorance is ‘most shameful’ (aiskhistos), but this [double ignorance] is ‘the most shameful thing of all’ (aiskhistotatos) and ‘the most deserving of reproach’. That’s why it belongs to [double ignorance] to be ‘most deserving of reproach’, since it’s the cause of our wandering astray: this follows from the fact that [1] the person who knows the path doesn’t go astray, nor does [2] the person who, [10] while not knowing [the path], recognises his ignorance (for this person would not even undertake the journey); but [3] it’s the person who is ignorant, while at the same time supposing he knows, [who wanders astray]. And he is the cause of ethical mistakes (hamartêmata) as well: for this [doubly ignorant] person tries to teach others what he doesn’t understand, and [so] instills damaging beliefs in them.
[124] Now, [Socrates] describes [double ignorance] as ‘the most shameful thing of all’, since even simple ignorance counts as ‘shameful’, as it is a form of ignorance. For ignorance produces a shameful effect (aiskhos) in the soul; but shame is one thing, and disease is something else.⁶¹⁹ For shame is observed in reason (logos) alone, but ethical weakness (ponêria), which is a disease of the soul, does not belong only to one of its parts, like reason (for disease does not belong in one part [of the organism], as Hippocrates says: ‘for if a human being were one [whole], he would not suffer pain’);⁶²⁰ rather, it lies in the struggle between the parts of the soul.
[125] [125,1] And this [ignorance] is ‘the most shameful thing of all’ because we are doubly ignorant, and it’s ‘most deserving of reproach’, considering that we do not reproach those who lack [knowledge], but those who have it but fail to use it, or those who use it badly. Likewise, the simple lack of knowledge (amathia) ‘deserves reproach’, since the person who lacks knowledge, despite possessing [5] innate principles of reason (logoi) as part of his nature, fails to put those arguments to use; but it is ‘most deserving of reproach’ when someone possesses [arguments] and puts them to bad use, and this applies in the case of double lack of knowledge.
[125] And it ‘produces the most harm’ (kakourgotatos), since it strives to draw false conclusions and to persuade us of what it doesn’t know. And the person who is in this condition [of double ignorance] has fallen short of Soul (psukhê) and Intellect (nous) and God (theos).⁶²¹ First, due to his double lack of knowledge, he has fallen short of Soul, since understanding (gnôsis) is congenial [10] to the soul; and due to his being in a ‘most shameful’ condition, he has fallen short of Intellect, since he is unable to revert to himself, which is distinctive of mind, and also because the noble or beautiful (kalon) is congenial to Intellect, and thus in becoming ‘most shameful’ he has fallen short of it; and he has fallen short of God in ‘producing the most harm’ and ‘deserving reproach’, since simplicity is congenial to God, and wellness (to eu) also derives from simplicity. (For [the adverb] ‘well’ is a designation of simplicity, which is why we call simple ways [of acting] ‘well-intentioned’ (euêtheis)).
[125] [15] ‘And how will you offer advice, Alcibiades – you who desire a good reputation – though you deserve reproach? And when you desire to be the most beautiful and noble (kallistos), [how will you offer advice] though you are the most shameful and ugly (aiskhistos)? And when you desire to know what’s advantageous and advise it, [how will you offer advice] though you are the most harmful?’ We should understand <that>⁶²² it is by being most deserving of reproach that [Alcibiades] falls short of God, and thereby (hôs) of being blessed; for the word ‘blessed’ was used of a person untouched by the doom of [20] death, which is also why ‘reproachable’ is opposed to ‘blessed’ in the line [from Euripides, Orestes 4]:
[125] That blessed man – and I do not reproach his fortunes...
[125] That is the content of the survey. Now let’s take yet another approach... By using the word ‘yet’, he shows that [126,1] he intends to produce the same [conclusion] again using a different argument. For before, he produced this conclusion in particular terms, but now [he will produce it] in universal terms. People who do what’s noble act well, don’t they? He asserts the first premiss, that those who perform noble⁶²³ deeds act well. Just because⁶²⁴ he makes the [5] just and advantageous identical by using the intermediate term ‘noble’, he does not thereby mean that they are absolutely (antikrus) the same (for the nature of the good is one thing, and that of the noble, something else; after all, the good has transcended the noble or beautiful (kalon) ‘above’,⁶²⁵ and ‘below’ on account of matter, which is shameful, but participates in the good). Rather, [he asserts] that they are convertible in the case of a human being, since they convert in their subject. It’s like when we say that ‘the human being’ differs in no respect from ‘the being who is capable of laughter’:⁶²⁶ that’s not because they are the same thing, but because the subject possesses the property of ‘humanity’ in every case where ‘capable of laughter’ is predicated of it;⁶²⁷ hence, these [two terms] are also convertible in the case of a human being.
[126] And since justice in a human being embraces goodness as well, it’s clear, considering his earlier discussion of courage, that [courage] is good;⁶²⁸ and here he comments that those who perform noble deeds act well, and according [15] to this account, they have well-being and thereby are performing good deeds, and acting, well-being, and acting well are functions of souls. It’s also clear in the passage that he maintains the identity of the noble and good ‘according to this argument, at least’, meaning ‘they are the same with reference to the subject, in that the subject escapes neither’.⁶²⁹
[126] This is also the view of the philosopher Proclus:⁶³⁰ but Damascius interprets [the passage] differently, taking the view that just because the noble, just, and advantageous are the same with respect to their subject, it does not follow that they are the same with respect to their distinguishing character (idiotês), but rather, they are convertible in spite of remaining separate with respect to their own distinguishing character, and it’s insofar as they are convertible that they are called ‘the same’. As he explains, it’s like how the excellences (aretai) are [25] mutually convertible while they separately preserve their own distinguishing character. For consider, the convertibility of the excellences doesn’t cause them to be identical [with one another],⁶³¹ nor does the convertibility of ‘capable of laughter’ and ‘human’, but following conversion each [term’s object] retained its [127,1] proper, distinctive character. Thus the good and the beautiful are also not the same, even if they do convert. And that is why the passage says ‘everything else like this’, meaning ‘things that are identical in their subject, but differ in their unique character (idiotês)’. And people who act well possess well-being (eudaimonia), don’t they? Here is the second premiss: we have noted the puzzles (aporiai) that confront it, as well as their solutions.⁶³² And they get these [good results] because they act well and admirably? [Plato] didn’t combine these terms – ‘acting well’ and ‘acting admirably’ – at random, but because [acting] well is a mean between the [morally] beautiful and the good, and [acting] well flowed from the good to the beautiful, and serves as a bond between them.⁶³³ That’s why [Plato], who knows all of this, [10] uses the words ‘therefore [acting] well is good’, even though the conclusion ought to assert ‘therefore the person who acts well does good deeds’. Surely good conduct is noble? Notice how he converts one premiss here, providing us with an idea (ennoia) of how to convert the others, and also on this account [providing us with an idea] that everything advantageous <is just>: for that is what demanded proof. For consider, he made the conversion [15] by saying, ‘Good conduct is noble’. So we’ve seen once again that they’re the same... He didn’t say ‘once again’ idly, but because this had already been proven by the syllogism based on particular terms, but now has been proven using the universal premiss. So it follows that if we find something noble, we’ll also find that it’s good – according to this argument, at least. Notice how well the interpretation of the philosopher Proclus accords with this passage.⁶³⁴ For he says that [when Socrates claims] ‘everything that we find noble, we’ll also find good’, he means that ‘[these terms] are convertible through their subject’. For no feature of the subject that is good escapes being just. We should be grateful to the philosopher [Proclus] for explaining these things in this way. [25] Well then, are good things advantageous? At this point, he adds the other two premisses: first, the more specific premiss, that ‘good [acts] are advantageous’, and later the more general premiss, that ‘as [Alcibiades] has granted, just [acts] [128,1] are noble’. And on this basis, everything just is advantageous, and vice versa. So, Alcibiades, just things are advantageous... Since he introduced the conclusion [here], it is appropriate that he also mentioned Alcibiades’ name, in order to arouse his attention and show him that he is the one offering these [5] [conclusions], and not Socrates. Well then, aren’t you the one who is making these points? ‘So who gave these answers and offered these [conclusions]? Aren’t you the one who is giving the answers?’ Because, as has often been pointed out, the person who gives the answers is the speaker, not the person who asks the questions. So if someone [who believed that he knew what is just and unjust] were to stand up to advise... If it was any other writer who was saying all this, rather [10] than Socrates, he would certainly have addressed Alcibiades with vulgar language following his refutation (elenkhos), saying ‘Now how in the world do you propose to give advice about what you don’t understand?’ But since Socrates is the speaker, what he says to him is this: ‘Surely, if someone stood up to offer advice about what he did not understand, you would laugh at him as he stood up?’ He has put the person who is being ridiculed in the position of [15] laughing at others. For it is the fruit of Socrates’ company to make the person who laughs at others into an object of ridicule himself.
[128] He uses the phrase ‘even the Peparethians’ because Peparethus was an insignificant island; by [saying] this, he shows that the famous name of Attica will not help to make the person who is ‘doubly ignorant’ about justice knowledgeable on the subject. ‘For [good] advice is given by the person with understanding about each subject’,⁶³⁵ not by the person [who happens to be] an Athenian; so it’s useful to make this point here. I swear by the gods, Socrates, [I have no idea what I mean...] Notice how the [129,1] young man has been liberated from his double ignorance and has come to stand in the intermediate position: for he claims that ‘one moment things seem like this to me, and at another moment, they seem different’. And the timing of his oath is not without significance; in fact, it shows that he is [now] in a speechless state. (Consider, why did he not swear earlier?) That is also why, when Socrates criticises him, he calls him ‘friend’; another reason is that [Alcibiades] climbed [5] up one rung [on the ladder of knowledge]: for he stepped from double ignorance into the intermediate condition between simple and double [ignorance]. If someone asked you whether you had two or three eyes... Here, he wants to show that [Alcibiades]’ ignorance has put him at odds with himself. And he has deployed quite a few examples that are appropriate to this purpose, by saying ‘if someone asked you if you had the ability to ascend to heaven...’ [117B]; and [10] there’s a sense in which this was appropriate to Alcibiades, on account of Pericles, who used to be called ‘Olympian’. Thus the line went about him,
[129] He hurled the lightning, he thundered, he cast Greece into turmoil...⁶³⁶
[129] And it wasn’t thanks to good deeds that [Pericles] gained this respect, but for money, as we learned from the outspoken comedy [Peace]: he started the [15] Peloponnesian War in order to avoid rendering accounts of the money spent on Pheidias’ Athena.⁶³⁷ ‘Again, if someone asked you about navigation, how would you answer? Or about cooking? Yet in these cases you aren’t at odds with yourself, since you know that you are ignorant’.
[129] These examples also are appropriate: the first [of ascending to the [20] heavens], because it shows that it’s necessary for the statesman to be raised above those entrusted to his care; and the next case of the navigator because, just as the navigator exercises foresight on behalf of his ship, [the statesman] must exercise foresight on behalf of those entrusted to his care, even if he is above them; and the third case of cooking, because it’s necessary for the statesman to be gentle (prosênês) to those he advises in making his arguments. For if those he advises failed to be persuaded that their adviser is guiding them [130,1] for their own benefit, they would never be persuaded by him. For it’s through gentleness alone that the Greeks’ adviser [sc. Nestor] was called
[130] one from whose tongue flows speech sweeter than honey.⁶³⁸
[130] Now, [Socrates] does not ask questions that admit of [multiple] possibilities, but questions with an impossible answer. For he didn’t ask ‘whether you have [5] two eyes or one’ – since [either of these answers] would have been possible, and [Alcibiades] could have given different answers at different times; but [he asks] whether he has three eyes, or two or four hands.⁶³⁹ I’m a little worried about myself now... Alcibiades is afraid of answering even such a clear question. And this is [natural] for someone who has been [10] shown the abundance of Socrates’ dialectical power: that is, it’s because he’s already had experience of this that he is afraid. ‘For those of the Argives who have been struck, they understand’, as the saying goes. [Whenever someone doesn’t know something], his soul will necessarily waver about it... At this point, since Alcibiades has been loosely (pakhumerôs)⁶⁴⁰ benefited, Socrates launches an assault on double ignorance and makes all [15] those [aforementioned] points against it a little later. Don’t you realise, then, that the errors in our conduct (hamartêmata en têi praxei) are caused by this kind of ignorance, [thinking that we know when we don’t know?] The phrase ‘through this kind of ignorance’ (dia tautên [131,1] tên agnoian) was well chosen, since our errors of reason arise through ignorance. (And presently we are examining [only] cognitive errors (kata gnôsin), where we speak of double and simple ignorance. But there is also another source of errors, namely, force: that is, errors fall into two categories, [5] arising either by ignorance, or by force). Now at this point he proves that [double ignorance] is a cause of errors as well [as its other risks]. For those who have knowledge do not err, since they succeed in their goal; nor do those in simple ignorance, since they do not make the attempt in the first place. And ignorance (amathia) that deserves reproach... That is, it fell short of the good because it was deserving of reproach. For reproachability is contrary to blessedness, and blessedness is appropriate to the gods, for whom the doom [10] of death does not exist. Well then, can you name anything more important than the just and noble? He says that the just and good and advantageous are of ‘the greatest importance (megista)’, since all people strive to make use of these from birth, working from a common concept;⁶⁴¹ it’s unlike other skills, where certain people possess [one skill] in separation [from another]. For example, certain people – not all – [15] make use of the art of letters (grammatikê), or of philosophy, but all people endeavour to encourage and discourage and praise and blame and denounce and defend [with relation to the just, good, and advantageous], and in short, make use of the three kinds of rhetoric.⁶⁴² And orators do not differ from other people, except in the arrangement or lack of arrangement [of their words]: one says the same thing, whether or not one speaks with competence in the skill [of [20] oratory]. Hence, he says that these ‘greatest’ matters are universal. So this [matter of arrangement of words] belongs to rhetoric alone, just as speaking Greek belongs to all Greeks, but skilfully causing someone [else] to speak Greek belongs to the art of letters alone.

## Lecture 15

[131] With the god’s favour
[131] Oh dear, Alcibiades, what suffering (pathos) you’ve been through...118B–
[131] Consider that there are two parts of the soul, one concerned with cognition, the other with vital functions: the cognitive part is purified by cross-examination, but the vital part is purified by forceful correction (epiplêxis).⁶⁴³ Therefore, after Socrates has purified the cognitive [part] of Alcibiades by proving to him that he suffers from double ignorance, he [purifies] the vital [5] part by explaining – with tragic flair (ektragôidêsai) – all the different kinds of troubles that follow from double ignorance (for he described the cause of his errors (hamartêmata)⁶⁴⁴ as ‘the most shameful thing of all, most deserving of reproach, most harmful’ [117D–118A]). At this point, after laying out the qualities of double ignorance in general, he goes on to mention its individual (idia) consequences to Alcibiades, by saying, ‘Oh dear, Alcibiades [...what suffering you’ve been through!]’ [118B]. Now, this is the [language] of someone [10] who is mourning and bemoaning Alcibiades as if he has perished, making a speech about the departed. This is Pythagorean [behaviour]: for the Pythagoreans used to cast out unsuitable [students] from their company (homakoeion) with their belongings, make a funeral monument (kenotapheion) for them, and mourn them and speak of them as if about the departed.
[132] Also, when he says ‘what’ (hoion), in ‘what suffering you’ve been through’, it’s similar to the tragic verse:⁶⁴⁵
[132] There’s nothing so terrible to describe,⁶⁴⁶
[or suffering, or heaven-sent affliction,
that human nature may not have to bear the burden of it.]
[133] [133,1] Which I hesitate to call by name: As appropriate to suppressing [the name], he raises the tone of his cross-examination, that is: ‘it is undiscovered, beyond fate, unspeakable’. And it’s appropriate, too, that he said ‘I hesitate to call it by name’, since it is unspeakable (aphrastos) and cannot be captured by language (arrhêtos), inasmuch as this has to do with matter (hulê), just as matter itself cannot be captured by language and is without form (aneideos). Granted, the [5] first cause is also beyond language, but that is as beyond form: matter, on the other hand, is beyond language because it is inferior to all form.⁶⁴⁷ Nonetheless, since we two are alone, it must be said: Because public criticism is interpreted as hostility by a person who is in the habit of caring about their reputation. That’s also why a certain Pythagorean, criticised in public by his teacher, could not bear the shame and killed himself.⁶⁴⁸ Hence among philosophers, the habit used to be to offer criticism in private, not in public. You’re wedded to extreme ignorance, my very good man: ‘Wedded’ (sunoikeis) is a good choice of word. Consider, if the reason that civil strife is worse than [international] war⁶⁴⁹ is that the one is waged by people from outside [one [10] another’s borders] and far apart, but the other is waged by people within and nearby (the saying ‘out of all brotherhood, outlawed...’, etc. [Hom. Il. 9.63] is about this), then war between members of the same household is worse than civil strife to the same degree as they are nearer together. And [Socrates] does not only say ‘you’re wedded to ignorance’, but ‘extreme [ignorance]’. The argument (logos) convicts you of it, and so do you yourself: [He means,] you have strong witnesses to this, since the argument convicts you (because it’s been shown that in a context of question and answer, the respondent is the speaker, not the questioner);⁶⁵⁰ and what’s more, you have an invincible witness, yourself. [15] That’s why you’re rushing into politics... That is, ‘Your beliefs are engendering a way of life in you: since you’re doubly ignorant in supposing you know about justice before you’ve learned about it, you are hurrying into public life’.⁶⁵¹ And you’re not the only one who’s suffered this, but most [of our city’s politicians are in the same situation]... Now to Alcibiades, this is a [135,1] consolation, to share his bad condition with many [others]: but this was no consolation to Socrates, since he wanted all people to be good, since he was the protector of humankind.⁶⁵² There are only a few exceptions, among them, perhaps, your guardian [5] Pericles. We inquire why he praises Pericles here, calling him ‘wise’, but runs him down a little later, saying that he is not a statesman (politikos) (just as he also proves in the Gorgias [515C–516D] that [Pericles] is no statesman; this is also how he roused Aristides to produce a speech in opposition, due to the arguments in the Gorgias).⁶⁵³ Now the philosopher Proclus says, ‘He refutes [Pericles] since he is not a man of knowledge (epistêmôn), but accepts him as a man of true belief (orthodoxastikos)’.⁶⁵⁴ But the philosopher Damascius rejects this explanation, arguing that the only difference between a person with true beliefs and a person with knowledge lies in [the latter’s] grasp of the cause, just as the scientific physician is no different from the empirical physician, since they do exactly the same things in practice:⁶⁵⁵ accordingly, if [Pericles] was a man of true belief, he would not have made mistakes (hêmartanen). Hence his own solution of this puzzle is that [Socrates] accepts Pericles as a [15] general (stratêgos), since [a general’s] goal is victory, but rejects him as a statesman, since he did not make his own citizens noble and good (kaloi kai agathoi).
[135] Next, Alcibiades seizes a short pause after his own relative has been commended (so that Socrates does not repeat about Pericles the questions that he asked [Alcibiades]: ‘How did he become wise, by learning or discovery?’), [20] and he preempts [Socrates] by enumerating his teachers. For [Pericles] was [136,1] Anaxagoras’ pupil in philosophy, and Pythocles’ pupil in music. He continues to raise his teachers, saying ‘Even now, entering on ‘the threshold of old age’,⁶⁵⁶ he is studying under the musician Damon’. But [Socrates] replies: ‘And yet this man is no statesman, since he does not have the ability to make his citizens noble [5] and good’. And he was right not to say [‘since he does not] make...’, because we cannot distinguish⁶⁵⁷ who is wise on this basis. For consider: suppose a person were not preoccupied with matters of secondary importance, and suppose that instead he were to occupy himself with purification (katharsis) or contemplation (theôria), when he separates himself from the many (hoi polloi)?⁶⁵⁸ What if he were to live the political life, but his comrades were unsuitable to him?⁶⁵⁹ So instead, Socrates said, ‘If he was wise, he would have been able to make another [10] person wise: yet he made neither you, nor your brother Clinias, nor his own sons wise’. ([Pericles] had them by Aspasia of Miletus, who was also his own teacher—for Pericles was taught by a woman, just as Aristippus was taught by his mother.)⁶⁶⁰ But if you claimed that ‘Nonetheless, he was a statesman, thanks to the tributes that he brought in [for Athens]’, this also wouldn’t imply that he was wise. Consider how he gave power to a city that was feverish,⁶⁶¹ although [137,1] he had the ability to transform his own constitution from democracy to meritocracy (aristokrateia). (For the constitution under him was, as the historian [Thucydides] puts it, ‘in name a democracy, but in fact the domination of one man’ [2.65,9]. And it is suitable that Plato spoke in favour of meritocracy [5] (aristokrateia), but not for kingship (basileia), since Plato regards kingship with suspicion because of the mortality of the person who becomes king. So due to the instability [of kingship] he entrusted his own constitution to many). Yet the law of nature orders that ‘the more you use what’s impure for bodies as their nourishment, the more harm you do’.⁶⁶²
[137] With this, the first part of the dialogue is complete, in which [Socrates] refuted Alcibiades both cognitively and with respect to his vital functions.
[137] [10] That is the content of the survey. Most of our city’s politicians [are in the same situation]: This is why Socrates was condemned to the hemlock, since he castigated the majority (hoi polloi) for attempting to behave justly without any knowledge of [justice].⁶⁶³ For it’s said, Socrates, that he didn’t acquire his wisdom all by himself: [15] Notice how the young man sobers up and shows that Pericles has got teachers, so that the same arguments won’t be used in his case that were used in Alcibiades’ case. That’s also why he says ‘He didn’t become wise all by himself, but [by learning] from teachers’. Notice too how Alcibiades meets the questions with natural talent (euphuôs). [20] Pythoclides and Anaxagoras... [Pericles] was aided by Anaxagoras in governing (to arkhein), for this man was the first to introduce Intellect (nous)⁶⁶⁴ into things (pragmata), a ruler raised above what comes after it,⁶⁶⁵ and not embedded on the same level with them (enkatatetagmenon): thus Pericles too was not comparable to the many in the democracy, and he governed them, as if [5] he was their Intellect (nous). Pythocles is mentioned here not only as a musician, but because he harmonised the citizens [of Athens] using suitable melodies. For just as there are melodies that foster self-control (sôphronika melê) (which is also why Aegisthus could not corrupt Clytaemnestra until he slew the bard on the ‘desolate isle’, whom Agamemnon had left behind as guardian—as the poet [Homer] says),⁶⁶⁶ likewise there are melodies that harmonise the citizens, and Damon helped Pericles with these, using which he harmonised the city. Even now, at his age, he consults with Damon... ‘At his age’, meaning ‘on the threshold of old age’,⁶⁶⁷ he visited Damon for lessons. Plato mentioned this man again in the Republic, since he had help from him in music.⁶⁶⁸ Really? Have you ever seen a wise person [who can’t make others wise...?] At this point, he is running down Pericles and showing that he is not really wise, on the grounds that he does not make others wise. For there are three ways of distinguishing (kharaktêristika) wise people, [1] by those who precede them, [2] by those who keep company with them, and [3] by those who follow them.⁶⁶⁹ [By observing] [1] those who precede [him, sc. the wise person], if he [20] can identify his teachers; [2] those who keep company with him, if he agrees both with himself and with the wise; and [3] those who follow him, if he can [139,1] say that he made [these] others like this [i.e., wise.] Now, Plato mentions each of these in one part of the dialogue or another: first [109D], when he sought to identify teachers of justice; second, [111A–112D] when he was saying, ‘Most people (hoi polloi) do not understand justice, since they disagree about it’; and third, here, [when he investigates] whether Pericles can say that he made others like this. [5] For I suppose this is pretty good evidence: For this is sound evidence of a wise person, if he’s able to make others wise. Well then, can you tell me who Pericles has made wise?⁶⁷⁰ ‘Well now’, says Socrates, ‘did he make his sons wise?’ And he goes on, ‘What should we say about it, if they became stupid and unfitted for learning’? And he asks, ‘Well, [10] did he made your brother Clinias [wise]?’ And he accuses [Clinias] of insanity, and says ‘Why? Wasn’t he able?’ ‘And what about you?’ And [Alcibiades] explains, ‘[No], because I’m lazy’. Now notice, here are three reasons why one might fail to become wise: stupidity, insanity, and laziness.⁶⁷¹ The poetic verse makes a similar point:
[139] Are you such a longstanding fool, stranger, so weak-minded...⁶⁷²
[139] [15] For in the first part [of the line] he pointed to witlessness (anoia), and in the words ‘so weak-minded’, to insanity; and then through the line
[139] Or do you give up of your own free will, and enjoy suffering sorrows?⁶⁷³
[139] he refers to laziness. As for the words ‘and enjoy suffering sorrows’, Euripides talks about this when he says
[139] [20] Long talk and leisure, a pleasant evil (kakon)...⁶⁷⁴
[139] But [can you name] any other Athenian or foreigner... He asks him, ‘What, then? Did he make anyone else wise?’ Suppose you claim that ‘Everyone [140,1] else was unsuitable’: but this is [the view of] Timon the misanthrope, to reject the suitability of all human beings. [I can name] Callias, son of Calliades, [who became wise by associating with Zeno...] By ‘Callias’, he doesn’t mean the man who is described in the comedy, the son of Hipponicus;⁶⁷⁵ this is the son of Calliades.⁶⁷⁶ [5] Each paid [Zeno] a hundred minas each, and became well-spoken (ellogimos): By ‘well-spoken’ (ellogimos) he means ‘noteworthy’ [i.e., well-spoken of], and not what we mean by the word now, ‘eloquent’⁶⁷⁷ – that’s clear, because he called him ‘wise’. But if Zeno was a philosopher, why did he take payment?⁶⁷⁸ Well, we reply that he did this in order to accustom his students to despising money; or in order to provide funds to those in need, by taking them from those with plenty; or so that he might balance out the excess wealth [of [10] some] and maintain equality [among his students] by giving to those who had less. For he pretended to take payment, without actually taking it [for himself]: for this was Zeno, who was good at pretending; this is also why he used to hear himself called ‘double-tongued’,⁶⁷⁹ not because he spoke on both opposing sides of an issue,⁶⁸⁰ but because he was in the habit of pretense. This is also why, [15] when a certain tyrant asked him who was plotting with him against the tyranny, he pointed out his own bodyguards; when [the tyrant] had done away with them, he was easily done away with himself.⁶⁸¹
[140] You can also see from this that Plato was the first [philosophical teacher] to make a point of refusing fees, since he was Zeno’s contemporary, and Zeno did take fees. But why does philosophy alone not demand fees, although other [20] skills do? Perhaps it is because no other skilled craftsmen claim to make their pupils good people, but only to make them skilled – as doctors produce doctors, and the carpenter produces carpenters. But the philosopher claims to make people good, and in so doing, he hopes not to be treated unfairly by them.⁶⁸² Perhaps Plato made a point of refusing fees thanks to his own wealth; that is also why to this day the school’s endowment (diadokhika) is preserved, despite the many confiscations that are taking place.⁶⁸³
[141] So concludes, with the god’s favour, the first section [of the dialogue].⁶⁸⁴

## Beginning of Part 2


## Lecture 16

[142] With the god’s favour
[142] All right, then. What’s your plan for yourself? To remain [in your present 119A– [[120D]] condition, or practice self-cultivation...?]
[142] During the first section [of the dialogue, 106C–119A], Socrates cross-examined [5] and refuted (elenxas) Alcibiades, proving for the cognitive [part of his soul] that he is doubly ignorant, and using tragic flair to explain to the vital [part of his soul] the harmful consequences of double ignorance, describing it as ‘the most shameful thing of all, most deserving of reproach, most harmful’ [117D–118A], the reason we go astray (planê), the cause of errors, and on this basis Alcibiades was enlisted for refutation, and [Socrates] used these [methods] to lay him low. In the second section, he encourages [Alcibiades] [10] after his defeat, and rouses him, saying: ‘Be of good hope, Alcibiades: for you have within you something fit for civic knowledge, something fit for ordering the affairs of the state, namely, your commanding part (hêgemonikon):⁶⁸⁶ so you ought to take serious, careful foresight (pronoia) for yourself by practicing self-cultivation’. And he encourages him in the present section, which is [15] protreptic [119A–124A], in order that in the final section [124A–135D] he can practice midwifery on him and prepare him to declare who the ‘civic person’ really is,⁶⁸⁷ namely, the rational soul when it uses the body as an instrument. For this is the definition of the civic person, but the purificatory and [143,1] contemplative person do not use the body as an instrument, since it begins to present an obstacle to them.⁶⁸⁸
[143] But [Alcibiades], since he is lazy and concerned with his reputation, says that he doesn’t need to take trouble over self-cultivation, since he does not have to deal with generals who are worthy adversaries: ‘For if I was dealing with superior people, perhaps I would be concerned to surpass them, but since [5] in fact I look to inferior people, there’s no reason to fear that I won’t surpass them: for I have the ability to get the better of them by my own nature’. And [he says this] because of both these concerns, namely, to avoid going to trouble over self-cultivation, and, for that reason, appearing incapable of setting the affairs of the state in order.
[143] [10] But Socrates laments bitterly over him, since in the first place he regards his allies in the contest as his adversaries. For he thinks that his rivals are the Athenian generals, who are really his allies – as if a ship’s pilot were to regard the sailors as his rivals instead of allies, rather than joining them in looking to other adversaries, to the chance movement of the winds and storms. For just as we take care to be [15] healthy and prosper, even if no one knows about it, so too we must take care of ourselves, even if we were to have no rivals to contest with. For our excellence is not measured against others, but against ourselves, and excellence is what it is in and of itself, not relative to something else. For this reason, indeed, we must not turn our attention away to others; and also because, even if it is necessary to look [20] to others, we must not look to many [others], but to the minority, and they should not be base and ordinary, but good and serious (spoudaios) people.
[143] He also challenges [Alcibiades] with a counter-factual objection when he says, ‘[That stands] even if you don’t look to [your fellow] citizens as adversaries, but as allies, and instead you look to foreigners as really worthy adversaries – [144,1] for example, the Great King of Persia and the kings of the Lacedaemonians, against whom the city of Athens is locked in continual struggles, as the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars demonstrate;⁶⁸⁹ but it’s the ancestral custom (patrion) of the Athenians to win [these struggles] by wisdom (sophia)’.
[144] But [Alcibiades] refuses to retreat from his laziness or his concern for his [5] reputation, but he says that even these people aren’t important. Hence, whereas Socrates, playing up the stature of [Alcibiades’] enemies, once calls them ‘Great King’, and elsewhere ‘Kings of the Lacedaemonians’, Alcibiades calls them ‘the Lacedaemonian generals’, and instead of the ‘Great King’, just ‘king’. But Socrates, [10] who wants him to get free of this sort of combativeness and lazy character, refutes him with an objection and a counterfactual: by way of objection, he says that [the Persians are] ‘the greatest enemies against whom our city is locked in continual struggles’, and by way of a counterfactual, he says, ‘even if we were to allow that they aren’t worthy of notice, still, we would have to work on the hypothesis that they were, so that we would be thereby motivated to strive for excellence’. Now, [15] Aristotle in his Protrepticus commented that ‘if we must do philosophy, then we must do philosophy; but if we must not do philosophy, then we must do philosophy; no matter what, then, we must do philosophy’.⁶⁹⁰ And Plato says, ‘if the Persian and Lacedaemonian kings are worthy of note, we must attend to 145.1 excellence, so that we might thereby surpass them; but if they aren’t, we must hypothesise that they are, in order that we might strive for excellence; no matter what, then, we must strive for excellence’. And again in the Theaetetus [170E–171C]: ‘if Protagoras is lying, he lies; if he is not lying, he lies; no matter [5] what, then, he is lying’. As you can see, we have many arguments along these lines from the philosophers. You also have here the Platonic doctrine, that whereas Aristotle wants Intellect to be the first principle,⁶⁹¹ Plato wants the Good [to be the first principle], since intellect lacks the capacity to give a share of itself to a lie, but the good gives a share of itself even to a lie, for there is such a thing as a good lie:⁶⁹² likewise here, [we have] the notion of taking something untrue as true for the sake of the good. But lying is not intellectual (noeros), as the good is.
[144] Since there are five methods of purification, these five have been transmitted by Plato in the present dialogue. For it is possible to be purified [as follows]:
[144] [1] By escaping into sacred precincts, or to teachers, or by studying books that [15] one encounters; and he has conveyed this method by saying, ‘But, my blessed friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription, “Know Thyself” ’ [124A].
[144] [2] Second, by forceful correction (epiplêxis), which he conveyed when he used the method of rebuking [Alcibiades], criticising his cognitive [part] for double ignorance, and his vital part and explaining with tragic flair the consequences of double ignorance, how [harmful] they are.
[144] [20] [3] Third is the Pythagorean [method], which is also perilous, since it causes one to take a taste of the passions ‘with the tip of the finger’ – which the doctors employ as well, making use of what is ‘a little worse’:⁶⁹³ and he has conveyed [146,1] this [method] here by saying that ‘You have something in you fitted for ruling the city, your natural leading portion (hêgemonikon), if you find yourself willing to adorn this with education’;⁶⁹⁴ for he exalted his reputation-loving nature this way.
[146] [4] Fourth is the Aristotelian [method], which heals one harm by another (kakôi to kakon iômenos), bringing the battle of the opposites into a harmony; [5] and he has conveyed this here by at one point using an accusation to castigate Alcibiades, and at another time rousing him up to the height with encouragement, causing him to produce the definition of civic knowledge.⁶⁹⁵
[146] [5] Fifth is the most efficacious [method], the Socratic, which uses a procedure of transformation (metabasis) from similarity; and he uses this here, [10] when he says ‘You long for power? Learn what is true power, which cannot be taken away by a tyrant. You long for pleasure? Learn what is true leisure, which is observed even among the gods’.
[146] That is the content of the survey. All right, then. What’s your plan for yourself? Now, the phrase ‘All right’ (eien) belongs to an encouraging person. [And he says] ‘What will you do?’ because [Alcibiades] has been refuted, and is in bad shape both in his cognitive [15] [part], since he suffers from double ignorance, and in his vital [part], since it’s been proven that double ignorance is the cause of so many harmful [consequences].
[146] [Alcibiades] says ‘a common plan’, meaning ‘Let’s make a plan together, for what I ought to do’. The poetic verse runs
[146] There’s need of a plan for me and you, Zeus-nurtured [brother]...⁶⁹⁶
[146] Up to this point, he was escaping double ignorance, and [now] he has [20] arrived at simple [ignorance]. Consider: neither the doubly ignorant person, nor the knowledgeable expert, deliberates. For the skilled craftsman does not make plans qua craftsman: if the carpenter plans, for example, it is not as a carpenter, but as a human being; for planning amounts to a lack of expert knowledge (phronêsis), since one makes plans in cases where one doesn’t already know the answer. In the remainder [of the dialogue], he strips offhis own passions, laziness and love of reputation, and says, ‘all but a few of those [25] who manage the affairs of the city are uneducated’ (he says ‘but a few’ because [147,1] of Pericles), ‘and so my contest is not against great people’. [Anyone who wanted to contest with them] would have to learn and train (mathonta kai askêsanta): ‘Learning’ is said about reason (logos), but ‘training’ about the unreasoning animals, since they are tamed by cultivation and training.⁶⁹⁷ [5] [There’s no need for me] to go to the trouble of learning... [The phrase] ‘To go to the trouble’ (pragmata ekhein) has to do with reason and the non-rational, and basically with our entire essence (ousia). ‘For’, he says, ‘I know that I’ll naturally get the better of them’. And notice how admirably [Socrates] describes both of the young man’s passions. Good grief, my good man, what a thing to say: how unworthy of your fine [10] form (idea)... Again, Socrates grieves over the young man and himself and complains, saying that ‘I’m angry about you, and about my [love]: about you, because you turn out to be so petty (smikroprepês); and about myself, because I love someone so petty’.
[147] But the phrase ‘What a thing to say’ describes what the poet puts indirectly:
[147] [15] What sort of word has escaped your teeth’s barrier?⁶⁹⁸
[147] and
[147] And he tosses out some word which is better left unspoken.⁶⁹⁹
[147] And he adds the phrase ‘unworthy of your fine form (idea)’, meaning ‘appearance’,
[147] But there is no strength in your mind, no courage.⁷⁰⁰
[147] [20] How do you mean? Isn’t my competition with these people? Alcibiades introduces this [line of questioning] interrogatively: ‘Isn’t my competition with the people of the city?’ But [Socrates] replies that ‘If you wanted to pilot a trireme,⁷⁰¹ would you be in competition with your fellow sailors? Or would you keep these as allies and choose to compete against others, against the chance
[147] [25] movement of the winds and waves?’ (Plato chose the trireme, as opposed to an
[147] ordinary ship, as a relevant example, because it is relevant to war). 119EHow worthy of you to be pleased if you’re [better than] the soldiers... That’s
[148] [148,1] because the general shouldn’t contest with the soldiers, striving to be better
[148] than they are, but he should consider them allies, and struggle alongside them
[148] against the enemy.
[148] But you’ve got to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-flicker: This Meidias
[148] [5] was called ‘quail-flicker’ because he reared quails for fighting. At the same time,
[148] [this example] is a dig at Alcibiades, because they say that once, when Alcibiades
[148] was at the podium advising [the people], a quail flew from [his robes].⁷⁰² (But
[148] [Socrates] doesn’t mean by ‘Meidias’ the person who slapped Demosthenes;⁷⁰³
[148] this [Meidias] was born earlier than that one).
[148] And still have the ‘slavish hairstyle’, as the women would say... It’s a saying
[148] of women, both about freed slaves and those who remain in slavery, that ‘you
[148] have the slavish hair on your head’, meaning ‘you’re still wearing a slave’s
[149] [149,1] haircut’. For in the old days, free men and slaves were distinguished by their
[149] names and their hairstyle, since [slaves] were given names like ‘Gete’ and
[149] ‘David’ and ‘Phryx’; but now, these have been confused.⁷⁰⁴ But [Socrates],
[150] [150,1] instead of saying ‘on the head’, says that ‘you have the slavish hairstyle in your
[150] soul, thanks to your lack of culture (amousia)’.⁷⁰⁵
[150] And make every preparation... In other words, we must take care even of the
[150] [5] instruments, the spear and shield, that clash with our enemy:
[150] Let a man put a good edge to his spear, and his shield in order;⁷⁰⁶
[150] —and not be careless of them, so that we ‘start pottery on a wine-jar’⁷⁰⁷ and get
[150] a thorough lesson in our enemy’s expertise (epistêmê). This is also how the
[150] Athenians, out of carelessness, used to engage their enemy with luck instead of
[150] preparation, whereas the Lacedaemonians used to succeed by serious discipline
[150] [10] (spoudêi... kai askêsei).
[150] [But still I don’t think] the Lacedaemonian generals [or the Persian King
[150] are any different]... Notice how he calls them ‘generals’ instead of ‘kings’, and
[150] instead of ‘the great king’, says ‘the Persian king’. Do you think you would cultivate yourself more [if you feared them and thought them formidable...] Notice how he uses a counterfactual here, to the [15] effect that even if they are actually unworthy of notice, all the same we should consider them [worthy], in order that we will cultivate ourselves.

## Lecture 17

[150] With the god’s favour
[150] Is it likely that natural talents will be greater among noble families, or not?120D–
[150] [20] Following Socrates’ guidance, Alcibiades should have regarded his competitors as worthy of consideration, even if they were not really so, in order that he might take great care to strive for excellence. But since he is lazy, even though [151,1] they actually are worthy, nevertheless he does not regard them as such, in order to avoid the effort of caring for himself. That’s why Socrates also establishes that the Lacedaemonians and Persians are superior to Alcibiades. And he proves this from four arguments: [1] from lineage (and he includes homeland in lineage, for ‘one’s race is also one’s homeland’, as Porphyry puts it);⁷⁰⁸ [2] from birth; [3] from upbringing; and [4] from education (and this is divided into two, preparatory education (propaideia) and education proper (paideia)).
[151] [1] [He argues] from lineage that ‘They derive [their lineage] from Zeus, but you [derive yours] from human beings’: for Perseus was the son of Zeus and Danaë, and Achaemenes was the son of Perseus and Andromeda (the one in heaven),⁷⁰⁹ which is also why the Persian [kings] are called ‘Achaemenids’. But Alcibiades claims that he himself is also descended from Zeus, for he was [10] originally a descendent of Ajax. And Socrates wittily declares that he too is descended from Zeus, since he was a descendent of Daedalus, and Daedalus traced his line to Hephaestus, the son of Zeus. Now, he claimed that he was Daedalus’ descendent because Daedalus was the first one to separate the feet of statues, which had them together, producing a representation of walking and [15] self-movement (autokinêtos); and Socrates was the first to make humans self-moving, since he did not allow them to come to knowledge by instruction, but [152,1] by midwifery and discovery, and in this way he made them self-moving.
[152] And he says that ‘Even if we are descended from Zeus like [the Persians] are, the lineage is not the same in both these cases: for we watered down our lineage over the intervening generations and we did not maintain its purity, but that’s [5] not their situation; instead, they have guarded this [line] unadulterated in the transmission of their lineage, because they are kings’. And next, he also establishes that they are superior in their homeland, as in their lineage: he says that ‘You are not originally Athenian, Alcibiades, if you trace your lineage from Ajax; for Ajax was from Aegina, and Ajax was [descended] from Telamon of [10] Salamis, and it’s from this man that Eurysaces was born’; and [he adds] that ‘It’s unclear whether you might not really be sprung from Zeus, but illegitimate, since the Athenian women are unguarded’; but the Lacedaemonian women were guarded, as the shameless comedy showed in the line:
[152] It’s a Spartan key, not to be carried about.⁷¹⁰
[153] [153,1] The Lacedaemonians guarded them because they received an oracle that they would have ill fortune if they put forward a king ‘lame in lineage’,⁷¹¹ that is, one who did not belong to the line of the sons of Heracles. Therefore, when Leotychidas had become king of the Lacedaemonians, because he was a product of adultery they later experienced [the Oracle’s prediction]:’ for [5] Alcibiades, when he joined the Spartans, slept with this man’s mother, the wife of Agis, and that was how he was born.⁷¹² But among the Persians, they did not consider it worthwhile to set a guard [on the Queen], since they felt that the terror of consequent punishments was a sufficient guard.
[153] [2] So much for [the argument] from lineage (genos); but the argument from birth (genesis) is that among the Persians, from the very beginning, the person who is going to be king grants all his subjects a full display of his own [10] right to rule (basileia). That’s because it was their custom for the eldest to rule; naturally, then, the Persians and all Asia sacrifice to him and pour libations as soon [as he is born], honouring him as a god (since before Alexander, all Asia was ruled by the Persians). But when Alcibiades was born, not even his neighbours were aware of it.
[153] [3] Next is [the argument] from upbringing (trophê), that ‘Among those [15] people [sc. the Persians], as soon as the king was born, the eunuchs with the best reputation began to care for him, and they mould his body parts with an eye to beauty, even making his nose aquiline, showing that the boy is fit for [154,1] leadership and kingship’. (For this is also why the eagle has an aquiline [beak], because it is kingly; and it was due to Cyrus that they began to cultivate the development of this aquilinity, since he was exceptionally kingly and civilised). ‘But when you were born, [Alcibiades], you were taken care of by a Thracian slave, who took no care for your beauty;⁷¹³ for you have nothing more than your nature as your gift’.
[154] [4] And [the argument] from education (paideia) is that ‘Those people [5] receive both preparatory education (propaideia) and education [proper] (paideia). For after reaching their seventh year, they are taught to hunt not [merely] fish and fowl, but four-legged animals; and at the age of fourteen, they identify four tutors for these [boys], one of whom teaches wisdom, another justice, another courage, and another self-control.⁷¹⁴ (Xenophon relates this in his treatment of Persian education).⁷¹⁵ ‘But you studied none of these subjects, except letters, cithara-playing, and wrestling, since Pericles assigned you [155,1] Zopyrus as a tutor, who was physically maimed and rendered useless by old age; and if he weren’t that sort of person, even he wouldn’t be appointed to you and available to you.
[155] But what kinds of excellence (aretê) were the Persians educated in?⁷¹⁶ We assert that it was not the natural forms of excellence (phusikai), since these are not produced by teaching; and they were certainly not [educated in] the civic [forms of excellence] (politikai), since [if they were, Xenophon] would not have said that [5] different men taught different subjects, but one man alone would have been sufficient to teach them all, since they are mutually convertible [i.e., the possession of one implies the possession of the others];⁷¹⁷ rather, it was the habituated (êthikai) [forms of excellence], for these are taught and are not mutually convertible.⁷¹⁸
[155] But how could Plato be telling the truth when he says here that [the Persians] were educated in wisdom, but later⁷¹⁹ he says to Alcibiades that ‘You have to [10] cultivate yourself, for it’s your city’s ancestral custom (patrion) to win by wisdom (sophia)?’ So if they were educated in wisdom, why does he make a special point of saying this about the Athenians? It’s because the statement (logos) can be true at one time and false at another. For it’s nothing strange if [the Athenians] had such a constitution in the distant past, but by the time of Socrates they had declined from this level, and it is no challenge to criticise this constitution [the democracy contemporary with Socrates]. For that reason, the [15] [argument] from lineage was also untrue [by that time]: for Darius, who became king of [the Persians] thanks to a horse’s neigh, was no Achaemenid;⁷²⁰ so it is the ancient [Persian] constitution that [Socrates] describes. Alternatively, we might say that perhaps Darius was an Achaemenid, if not as a grandson, still by an indirect line; that is, even if he was not, as the poet says,
[155] [20] [Their own] son, and grandson of Zeus who gathers the clouds;⁷²¹
[155] – but still a daughter’s son, or related in some other way, since there would perhaps have been no argument over the kingship, if he were not descended from Zeus.
[155] That is the content of the survey. Is it likely that natural talents will be greater [among noble families]? He asks him, ‘Do you think that those who are descended from noble (gennaios) [156,1] ancestors are superior, and would you call wellborn (eugenês) people ‘noble’, rather than strong people?’ For in virtually every case, those from wellborn families are better; which is also why we read in the poet,
[156] Putting mares under them without Laomedon’s knowledge.⁷²²
[156] For everyone is convinced that people from wellborn families are themselves wellborn. Let’s compare our situation with theirs: He did not choose to juxtapose the [5] Athenian and Persian constitutions, but [to juxtapose] their constitution with Alcibiades. [That’s because] as a lover (erôtikos), he acts in a manner that draws the young man in (oikeiopoieitai): for the lover does not want to ascend alone, but along with his beloved. The line of Heracles and Achaemenes [go right back to Perseus, son of Zeus]: [10] For Perseus was born of Zeus and Danaë; and Achaemenes from Perseus and Andromeda, and Alcaeus and Electryon were born from other women; and from Alcaeus and Amphitryon, Electryon and Alcmene; and from Amphitryon and Alcmene, Heracles. Hence Heracles is sprung from Zeus on either side, for he clearly possessed much of Zeus’ character and vitality from both his father’s side and his mother’s side; at any rate, the story goes that in a single night he made [15] love to fifty women, and and every one of them had a child by him.
[156] Now the philosopher Proclus⁷²³ here raises the puzzle why, when [Socrates] could prove that the Lacedaemonians also trace their lineage to Zeus by way of Heracles, he does not do this, but he presents them as deriving from Perseus [instead]. And he resolves [the puzzle] himself, saying that [Plato] probably honoured [Perseus] before [Heracles] because he was winged:⁷²⁴ for both men were born to purify [the world] of evils, and especially Heracles; hence Pisander describes him as ‘an utterly just destroyer’,⁷²⁵ since he performed a great many slaughters for purification. But Perseus was also such a person, and he also had [5] [the advantage of] being winged, as the comedy showed, and the Gorgon and the sickle.⁷²⁶ [Every one of them is a king all the way back to Zeus]—kings of Argos and Sparta: He uses these words to describe the Peloponnese, because this [land] was long ago divided into five parts: the lands of the Argolid, Messene, Arcadia, Elis, and Laconia.⁷²⁷ Their wives are guarded at public expense: To protect the line of the Heraclids [10] for kingship, the ephors used to guard the wives of the kings. And among them, there were three penalties concerned with marriage: for remaining unwed, for late marriage, and for a bad marriage. And they used to say that a bad marriage was one struck for the sake of money.⁷²⁸ [When the eldest son and heir to the throne is born], all [the king’s subjects] have a feast day: Here [Socrates] proves his argument from birth: for from the [15] very start, the newborn [king] grants a full display to all his subjects. That’s why all of them immediately conduct a sacrifice, then honour the king’s birthday each and every year, because the Persians honour what is heavenly, and most of all in the heavens the Sun; and this is also why they celebrate the king’s birthday every year, because the Sun is the symbol of the year. For [the year] is called [20] ‘annual’ (eniautos) because it generates the Sun in itself (en heautôi poiôn). Even the neighbours [hardly notice], as the comic poet says: This is a citation 121D from Plato the comic poet.⁷²⁹ When they reach seven years of age [the boys take up horseback riding with their instructors, and begin to hunt wild game]: For at seven years of age, their cultivation changed: this is because seven is respected as a critical moment (krisimos), and because a seven-month-old [embryo] is considered viable (zôsimos),⁷³⁰ and because hepta [‘seven’] is said like septa [‘august’, ‘revered’].⁷³¹ [159,1] That is also why the Romans call number septem, from the number 7, which is held in very high esteem,⁷³² [and as] the whole (holon), as in the verse ‘Teucer, dear head’ [Iliad 8.281].⁷³³ Who they call ‘royal tutors’: Unless they were comparing these men to Zopyrus, a cheap tutor, since they would have called them ‘teachers’ for training [the boys] in habituated kinds of excellence (êthikai aretai).⁷³⁴ Considered the best: Meaning, ‘Those who, at each age, have proven themselves in their actions’; for he calls these ‘those considered the best’. The wisest, the most just, [the most self-controlled, and the most courageous...] He ranks wisdom (sophia) first, since it belongs to the more [10] valuable part of us, our reason (logos); justice (dikaiosunê) comes immediately afterward, since it interpenetrates our entire being (ousia).⁷³⁵ And he says that the man who teaches wisdom ‘teaches him the Magi’s art’, but to prevent anyone imagining that by ‘the Magi’s art’ (mageia) he means spells (manganeia) and sorcery (goêteia), he adds ‘which is the cultivation (therapeia) of the gods’.⁷³⁶ For the Persians honoured (as we have said)⁷³⁷ what is in the heavens, whom [Socrates] calls ‘gods’ (theoi) because [heaven] ‘always runs’ (aei thein).⁷³⁸ For [15] he does not mean the ‘sorcery’ that Demosthenes ascribes to Aeschines’ mother: for this man was a mendicant priest of Cybele (mêtragurtês).⁷³⁹ They also teach what a king should know: If kingship is teachable, then it is [properly] not assigned by lot, but according to expertise (epistêmê), and we should not accept kingship that’s assigned by lot. [20] [The justest] teaches him to tell the truth through his whole life: For justice is observed not only in our actions, but also in our words. And the just person portions out what each deserves: therefore, when he portions [160,1] out what is deserved in speech, he will speak the truth; for he does not portion out lies. [The most self-controlled teaches him] not to be ruled by even a single pleasure: For it is a strange business if a person who has defeated the enemy is then conquered by their spoils, if that happens to be women in their prime. It is when we are not under [another’s] control that we are truly free, fearing [5] nothing, since the word ‘slave’ (doulos) is derived from ‘fear’ (deos); for the slave as such is ‘afraid (dedien) completely (holos)’ of his master, since he always has him in mind. [Zopyrus, a tutor] so old he was perfectly useless: [He was] not only perfectly useless because of his old age, but also because he was maimed – ‘someone who [Pericles] would never have assigned to you as your tutor if he were not in this kind of a useless condition’. (As a matter of fact, this is also what children’s tutors are like in the present day).⁷⁴⁰ I could tell you about all the rest of [the upbringing and education] of your competitors... [This is the rhetorical] figure of omission (paraleipsis), which enlarges both the speech and the speaker, and hints silently at something greater. Hence he says, ‘I could have told you other things too, if I didn’t think this was [already] enough’. [Your birth, upbringing and education... is of no concern to anybody], [15] except perhaps someone who happens to be in love with you: He ought to have told him, ‘No one is paying attention to your cultivation (epimeleia)’; but because philosophers are fond of generalisation, he says that ‘No one is paying attention to you, unless it’s someone happens to be in love with you’.

## Lecture 18

[160] With the god’s favour
[160] And again, if you care to consider the wealth of the Persians...122B–
[160] Socrates has compared Alcibiades with the Persian King and proven him [161,1] inferior to that man [i.e., the King], arguing from four distinct [bases]: [1] from homeland or lineage, [2] from birth, which he called ‘birthday celebrations’ (genethlia), [3] from upbringing (trophê), and [4] from education (paideia) (and he subdivided education into ‘preparatory education’ and ‘education proper’). Since [in that passage] he did not also compare him with the Lacedaemonian kings and employ the same four arguments to show that he is [5] also inferior to the Lacedaemonians, he now compares the young man with the lifestyle (diaita) and wealth common to both [Persians and Lacedaemonians].
[161] Now [Socrates] is generally disgusted (duskherainei) with the criteria of comparison that he uses here for Alcibiades (for if the human being is the soul, we should not make comparisons on these criteria),⁷⁴¹ and he is even more disgusted with the use of wealth as a criterion of comparison, since this [10] especially lies outside of us [ourselves]. For lifestyle (diaita) concerns the body, but wealth concerns what derives from outside [the body]; hence in the case of lifestyle he uses the words ‘if you wish’ [122C4] but in the case of wealth, ‘we can’t leave this unspoken’ [122D2].
[161] He also says, ‘Alcibiades, even if you rejoice in your luxurious lifestyle’ (for Alcibiades was that kind of person, as witness the writers who composed books of many lines about his luxury, just like the cookbooks passed down even today),⁷⁴² ‘still the Persian table exceeds your lifestyle, since it is even more luxurious than the Sybaritic table;⁷⁴³ while if the Lacedaemonians make no use of luxury, you’re still outdone by their frugal lifestyle’. From this passage, [the commentators] raise the [20] puzzle (aporia) why Socrates contrasts Alcibiades with the Persians in luxury; for by doing so, he makes [Alcibiades] all the more competitive with them, and prone to emulate them in this [sort of thing]. Now, we resolve the puzzle as follows, by explaining that ‘nevertheless, he does not compare [Alcibiades] to the Persians in their soft living alone, but also to the Lacedaemonians, who employ a frugal lifestyle’; moreover, he constructs his argument on the basis of what appears good [25] to Alcibiades, and luxury does seem good to him.
[161] ‘But you’re also inferior to the Lacedaemonians in wealth’. Consider that wealth is threefold: [1] self-moving (autokinêtos), [2] moved by another (heterokinêtos), or [3] not moving at all (akinêtos):⁷⁴⁴ in every one of these cases the young man is worsted by the wealth of the Lacedaemonians. [1] In the case of unmoved [wealth], it’s because after [the Lacedaemonians] took Messene,⁷⁴⁵ [162,1] they marked it offto serve as an abundant resource for their needs; Tyrtaeus the poet said about it,
[162] Messene, good to sow in, good to plant in;⁷⁴⁶
[162] – for the land was fertile.
[162] [2] Moreover, they used to vaunt themselves for their wealth in self-moving [resources], since they enslaved the entire people of the Helots; and [their [5] wealth] was also visibly self-moving, since they were horse-masters, as witness the saying ‘into horse-pasturing Argos’.⁷⁴⁷
[162] [3] They also used to outdo others in wealth that is moved by others (heterokinêtos), since it is reported about them that they demanded two parts of their subjects’ income, and that their veins are said to be ‘of silver and gold’, and there’s the saying ‘Mycenae rich with gold’;⁷⁴⁸ and the report of them also [10] runs that the gold entering their possession never left. Hence he also uses a story to describe this kind of [one-way] tribute: the story goes that once upon a time, a lion who had grown old pretended that he was ill, and the other animals came in [to his den] to visit him, and he captured them, ate them, and so brought them to ruin. But the fox, who was clever, refused to enter, but [15] instead he stood at the entrance; and when [the lion] pressed him to come in, he said that he would certainly not, since he observed footsteps of the [animals] going in to the [lion], but no footsteps going back out – that is, he saw footsteps going inward from the entrance, but none going back out to the entrance.⁷⁴⁹ [163,1] So it is the same in the case of the Lacedaemonians: [Plato] says that the money goes in, but even to this day, nothing ever goes out. And he compares them to the lion who has grown old, since they live according to a meritocracy (aristokrateia), which is appropriate to the lion, but they weakened it, so that they were at risk of declining from a meritocracy into oligarchy.⁷⁵⁰
[163] [5] But if the Lacedaemonians outdo Alcibiades in wealth, the Persian kings outshine Alcibiades far more by this [criterion], too. For the story about them runs that entire cities – stretching out as long as a day’s journey – are allocated (aphorizein) for each and every ornament of their women, so that each ornament comes from [that city’s] tribute. That’s also how the cities [10] came to have names derived from these [ornaments]: for where else would [a city] get the name ‘Queen’s Girdle’ or ‘Veil’, other than this? And this is not implausible, if you also consider that when Themistocles changed sides⁷⁵¹ the king allocated three cities to supply his needs – for he asked to spend a year among [the Persians], until he could master Persian customs, and thus to [15] discuss in person his betrayal of Greece – since as the historian [Thucydides] relates, [the king] handed over Magnesia and Myus and Lampsacus to him.⁷⁵²
[163] Now once again [the commentators] raise the puzzle why Socrates plainly discourages Alcibiades from becoming this sort of person,⁷⁵³ even as he compares him to the Persians, and exalts Persian customs. Well, it’s not that he vaunts their customs; rather, he dismisses them as women, since [women] are lovers of money, having this character thanks to their lower birth – for they are naturally weaker and tend to be fond of money.⁷⁵⁴ And since the [5] Persians are like this (effeminate in their character), that’s why they also wear trailing robes and use adornments. And they’re not the only ones like this, but the Indians also have this kind of affection.
[164] Nor does [Socrates] vaunt the Lacedaemonians and express amazement at them, but on the contrary, he reproaches them with the words of the oracle, which runs:
[164] [10] Love of money will undo Sparta, and naught else;⁷⁵⁵
[164] And it’s for this reason that Lycurgus mandated that their currency be bronze,⁷⁵⁶ and that they steep it in vinegar, so that it would degrade swiftly and would not remain among them for long. It’s also said that Pherecydes, the teacher of Pythagoras, whose book on theology is preserved, experienced a dream after [15] he arrived among the Lacedaemonians, and told the Lacedaemonian kings not to place value on money; and on the same night, it’s said that [the dream] appeared to the other king, [advising him] to trust Pherecydes; and as soon as Pherecydes woke up and spoke to the king, it’s said that their constitution changed course, when it was once again on the verge of declining into oligarchy.⁷⁵⁷
[165] [165,1] After Socrates has criticised (elenxas) Alcibiades along these lines, with a long and drawn-out speech (because someone who presents history is obliged to use drawn-out speeches, since the discussion is about particular cases (merikôn), whereas in [discussions about the] universal, discourse by question and answer is appropriate, because discussion through questioning is [5] appropriate to beings that are bodiless and partless, whereas drawn-out discussion befits bodies which have parts and are extended in space: that is also why orators use drawn-out speech, since they are concerned with particular cases) – after criticising him for the first part [of the dialogue] as ignorant of himself, at this point he begins the third part by saying, ‘No, my [10] excellent friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription, and “Know Thyself” ’ [124A]. In these words, with the god’s favour, the second part [of the dialogue] and the present survey are complete. Again, if you care to consider the wealth [of the Persians]: Notice how disgusted Socrates is when he compares Alcibiades to the kings of the Persians [15] in terms of lifestyle (diaitan); this is also why he uses the words, ‘If you care to’. And he will appear even more disgusted later, when he compares him [to them] on the [criterion] of wealth, because [wealth] is even [more] outside of us; this is also why, still disgusted, he says ‘we can’t leave this unspoken’ [122D2]. Note, too, how Socrates chooses the right moment to speak like an orator and use a mocking tone, setting everything out in plurals instead of singular forms, using the words ‘wealths’ and ‘luxuries’.⁷⁵⁸ And he speaks about ‘trailing robes’ (using two words) because the Persians wear tunics that stretch to their feet, which is also why they’re called ‘robe-trailers’ (helkesipeploi); as do the Indians, like the Ionians too. The throng of servants-in-waiting: Notice as well how he introduces [166,1] plural forms to elevate [the Persians], even though the train [of servants] is singular. Again, if you care to consider the self-control and decorum [of the Lacedaemonians]: After the comparison with the Persians, [Socrates] turns and contrasts him with the Laconians. Now we should investigate why he [5] claims that the Laconian women are self-controlled (sôphrôn), supposing the comic saying is true that
[166] It’s a Laconian key, not to be carried around,⁷⁵⁹
[166] and
[166] Not every man’s voyage leads to Corinth.⁷⁶⁰
[166] – For Lais came from [Corinth], while Helen was Laconian.⁷⁶¹
[166] Well, he says that the Laconian women are self-controlled because they are obedient to their masters. For this is also what the poet [Homer] means when he says of the Trojans, ‘The Trojans [came on] with clamour’, etc. [Il. 3.2], whereas he says of the Greeks, ‘[They marched] silently, in fear of their commanders’ [Il. 4.431]. And this is appropriate to self-control, that the inferior [15] obey the superior; for when [self-control] develops in the remotest portion of the soul,⁷⁶² it causes [the soul] to obey reason. And their love of hardship, love of victory, and love of honour: For the Laconians were also fond of hardship (philoponoi), which is why from childhood they were whipped, habituating them for hard work; for they [20] received whippings from four years of age. But they also used to enjoy [167,1] practicing gymnastics at the Eurytus, as Euripides says, with men and women exercising together. And the word ‘love of victory’ (philonikia) should be written with [the letter] ‘i’,⁷⁶³ since they used to rejoice in victory. And notice how he finished with love of honour (philotimia), since they lived under that kind of constitution, namely, under a timocracy. For they have so much land of their own, and in Messene [that not one [of [5] our estates] could compete with in size or excellence...]: Notice that he begins by comparing wealth; and he makes the comparison first on the basis of wealth moved by another (heterokinêtos). The Peloponnese was divided into five parts, of which one was Messene. Also, the language should be interpreted in reverse: ‘For they have so much land, both in size and excellence, of their [10] own and in Messene, that not one [of our estates] could compete with’. For many generations, [gold and silver] have been pouring in to them from all over Greece: Note how it’s also possible to show from these words that Plato really reproaches [the Lacedaemonians], since it’s a sign of envy only to take and never to give. In fact, he represents their wealth as enmeshed in matter [15] (enhulos); for this – only to take and never to give – is suitable to matter, which is also why Plato in the Timaeus [51A–B] assigns no other name to [matter] but ‘receptive’ (metalêptikos). So how could he approve of them, when he joins the Pythia and Pherecydes and Lycurgus in reproaching them? And in the rest [of the lemma], he adds the parable of the Fox [and the Lion], gracefully [20] and suitably presented. For Platonic grace always flourishes, and never grows old. [You can clearly see the tracks] of the money going into Lacedaemon: He changed the name of the lion into ‘money’; for he likened [money] to a wild beast.⁷⁶⁴ I once heard a reliable man: [The commentators] explain that he is talking about Xenophon: for this man related his inquiry into Persian [life] in the Anabasis,⁷⁶⁵ after joining Cyrus in his expedition against his brother Artaxerxes.⁷⁶⁶ [He crossed] ‘the Queen’s Girdle’: There’s nothing implausible (atopos) about cities being allocated for each and every ornament worn by the queens of Persia, since among us, too, purple is called ‘Tyrian’, [Tyre] being the [5] source of purple dye, because it’s allocated especially for the Emperor’s purple toga.⁷⁶⁷
[168] Notice, too, how he used this kind of talk to dismiss them as women: for [women] love wealth because of their low birth and natural weakness. That’s also why the Persians have a feminine look, since they enjoy wearing that kind of jewellery.⁷⁶⁸ But if our soldiers wear adornments, in doing so they turn their [10] character (êthos) into something foreign (barbaron). Now if someone were to say to [Amestris], the king’s mother [and the wife of Xerxes]: He builds his speech up from the prior generation to the contemporary to the posterior, speaking of the king’s mother, wife, and daughter. And he remarks, ‘If someone were to tell [her] that Alcibiades wishes to enter competition with her son, how in the world could you compete with [15] him with confidence? For there’s no other way you should attempt to do this, except by cultivation [of yourself] developing from wisdom (sophia); for it’s the ancestral way of the Athenians to achieve victory by wisdom’. (So when he commented earlier that the four later [teachers] educate the Persian kings,⁷⁶⁹ and one teaches courage, another wisdom, we shouldn’t understand [these to be] excellences in the strict sense).⁷⁷⁰ ‘So shouldn’t we be ashamed, Alcibiades’, [20] he goes on, ‘if we are worsted by our enemies, and not only by them, but also by their wives? And not only at that, but also because they grasp the means for [169,1] our salvation, while we’re ignorant of it!’ The son of Dinomache: This is emphatic; for where he had previously elevated his speech by basing it on prior, contemporary, and posterior generations, now he says, ‘The son of Dinomache’.⁷⁷¹ This ‘Alcibiades’ [... hardly twenty years old]: This is also emphatic, namely in the phrase ‘who has not yet turned <twenty>,⁷⁷² which ranks [Alcibiades] in the third place:
[169] For that man is best who has insight into all things himself;
next, excellent is he who pays heed to a good adviser.⁷⁷³
[169] [10] But Alcibiades has been cast down into the third rank, since he does not even pay heed to someone else.
[169] Secondly, entirely uneducated: Meaning, ‘Doubly ignorant, knowing nothing
[169] of himself and his affairs’.
[169] [When his lover tells him] to learn and cultivate and train himself: [The word]
[169] ‘learning’ referred to reason, but ‘training’ (askêsis) to the non-rational soul. For
[169] [15] learning is categorically distinguished from training, since of course the non-
[169] rational [parts of the soul] are educated through training; but ‘cultivation’
[169] (epimeleia) is common to both [the rational and non-rational soul].
[169] And I think that Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides: He adds another
[169] constitution, that of the Lacedaeomnians, and again he elevates his speech by
[169] basing it on prior, contemporary, and posterior generations.
[169] And yet, [don’t you think] it’s shameful that our enemies’ wives [have a
[169] [20] better appreciation than we do of what it would take to challenge them]?
[169] He makes the remark that we already mentioned, namely, that it is shameful to
[169] be worsted by one’s enemies, and not only by them, but even by their wives;
[169] and what’s most shameful of all, that they should know how we can be helped,
[169] while we have no idea.
[169] So concludes, with the god’s favour, the second section [of the dialogue].⁷⁷⁴

## Beginning of Part 3


## Lecture 19

[170] With the god’s favour
[170] 124A–
[170] No, my blessed friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription and ‘Know D
[170] Thyself’.
[170] [5] Now the first and second part of the refutations of Alcibiades initiated a shared
[170] project:⁷⁷⁶ for in the first part, [Socrates] demonstrated that [Alcibiades] was
[170] ignorant of himself with respect to his soul, and in the second part, [that he
[170] was ignorant of himself] with respect to his body and external factors:⁷⁷⁷ first
[170] with respect to soul, because he thinks he has knowledge without actually
[170] having it, so that he is doubly ignorant; or as a beginning doctor might initially
[170] consider himself a philosopher, to whom Alexander wrote,⁷⁷⁸
[170] Be still, poor wretch, among your bandages (en splêniois)!
You don’t actually see what you think you see.
[171] [171,1] — or with respect to body, as if some Thersites were to think that he was a man in his prime;⁷⁷⁹ or with respect to externals, as if some utterly destitute person thought himself wealthy when he wasn’t.
[171] With these comments [24A–D], then, he introduces the third part [of the dialogue] and he comes to the two refutations that he laid out in the [first] two [5] parts [and says]: ‘No, my blessed friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription and “Know Thyself” ’ [124?]. And he calls [Alcibiades] ‘blessed’ (makarion) because he is about to link him to the gods; and in this context, [the word] ‘blessedness’ (makariotês) is used for the negation of ‘fatedness’ (kêr), since [the prefix] ma– indicates negation. And he positions himself before the god because he is the proximate cause of Alcibiades’ salvation. [10] By using the phrase ‘Know Thyself’ (gnôthi seauton), he reveals the content of [the god’s] command (prostattomenon), since he used the [words of the] instruction to reveal what [the god] commanded: [1] he used the word ‘know’ (gnôthi) [to show] that we are not a body (sôma) (for [a body] does not have knowledge), nor a combination [of body and soul] (for this does not have knowledge either, insofar as it is a combination, since it certainly doesn’t have knowledge as a body), but [instead] we are a soul (psukhê), and not a vegetative soul (for that has no knowledge);⁷⁸⁰ and [2] he used the word ‘thyself’ (seauton) since [we are] also not non-rational (alogos) (for the non-rational [soul] does not revert upon itself), but [rather] rational, and not always completely rational, but sometimes even ignorant. That’s also the reason why he added the [imperative] command ‘know’ (gnôthi): for no one commands the agent to act, but now [sc. in Alcibiades’ condition of ignorance], he commands him to know himself.
[171] [20] ‘For you’re in urgent need of cultivation’, he says, ‘and you’re not the only one, but I am too. For all human beings – more than other animals – stand in need of [172,1] cultivation, and you and I especially so, most of all’. Now let us investigate why he maintains these three positions: that is, [1] why is Socrates ignorant of himself? [2] Why is the human being alone in need of cultivation, more than other animals? And [3] why does the third point also hold, that Socrates and Alcibiades especially stand in need of cultivation, more so than other human beings?
[172] [1] Well then, the answer to the first question is that ‘self-knowledge’ is said in many ways (pollakhôs):⁷⁸¹ it is possible to know oneself with respect to one’s external [possessions]; and of course it is possible to know oneself with respect to one’s body; and it is possible to know oneself as a civic or social person (politikôs), when one knows oneself in the tripartition of one’s soul;⁷⁸² and it is possible to know oneself as a purificatory person (kathartikôs), when one knows oneself in the act of liberation from the affections (pathê); and it is possible to know oneself as a contemplative person (theôrêtikôs), when a person contemplates himself as liberated (heauton... theasêtai); it is [10] possible to know oneself theologically (theologikôs), when a person knows himself according to his paradigmatic Form (idea); and it is possible to know oneself as an inspired person (enthousiastikôs), when a person knows himself as a unity (kata to hen) and, thus bonded to his proper god (oikeios theos), acts with inspiration (enthousiâi).⁷⁸³ Now Socrates did not know himself as an inspired person, which is also why in the Phaedrus he says, ‘it is ridiculous to look into other things, while remaining ignorant of myself’ [229E–230A].
[172] [2] As for the second question, [the commentators] say that the human [15] being stands in need of cultivation more than other animals, not only with respect to his body (since nature made it naked, after providing hair all over for other animals, and horns for some, and hooves), and again not only with respect to externals (since we are the only animal to need shelter from houses), but also with respect to reason (logos), since the troubles that [20] human beings face are extremely harsh, more so than other animals, which is why we have resourceful reason within [us], like some Odysseus toiling to the limit for his appetite, and elaborating his sufferings (pathê).⁷⁸⁴ That is also why it was said,
[172] The earth breeds nothing feebler than a human being.⁷⁸⁵
[173] [173,1] For this reason, then, [Socrates] says that the human being is more in need of cultivation [than any other animal].
[173] [3] As for the third [question], why Alcibiades and Socrates [stand in need of cultivation] more than other people: first, Alcibiades [does], because great natures become causes of great harm (kaka) when they go without cultivation, just as when they happen to be cultivated, they are the causes of great goods. As a matter [5] of fact, this is analogous to the case of rich land that produces good fruit when it is cultivated and farmed, but when it’s uncultivated, naturally produces thistles (for it knows only how to generate its produce, without distinguishing whether it is thorny or otherwise); that is just the situation with talented natures (dexiai phuseis). And wherever Alcibiades inclined from or to, he made a change (tropê). [10] For instance, when he joined the Laconians, he slept with the king’s wife, mother, and daughter; and when he came to Athens, he advised his guardian Pericles to consider how he might avoid rendering an account to the Athenians of the money spent on the Athena of Pheidias.⁷⁸⁶ That’s also why that man [sc. Pericles] used to say to the people who came to examine the expenditures that ‘it was spent [15] on necessities (to deon)’. And the comedy about him says ‘I was ruined (apôlesa) on necessities’, instead of ‘I spent (anêlôsa)’.⁷⁸⁷ And that was the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.⁷⁸⁸ For these reasons, Alcibiades stood in need of a great deal of cultivation.
[173] But Socrates was also [in need of cultivation and that was] because of the loftiness of his love of wisdom (philosophia).⁷⁸⁹ Alternatively, since he’s a lover he wants to be in the same state as his beloved, so he says that he is with him in [20] standing in need of much cultivation.
[173] That is the survey. Trust in me and in the Delphic inscription: He allies himself with the god: [174,1] and he has many grounds for doing so. Thus in the Phaedrus [sic; Phaedo 85B]⁷⁹⁰ he calls himself ‘a fellow-slave of the swans’; so too in the present dialogue he allied himself with Apollo, criticising the Lacedaemonians for their love of money (for the oracle was given about them:
[174] [5] Love of money will destroy Sparta, and naught else).⁷⁹¹
[174] So in the Theaetetus [151D], [he says] ‘no god is unkind to humanity, nor do I do this out of unkindness, but it’s altogether wrong for me to allow falsehood or hide the truth’. These people are our competitors: ‘For the Persians and Laconians are our [10] competitors and adversaries, “but not the ones you thought”’ (for those [Athenians] turned out to be allies); ‘and we can’t overcome them in any way except by wisdom and cultivation’. And note how he says that he, too, is ignorant of himself [cf. 124B–C]. [15] [Winning fame] in Greece and among foreigners, which is what I think you want: [Here is] Socratic therapy, to say ‘If you aim to become famous, learn what civic knowledge (politikê epistêmê) is; for that alone has the capacity to make you famous’. For Socratic healing develops from the application of likes to likes, in the manner of doctors who apply similar medicines [175,1] (pharmaka) to the humours, and in that way empty out the excessive, harmful humour.⁷⁹² Can you interpret this for me? For [your words] seem very much like [the truth]. The boy answered with natural talent: for he calls [Socrates] an ‘interpreter’ (exêgêtês), because Apollo was honoured by the Athenians as an interpreter, since through the interpretation of his oracles he became a cause of salvation for the Greeks.⁷⁹³ So [Alcibiades] called [Socrates] an ‘interpreter’ when he allied himself with the god. Yes – but let’s take counsel together: Notice how Socrates also acts [as if he is] ignorant (agnoei), and this is also the reason why he takes counsel together [with Alcibiades]. For he takes counsel with his beloved in ignorance, even though he is a knowledgeable person (epistêmôn) with the capacity to understand [what he claims not to know]. But it’s because he is a lover that he acts ignorant in company with his beloved.⁷⁹⁴ For when I speak about the need of being educated, I’m not referring only to you: ‘For it’s something we have in common’, he says, ‘me and you, being ignorant of ourselves and therefore standing in need of education; but we have just one difference, that your guardian is Pericles, but mine is a god’, which is one and whole.⁷⁹⁵ The same goes for other passages: ‘For I know nothing but one thing, and one thing only: how to offer and grasp arguments (logoi)’,⁷⁹⁶ that is, dialectic, which is the whole, granted that philosophy has knowledge of all things.
[175] What? Did Alcibiades not have a guardian who was divine? Yet it is said in the Phaedo [107D] that after death the daimon leads the person to the judges, [20] [the daimon] who had been allotted to him in life. But [Alcibiades does not have such a daimon] with awareness of it (sun aisthêseôs), as Socrates does. [I say] that [there’s no other way you will come to be] manifest...: He used the same word, ‘manifestation’ (epiphaneia), both for the god and for Alcibiades; because in its proper sense ‘manifestation’ is said of a god.⁷⁹⁷ For Alcibiades <cared for his reputation>,⁷⁹⁸ and the reputation-lover is fond of being [25] manifest. Notice, also, how [Socrates] boasts at the right moment (en kairôi), as [176,1] he claims ‘your manifestation will come about through me. You’re being playful (paizeis), Socrates. –Maybe... [Alcibaides] says that he is ‘being playful’ because he said ‘I’m in need of cultivation too’. But [Socrates] replies, ‘perhaps I’m playing’; for activity about matters of secondary importance is a game (paignion). That’s also the reason for the [verse]:⁷⁹⁹
[176] [5] But among the blessed immortals, unquenchable laughter went up
as they saw Hephaestus bustling about the palace.
[176] For the poets have described the overseer of the bodily world (sômatikon pan) as lame in both legs; this is what they mean by the epithet ‘twin-lamed’ (amphiguêeis). All people [need cultivation], but especially we two, most of all: Consider [10] the difference between Socrates’ words and those of Homer’s Achilles. For the latter says to Patroclus, rousing him up to fight:⁸⁰⁰
[176] [If only] not one of the Trojans could escape death, not one of them,
nor any of the Argives, but you and I could escape destruction.
[176] For he says, ‘let everyone else perish, but let us be saved’, whereas Socrates, [15] as the guardian of human nature, says that all human beings stand in need of a great deal of cultivation. There must be no giving up, nor slacking off: ‘There must be no giving up’, with a view to the argument (logos), for we must not have the argument enfeebled with its sinews cut; ‘nor slacking off’, with a view to appetite (epithumia), for we must not let our appetite slacken, but keep it taut, straining [20] for the aim of benefit (ôphelia).

## Lecture 20

[177] With the god’s favour
[177] 124D–Now tell me: we say that we want to be as good as possible, don’t we?
[177] Now since⁸⁰¹ the target (skopos) of the dialogue is knowledge of ourselves
[177] (gnônai heautous)⁸⁰² – not as our body, nor as external things (for it’s been
[177] entitled ‘Alcibiades, Or Concerning the Nature of the Human Being’), but as the
[177] [5] soul (psukhê), and not as the vegetative soul, nor as the non-rational [soul],
[177] but as the rational [soul]; and [since it’s] certainly not about knowing ourselves
[177] as [the rational soul] when it acts to purify itself, or in its contemplative
[177] or theological or theurgic [aspects],⁸⁰³ but as a civic person (politikôs) (for
[177] Alcibiades wouldn’t be willing to work for what he seeks, if he didn’t have some
[177] [10] incentive for it, whereas certainly in this [passage] he is disgusted at how lazy
[177] he has been in the search; for [Alcibiades] is – as the text [118B] says – ‘rushing
[177] into politics’, and thanks to this he has some willy-nilly desire for what he
[177] seeks); and what comes next also agrees with this interpretation of the
[177] [dialogue’s] target (for in the next part, [Socrates] defines the human being as
[177] [15] a ‘rational soul using the body as an instrument’ [129E–130C]: and only the
[177] civic person is like this; for the purificatory person does not use [the body] as
[177] an instrument, if instruments contribute to the goal of the wielder; rather, the
[177] body becomes more of an impediment to the purificatory person, and Aristotle
[177] put it well when we said, ‘it is difficult even to imagine what sort of [bodily]
[177] part mind (nous) will hold together, or how’);⁸⁰⁴ and for the purpose of this
[177] dialogue, some points had to be taken up that are comparable to the next
[177] dialogue in sequence, the Gorgias, which treats the civic forms of virtue
[177] individually⁸⁰⁵ – [for all these reasons], it was therefore necessary to explain
[177] who the person with civic [excellence], or statesman (politikos), is:⁸⁰⁶ on
[178] [178,1] account of this, he states here the causes of civic knowledge, [including] [1] the
[178] material [cause], [2] the formal [cause], [3] the efficient [cause], and [4] the
[178] final [cause].⁸⁰⁷
[178] [1] The material cause (hulikon) is not concerned with [paradigmatic
[178] Forms] to be grasped by contemplation, but with practical materials (prakta):
[178] and not just with some of these (for certain materials underlie the work of the
[178] [5] carpenter, like wood; and ship-building has some too, like the ships), but with all [practical materials]. For just as each skill has knowledge of one thing, but is ignorant of many [others], while the philosopher knows all beings, so too whereas each of the other skills has a single underlying [matter] and deliberates carefully about it, the civic [skill] (politikê [tekhnê]) takes all beings as its practical materials (prakta), with a view to improving them. For it would be out of place for [the civic skill] to have only one underlying material, considering that the statesman (politikos) imitates the Demiurge⁸⁰⁸ and deliberates about how to imitate him in his productive activity, and therefore he too wants to set [all things] in better order. And in doing this, the civic [skill] is unwilling to do any injustice to the skills that have descended from it, by putting their functions to its own use, for on the contrary it wishes to preserve them, by offering advice about whether and when they ought to be [15] employed. In fact, it’s like this when Homer’s Achilles encourages [the Achaeans] to consult a prophet,⁸⁰⁹ but he has not done the prophet’s work [himself], or offered a prophecy.
[178] [2] Now the form (eidos) of political knowledge is rulership (arkhein); and it’s not the rulership of non-rational [animals], ‘caring by blows’,⁸¹⁰ but of human beings; and it’s not of human beings simply, since the doctor also rules human beings in distress; nor of human beings when they reap (for that’s the [20] work of farming); nor of sailors (for that’s the pilot’s work); nor of singers (for that’s the chorus-teacher’s work); but of human beings ‘as they deal with (khrômenôn) human beings’ [125C]. But since the pilot also rules people who are boatswains (it’s people who look after the ship’s tackle who are called [179,1] ‘boatswains’), who rule the people who row, and the chorus-teacher rules the flute-players who lead the singers, therefore [Socrates] adds that the statesman rules human beings, those who are in positions of leadership, and who join together in contractual agreements.
[179] [5] [3] And the efficient cause (poiêtikon aition) is not wisdom (sophia), but practical wisdom (phronêsis), which is concerned with practical matters (prakta).
[179] [4] And the statesman’s final [cause, or goal] is producing agreement and affection in the state (polis), either between [different] understandings (gnôseis), in which case he produces agreement (homonoia) (for agreement is nothing but commonality of understandings and shared belief (homodoxia)), or between ways of life, in which case he produces affection (storgê) (for <affection>⁸¹¹ is natural love (philia)). Now these two are not identical, since there is such a thing as affection without agreement, as for instance a husband and wife [might] love one another without agreeing [on specific subjects] (for they are not in agreement in their domains of expertise: the woman, for example, is not in agreement with her husband on matters of war or expertise in armed combat, while the man [is not in agreement] with his wife in knowledge of wool-spinning);⁸¹² and conversely, there is agreement without affection, since potters agree [with one another], out of their concern for the same objects of knowledge, and they have the same thoughts (ta auta noousi) [about their area of expertise] (for this is called ‘agreement’ (homonoia)), yet they do not have affection for one another, whence the saying
[179] [20] One potter begrudges another; likewise for the carpenter.⁸¹³
[180] [180,1] Now how might the statesman produce agreement and affection in the state? He could produce affection, if he causes the citizens to be disposed to one another like a state comprised of a single family, so that they measure their [5] kinship by age, regarding all the aged as fathers, those who are much smaller as children, their contemporaries as brothers, so that instead of his⁸¹⁴ saying ‘age-mate delights age-mate’, we should say ‘citizen delights citizen’. And if everyone were to enjoy the same experiences of sight and sound, agreement follows. For agreement was [found to be] a shared understanding (koinônia gnôseôn); and those who have achieved this would [also] have a shared vision and hearing, since the senses are kinds of understanding.
[180] [10] And that is the survey. Tell me: we say that we want to become as good as possible? That is, ‘We want to become as good as possible, so for this reason it’s necessary that we learn what the statesman knows’. And at this point [Socrates] began the prelude to his work (prooimion tês praxeôs), by describing the material of the statesman’s knowledge. Clearly, in what good men do: Since Alcibiades is young, he didn’t answer well [15] when he said ‘it’s necessary to have that excellence which “good men have” ’. For [181,1] he ought to have described the [specific] kind of excellence required, whether it is concerned with objects of contemplation (theôrêmata), or with actions (prakta). Hence Socrates asks him ‘Good at what?’ For the text (lexis) doesn’t proceed exactly like the conceptual survey (theôria), providing [the account of] the material of the statesman in good order, but [it proceeds] by question [5] and answer, because Socrates doesn’t want to describe the material himself, but in concert with Alcibiades, as a midwife (hôs maieutikos); for if he wanted to express it himself, he would present the survey (theôria). Taking care of practical matters (pragmata), obviously: Notice how up to this point, Alcibiades was benefited on one rung [of the argument]: for he took the argument as a single, undivided whole maintaining that practical [matters] [10] serve as material for statesmen. That’s why again [Socrates] asked him ‘What kind of practical [matters]? To do with horses?’ And he says ‘No’; for when we want to learn about these things, we study under equestrians. ‘For [good] advice about a subject comes from the person who understands it, not from the wealthy person’.⁸¹⁵ What the noble and good citizens (kaloi k’agathoi) of Athens [concern themselves with]: Alcibiades was benefited in this respect alone, that he [15] converts the noble and good (antistrephei kalon kai agathon). As for the rest, [Socrates] asks him, ‘Apparently, insofar as someone has knowledge, he is not wise? For example, surely the shoecutter who is wise in making shoes will also be good [at shoemaking], but he’ll be unwise at something else, like weaving; and [thus] the same person will be both good and bad!’ And there’s nothing out of place about this in the case of the shoemaker, but it is out of place in the [20] case of the statesman who wishes to produce a benefit for every practical concern (prakta), because he is putting on the persona (hupoduetai) of the Demiurge. What? Are you saying that good men are also bad? Notice how he grants in the conclusion that all practical matters (prakta) serve [as material] for the statesman; for he says that good people are by no means bad [at statecraft], but [25] this is exactly the case for experts in particular crafts (tekhnitai), that they are both good and bad. So which ones do you sayarethe good men? At this point, he begins to [182,1] explain the form (eidos) of the statesman, namely, rulership (to arkhein). And again, by using appropriate questions, he moves from [abstract] universals (katholou) to the real form (tôi onti).⁸¹⁶ For he uses suitable questions to compel
[182] [Alcibiades] to grant that [it is] the rule of people as they deal with [other]
[182] people in lawful, customary contracts. And we might experience wonder at the
[182] [5] midwifery of Socrates, how he uses such a plethora of examples to broaden the
[182] soul’s narrow passage, and induce it to give birth to truth.
[182] When they’re doing nothing? That is, ‘unoccupied’. And he replies, ‘no’.
[182] When they do business with each other: Notice again how the youth was
[182] [10] benefited in [recognising that the statesman] rules over people as they manage
[182] and ‘do business’ with each other, that is, as they rule others.
[182] [I mean ruling over people] who take part in citizenship and do business
[182] with each other. Notice the final answer, that [the form of statesmanship] is to
[182] rule over people as they deal with each other in lawful, customary contracts
[182] (kata nomon sumbolaiois).
[182] [15] Well, what skill is this? At this point he begins [to discuss] the efficient cause,
[182] that it is practical wisdom (phronêsis), not wisdom (sophia).⁸¹⁷
[182] [I call it] good advice (euboulia), Socrates. Instead of [naming] a state, the
[182] youth moved to an activity. [But that was a mistake], for he ought to have
[182] named practical wisdom, but he named good advice [instead]; and having said
[182] that, he named it simply, [but that was a mistake], for he ought to have said
[182] which kind of good advice. And we should note that above, too, he moved to
[182] [20] participants intsead of the state participated, which he could not see, like
[182] someone who was unable to see small letters and so turned to look at large
[182] letters.⁸¹⁸ 126AAnd when the city is better managed, what is present [or absent]? Perhaps
[183] [183,1] [he means to refer to a time] when affection is present and division of opinion
[183] absent (which he subsequently calls ‘civil strife’ (stasis), that is, war with one’s
[183] own people). The poetic verse about this was well stated:⁸¹⁹
[183] Out of all brotherhood, outlawed, homeless is that man,
 [5] who longs for the horror of fighting among his own people.
[183] [What is present in our eyes when they’re better cared for?... Sight is
[183] present and] blindness is absent: What, then? Is it possible for blindness to
[183] become absent thanks to human ingenuity? For that belongs to divine radiance. [The explanation is] that it’s possible to use the name ‘blindness’ for the condition that is caused by cataracts.⁸²⁰ When mutual friendship is present: Socrates has used many examples to [10] explain to the young man what the statesman’s final cause [or purpose] is, and at this point, Alcibiades gives birth to this [answer], saying that it is ‘to produce friendship among his citizens’. And once he has articulated this in its basic form (haplôs), in the next [section] Socrates makes him discriminate and declare its fulfilment (teleion).

## Lecture 21

[183] With the god’s favour
[183] When you say ‘friendship’ (philia), do you mean agreement or disagreement?126C–
[183] [15] Since Alcibiades was describing friendship as the goal of the statesman’s knowledge, Socrates challenges him – not because he himself disagrees that friendship is the goal, but because he suspected that Alcibiades did not distinguish between affection (storgê) and friendship (philia). And he [20] shows that agreement is friendship both directly, and by an argument from impossibility [i.e., reduction to absurdity]. His direct [argument] runs as follows: ‘If disagreement is enmity, agreement will be friendship; therefore, not only is affection (storgê) friendship, but so is agreement’. And his argument [184,1] from impossibility runs as follows: ‘If a husband and wife do not agree, and if we were claiming that agreement is to know the same things, but these people <do not>⁸²¹ know the same things ([which they don’t], since [the husband] supposes that he need know nothing of wool-spinning, and [the wife] thinks that she need know nothing about mastering horses); but those who do not enjoy the same objects of knowledge are not friends to one another; therefore, [5] a husband and wife are not friends to one another’. (And it’s clear that they are not in agreement with respect to their immediate goal, inasmuch as one happens to understand horsemanship, the other wool-spinning, whereas they are in agreement with respect to their more final goal, for the [husband] goes to war to protect his wife – because [men fight] ‘for their children and for their wives’⁸²² – but she weaves wool to protect the man, so that he may not be [10] destroyed by the onslaught of the climate).
[184] Next, having extracted [the premiss] from [Alcibiades] that those who do not enjoy the same objects of knowledge are not friends to one another, he proves [from this] that just people are not able to organise (oikein) their cities well. He also takes a premiss proven in the second figure:⁸²³ ‘Those who do their own work and don’t meddle in others’ business are not friends to one another; those who organise their city well (eu) are friends to one another (for [15] that was the purpose of the statesman’s knowledge, [namely], friendship and unity); therefore, those who do their own work are not friends to one another’. Once he has obtained this conclusion, he proceeds to reason, having added on another premiss from outside [the argument, as follows]: ‘The just do their own work: those who do their own work do not organise their cities well; [20] therefore, the just do not organise their cities well’.
[184] But Alcibiades ought to have considered that [the word] ‘friendship’ (philia) is said in many ways. For there is friendship in respect to the One (hen), which is also called ‘union’ (henôsis), and this arises in [episodes of] inspiration (enthousiasmois) [that derive] from the One and [unite us] with what is better (pros to kreitton). And there is friendship in respect to mind (nous), which is called ‘agreement’ (homonoia). And there is [friendship] in respect to thought (dianoia), which is called ‘thinking alike’ (homophrosunê); that’s also [the meaning of] the phrase ‘in my sharp-witted thoughts’ (en phresi peukalimêisi).⁸²⁴ And [there is] friendship in respect to opinion, which is called ‘[holding] the same opinion’ (homodoxia). And there is [friendship] in respect to habits of character (êthesin), which [is called] ‘shared feeling’ (homoiopatheia); that’s also the [meaning of the phrase] ‘comrade delights comrade’, by shared feeling, for children delight each other and so do youths and the elderly, by enjoying [185,1] [having] the same feelings and experiences (pathê). And there is another [form of] friendship, which belongs to descent (kata ta genê), which is called ‘kinship’.
[185] That is the content of the survey. When you say ‘friendship’, do you mean agreement? etc.: That is to say, ‘Do you call it “agreement” because [it involves] enjoying the same objects of [5] knowledge? For example, do you call it “agreeing” about numbers when [people] have the same [numbers] in mind, due to the [skill of] arithmetic? And surely you call it “agreeing” about sizes [when it comes about] thanks to the [skill of] measurement, and likewise in the case of weights and the [skill of] weighing (statikê)’?
[185] Now up to this point, you can derive from [the passage] that Plato countenances three species of quantity,⁸²⁵ [namely], the discontinuous, continuous, and weight (rhopê) (since [in the text] he discussed and [10] distinguished the art of weighing from the others). And in the case of arithmetic, he began from a multitude and arrived at one, when he said ‘cities agree with one another about numbers thanks to arithmetic’, then ‘private citizens’ do, and ‘each person with himself’ [126C]. But in the case of geometrical measurement, he did the reverse, beginning from the one and arriving at the many, when he said, ‘What about size? [Isn’t it geometry] that makes a person agree with [15] himself, and private citizens with one another, and cities’? That’s because the multitude is appropriate to arithmetic, since [that skill] has to do with numbers, but the one (to hen) [is appropriate] to geometry, since [that skill] has to do with continuity (to sunekhes), whereas the former has to do with discontinuous quantity. In the case of weighing, on the other hand, he didn’t use any of this language, neither starting from the one and arriving at the many, nor [starting] [20] from the many and arriving at the one, since this is a different case than those [of arithmetic and geometry]. For it’s clear that weight is different from continuous [quantity], since they are affected in a manner contrary to one [186,1] another: for [there can be] a small weight in a great size, and vice versa.
[186] And Homer thought nothing of ungrammatical expression (soloikismos), so that he points the way to the undisciplined motion of a horse by assimilating his words to their subject and saying:
[186] [5] As when some stalled horse who has been corn-fed at the manger
lightly him the knees do carry...⁸²⁶
[186] But Plato, by contrast, [verbally] imitates his subject (pragmata) without error in his language.⁸²⁷ What is [this agreement you’re describing], and what is it about, and what skill secures it? It’s worthwhile to investigate why Socrates asks many questions [10] [at once]. For he asks what this agreement is, and where it resides, and what is its efficient cause, and whether the statesman (politikos) is identical with the person of good character (êthikos) and the household manager (oikonomikos). For these reasons, and since he himself is aware that he asked a lot of questions, he says ‘Don’t flag in your answers’ (mê kamês apokrinomenos); and the words ‘don’t flag’ came out at the right moment, since there were so many questions. Yet [Socrates] himself, in the Gorgias, censured Polus for asking a lot of [15] questions. Well, to begin with, let us get to know (mathômen) what the questions are, before [we explain] the solution [to this puzzle]. [1] ‘What is this agreement?’ [The answer] is that it is shared understanding (koinônia gnôseôs). [2] ‘Where does it occur?’ [The answer] is that it occurs among objects of knowledge that are teachable (en tois didaktois gnôstois), and not among actions. [3] ‘What is the skill that produces it?’ [The answer is] statecraft (politikê): for this uses teaching to make [people] enjoy the same objects of knowledge (for just as it comes naturally to fathers to have affection for their [20] children, agreement [develops] like this). [4] And ‘are statecraft (politikon), good individual character (êthikon), and household management (oikonomikon) the same, or not?’ [The answer is that] they are the same: for just as large letters don’t differ from small letters in form (eidos) (since [making them] bigger or smaller produces no alteration of form),⁸²⁸ so too practical actions (pragmata) don’t differ because of their scale; [another answer] is that in the preceding parts [114B–D], we have [learned] that the person who is persuasive to one individual is also persuasive to many, and it belongs to the [25] same person who persuades many to persuade one; [and another explanation] is that just as there’s no difference between the doctor who cures one person, [187,1] the doctor who cures many, and the doctor who cures everyone (for it makes no difference for their capacity [to cure] (hexeis) where there is more or less of their subject), likewise there is no difference between the statesman, the household manager, and the person of good character.
[187] It remains to explain why he asked many questions [at one time]. Perhaps [5] it’s because he brings the many to one, and his questions have continuity. For he first asked ‘What is it?’ then ‘In what does it occur?’ then ‘What skill produces it?’ and then ‘Is there a difference between the statesman, moral person, and household manager?’ – and in a sense these are all [one question]. But you should offer another solution (lusis), as well: one should not ask multiple questions [at once] in [strict] dialectical questioning, where there’s no place for [extended] speech (logos), but it’s sufficient to nod or shake your head and [10] say ‘yes’ or ‘no’; and that’s because if we do ask many questions it [becomes] unclear which sort of question [the interlocutor] answered. In interrogative questioning, on the other hand, it’s not impossible to do this, since [the respondent] may also use [extended] speech to distinguish which sort of question he is answering. Thus the poet, too, asked many questions [at once] in an interrogative context:
[187] [15] What man are you and where do you hail from? Where are your city and
parents?⁸²⁹
[187] Since he was able to use [extended] speech in his answer. And is [that skill] the same in a state and in a private individual?⁸³⁰ He poses the fourth question, whether the household manager, statesman, and person of good character are one and the same. For by saying ‘Is it the same in a state’, he pointed to the statesman; but by saying ‘an individual with himself’, he pointed [20] to the person of good character; and by saying ‘and with another’, to the household manager. And Alcibiades replies, ‘Most likely’. Now how did Alcibiades come to understand such a substantial position, that these are identical with one another? Well, the present dialogue helped him, thanks to the argument that ran, ‘The person who is persuasive to one is also persuasive to many’ [cf. 114B–D]. IthinkI mean the sort of friendship and agreement [you find when a mother and father agree with a son they love...] Note that due to these [188,1] [words], Socrates needed to present the refutation stating that the goal of the statesman’s knowledge is not friendship, since Alcibiades is clearly claiming that friendship and affection are identical (for he says, ‘I say that a father “agrees” with his children, and siblings with siblings’). [5] Well, Alcibiades, do you think that a husband is able to agree with his wife [about wool-working...] At this point he begins to cross-examine [Alcibiades] and deliver his proof from impossibility, proving that friendship is agreement. And the skill of carding wool (xantikê) is either called ‘wool-working’ (talasiourgia) from the working of wool (ta lasia ergazesthai), or from the baskets (talaroi); and if mules also have the name of ‘labourers’ (talaergoi), thanks to their willingness to work and struggle (talaipôrein) at their tasks, [that name] was taken⁸³¹ from wool-working (talasiourgia). And women also have this kind of disposition – being willing to work – whereas men do not: that’s why the line about them runs:
[188] He goes outside and puts a stop to his heart’s frustration;⁸³²
[188] For this is a woman’s area of learning: Now if men and women have common areas of excellence (aretê),⁸³³ why does he say ‘for this is a woman’s area of learning’? The answer is, [that’s true] under this [present] kind of constitution.⁸³⁴ Could she agree [with her husband about military tactics] without having [189,1] learned about it? The words ‘without having learned’ are appropriate, since the Amazons were warlike [women].⁸³⁵ Perhaps you would say [that’s for a man to know about]: The language ‘perhaps’ and ‘you would say’ is appropriate [i.e., because Socrates himself would reject these claims]. For the excellences of men are shared in common [with women], since their natures are shared. The male parts, when pushed inward, become female; and conversely the female parts, pushed outward, [become male]; and if the female dog shows no difference from the male in regard to guardianship, nonetheless they are both guardians by disposition. If their natures are common, then, why are their knowledge and excellences not also common? And one should no longer call learning ‘female’ or ‘male’, but ‘human’, for ‘human’ is common [to both genders]. Nor is there friendship: ‘If they do not agree’, he says, ‘they are no friends to one another, considering that friendship was agreement’. Nor are the cities well governed [when the different groups each do their own work]: At this point, he wants to prove that [on Alcibiades’ false assumptions] just people do not organise their cities well. And he adds on the [190,1] premiss and works out the rest of his argument, that ‘when friendship is present among those who do their own work, wherever it arises we say that those states are organised well’, constructing the argument as follows: ‘Those who do their own work are not friends to one another; those who organise the state well are [5] friends to one another, which is why this is the goal of statecraft (politikê); therefore, those who do their own work do not organise their states well’. But it seems to me that [friendship arises between them] on just that account – [that they do their own work]: Alcibiades argues against Socrates that ‘Actually they do organise their states well, for this very reason, that they do their own work’; and Socrates replies, ‘this is what you were maintaining before’. [When everyone does his own work], are they acting justly or unjustly? [10] Here he begins to present the argument that the just do their own work. No, by the gods, Socrates, I don’t even know myself what I mean: Notice how Alcibiades has clearly been benefitted: in fact, he has arrived from double ignorance to simple [ignorance], since he [now] agrees that he doesn’t know. Aristides also <remarks>⁸³⁶ about the orator Demosthenes that ‘He was the very pattern (tupos) of an eloquent Hermes, come among men’;⁸³⁷ but I would say that this [saying] is better suited to Socrates, since he was first assimilated to Hermes (for he is called ‘Herm’s son’), and just as Hermes used to produce sleep and wakefulness ‘with one strike of his rod’ –
[190] [He charms to sleep]
 [20] whom he wishes, and he wakes again the sleepers⁸³⁸
[191] [191,1] – so too Socrates uses one rod, namely dialectic, both to overthrow those who speak proudly, and to rouse again those who have fallen and call them back up. Thus when Alcibiades was upright, he used refutations (elenkhoi) to overthrow him, proving that he was doubly ignorant; and now, he arouses him after he has been laid low, saying ‘Take courage, for you are a young man and you’re capable of learning’ (for ‘all the heavy labours belong to the young’,⁸³⁹ and ‘all things suit the young’⁸⁴⁰): ‘for if you were upwards of 50 years old, it would be difficult for you to learn’. And the word ‘difficult’ was well chosen, but it’s not ‘impossible’: for Socrates wants to help every human being, both the young and the elderly. Now that I’ve seen it, what should I do about it? [Alcibiades] asks him what [10] he should do to learn; and [Socrates] replies that it’s nothing difficult, nothing like the attempt of Otus and Ephialtes to
[191] plan to put Ossa atop Olympus,⁸⁴¹
[191] but [only] to offer and receive arguments (logos). And Archimedes, after his [15] invention of the lifting-screw – when he proved that with a given force he could move any given weight, since relying on this, even one man could move the earth – made a great (and impossible) boast: ‘Give me a place to go, and I
[191] will move the earth’;⁸⁴² for he said that was possible, given a place [to go]. But
[191] Socrates asks something easy.
[191] If god wills: He says ‘god’ (theos) to refer to the allotted daimon, for he also
[191] called this ‘god’ earlier.⁸⁴³ And he says ‘If [we are to trust] in my prophecy’,
[192] because prophecy is twofold: on the one hand divine, which is also a kind of
[192] madness (mania); on the other hand skilled, which is called inquiry (masteia).
[192] So Socrates is speaking now in terms of the double [nature] of prophecy;
[192] through the divine kind, which is why he says ‘if he wills’, and mentions god;
[192] and through the skilled kind, since he judged from Alcibiades’ nature⁸⁴⁴ that he
[192] was capable of learning.
[192] You and I will be in a better state: How will Socrates also be in a better state?
[192] Clearly, it’s because he is ascending along with his beloved.

## Lecture 22

[192] With the god’s favour
[192] 126C–When you say ‘friendship’ (philia), do you mean agreement or disagreement?
[192] Since Alcibiades described friendship as the goal of the statesman’s knowledge,
[192] Socrates refutes him on this point – not because he doesn’t want this [to be the
[192] outcome], but because he thinks [Alcibiades] means that friendship (philia)
[192] and affection (storgê) are one and the same. And the text at hand⁸⁴⁶ presents
[192] [15] three proofs of this. [1] First, that not only affection, but agreement (homonoia)
[192] as well, are cases of friendship;⁸⁴⁷ and this is proved right away at the start. For
[192] if disagreement is enmity, then agreement is friendship; but the first, therefore
[192] the second.⁸⁴⁸ [2] Second, he proves that friendship develops according to
[192] agreement, as in the case of the skilled crafts (tekhnai); for skilled craftspeople
[192] (tekhnitai) agree with each other and thereby are friendly to one another, and
[192] for that reason they enjoy the same objects of knowledge – but they do not
[192] [20] have affection for one another (stergousin), since [as the saying goes] ‘one potter
[192] begrudges another’⁸⁴⁹ (but [Socrates] uses philosophical examples, arithmetic
[192] and geometrical measurement and weights); surely, then, [in these cases] there
[192] is friendship without affection. [3] Third, he proves that conversely there is also
[192] affection without agreement: for a man and a woman love one another with [193,1] affection, but they certainly do not agree: for the man does not have the same thoughts about wool-working as his wife (for how could he, if he is ignorant about it?) nor does the woman, of course, about fighting on horseback (hippikê). And it’s clear that it’s [only] according to their immediate goal that they do not agree, since (as we have pointed out) they do agree according to their more final goal [sc. protection of one another].⁸⁵⁰ And he does this as a proof that both agreement and affection are cases of friendship, since friendship exists [5] when either one of these is present alone. What skill is it that makes cities agree about numbers? Notice how he proves the second point in this [passage] – that there is a [kind of] friendship according to understanding (gnôsis), not according to affection – using [the example] of skilled craftspeople: for they are friends to one another in this [former] sense, since they think the same things, and insofar as they are skilled, [10] they are friends; but as human beings, they envy and dislike one another. And you should add on here what we said earlier.⁸⁵¹ Well, this agreement you’re talking about, what is it? Since it’s necessary to introduce the other [third argument] here – that there is affection without agreement, as for instance in the case of a husband and wife – [Socrates] interrupts the argument and asks [Alcibiades] four questions: [1] what is [15] agreement; [2] in what does it occur (because it’s in what is taught, but not in what is done); [3] what is its efficient cause; and [4] if household management, statesmanship, and being a good person are one and the same.⁸⁵² And we should recognise that it’s also possible to prove, based on other sources (allothen),⁸⁵³ that there’s nothing out of place about asking many questions [at once] in interrogative questioning (pusmatikai erôtêseis). At any rate, [Socrates] himself asks many questions [at once] in the Apology: ‘Who is he, and where is he from, and what’s the price [of his teaching]?’ [Ap. 20B]. And [Callias] replies [20] to him, answering ‘who’ by saying ‘Evenus’; and ‘where from’ by saying ‘from Paros’; and the third question [by saying] ‘for five minas’.⁸⁵⁴ That does seem quite likely: Notice how Alcibiades is superior to Aristotle, once he has been helped by the present dialogue [to recognise] that the person who is persuasive to one is persuasive to many, that the person of good character (êthikos), the household manager (oikonomikos), and the statesman (politikos) are one and the same, differing only in their greatness or smallness [25] and having no other difference in their nature besides this; but [Aristotle] distinguishes between these [spheres].⁸⁵⁵ In order, however, that we not cut [194,1] down Aristotle’s worthy reputation (axiôma), let us say that Alcibiades is superior to Aristotle, not [when he acts] by himself, but when he acts in concert with Socrates. I think that I mean the kind of friendship [and agreement you find when a mother and father agree with a son they love]: It’s due to this [statement] that Socrates was compelled to refute Alcibiades in his assertion that the goal of the [5] statesman’s knowledge is friendship, because here he plainly understands friendship as identical with affection, due to the examples [that he provides]: except, thanks to his error on this point, he could not grasp the form of affection, but descended to [the level] of examples; and [he also erred] because he could not understand the simple form of [affection], but he descended to the composite,⁸⁵⁶ as from small letters to large.⁸⁵⁷ [10] Well, Alcibiades, do you think that a husband [is able to agree] with his wife [about wool-working...] He proves the third point, that there is affection without agreement, and he asks whether ‘a husband agrees with his wife about wool-working, [that is], if he thinks what she thinks?’ For agreement proved to be thinking alike about the same things. And the words ‘the man who does not know with the woman who does know’ were well chosen: for anyone can learn to weave wool. But if they do not agree, then they are not friends to one another: [15] for Alcibiades was saying just recently, through the examples [of parents and sons, siblings, and spouses] that agreement and friendship are one and the same, referring to affection under the name of agreement (homonoian legôn tên storgên). Perhaps you would say that this is for a man [to know about]: If the excellences (aretai) are common between men and women, as was proven [by Plato] in the Republic,⁸⁵⁸ since their nature is common (for male and female [20] parts are the same, different only in their placement (thesis)), and their education is common⁸⁵⁹ (for it’s analogous to how female dogs are just as fit for guard duty as male dogs); and considering that Agamemnon⁸⁶⁰ combined the [195,1] female and the male in one pair, as the line shows,
[195] Aethe, Agamemnon’s mare, and his own Podargus;⁸⁶¹
[195] – then why does he say here that a man has one task (ergon), and a woman another, instead of saying that there’s a single task for every human being? It’s because this remark doesn’t correspond to the best kind of constitution (hê eu [5] ekhousa politeia), but to another kind; moreover, he says ‘according to your argument (logos)’ [127A], and ‘perhaps’, and so on.
[195] And the syllogism is structured in the second figure⁸⁶² as follows: ‘A woman and man do not agree (for they are not concerned with the same objects of knowledge); those who are friends to one another agree (since it has been proven that disagreement is enmity); therefore, a man and woman are not [10] friends to another’. Nor, then, are cities well governed [when the different groups each do their own work]: After using one paradoxical [argument] to demonstrate that friendship and agreement are not identical, but friendship applies to more cases (by demonstrating that a husband and wife are not friends to one another), here he also adds a second paradox to his argument, namely, that the [15] just do not govern their cities well. And we must introduce the syllogism, not in the first figure, as the survey presented it⁸⁶³ (since [then] we collapse into paradoxical dialectic, constructing the argument out of negations), but we ought to analyze the passage into the pre-syllogism (prosullogismos) and syllogism [proper] (sullogismos). For the pre-syllogism runs like this: ‘Those who do their own work do not agree (since they do not have the same objects of knowledge); those who are friends to one another do agree; therefore, those [20] who do their own work are not friends to one another’. And the second pre-syllogism, taking [that] syllogism’s conclusion [as its first premiss], runs: ‘Those who do their own work are not friends to one another; those who govern their states well are friends to one another; therefore, those who do their own work do not govern their states well’. And finally, the syllogism [196,1] (sullogismos): ‘The just do their own work, for they do not treat one another unjustly; those who do their own work do not govern their states well; therefore, the just do not govern their states well’. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship [which we said must be present if cities are well governed....] Since Alcibiades said that [5] ‘I think states are well governed whenever every individual does their own work and does not treat one another unjustly’, Socrates asks him, ‘How can you say this, that when friendship is not present it’s ever possible for states to be finely governed? For you have granted that those who do their own work are not friends to one another, given the argument that we developed about a husband and wife’. And [Alcibiades] replies, ‘But on this same model, on which [10] they do their own work and do not treat one another unjustly, friendship develops’. Not [according to you] a moment ago: but now, what do you mean this time? Socrates says that ‘A moment ago, you didn’t agree with this point of view, but now I ask you again: what do you mean? When agreement is absent, how could friendship arise? Or is it possible for agreement to exist about issues where there is no commonality of viewpoint (homoiotês gnôseôn)?’ And [15] in these words, he analyzes [deductively] what he showed synthetically earlier.⁸⁶⁴ Then whatdoyou mean by this ‘friendship’ or ‘agreement’? Socrates asks again, after he refuted him and showed that the just do not govern their states well, ‘Tell me, then, what do you say friendship or agreement is?’ That is: ‘Take [20] back whichever premiss you want’. Well, Socrates, I swear by the gods that I don’t even know what I mean: When Alcibiades has been refuted on many grounds – when [Socrates] proved him doubly ignorant about justice, and again when he was claiming that justice differed from advantageousness, and now – he is nowhere as distressed as he is here, because he has been proven ignorant about the very subject that [25] concerned him most, that is, about the goal of the statesman’s knowledge: hence he says, ‘I don’t even know what I mean’. I think I must have been in a shameful state for a long time without being [197,1] aware of it: Again, notice how he has been helped, since he called ignorance a ‘shame’. For there are two kinds of defectiveness (kakia), a point that has been demonstrated in the Sophist;⁸⁶⁵ there is the defectiveness of the soul, and this is called ‘shamefulness’ (aiskhos) and ‘badness’ (ponêria); and [there is the defectiveness] of the living animal (zôion), and this is called ‘disease’ (nosos). Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: That is, [Socrates asks] ‘nothing [5] great, except to answer the questions or allow yourself to learn from my argument (logos)’.

## Lecture 23

[197] With the god’s favour
[197] Come then, what is it to cultivate or care for oneself (to heauton 127E– [[129A]] epimeleisthai)?
[197] Since Socrates’ speech has now arrived at the necessity of exercising great care [10] [for one’s own cultivation], [therefore], before he teaches what the method (tropos) of cultivation is, he presents in advance two premisses (lêmmata) that support his demonstration of the proposed [conclusion].
[197] [1] The first [premiss] is that it is not the case that someone who cares for his belongings also [thereby] cultivates himself. For there are some three typical subjects to be considered: ‘me’, ‘what belongs to me’, and ‘what belongs [15] to my belongings’. Hence he says that it is not the case [a] that someone who cares for his belongings in so doing also cares for himself, nor [b] that someone who cares for what belongs to his belongings in so doing also cares for his belongings.
[197] [The commentators] present a puzzle (aporia) about the second [subject]: ‘Note that physical training (gumnastikê) and medicine (iatrikê) care for one’s belongings (i.e. the former can produce health, while the latter can preserve it), and yet they also contribute to self-cultivation: for through the production of [20] health, they care for the activity of the soul without interference through the body.’ [The solution is] that it is one thing to reflect on (phrontisai) oneself, and another to cultivate the soul with a view to its activity (to energêsai). For the one reflects on the being (ousia) of [the soul], the other on its activity: and the activity is the first possession (ktêma) of the soul, but not [the soul] itself.
[197] Again they present a puzzle: ‘Note that weaving and sandal-making care for what belongs to one’s belongings (the former for clothing, the latter for shoes), [25] and they also care for one’s belongings (the former for feet, the latter for the whole body).’ [The solution is] again, that physical training and medicine, [198,1] which reflect on (phrontizousa) the being (ousia) of the body, are one [kind of skill], while the skill which [reflects on] its activity (such as weaving and sandal-making) is another, which [operates] in order that [the body] may act comfortably (eukolôs). Therefore, through these questions he explains that it is necessary to consider the being of the soul, in order that we may make it supremely good (beltistên).
[198] [5] [2] The second premiss is that someone who would care for anything must get to know its being well in advance: for in relation to different [kinds of] being, care and fulfilment (teleiotês) are different.⁸⁶⁶ For if we were the body, we would take care to possess beauty and strength; and if we were the vegetative soul, again we would reflect upon how to remove the excesses and ‘weave anew’⁸⁶⁷ the remainder; and if we were spirited emotion (thumos), our goal [10] (telos) would be victory (for such is spirited emotion, ‘wishing to conquer all’):⁸⁶⁸ and if our being were the tripartition [of the soul], then our goal would be the moderation of affection (for such a person uses spirited emotion moderately (memetrêmenôs) at appropriate times (kairôi tôi thumôi) in addressing incoming [affections], in the same way as through desire it lays claim to (epipoioumenos) the cultivation of the body): but since [in fact] we are the reason (logos), our goal is freedom from affection (apatheia).⁸⁶⁹
[198] Once he has said this, though it is necessary to introduce and state the method of caring for ourselves, he instead defines what the human being is. And he [thereby] seems to be doing what he did not propose [earlier], for he introduces this [question] nowhere [else]. And we resolve this (luomen) as follows: by doing this, he also [simultaneously] taught what he proposed [to teach]. For in medicine, the student who has mastered the principles (logoi) of [20] medicine does not also [successfully] heal in every case (pantôs therapeuei): but in philosophy, someone who gets to know the being of the human person (anthrôpos) also discovers that [the human person] is the soul: and someone who knows the soul also knows the principles (logoi) in it: and someone who knows the principles in [the soul] thereby knows all beings (panta ta onta), since he discovers that [the soul] is a representation in every shape (pammorphon agalma) of all beings, and through one thing he knows all beings, and does not toil over the knowledge (gnôsis) of [199,1] the rest: such a person knows the principle of the just, which is in [the soul]: and since (as he makes clear in the Gorgias)⁸⁷⁰ someone who knows just things is [himself] just, someone who knows the soul will thereby be just. And it was appropriate (kalôs) that before the temple of Apollo at Delphi all [5] that was inscribed was ‘Know Thyself’, since the one who knows himself knows all beings, and the knowledge of all beings belongs to the prophet.
[199] That is the content of the survey. What does it mean to care for or cultivate oneself? He says, ‘We must understand what it is to care for or cultivate oneself (to heautou epimeleisthai), what it is to care for the self (tou autou), and third, what it is [to care] for one’s belongings, so that we don’t forget and imagine that, in caring for externals, we are caring for ourselves.⁸⁷¹ And we must grasp when it is that the human person [10] does this very thing, that is, “cares for himself”; is it whenever he reflects on his belongings?’ And [Alcibiades] – since he is uneducated – answers, ‘Yes’. Really? When does a person care for his feet? He asks [Alcibiades] again if the person who cares for his sandals [thereby] cares for his feet. And [Alcibiades] [15] replies that ‘I don’t understand (ou manthanô)’, because the person who cares for his sandals seems to care for his feet as well. This is why Socrates transfers the argument to uncontroversial ground, by asking, ‘Does the person who cares for his ring also [thereby] care for his hand?’ For it’s clear here that the ring contributes in no essential way (pros tên ousian) to the hand, no more than [it [20] does] to sandals or weaving. That’s also why Alcibiades readily answers here, ‘of course not’, but he answered the other [cases] doubtfully, ‘I don’t quite understand, Socrates’. And it’s quite timely to comment here, ‘But Alcibiades was not yet aware that the person who takes care of his belongings does not [thereby] care [200,1] for himself’, which Aristotle said about Plato’s teacher Parmenides in the Physics.⁸⁷² So whenever someone makes something better, do you call that ‘taking proper care of it’(orthê epimeleia)? Note how in these words he resolved the two puzzles, by saying that ‘I describe that person as “taking care” who makes [5] the being (ousia) better, not its activity (energeia)’. For there are three columns (sustoikhiai) and three entities (pragmata) [in each column]: me (egô), mine (to emon), and what belongs to what is mine (to tou emou):⁸⁷³
[200] And the entities are not confounded with one another, nor is their care, nor
[200] their modes of fulfilment (teleiotêtes), but in fact none of the [particular] skills
[200] are productive of our [own] fulfilment. For our own fulfilment comes about
[200] through philosophy, but [the fulfilment] of our belonging through [the skills
[200] [10] of] exercise and medicine, and [the fulfilment] of our belonging’s belongings
[200] through [the skill of] money-making (khrêmatistikê).
[200] Or by that skill by which we make feet better? That is, ‘We don’t make feet
[200] better by the cobbler’s skill, but by another skill; namely, that which improves
[200] the rest of the body, exercise (gumnastikê)’. 128ENow, could we ever have known what skill [makes a shoe better, if we had
[201] [201,1] not known a shoe?] The second premiss, that it’s impossible to care for
[201] anything without first knowing its being (ousia).
[201] And was it some scamp who inscribed these [words ‘Know Thyself’] on the
[201] temple at Delphi? ‘Scamp’ (phaulos) here doesn’t designate someone with a
[201] bad character, but a lightweight person (eutelês). That is, ‘Was it some
[201] [5] lightweight person, the one of the seven sages who inscribed this on the shrine
[201] of the prophetic god?’ But it was Chilon of Lacedaemon.⁸⁷⁴
[201] Often I think, Socrates, that it was for anybody: Self-knowledge seemed to
[201] Alcibiades sometimes to be easy, other times to be extremely difficult, because
[201] of the tragic [verse] that says
[201] [10] To know yourself in words is nothing great;
but in deed, only Zeus of all the gods knows [how to do it].⁸⁷⁵
[201] So [it struck Alcibiades] as a minor thing in name, but challenging in
[201] action.
[201] But, Alcibiades, whether it’s easy or not, [nevertheless this is the situation we’re in]: [Compare] the saying elsewhere, ‘whether it is easy or not,⁸⁷⁶ ‘we must pursue the path’.⁸⁷⁷ For whether it is challenging or easy to know ourselves, [15] it is absolutely necessary to know ourselves.

## Lecture 24

[201] With the god’s favour
[201] ‘Come then, in what way might the self itself (auto to auto) be discovered?’129B–
[202] [202,1] The object proposed is to find out what our being (ousia) is, since a human being (anthrôpos) is neither the body nor the combination [of soul and body]. And he demonstrates this through two syllogisms, [A] one categorical and [B] the other hypothetical. And he places the categorical before the hypothetical because it is more rigorous (iskhuroteron): he presents the categorical [syllogism] in the present examination (theôria), and he will present the hypothetical [syllogism] next in sequence. Here is the categorical syllogism [A]:⁸⁷⁸
[202] [A⁴⁶¹] ‘A human being uses the body as an instrument (organôi) (for he is its
master [despozei autou], for he moves it⁸⁷⁹ (kinei auto) when he wishes,
however much he wishes, and wherever he wishes).
[A⁴⁶²] The soul is that which uses the body as an instrument.
[A⁴⁶³] Therefore (ara) a human being is the soul.’
[The Minor Premiss [A⁴⁶¹]]⁸⁸⁰
[202] [10] Come then, let us test out (kôdônisômen) each of the premisses: for the minor premiss [A⁴⁶¹] will appear not to be tenable, but to take the targeted conclusion [A⁴⁶³] as granted.⁸⁸¹ That is, the object of inquiry is ‘Is the human being the soul’; and he has said that [the human being] uses the body as an instrument, which is distinctive (idion) of soul. Accordingly he takes it as given that the human being is the soul before demonstrating [this]. And he himself establishes the minor premiss through particular [examples] (dia tôn kath’ hekasta) by saying, ‘If the lyre-player uses the plectrum as an instrument, and [203,1] the shoemaker uses his hand, and if they themselves are different from their instruments, then it is also clear that the human being, who uses the body as his instrument, would be something different [from the body].’⁸⁸²
[203] [4] But since, as we have said, he appears to take the targeted conclusion as [5] granted upon, it must be said that any whole, which possesses its real existence (hupostasis) in its parts, does not care nothing for (periphronei) the part, since [by doing so] it would aim at its own destruction: yet the human being relinquishes his body when his courage is tested (andrizomenos) in terrible circumstances: and therefore the human being is not the combination [of soul and body].
[203] But on this argument non-rational animals (aloga zôa) will also be [identical to] the non-rational soul, given that they think nothing of being in a fight against attackers. For those [non-rational animals] also believe that the non-rational soul is not in the shell (ostreinôi),⁸⁸³ since [otherwise] they would not relinquish the body: but indeed they do relinquish [the body] inasmuch as they are aware (eidotes) that the soul does not perish with the body, for the user does not share danger with the instrument, as the whole [shares danger] with the parts.⁸⁸⁴
[203] Accordingly the minor premiss holds true.
[The Major Premiss [A⁴⁶²]]
[203] Likewise the major premiss [A⁴⁶²] [holds]: for the soul is that which uses the [15] body as an instrument, which is neither the body nor the combination. [It is not] the body, since a body never uses a body as an instrument, being [by definition] moved by something else (heterokinêton): yet neither is it the combination, since the user [by definition] differs from the instrument. In order, then, that the part and the instrument might not be identical, it follows that it is soul.
[203] And this is [our exegesis] of the text.
[203] [‘Self’ and ‘The Self Itself’ According to Proclus and Damascius]
[203] [20] Come then, let us digress [beyond the exegesis of the text] and discuss and inquire about the terms (onomata) [used here], what is ‘self’ and ‘self itself’, both according to the philosopher Proclus and according to the philosopher Damascius.
[203] Now, the philosopher Proclus states that [the self] is three things: [he calls] [204,1] the tripartition of the soul ‘self’ (auto); he calls the rational soul ‘the self itself’ (auto to auto); and [he calls] the individual (atomon) ‘each self itself’ (auto to auto hekaston).⁸⁸⁵ For, as the text (lexis) says, if we would know what ‘the self itself’ is, we must also learn what ‘each self itself’ is, because it is insufficient to [5] know a human being unqualifiedly (haplôs), but one must also get to know what the individual is, because the task at hand is to help Alcibiades also to get to know himself who this person is, i.e. that [he is] the soul; and [our] actions (praxeis) are concerned with particular cases (ta kath’ hekasta).⁸⁸⁶
[204] And this is not the only reason [that the individual is identical with the soul], but also because the Peripatos erred concerning the individual, supposing that it comes to be from the coincidence (sundromê) of the accidents. This is [10] why they also define it thus: ‘that of which the assemblage (athroisma) could never come to be in the case of anything else’.⁸⁸⁷ And [thereby] they make the better from the worse, i.e. from the accidents.
[204] But Damascius calls ‘self’ the civic soul, which uses the body as an instrument: and ‘the self itself’ [he calls] the purificatory and contemplative [soul], which certainly does not use the body as an instrument. And Damascius seems to speak more with a view to exact knowledge (epistêmonikôteron), and [15] the philosopher Proclus more with a view to the exegesis of the text [205,1] (exêgêmatikôteron lexeôs). In fact, the text agrees with [Proclus]: for from the beginning it says that, if ‘the self itself’ is to be discovered, one must also inquire into what ‘each self itself’ is. And in this [context] he proposes to present not the purificatory nor contemplative [human being], but the civic human being: [5] which is why he also defines it as ‘the rational soul using the body as an instrument’. Thus [Damascius] attended to the [underlying] subject-matter (pragmata), whereas [Proclus] focused on the text (lexis).
[205] That is the content of the survey. Maybe this is the way to find out what we ourselves might be: ‘If we could find out’, he says, ‘what the human being is, then in addition to this it’s also possible to know what each one of us is, for thus we might quickly learn about [10] this [sc. each of us]; but ignorant of this, our common [humanity], it is impossible to get to know the individual’. Hold on, by Zeus: who are you speaking with now? At this point, he wants to construct the minor [premiss], that the human being uses the body as an instrument. ‘For’, he says, ‘if you are talking with me, and the soul is using the [15] body as an instrument for the conversation’ (for speech is the result and instrument of soul: for thoughts (noêmata) are the soul’s messengers, just as Aristotle’s logic is both an instrument and result, like the smith’s anvil and the carpenter’s hammer);⁸⁸⁸ ‘but surely Alcibiades is also the one who is listening,
[205] and this is a distinctive trait (idion) of the human being, [the capacity] to listen’
[206] [206,1] (but you should add ‘hearing in this way, through speech’: for non-rational
[206] animals also have hearing); ‘and so, since it converses and hears, a human being
[206] is the soul using a partial instrument’. But since we should not take a partial
[206] instrument as an example (paradeigma), he offers the example of the cobbler
[206] [5] using a complete instrument in his projects (ergasiai).
[206] For example, I suppose a shoemaker cuts with a carving knife: Note that the
[206] example is about using the whole body as an instrument.⁸⁸⁹ For if [the soul] uses
[206] just one hand, [that hand] still receives outflows and portions from the first
[206] principles (arkhai), namely, arteries and veins and nerves. For that reason, the
[206] Peripatos was also right to say that the hand doesn’t weave, but the human being
[206] weaves using his hand, since it is the whole [being] that acts through the part.⁸⁹⁰
[206] And you can say the same about speech (ta tês glôttês) as well, that he uses it to
[206] present the whole [body] as an example; but it’s clear in these cases [cf. 129B–C].
[206] And the scraper and shoemaker’s knife aren’t the same thing: for the scraper
[206] (smilê) has an even base, but the knife (tomeus) has a round base.
[206] Does he cut with instruments only, or also with his hands? ‘With instruments’
[206] [15] [meaning] from outside, but ‘with hands’ meaning ‘with his natural instruments’,
[206] which we also need in the argument.
[206] [Then whatisa human being?] – I don’t know what to say. Alcibiades was
[206] right to have doubts about the definition of the human being, since he is
[206] missing the major premiss to prove that the human being is the rational soul:
[206] and he adds this [premiss next].

## Lecture 25

[207] With the god’s favour
[207] 130A–Then [the soul] rules (arkhousa)? – Yes. – In fact I think that nobody [would Dbelieve otherwise].
[207] Socrates, having demonstrated through a categorical syllogism [A, above] that
[207] the human being is the soul, now establishes this same [proposition] through a
[207] [5] hypothetical [syllogism] [B, below]. He presupposes the following premiss for
[207] this [syllogism], that the human being rules the body:⁸⁹¹ and this [premiss] is evident not only from people who are in control (tôn enkratôn), but also from people who are out of control (tôn akratôn), since, though able to control [themselves], they do not control themselves: for if they were out of control under compulsion (ex anankês), we would not chastise them.
[207] Having presupposed this [premiss] he establishes [the conclusion of A] through a hypothetical syllogism [B] as follows:⁸⁹²
[207] [B⁴⁶¹] ‘The human being is either the body or the soul or the combination;
 [10] [B⁴⁶²] But it cannot be the body (because a body never rules the body, since
[in doing so] it would both rule itself and turn back upon itself);
[B⁴⁶³] But neither can it be the combination qua combination (since again, if
it rules a body, the body will rule itself, and [the human being] will again be
the body).
[B⁴⁶⁴] Therefore what is left is that the human being is the soul.’
[207] [15] When the argument is advanced in this way, some criticise it by claiming that ‘on this argument, since honey-water is either water, or honey, or honey and water, and it is not honey, nor indeed honey and water, then what is left is that it is water’.⁸⁹³
[208] [208,1] But we reply that ‘Your premisses are false, since honey-water is not honey under all conditions, and not honey and water under all conditions, even if it is altered: whereas Plato’s [premisses] are true. That is, the human being is not wholly body (given that the human being rules the body, but body, as we have [5] said, never rules itself); nor is it the combination (since if the combination rules the body, [the body] will also rule itself): accordingly, the [underlying] paradigm is not the same.
[208] Having pre-established his [argument], he defines the human being as the rational soul (psukhê logikê) that uses the body as an instrument (organôi). And in order to prevent the definition also encompassing the heavenly souls, it [10] is necessary to add ‘the body moving in a straight line (to euthuphoroumenon sôma)’.⁸⁹⁴ And he presents (lambanetai) these demonstrations while saying that they are rough, and need differentiation, since [Socrates and Alcibiades] made a definition of the political person, but obviously not of the purificatory or contemplative or inspired [person]: for the latter do not use the body as an instrument. And so he spoke of the political person in broad terms in his relation to those [higher persons].
[208] [15] That is the content of the survey. And doesn’t the soul rule [the body]? He uses this comment to present the premiss that the human being rules the body, not only on account of people who are under control, but also on account of people who are out of control: for we do blame them, but not if they acted under compulsion (ex anankês). Then does the body rule itself? [He asks] because it’s impossible for a body [209,1] to rule a body, since [in that case] it would be [capable of] reverting upon itself. Does the combination [of the two rule the body]? [He asks] because the combination can’t rule insofar as it is a combination [of soul with body]. For the same paradoxical result (atopon) would recur, that the body would rule [5] itself. Do you need any clearer proof that the soul is the human being? He asks him whether ‘you still think that we need a clearer proof that the soul is the human being, or do we need more precise arguments to prove that the soul is the purificatory and contemplative and inspired human being? Or is that out [10] of proportion (asummetros) to your [capacities]?’ And he replies, ‘It’s sufficient’, because he is careless (rhâithumos). [Well, if we’ve proven it fairly well], though perhaps not rigorously: Note how he himself understands these arguments, which also emerge from a [stipulative] definition, and says that they are [only] loose or rough (pakhumerês), comparing the inspired person and the rest. [We’ll have a more rigorous proof when we find out what we skipped over, [15] because it would have taken quite a lot of study. – What was that?] – What we mentioned just now, [that we should first consider what ‘itself’ is, in itself]: Previously the interpretation of the philosopher Proclus prevailed, that [Plato] calls the soul ‘self’ (auto), but the rational [soul] ‘self itself’; and now the [interpretation] of the philosopher Damascius [prevails], that ‘self’ is the civic soul, but ‘self itself’ is the purificatory and contemplative soul.⁸⁹⁵ For [Socrates] says, ‘Presently, we have reached the basic stage of describing the civic soul as ‘the [20] self itself’; but at that point [in the future], we will know with precision that the human being is the soul, and we will articulate properly what ‘the self itself’ is.

## Lecture 26

[209] With the god’s favour

## Abstract (aposêmeiôsis)

[209] [[129B]] Come then, in what way [might the self itself be discovered]?
[209] He describes the rational soul as ‘the self itself’, not as it uses the body as an [210,1] instrument or dwells in a body, like the purificatory or contemplative person: and he describes the rational soul as ‘self’ when it avails itself of the affections and the body as an instrument, referring to the civic soul. And he also describes [5] this ‘self’ as ‘each self’, due to the activity of the individual life (atomos zôê), which is naturally attached [to the rational soul], concerned with indivisible [acts] (atoma). And since, when his project was to discover ‘self’, he discovered⁸⁹⁷ ‘each self’, he indicates in what follows [130D] that he did not discover what he set out to [discover]. But perhaps he does not even discover ‘each self’, but only ‘self’: for he discovers who the civic person is, but not who Socrates is, which is why Proclus investigates – not as part of an independent digression (parenthêkês), but in his interpretation of the primary text (lexis)⁸⁹⁸ – who is the common (koinos) human being and who is the unique (idios) human being. For the Peripatos does not get it right about the individual person, since they construct his being (ousia) out of accidents (sumbebêkota).⁸⁹⁹ And the text adds this point on next, saying, ‘For if we discover the common human being, we might also discover each particular human being, which we also need [to discover]: for we also care for this. For the discussion was about Socrates [15] and Alcibiades. But if [we don’t discover] the first, we also [won’t discover] the second’.⁹⁰⁰
[210] [The following points were also presented]:
[210] [1] That the discussion concerns both the activity and instrument of a rational soul, like the carpenter’s hammer and the smith’s anvil,⁹⁰¹ and like the philosophers’ practice of rational discourse (logikê pragmateia tois philosophois).
[210] [20] [2] That it is the [work] of the rational soul to hear, point out, and understand discourse (logos).
[210] [3] That a ‘scraper’ (smilê) is the [instrument] with a straight base, but it’s a ‘shoemaker’s knife’ (tomeus) whenever the base is rounded; for this is also the knife used in surveying (geômetria).
[211] [211,1] [4] That cobbling is also the work of the rational [soul], since every skill (tekhnê) is an echo of Intellect (nous). And the first skilled craftsman was Hephaestus, ‘whose bellows (phusai) display nature (phusis)’.⁹⁰²
[211] [5] That the [word] ‘perhaps’ [in the phrase, ‘we’ve been considering what each self is... perhaps that will be enough for us’] is used properly: for the civic [5] person suffices for Alcibiades, but not for Socrates.
[211] [6] That the living being does not [arise] from soul and body, but from a non-rational image [of the soul] and the body: but even if [the former] were the case, only plant [life would arise] from soul and body.⁹⁰³
[211] [7] That Plato does not want to make even the body [let alone the human being] out of matter and form,⁹⁰⁴ but [of] enmattered form (eidos en hulê), like the human being who is located in space (en tôi topôi) and the Achilles [who is painted] on a board (en tôi pinaki).⁹⁰⁵ For he wants forms in this place to be ‘shadows’ of the [paradigmatic] Forms; and he calls matter that ‘in which’, not ‘out of which’, and the form [he calls] ‘that which’ (ho). And the products of some things [derive] from active and passive [principles], like honey-water, but neither matter nor form passively undergo anything from the other. There is a great deal of outstanding evidence, therefore, that [5] according to Plato the human being is not constituted out of the soul and body.
[212] [8] Then whatisthe human being? Note how he wants the middle term of the first syllogism⁹⁰⁶ to serve as a definition, since he is also making the syllogism clear not only based on its own terms, but also based on what comes next, since it is built out of convertible terms.
[212] [10] [9] That the human being, according to Plato, is a soul using a body that moves in straight lines (euthuporos); for this ought to be added on [to the definition] to account for the souls of the heavenly [bodies].⁹⁰⁷ But the vegetative and non-rational [souls] will not be captured [in the definition], as we have pointed out,⁹⁰⁸ because they use the body not only as an instrument, but also as a subject (hupokeimenon).⁹⁰⁹
[212] [10] That Plato’s arguments proving that the human being is the soul or that [15] the soul is the human being are meant in earnest, and he is in no doubt about them, and he presents them prior to the civic target (politikos skopos) [of the dialogue]⁹¹⁰ because he only wants Alcibiades to revert (epistrepsai) [upon himself], is proven by [his words] ‘unlikeliest of all’, which express strong disagreement (diastatikos), and [the phrase] ‘it’s been proven’.
[212] [11] Hold on: The passage proves through induction that the human being [20] uses the body as an instrument, if Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, but a person who is having a conversation uses speech, and the person using speech as an instrument is using the body as an instrument; and if the shoemaker and the lyre-player use the body as an instrument; for the body is divided up and naturally attached [to the real person], both as a part and as a whole. And he proves the major [premiss] clearly by division.⁹¹¹
[212] [12] That (since the whole uses the part) he uses the same induction to prove that the user differs from the instrument it uses.⁹¹²

## Lecture 27

[213] With the god’s favour
[213] So the right way of looking at it [is that, when you and I talk to each other, 130D– [[133C]] one soul uses words to address another soul.]
[213] As for ‘the conversation of Socrates with Alcibiades’ [130E], [Socrates] made its introduction out of dialectical struggles, and its conclusion using intoxication with love.⁹¹³ For restoration or return (apokatastasis) is also suitable to love, which is a kind of reversion (epistrophê), and so is the conversation of lover with beloved; for they share the instrument of rational speech (logos). And [Socrates] previously understood [the word] ‘conversation’ (dialegesthai) as [10] follows: ‘since Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, he avails himself of rational speech (logos), and thereby has the body as his instrument’ [129B–C]. But now he offers the following sort of interpretation (dianoia) of the same [word] ‘conversation’: ‘Since Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, and they have been proven to be souls, the souls are conversing with one another with the aim of mutual intercourse’ [139D]: and [1] this is now a corollary [of the argument]. That is why, after he has launched himself into the corollary, he also appends three additional corollaries. For some parts of this dialogue comprise its target (skopos), like the arguments proving that we are the soul [124A–130D]; [15] some parts precede the target, like the purification of double ignorance [106C–119A] and the exhortation [119A–124A]; and some parts follow [the target], like the present corollaries.
[213] [2] The second corollary [is] that no expert in the particular skilled crafts [insofar as he is such an expert] has self-knowledge. And here the Platonic doctrine appears that artifacts (tekhnêta) do not have rational principles (logoi) (for if the soul contained [such principles], the skilled craftsmen would know [20] themselves); and [we also have the Platonic doctrine] that we must take heed of those branches of study. Their value to us is not limited to our life here, but is also helpful to us after our departure. For the things of this world (ta têide) are a preparatory education (propaideia) for our life in that world (tou ekei biou), which is many times longer.⁹¹⁴
[213] [3] The third corollary: no expert whose skill works on particulars (kath’ [214,1] hekasta) is self-controlled (sôphrôn), since he does not know himself. But why does self-knowledge belong to self-control (sophrosunê), but not to practical wisdom (phronêsis)? Well, it is because reversion belongs to self-control: for when [the soul] is engaged in the worst sort [of behaviour] and cannot descend further, it ascends. Or it is for the contrary reason: ‘good habits are unstable at their peak’.⁹¹⁵ For in general, self-knowledge belongs to every kind of excellence (aretê): since it certainly does belong to self-control, because of reversion, as we have pointed out; and it also belongs to practical wisdom, since reversion develops on account of insight (gnôsis); and it belongs to courage, since [self-knowledge] submits to no [other] investigation of oneself; and it belongs to justice (dikaiosunê), since it is right and proper (prosêkei) to know oneself before anything else. Now why was it that in the Charmides⁹¹⁶ [164D–175D] [10] Socrates refuted the definition of self-control which claimed that self-control is self-knowledge? Because even if the excellences (aretai) do reciprocally imply one another, nonetheless they differ in their distinctive quality (idiotês): for they are not [numerically] one, but all [of the excellences] are present in courage in a courageous way (andreiôs), and in another [excellence] in a self-controlled way, just as all the gods are present in Zeus in a Zeusian way, but in another [god] in a Heraean way, for no god is incomplete.⁹¹⁷ And as Anaxagoras used to say, ‘all are in all, but [in each] one abounds’:⁹¹⁸ we’ll say the same about the divine beings. For every excellence is practical wisdom, since it has an understanding of practical actions (prakta); and every [excellence] is courage, since it engages in a struggle (agônizesthai); and every [excellence] is self-control, since it leads [us] to what is better; and every [excellence] is justice, [215,1] since it measures out which actions are right and proper. And among the civic excellences, each one has its own distinctive subject-matter (hupokeimenon idion), but all those [excellences] beyond these [civic ones] are one and the same in their definition (logos).
[215] But why are none of the skilled craftsmen self-controlled (sôphrôn)? Because self-control (sophrosunê) is threefold [sc. civic, purificatory, and contemplative]. [5] For all reversion is from the worse to the better: for example, even when reason (logos) reverts upon itself, insofar as it is reverting, it is inferior to the object of its reversion.⁹¹⁹ And the reversion of the non-rational to reason is civic self-control (politikê sophrosunê), and this is the only self-control that craftsmen skilled in particulars and statesmen (politikoi) alike are capable of having; but the [reversion] of reason to itself is purificatory self-control; and the [reversion] [10] of reason to its betters is as contemplative self-control. Hence the statesman knows himself according to common self-control, that of the non-rational to reason, but not according to purificatory or contemplative self-control.
[215] [4] The fourth corollary: [that] none of Alcibiades’ other lovers loves him, but [rather loves] one of Alcibiades’ belongings; but Socrates alone loves Alcibiades [15] and is properly speaking his ‘lover’: since the goal of love is union (henôsis), but bodies are circumscribed by spatial location (topos) and do not interpenetrate, but souls are able, thanks to their similar character and life, to interpenetrate one another (for in fact, prior to the journey down here, all were one, in the same way that all the Ideas are one, and by interpenetrating they produce the Living Being Itself (autozôion), and [produce] the intelligible cosmos prior to the [20] sensory cosmos); and that love (erôs) is for the Beautiful, but the truly beautiful in the soul – for the body swims upon matter, which is ugly.
[215] In cases where the lover’s [skill] attains its goal, reciprocal love (anterôs) [arises]. For Alcibiades loves Socrates in return, and begs him not to abandon him; and Socrates announces that he will not abandon his love, unless he is destroyed by the people (dêmos). [He says this] because the people are a [25] terrifying (deinos) teacher, since, by praising their orators, they encourage [216,1] them to construct speeches that are pleasing to the people. And what Hermes is for Odysseus, Socrates becomes for Alcibiades:⁹²⁰ when [Alcibiades] is about to approach the people (corresponding to Circe), he gives him the antidote (pharmakon alexêtêrion) called ‘moly’; and he provides it lest [Alcibiades] be transformed into a wild beast by the people.⁹²¹ And the medicine is this: not to [5] observe (theasasthai) the entire people all together at once (holon homou), but to carefully examine (skopêsai) the [constituent parts] from which the people develop. For the people does not develop ‘from oak or stone’,⁹²² but from [its] particular [constituents]: for [when you analyze them in this way] you will find the fullers, cobblers, and carpenters; and those who are amazed by the people resemble those who think nothing of a single counterfeit coin, but are impressed (thaumazousi) by a great many of them together in one place. Yet a [10] great many assertions do not [necessarily] produce a single syllogism (sullogismos), although one [assertion] can. Also, one should not want to be [warned by] the barking of many dogs: for the multiplicity is more confused than each individual one. And multiplicity is of no benefit, except when it comes to physical force.
[216] And this is what Socrates did for Alcibiades:⁹²³ for after he brought him [15] around to the [craftsmen’s] workshops, he asked him about each one, whether he thought it fitting that he be praised by this [person], and after he said ‘no’ in each case, he added, ‘but surely the people is made up from these?’ And [Socrates] calls the medicine not ‘moly’, but ‘stripping off’: for he strips the multiplicity (plêthos) from [Alcibiades], like multiple tunics. Similarly, Homer’s Odysseus did not observe everything at once, but ‘looked at each one with his eyes’.⁹²⁴ Also, [the character] Circe – since we have mentioned her – references the overseer (ephoros) of sensory life; that is also why she is the daughter of Helios [the Sun], who is the leader of sensory things (aisthêta). But [Socrates] [217,1] also provides [Alcibiades] with another antidote: for he advises him to care for excellence by training and learning; and training befits the non-rational [part of the soul], but learning [befits] reason.⁹²⁵ For he knew that the young man was all aflutter about the people.
[217] Up to this point, the discussion has been about the ‘self’, and [Socrates] has [5] taught about who the civic person is. From this point forward, he is also speaking about the ‘self itself’, that is, the purificatory and contemplative [person], and he says, ‘Just as if the Pythian [god] told the pupil [of the eye] “See thyself” ’ (and the command is appropriate to the one commanded, since as the Sun is the source of light, so too vision, since it is sun-like, is analogous [10] to the Sun), ‘and that [organ] obeyed the commander, as an appropriate leader, and yet, thanks to its externally moved nature (heterokinêton) was unable to revert upon itself, it would surely look away to another [pupil] or to a mirror, from which it could observe itself; and likewise you, since you have utterly blinded what is self-moving in you and acted as something externally moved and lacking the capacity to revert upon yourself, now look into my soul, and [15] know your own [soul] through it. And when you look away to my [soul], you will find therein ‘divine images (theia agalmata)’,⁹²⁶ Intellect (nous) and God (theos); and in virtue of Intellect you will act in a purificatory manner, whereas in virtue of God you will act in a contemplative manner. For God is in [the soul] by relation (kata skhesin),⁹²⁷ and we have the common concepts (koinai ennoiai) by the illumination of Intellect,⁹²⁸ and we have inspirations by the [illumination] of God’. For as a lover, [Socrates] did not want the young man to [20] be led upward by him, but together with him. That is also why he wanted [Alcibiades] to be led upward by his own soul, and not to have his own power of self-movement (autokinêton) twisted.
[217] But since our discussion has turned to the images that appear in mirrors, we should not suppose, as the philosopher Proclus supposes,⁹²⁹ that Plato thinks [25] they are reflections. For these concepts are Peripatetic and mechanistic, that is, to claim that ‘shadows’ (skiai) come about by the interposing of a body.⁹³⁰ For Plato does not suppose that they are fleeting, weak, and feeble things, but he wants them to be real beings (hupostaseis): for on his view, they develop because of the ‘outflows’ that emerge from sense-objects, just as [occurs] in the eye; and as they are concentrated, they appear in the mirror, so that the similarity [of the eye with the mirror] produces recognition (gnôsis).⁹³¹ [5] For the outflows resemble the sources from which they flow; that is why the crystalline [part of the eye] sees itself in the mirror, due to its own outflows (oikeios).⁹³² For, as the philosopher Damascius says, just as the person who sees himself in a picture (eikôn) does not see himself by reflection (anaklasis), so too he does not see himself by reflection in the mirror; but [he sees himself there] because there is a copy (apeikonisma) of the eye there. And Plato also [10] takes this view elsewhere. For in the Sophist he says that images come about ‘by a supernatural process’ (daimoniâi mêkhanêi) [Soph. 266B], [that is], because of their speed of concentration; for the ancients call everything speedy ‘supernatural’ (daimônios), on account of daimons’ high level of activity (drastêrion), which is also the reason that they call Aristotle ‘supernatural’, because he is exceptionally quick. ([The historians] also relate about the river [15] Hyllus that if someone fills a drinking-cup from its water, fish are instantly generated: that’s also why the poet picks it out and says ‘in the fish-swarming Hyllus’,⁹³³ even though other rivers also generate fish, but [he does this] because of the speed of the concentration and generation [of the fish]).
[219] Now the ancients maintain that this is true – that shadows and images (skiai) are real beings – [as follows]: first, when a dog is sleeping in a high place, if his shadow is cast to the ground, a hyena coming across the shadow and [5] treading upon it causes the dog to descend: therefore, it is clear that [shadows] are not reflections, but outflows.⁹³⁴ Second, if women who are purging their [220,1] monthly flow look into a mirror, they instantly stain it, and it clearly follows that this happens because of their outflows.⁹³⁵
[220] That is the content of the survey. Yes and I am glad [that you are the one who won’t abandon me], Socrates: Notice how he entreats [Socrates] to remain: his reciprocation of love (anterôs) is clearly displayed by this. For this is the goal of the lover, to be loved in return by his beloved and to exchange the arrangement (skhêma) of the love, [5] to make the former lover the beloved, and to make the former beloved the lover. Then you must try to be as beautiful as possible: That is, ‘If you want me not to abandon you, be as beautiful as possible’: for as a lover, he cannot bear to love someone without value. For love (erôs), since it is ‘formidable’ (errhômenos) (which is also why it has obtained this name),⁹³⁶ and since it is ‘heroic’ (hêrôikos), cannot bear an object without value (eutelês pragma), but wants the beloved to [10] be lofty. So this is how it stands with you: [Alcibiades] has never had another [lover], as it seems: He says that ‘I want you to be as beautiful as possible, for there has never been anyone who loved Alcibiades but Socrates alone’. Why, then, [does he say] ‘Except for one alone, and this one cherished (agapêtos)’? For this seems silly: if he is the one [lover], then [of course] he is also cherished. Well, it is necessary [15] to understand the phrase as follows: ‘You have come to have one lover, and that is the cherished’ (for he omits the article) ‘Socrates, the son of the midwife Phaenarete and the stonemason Sophroniscus’: the consequence is that Alcibiades’ [221,1] noble birth was no help to him (for he was a descendent of Alcmaean and Aeacus), nor did Socrates’ low birth do any harm to his wisdom. And the phrase ‘so this is how it stands with you’ means, ‘this is your situation (houtôs ekhei ta pragmata)’. And you said that I just anticipated you in coming to you: For this is what [5] he was saying at the beginning, that ‘You barely anticipated me in beginning a conversation, since I meant to ask you, why you would not leave me alone’. And he replies that ‘This is the only reason why I don’t leave you alone, that I am your only lover. That’s why those men were only around while your body was in bloom; but when its bloom is off, I am present for the bloom of the [10] soul. Both now’, he continues, ‘and always, if you are not destroyed by the Athenian people’ (for he knew that [Alcibiades] was a lover of the people), ‘I shall never forsake you’. For it’s the case that we think nothing of a single person, but we make a fuss over a large crowd. Yet one assertion [can make] a syllogism, while many [assertions] do not [necessarily do so]; for the multitude [15] resembles an assertion that brings its subject-matter (pragmata) into a single confusion, for in this way too the multitude is a cause of confusion. For many good [Athenians] have already suffered that end: If they [were] good, how did they become lovers of the people, and suffer ruin? Well, they were only good in their disposition (hexis) [and not in practice]. For ‘the people of great-hearted Erechtheus’ might look fair of face: He parodies the saying ‘people of great-hearted Erechtheus’.⁹³⁷ ‘But it’s necessary to observe the multitude stripped down’: and notice the name of Socrates’ moly, ‘stripping’. So too Odysseus: ‘But he looked at each one with his eyes’.⁹³⁸ But the phrase ‘fair of face’ was used for all of them as a group (epi holou hôs holou), since each of them taken individually was valueless (eutelês). Exercise yourself first, my blessed man, and learn: Notice that he provides [222,1] him with another antidote, namely, training and learning about excellence. But try to explain [exactly how we should cultivate our own selves]: Notice another indication of [Alcibiades’] reciprocal love, as he begs [Socrates] to teach. And the phrase ‘our own selves’ (hêmôn autôn) points by duplication [of the [5] words] to ‘the self itself’, the purificatory life and the contemplative [life]: for up until this point, the civic life [has been under discussion]. But if the target (skopos) of the dialogue has to do with ethics (êthikos), why would he speak about the purificatory and contemplative life?⁹³⁹ For the discussion (logoi) is about that life from this point forward. Well, according to the philosopher Proclus, the target is [10] ethical, for he understands ‘self’ as the tripartition [of the soul], and ‘self itself’ as the rational soul using the body as an instrument; but according to the philosopher Damascius, [the dialogue] has a civic, purificatory, and contemplative target, since he understands ‘self’ as the rational soul using the body as an instrument, and ‘self itself’ as the [rational soul] without an instrument. [15] We’ve agreed what weprobablyare: Notice that he says that ‘we have defined civic self-knowledge’: for he points clearly to this – the civic life – using the phrase ‘probably’ (epieikôs).⁹⁴⁰ And [Alcibiades’ reply] ‘these things are so’ (esti tauta), through the use of the plural, points to ‘the self itself’. [And the next step is] that we have to cultivate our soul and look to that: [20] ‘And so we must attend to our soul’, he says, ‘but not to our primary belonging, namely our body, nor to our secondary [belonging], namely our possessions: [223,1] since again, [by doing the latter] we will know ourselves in a civic way, and now we want to know ourselves in a purificatory and contemplative way’. Now, by what means (tropos) could we get the clearest knowledge of it? The [5] [word] ‘clearest’ (enargestata) is appropriate to the [command to] ‘Know Thyself’, which is the Sun,⁹⁴¹ who is the overseer (ephoros) of clarity (enargeia). And again he says ‘our own selves’ next, pointing by reduplication to the ‘self itself’. I think it’s likely that there are not many examples (paradeigmata) of it [except the case of sight]: That is, ‘There isn’t any more appropriate example [10] than sight, because it is sun-like in form (hêlioeides), and appropriate to the one who makes the command [to know oneself]’. [The eye can look] at mirrors and things of that sort: Through the [word] ‘mirrors’ he refers to artificial mirrors, and through the [phrase] ‘things of that sort’, to natural [mirrors], such as crystal and horn. And we should recognise that [the word] ‘maiden’ [‘pupil’] (korê)⁹⁴² is used either because of its proximity to the form of crystal, which is pure, and so is the maiden, since she is [15] unmarried; or it’s because it has been wrapped around with many protective layers, just like the maiden.

## Lecture 28

[223] With the god’s favour
[223] But we agree that knowing oneself [is the same as being self-controlled].133C–
[223] Since we got to know ourselves as a civic person (as we recognised that the [5] human being is a soul using the body as an instrument), and as a purificatory person (as we recognised that it is a rational soul making no use of the body as an instrument, but reverting upon itself), and as a contemplative person (as we recognised the human being as a rational soul that does not use the body as an instrument, but reverts upon its betters), he exalts self-knowledge, by saying that the person who does not know himself is not a statesman. And he says this [10] because Alcibiades was planning on being a statesman: for [Socrates] saw him ‘rushing’ into public affairs [118B]. And he is not only not a statesman, but he is actually miserable, because he is in error (hamartanôn): and [he would be] all the more miserable, if he got the power [to be a statesman], and not only miserable, but a maker of misery, because he would be in charge of others; and especially a maker of misery, if he secured dockyards and harbours and walls [15] and revenues [for them]. And he says this to point riddlingly to Pericles, who built the wall of the Piraeus, and Themistocles, who prepared the triremes, by the oracle:
[223] Wide-seeing Zeus grants to Tritogeneia [Athena] a wooden wall...⁹⁴³
[225] [225,1] And [Plato] develops some three [points]: [1] that the person who is ignorant of himself is also ignorant of what belongs to him. (And why were we saying earlier that the doctor knows his belongings without knowing himself, and that the same applies to the money-maker?⁹⁴⁴ Because he possesses what belongs to him and what belongs to what belongs to him,⁹⁴⁵ or his own nature (phusis),⁹⁴⁶ and this [possession] is how he – both the money-maker and the [5] doctor – knows them; or because these [belongings] contribute to their needs and are instruments, and so these [people] are ignorant about them. Thus, then, let us liberate [Socrates] from this apparant self-contradiction. He himself also provides an indication in this direction when he says, ‘Then it wasn’t quite right to agree, as we did a few moments ago [131A–C], that some people know [10] what belongs to them without knowing themselves’. For both are true in the sense just stated). Those who are ignorant of their own belongings are also ignorant of others’ belongings, for knowledge of contraries is one and the same:⁹⁴⁷ the person who is ignorant of others’ belongings is ignorant of the citizens’ belongings: but such a person is not a statesman: therefore, the person who is ignorant of himself is not a statesman.
[225] [15] [2] Next, he builds upon this many other paradoxes, ‘[piling] Ossa upon Olympus’, as the poetic [saying] goes;⁹⁴⁸ [he shows] that [such a person] is neither a person of good character (êthikos) nor a household manager, as follows: ‘The person who is ignorant of himself is not a statesman: but the person who is not a statesman is also not a person of good character (êthikos) nor a household manager, for these differ [only] in their large or small scale, like small and large letters;⁹⁴⁹ but the person who is neither a person of good [20] character nor a household manager, if he should act as an individual, errs against himself, and if he acts as a statesman, errs against many; and the person who errs against himself is miserable (athlios), and especially miserable, if he comes into power; and the person who [errs against] many makes others miserable, and especially so if he furnishes [the many] with power; therefore, the person who is ignorant of himself is not only miserable, but also makes others miserable’.
[225] [25] [3] The third argument, that the statesman knows himself, [runs as follows]: ‘For the statesman makes his citizens good (for this is the definition of the statesman to make people good); the person who makes people good is [himself] good (for nothing provides what it itself lacks);⁹⁵⁰ the good person is loved by god (for the good and god are one and the same); the person loved by god knows the divine in himself; such a person knows himself, because he [226,1] knows the highest [part] of his soul, and its flower; therefore, the statesman knows himself’.
[226] He also proves the remaining [point], which he accepted as unproven in the second argument, that the person who is ignorant of himself makes others [5] more miserable if he should obtain power. First, [he proves] that this person resembles one who is sick and out of his mind, refusing to obey his doctors, but rearing his body to be unhealthy, with even his diet changed to be unhealthy. For the words were well said, ‘the more you use what’s impure for bodies as their nourishment, the more harm you do’.⁹⁵¹ His second effort is [to prove] [10] that such a person resembles a tyrant, since the tyrant is nothing but power deprived of reason. Third, [he proves] that he does not even have power: for power preserves the person who has it, but this person ruins the one who has [power, i.e., himself]. For it’s just as badness (kakia) leads to ruin, and likewise as if someone inexperienced in steering attempted to steer a ship: for he becomes a cause not only of his own destruction, but also of [the destruction] of his fellow sailors⁹⁵² and those who voyage with him.
[226] [15] After this he proves, referring to the ancient saying that excellence is not ruled by a tyrant and is free⁹⁵³ – for excellence is free by nature, unable to bear submitting to inferiors, which is also why the soul is naturally free, since it is self-moving and naturally tending to rulership (arkhikê): hence it’s also difficult to rule over human beings, who are naturally suited to rulership, so that Plato [20] also represents the capacities of the soul in the Phaedrus as horses, thanks to their pride, since rulership is also [proud] – Socrates is not only unable to bear this [sc. tyranny], but also says that excellence (aretê) rules and badness (kakia) is a slave, even if he is a king. For the bad person is a slave, even if he should rule all people, just as the good person is free, even if he is a slave. And he proves each of these two points: for the good person is a ruler, because he links [25] himself to god, who rules all; and the bad person is naturally a slave, because he links himself to matter, which is worst, and is ruled by all things.
[227] [227,1] Next, at the conclusion of the dialogue, reciprocal love (anterôs) makes its appearance: for Alcibiades loves Socrates in return. That is also why he wants to cherish him in turn (antipelargein): for just as storks (pelargoi) take care of their parents when they have grown old, bathe them and carry them, and simply accomplish everything that their parents did for themselves, [5] so too Alcibiades here imitates the stork. For reciprocal love has been compared with the stork not only because it reverts (dia tên epistrophên) – which is appropriate to love – but also because love ‘has wings’, as [Plato] says in the Phaedrus;⁹⁵⁴ that is also why he is called ‘Winged’ (pterôs), deriving from ‘wing’ (pteron).
[227] That is the content of the survey: for the present dialogue comes to an end alongside [the survey], with the god’s favour. But we agreed that knowing oneself was the same as being self-controlled: [10] For it was also pointed out earlier that self-control is appropriate to reversion, because it rides upon appetite (epithumia), around the part [of the soul] most remote [from reason]. Hence, since our nature is unable to be still, and cannot go further, it returns to its betters. Because of this, they say ‘good habits are unstable at their peak’.⁹⁵⁵ [15] So if we didn’t know our own selves [... would we be able to know which of the things that belong to us were good, and which were bad?] Here is the first premiss of the first challenge, that the person who is ignorant of himself does not know what belongs to him, either. And both the puzzle and its solution have been stated in the survey. [228,1] How could that be, Socrates? Alcibiades answers readily, because he has been helped in this dialogue to see that the person who is ignorant of his own being (ousia) is also ignorant about how he can be fulfilled (teleiotês). So, since he said ‘[how could we know] good and bad’, he replies, ‘how could that be possible?’ I suppose perhaps (isôs) it would seem impossible to you [to know that what belongs to Alcibiades belongs to him, without knowing Alcibiades]: Note the solution to the puzzle in the word ‘perhaps’, since it is ‘perhaps’ [5] impossible that the doctor know his belongings, yet not himself. And he states the solution more clearly in what follows: for he says that Alcibiades does not know that his own belongings are Alcibiades’ own, meaning [this in the sense], ‘if he knows them according to their being (ousia), but not in their relation to something else’. [10] Therefore, if we don’t know what belongs to us, how could we know what belongs to our belongings? This is an unnecessary addition (ek perittou), that the person who is ignorant of his own belongings is also ignorant of what belongs to those belongings: for the first [assertion] sufficed; but thanks to [Socrates’] abundance of capacity, he once again points riddlingly here toward the solution [to the puzzle], in the words ‘what belongs to our belongings’ (ta tôn hêmeterôn), since it’s in relation (têi skhesei) to him [that he is ignorant of them]. Then it wasn’t quite right to agree, as we did a few moments ago, [that some people know what belongs to them without knowing themselves, while others know what belongs to their belongings]: Note how he himself, as we pointed out in the survey,⁹⁵⁶ offers an indication of what we said above. For he says that ‘We weren’t right to say that the money-maker and the doctor know their belongings and their belongings’ belongings without knowing themselves: for one and the same person knows me, what’s mine, and what belongs to what’s mine’. Whoever is ignorant of his own belongings [probably won’t know other people’s belongings either]: The second premiss: [it follows] because knowledge of opposites is one and the same.⁹⁵⁷ And he adds the remaining [premiss] and the conclusion, that [such a person] could not be statesman.⁹⁵⁸ Nor could such a man become a statesman: In the conclusion, he raises the tone of the argument by saying that such a man is unable to be a statesman, that is, ‘he is not able to benefit from the good that you have’.⁹⁵⁹ So too the orators, in the climaxes of their speeches, raise the tone of the subjects of their [25] arguments. No, nor a household manager either: The second argument, that <the>⁹⁶⁰ non-statesman cannot be a person of good character nor a household manager: for these differ in their scale, large or small. And if he doesn’t know [what he’s doing], won’t he make mistakes? That is [229,1] to ask: he is miserable, if he cares only for himself, and he makes others miserable, if he cares for others too, and especially if he comes into power. So the way to avoid being miserable is not by getting rich, [but by being self-controlled]: Timaeus conceptually distinguished the divine from the cosmos [Tim. 42E], so that he might gaze down upon the cosmos, which is the sort of thing that needs to be kept distinct from god; and Socrates separated power from philosophy, so that he might gaze down upon [power] [5] as it is, the sort of thing that needs to be separated from the good person (spoudaios). So it’s not walls or triremes [that cities need...] Here he begins the second [sic; third] argument, which states that the statesman knows himself. For he says that ‘We should not pay attention to walls and triremes, then, since these are not causes of well-being (eudaimonein), but of ill-being [10] (kakodaimonein); instead, what the statesman should pay attention to is making his citizens better, <not>⁹⁶¹ richer’. Can one provide what one lacks? The second premiss, that ‘the person who makes people good must be the good person, for he cannot provide what he himself lacks. But if this is true, then you must strive for excellence (aretê)’. [15] Then it is not power (exousia) or authority (arkhê) [to do what you please that you have to secure for yourself or the state, but justice and self-control]: [He means] that [Alcibiades] should not fuss over wealth and power, but over justice and self-control. And he mentioned these excellences because [Alcibiades] possessed the others (since he had practical wisdom, as an organiser of the city’s affairs, and courage, as a general). [And if you and the city] act with justice and self-control:⁹⁶² The third [20] premiss, that the good man is loved by god. With a view to what is divine and bright: Another premiss, that the person who is loved by god knows the divine in himself. And through the word ‘bright’, he pointed to the intelligence [in us] (to noeron); and through what follows, he ranged against them the ‘godless and dark’. And if this [is true], the discussion concerns what is divine and intelligent in the human being, since he [25] also mentioned their contraries: and he contemplates the contraries [i.e., divinity and godlessness, light and dark] in a single subject-matter (en miâi hulêi). Why, then, does he say that the statesman contemplates the divine in himself, since even the person who has mounted to this [level], the purificatory person, does not know the divine in himself? For this belongs properly to the inspired person [230,1] (entheastikos). Well, it is because the divine is threefold: there is the causally divine, the really divine, and the divine by participation.⁹⁶³ But if you act that way, [I am prepared to guarantee your well-being]: After he has shown through the first argument (which stated that the person who is ignorant of himself is miserable, and not only this, but also makes others [5] miserable) – after he has shown by this that badness (kakia) is sufficient for ill-being; and having shown through the second argument (which states that the statesman knows himself) that excellence is sufficient for well-being; [after having shown that,] he says here that ‘I want to guarantee this very point on either argument, that the one [good person] is well off, and the other [bad person] [10] is badly off’. And Socrates is a ‘safe guarantor’ because the one who has knowledge in reasoned arguments (logoi) is a safe guarantor. And the Peripatos accepts one of these [premisses], that badness is sufficient for ill-being, but not the other, because Aristotle,⁹⁶⁴ who adopts a more human perspective (anthrôpinôteron), wants [us] also to need external [goods] for well-being; but Plato accepts both [the premisses]. [15] For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has power to do whatever he wants [but has no intelligence]: At this point he proves [the premiss] that was accepted without a supporting argument: that the [unintelligent] person who has power is more miserable [than the one without power]. And now he constructs a case to support this premiss, from three arguments. [1] The first runs as follows: ‘This person is like a sick person who has no medical insight (nous) and does not obey a doctor; for this person increases their poor health (kakokhumia) by making use of disorderly nourishment’. And we must [231,1] kindle these [ideas] in the soul like [molten] silver, so that they become part of us. With such a tyrant’s power that nobody chastises him: The second [argument], that he is like a tyrant. For those instruments are especially harmful, that cannot be well used: which is also why it was said,
[231] [5] Iron itself attracts a man.⁹⁶⁵
[231] Won’t his body, in all likelihood, be ruined? [Here is] the third [argument], that [in such a case] there is not even power, but powerlessness, because no [genuine] power is destructive to its possessor. And he introduces the example of the pilot, and shows that the person who wields bad power is both miserable and makes others miserable. And before one acquires excellence, it’s better to be ruled [by somebody [10] better]: he constructs the other [supporting case], that excellence is not only free, but also rules (arkhikê): for excellence links itself to god, who is ruler of all, while badness [links itself] with matter, which is ruled by all and is most remote [from full reality].⁹⁶⁶ What follows? Surely the good person (spoudaios) is not a slave to god? Well, this slavery is superior to every [kind of] rule, and [this person], by his slavery, rules over all others: for the condition of being [15] moved by another (heterokinêtos) in this way is better than self-movement (autokinêtos). And therefore he says that it is better to be a slave than a master and ruler who lacks excellence. And the better is also nobler? For it’s been proven that everything beautiful is good, and vice versa.⁹⁶⁷ It suits the bad person to be a slave: So Alcibiades, who wishes to rule over all [20] human beings, has been proven to be a slave, if he fails to strive for excellence. [Shouldn’t we avoid whatever is appropriate for slaves?] –As much as possible, Socrates: He answers readily, because he is naturally suited for rule and so cannot bear slavery. [25] Now do you see what a condition you’re in? Is it appropriate for a free man? For Alcibiades was naturally suited for freedom: that is also why at a meeting of the Athenian Assembly about [public] income, he offered ten talents of his own free will to the council [cf. Plutarch, Alc. 10]. [232,1] [Do you know how to escape from your present state?] Let’s not call it [by name, where a handsome young man is concerned]. The matter is full of what isn’t said, namely, ‘slavishness’: for namelessness is suitable to matter, which is ugly and without form. But [Alcibiades] says, ‘If you are willing, Socrates, I am able to escape’. And Socrates does not accept his reply; for he [5] responds, ‘You haven’t spoken well; instead [you should say] if the god is willing’. For the excellences are human insofar as they are excellences, but as concerned with achieving well-being, they derive from god: thus both [answers] are true, Alcibiades’ and Socrates’. And furthermore I say this as well: [we’re probably going to change roles, Socrates]: At this point, reciprocal love [comes in]: for he says that ‘it’s likely that we’ll exchange the arrangement [of our relationship], as I become the [10] lover, and you the beloved’. And I will certainly begin, from this point forward, [to care] for justice: After he has heard about the stork, he says, ‘I will begin to be just’, because [their] life is just. I should like to think that you will carry this out: ‘I would like you to carry this out, but I am afraid, because you are a lover of the people’. And note, too, how Socrates knows that he will not remain [in this good condition], but that [15] he will move toward the worse. Lest [the state] overcome both me and you: How does the people overcome Socrates as well? The answer is that it will overcome him as a lover, and with his beloved.⁹⁶⁸
[232] Thanks be (kharis) to the god of fulfilment.⁹⁶⁹
[232] Commentary on theAlcibiadesof Plato
[232] [20] from the voice of Olympiodorus the great philosopher.

## Notes

[1] For clarity, I have marked the beginning of the first lecture (praxis) on the Alcibiades here at 3,2, but this division is somewhat arbitrary. The manuscript (M) begins labelling Olympiodorus’ ‘lectures’ with Lecture 2 at 9,20 (praxis sun theôi B). The preceding material may have been delivered as a single lecture that functioned to introduce both Platonic philosophy and the first dialogue in the Platonic curriculum, featuring a brief preamble (1,3–13), the Life of Plato (1,13–3,2) and Olympiodorus’ initial discussion of the Alcibiades itself (3,2–9,19). But the Life has often been treated as a separate work, from its first publication in the Amsterdam edition of Diogenes Laertius in 1692 to Creuzer’s edition of Olymp. in Alc. in 1821, and there is a clear thematic break between the introductory material on Plato (1,3–3,2), on the one hand, and Olympiodorus’ commentary on the Alcibiades proper.
[2] Proclus in Alc. 4–10. The skopos necessarily comes first in the order of seven issues which, for Iamblichus and his successors, must be dealt with ‘before the reading of a text’ (Mansfeld 1994, 10–11, 31, passim; see for example Proclus in Remp. 5.28–7.4): these are, in varying order and emphasis (1) the theme, target, or purpose (skopos) of the dialogue; (2) its position in the corpus (taxis); (3) its utility (khrêsimon); (4) the explanation of its title (aition tês epigraphês); (5) its authenticity (gnêsion); (6) its division into chapters or parts (diairesis); and (7) the genre or part of philosophy to which the treatise belongs (hupo poion meros... anagetai), a heading already used by Origen (Mansfeld 10–11). In the present commentary we find four of these points covered at length: (a) skopos: 3,3–9,19 (b) khrêsimon: 9,20–10,17 (c) taxis: 10,18–11,6 (d) diairesis: 11,7–23 More briefly examined are (7) the genre, at 13,11, and (4) the title, at 3,5–8; the fift h item, authenticity, is omitted by Olympiodorus – oddly, from the perspective of modern scholarship. It is likely that the standard position of this dialogue in the Iamblichean curriculum exempted it from doubt.
[3] Proclus of Athens (412–485 AD) was a prolifically productive teacher, writer, and thinker in later Neoplatonism; for a short introduction to his thought, see Helmig and Steel 2012, and for book-length surveys, Chlup 2012 and Siorvanes 1996. Proclus adopted and developed a systematic philosophy that derived from Iamblichus (c. 245–325 AD), Plutarch of Athens (c. 350–430 AD, not to be confused with the earlier Platonist and biographer), and Syrianus (born in the later fourth century, died 437 AD), with modifications at each point of the way. Proclus’ commentary on the Alcibiades survives in part, and it is clear that Olympiodorus is indebted to it. (An excellent text and translation are available in Segonds 1985–86, and an English translation is available in O’Neill 1965.)
[4] The Second (or Lesser) Alcibiades is today generally regarded as spurious.
[5] 124A.
[6] 131A–C.
[7] Menoeceus voluntarily gave his life to save Thebes, when it was discovered, through Tiresias’ divination, that a youth must be sacrificed in order to appease Ares for the slaughter of the dragon at the foundation of the city. This story is told by Euripides at Phoen. 1009–14.
[8] This is fragment 11 ascribed to Proclus’ Alcibiades commentary, given at O’Neill 1965, 227–8.
[9] Damascius, born around 462 AD in Damascus, became the last head of the Academy in Athens. While adopting a basically Proclan system of Neoplatonism, he also re-examined a number of Proclus’ views. Olympiodorus may have had access to a commentary On the Alcibiades by Damascius.
[10] For this and the following ‘levels’ of philosophical excellence or personhood (civic, purificatory, and contemplative) see the Introduction §2.1. Excellent or virtuous activity in the city or state (polis) – more broadly, as a member of civic society (politikos) – is a grade of human excellence available to the philosopher but unavailable to non-philosophers, whose virtue relies merely on natural endowment (phusikê aretê) and good habits (êthikê aretê). A ‘civically’ excellent person employs both the rational part of the soul (reason, logos) and its non-rational parts (spirited emotion, thumos and appetitive desire, epithumia) in order to operate consistently and effectively in society. One rung ‘above’ the civically excellent philosopher is the philosopher of ‘purificatory excellence’ (kathartikê aretê), who has made his reason (logos) ‘separable’ from the lower two parts of his soul. Adopting the city-state analogy of Republic 2, 368C–369A, a Platonist could regard ‘civic excellence’ (politikê aretê) as primarily referring to the inward organisation of the ‘civic body’ (polis) comprising the three parts of the soul. Thus ‘a good person will look to the constitution (politeia) within him’ (Republic 591E), ‘directing all his efforts to attaining the [best] state of his soul’ (591C), not ‘concerned with “doing his own work” externally, but with what is inside him, what is truly himself and his own’ (443C). Just behaviour in the outward polis would then be of secondary concern, flowing from this inner justice.
[11] Olympiodorus follows the Neoplatonic tradition in regarding emotion and appetitive desire as two faculties of the tripartite soul that require the body as an instrument: for instance, a physical process is a necessary condition for becoming angry or experiencing a strong appetitive desire. (It is not a suffi cient condition, as soul [psukhê] is still the primary agent of these activities.) By contrast, reason (logos) is a faculty of the soul that does not require the body as an instrument; thus the ‘reasoning’ or ‘rational’ soul (logikê psukhê) can be seen as separable from the body.
[12] Cleombrotus of Ambracia was said by Callimachus (Epigram 23) to have thrown himself from his loft y roof after reading ‘that one work by Plato On the Soul ’ (sc. Phaedo). For the ‘chains’ that bind the soul to the living body, see for example Phaedo 67D.
[13] Olympiodorus refers to the theory of a cosmic ‘sympathy’ between parts of the cosmos, especially (for the Neoplatonists) between ontologically ‘higher’ causes and the ‘lower’ effects which proceed from them. The lower effect can ‘return’ to its cause by means of their sympathy (literally ‘shared experience’, sumpatheia) or fundamental similarity: see Proclus Elements of Theology, props. 29, 31. As Olympiodorus suggests below, when an embodied human soul engages in contemplation (theôria) it becomes ‘like’ its higher, purely intellectual form, and thereby ‘ascends’ in a sense to the intelligible world. The theory of sympathy went through several iterations in antiquity. It has an early source in a Stoic view of the cosmos as an animal whose parts are related as organic limbs: the experience of one part of the whole body can be felt in another part of the body. Plotinus’ adaptation of the theory to Neoplatonism can be found, for instance, in Enneads 4.4.32 (‘This One-All, therefore, is a sympathetic total and stands as one living being; the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate parts: talon, horn, finger, and any other member are not continuous and yet are effectively near’, tr. MacKenna 1957). Porphyry continues to develop the idea, although his version of it is criticised by Iamblichus (see De Mysteriis 3.27, 5.7, etc.) In Neopythagorean circles, the acoustic principle of sympathetic resonance or vibration may also have provided a useful metaphor for ‘sympathy’ in the Neoplatonic sense. The Hermetic and alchemical traditions in antiquity also developed the dictum ‘as above, so below’ (e.g. Emerald Tablet 2), which reflects a similar concept of sympathy.
[14] For the later Neoplatonist, the okhêma pneumatikon or ‘pneumatic vehicle’ conveys the psyche while it is ‘divided in association with bodies’ (Proclus in Alc. 4–5; in Olympiodorus’ tetradic terminology, ‘political’): cf. Dodds 1963, App. 2, 315–16. At its most manifest it is a ‘shell-like’ vehicle which conveys the irrational soul (alogos psukhê): cf. 203,10–11 below. The idea of this pneumatic vehicle, which serves to connect the psukhê to the soma and conveys the alogos psukhê, combined Aristotle’s account of the pneuma as ‘analogous to the element comprising the stars’ with Plato’s account of the okhêma or ‘vehicle’ onto which the Demiurge placed the soul: cf. Finamore 1985.
[15] Od. 22.1. Following Plato, Olympiodorus elsewhere connects nakedness with freedom from body, as at in Gorg. 48.1.
[16] The contemplative person has to work at this spiritual exercise by acting (energousa) ‘according to what is most divine’ in his soul; in other words, Olympiodorus presents us with a philosophical Odysseus whose efforts in the realm of theôria lead to his well-being.
[17] At the beginning of Lecture 2, Olympiodorus refers to this reconciliation as the view adopted by ‘the commentators’ (exêgêtai) – that is, contemporary interpreters, presumably including himself.
[18] That is, the two positions are compatible: Damascius’ account of the target (skopos) of the text is a specific version of Proclus’. If I understand the sentence rightly, Olympiodorus is maintaining his general allegiance to Proclus while following Damascius’ more particular view. Damascius may have explicitly contrasted his interpretation with Proclus’, whereas Olympiodorus treats them as congruent.
[19] 118B.
[20] De Flat. 1, 6 92 L.
[21] See Rose 1886, frr. 80; 81. Compare Republic 9, 589A, where Socrates describes the rational element in the tripartite soul (the anthrôpos) as potentially ‘familiarising or reconciling with one another’ the two lower elements, rather than ‘suffering them to bite and fight and devour one another’.
[22] Cf. Olymp. in Gorg. 46.1: ‘Note that aristocracy was at its height among the Pythagoreans. For aristocracy is what makes citizens upright, and people become upright by having their souls perfected. But perfection of the soul does not arise except through life and insight. Nor could insight arise unless one’s life has previously been corrected, for insight does not occur in a soul that is soiled. Consequently, the Pythagoreans used first to purify their life by habituating themselves to sampling the passions with just the tips of their fingers, and so they gave insight to their successors. Hence they lived together in aristocracy’ (tr. Jackson et al. 1998). As Jackson et al. 289 point out, Olympiodorus himself appears to favour the Socratic approach.
[23] Hom. Il. 4.86–103. Athena comes among the Trojans and persuades Pandarus to fire an arrow at the Greek host. By doing so, he breaks the truce by which he swore to abide.
[24] Il. 5.290–6: Diomedes hurls his spear at Pandarus, and Athena guides the point to his tongue.
[25] Proclus describes this approach in more detail at in Alc. 151,16–152,20, especially 152,3–12: ‘Each individual is not to be brought up in the same way, but he who has the natural aptitude to be a philosopher differently from the person inclined to love or music [cf. Phaedrus 248D], and he who, through the picturing of heavenly ease, is wildly excited to pleasure, must be brought up differently from one who, through the desire for self-suffi ciency, yearns for the acquisition of money, and differently again from one who, because of the notion of divine power, is carried away under the influence of the mere appearances of power. For everywhere mere representations clothed in the likeness of their archetypes lead senseless souls astray; whereas they should rise up therefrom and pass over to those true and genuine realities. Such was the method of Socrates’ teaching, to elevate each individual to his appropriate object of desire....’ Below (20,6–10) Olympiodorus adopts a similar line on the education of different types of personality.
[26] Il. 6.138; Od. 4.805.
[27] This paraphrase sets the text of Alcibiades 132D–133C into the appropriate form for the structural exegesis which follows. Compare Phaedrus 255C–E: ‘As a gust of wind, or an echo, bounces off smooth hard surfaces and is carried back to whence it came, so too the stream of beauty goes back [from the lover] to the beautiful boy. It passes through his eyes, which are the natural route to the soul. When it arrives,... it fills the soul of the beloved in its turn with love. He is in love, but he does not know with what;... he has not realised that he has seen himself in his lover, as if in a mirror;... he contains an image of love, a counterlove’ (tr. Denyer 2001, ad Alc. 135E1).
[28] I take Olympiodorus’ point to be that children, and rural people, more often experience visions and inspirations from the gods than city-dwellers do. The sophistication of a cultured, urbane person might be an impediment to inspiration.
[29] Olympiodorus may mean that divine inspiration is not normally consciously analysed, and thinking about it destroys the inspiration. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for this suggestion.
[30] Anth. Pal. 14,73; see below, 31,7, with note.
[31] The verb epistrephei again reflects the crucial idea of ‘turning’ or ‘reversion’ which Olympiodorus introduced briefly at the beginning of the biography (2,16, where Plato is epistrophos of many). The significance of reversion as the means of self-knowledge will be discussed below (10,4); see Lecture 2, with notes, for further details with references to Proclus’ Elements of Theology.
[32] The phrases sun theôi (‘with the favour or help of [the] god’) and sun theois (‘with the favour or help of [the] gods’) had ancient roots in Greek inscriptions and literature (see for example Pindar Nemean 6.24–5). It was common property of pagans and Christians in late antiquity, and the label ‘lecture sun theôi ’, or something like it, occurs for example in Philoponus (e.g. in De An. 450,33), Elias, and David, in addition to Olympiodorus’ lectures. I have not capitalised ‘God’ in English, retaining some ambiguity about which ‘god’ is meant. Olympiodorus’ comments below suggest that he would not reject this label for his lectures (cf. 39,20: ‘in [the Gorgias], with the god’s favour, we will also discover...’, pointing forward to the next course in his own curriculum; the idea that divine support is essential in philosophical education is also familiar in later Neoplatonism).
[33] Here and following, the translations of the lemmata are partially based on D.S. Hutchinson’s translation of the Alcibiades I in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997, 557–95, with changes throughout to bring out Olympiodorus’ specific points about the language. There are also some deviations from the textual tradition of Plato, some explicable by auditory error on the note-taker’s part, some by mistakes in transmission, and some genuinely good readings, as at 110C6 (cf. Dodds 1957, 358). Olympiodorus does not actually comment on this lemma (103A) in Lecture 2, but picks up the subject in Lecture 3.
[34] This gloss may be unnecessary and intrusive, but the point is that Olympiodorus and his contemporaries agree upon the exegesis of the target (skopos) given in Lecture 1. The emphasis on ‘the agreement of the exegetes’ (ton tois exêgêtais aresanta) reflects Olympiodorus’ interest in harmonising the Proclan and Damascian views given above.
[35] Olympiodorus continues through the standard list of issues to tackle at the outset of reading a new text: see again Mansfeld 1994.
[36] Cf. Proclus, El. Theol. pr. 83: ‘all that is capable of self-knowledge is capable of every form of self-reversion’ (pan to heautou gnôstikon pros heauto pantêi epistreptikon estin). (Here and following I cite the Elements of Theology by proposition number and refer to the text of Dodds 1963.) At in Alc. 20, Proclus explains, ‘Now there are three kinds of reversion: everything that reverts either reverts to what is inferior to itself by falling away from its own perfection, or is elevated to what is superior through its own life and natural activity, or reverts upon itself according to the knowledge that is coordinate with itself, and the middle form of movement’ (tr. O’Neill).
[37] For this translation of logos, see note to 15,11 below.
[38] Cf. Proclus El. Theol. p. 195: ‘Every soul is all things, the things of sense after the manner of an exemplar and the intelligible things after the manner of an image’ (tr. Dodds).
[39] Compare Proclus in Alc. 1,3–9: ‘If [our own being] is correctly posited, we shall in every way, I think, be able more accurately to understand both the good that is appropriate to us and the evil that fights against it.’ Proclus goes on to stress that the Alcibiades is especially valuable for this reason.
[40] The Greek noun teleiotês, literally ‘completeness’, is often translated ‘perfection’. In the context of the Greek Mysteries, it can be translated as ‘initiation’. In many of Olympiodorus’ uses of the words teleios and teleiotês, he has in mind a common principle that derives from Aristotle’s theory of entelechy, with Neoplatonic adaptations: each body and soul is engaged in a continual process of coming-to-be from potentiality (dunamis) to actuality (energeia). I have used the English word ‘fulfilment’ to capture this developmental dimension of teleios and teleiotês, although I appreciate that it is not very satisfactory in other respects.
[41] ‘Virtue’ would be a more common translation for aretê, and ‘vice’ for kakia. But the modern language of morality can sit uneasily with the answering Greek terminology, as several of the founding figures of Anglo-American virtue ethics stressed, and I have sometimes preferred to use English terms such as ‘excellence’ that allow for the more basic sense of aretê in earlier Greek literature – in this case excellence of character.
[42] Cf. Gorg. 523C–E, 524C–D; Phaed. 107C–D. See also Olymp. in Gorg. 48–9.
[43] 229E–230A.
[44] Since the Parmenides represents the culmination of the Platonic curriculum and the perfection of understanding of the highest things (theology), as the Alcibiades represents the beginning of the curriculum and the starting-points on self-knowledge. See Introduction §2.1.
[45] The tripartite division of the dialogue into ‘refutation’ (elenktikos, 106C–119A), ‘exhortation’ (protreptikos, 119A–124A), and ‘midwifery’ (maieutikos, 124A–135D; on Socratic ‘midwifery’ see M. Burnyeat, ‘Socratic Midwifery and Platonic Inspiration’, BICS 24 [1977] 7–17) derives from Proclus in Alc. 13–15, who ascribes it to Iamblichus: ‘First therefore comes one section that takes away ignorance from the reason... next after this is placed a part of the dialogue, which proves that we must not be content with physical advantages and so fall short of practices that accord with perfect excellence; and third after these is the part that provides the recollection of our true being and the discovery of the correct treatment, and brings a fitting end to the whole theme of the discussions’ (tr. adapted from O’Neill 1965).
[46] Rhetoric 1.7, 1365a29.
[47] Socrates does not promote any particular doctrine, but ‘elicits’ wisdom from his interlocutor. Since the knowledge comes from within Socrates’ interlocutor, who answers his questions, it is the answerer who ‘speaks’ in the dialogue, not Socrates himself.
[48] The Greek word maia means ‘midwife’, as in the adjective maieutikos (meaning roughly ‘obstetric’, ‘to do with assistance in childbirth’).
[49] For the imagery of ‘pouring wisdom’ into an empty vessel, cf. Phaedr. 235C–D and Symp. 175D–E (which, however, specifically denies that hearing is filling an empty vessel).
[50] Theaet. 150C.
[51] This passage, including the metaphor of the storks who nourish their parents, is drawn from Alc. 135D–E, where Alcibiades proposes a role-reversal (metabolê tou skhêmatos): ‘Let us venture to reverse our arrangement, Socrates, with me taking your part and you mine: for from this day forward I must be your attendant (paidagôgêsô), and you must have me always in attendance on you’; to which Socrates joyfully replies, ‘So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling.’ Compare Symp. 222B, where Alcibiades himself warns that Socrates has allegedly tricked Charmides, Euthydemus, and other youths exapatôn hos erastês paidika mallon autos kathistatai ant’ erastou, ‘by pretending to be their lover [erastês], but he ends up instead as the one that they love [paidika]’. The idea of reciprocity is clearly essential to the Platonic doctrine of erôs, and it is closely allied with the physics of vision; cf. the poetic metaphor of Phaedr. 255C–E, quoted in n. 71 above. This may be taken as a corollary of the Presocratic theory that like perceives like (i.e. percipient becomes like to the perceived).
[52] Phaedr. 257A.
[53] The anecdote about Alexander is puzzling. We may, as Westerink suggests (in Westerink 1982, addenda), have lost a portion of the context. Perhaps the thread of thought ran like this: Socrates, in the preceding sentence, has prayed for his erotic skill not to be disabled by the god. But his erotic skill was, it seems, disabled in Alcibiades’ case, for Alcibiades ‘came to a bad end’ after his actions led to the ravaging of the Athenian army through the Sicilian expedition (Thucydides 6) and subsequent events. Olympiodorus then offers a parenthetical observation about Alexander the Great (he anticipated that someone who brought an army into trouble, would come to a bad end himself).
[54] The following section roughly follows Proclus’ distinction of the divine lover from the ordinary lover in Alc. 34,17–35,20. Westerink also compares Olympiodorus in Gorg. 25.3 (123,5–7). The Greek verb energein can mean sexual intercourse. But to ‘act according to the body’ also might be read in a Neoplatonic technical sense – as in Plotinus, Enn. 3.4, for instance, one might ‘practise’ (energein) the bodily and perceptible level of existence, or a series of loft ier and imperceptible levels of existence, such as the daimonic.
[55] Plato’s ‘Athenian stranger’ offers a similar contrast at Laws 837B–D: ‘The lover of the body, hungry for his partner who is ripe to be enjoyed, like a luscious fruit, tells himself to have his fill, without showing any consideration for his beloved’s character and disposition. But in another case physical desire will count for very little and the lover will be content to gaze upon his beloved without lusting for him – a mature and genuine desire of soul for soul’ (tr. Saunders).
[56] Some Greek philosophers were committed to the idea that character could be evaluated from the signs of physical features (physiognomy); see for example Aristotle Prior Analytics 2.27, 70b7–31. Proclus discusses the relevance of the practice later in his commentary, ad 103B (in Alc. 94,2–15): ‘Socrates saw in Alcibiades many remarkable natural tokens of his suitability... his outward beauty and height were signs of his enterprising... pre-eminence of soul; and to their appearance nature which creates the body attached certain tokens, which Socrates observed and judged the youth to be worthy of attention. This was originally a custom of the Pythagoreans [cf. Iamblichus Vit. Pyth. 17,71], to discern through bodily signs, in those that approached them, their fitness for the better life....’
[57] Phaedrus 238E–240A.
[58] Proclus’ corresponding discussion (in Alc. 47,13–49,12) fills in the contrast and the solution. ‘[T]he end of the indulgent and the moderate person is not the same, but as their habits, so also their ends completely differ; whereas all lovers have the same end, viz. familiarisation with the beautiful, but forgetfulness and ignorance of what is primarily beautiful make the inferior lovers rush down and concern themselves with the kind of beauty that is implicated in matter. As therefore even the lowest beauty has the same name as the primarily beautiful... so also the lowest of lovers claims he same name as the first... ‘We assert that what is more divine, through abundance of power, regulates its inferior derivations and gives to them some reflected semblance of its own specific nature. Now moderation cannot do this... but the inspired friendship of love, since it is more divine than moderation, gives something even to its image... In this respect, then, it receives a share in the same name; for everywhere images desire to share the same appellation as their exemplars’ (tr. O’Neill 1965, lightly adapted).
[59] Literally, ‘colour’ (khrôsai).
[60] This has the ring of a poetic saying, but I have not been able to locate the source. Building on Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium, Olympiodorus stresses that both inspired and vulgar love are kinds of madness with a common goal, ‘birth in beauty’.
[61] Cf. Symp. 206E.
[62] I have generally elected to transliterate, rather than translate, the Greek word daimôn, which can refer to any divine power or apportioner (of destiny). In the later ancient technical sense relevant here, daimôn usually references a ‘spiritual... being inferior to the gods’ (LSJ A II 2). This technical sense owes a good deal to the speech of Diotima in Plato’s Symposium, where Erôs (Love) is described as a daimôn ‘intermediate’ between gods and human beings; the Neoplatonic commentators also drew on Socrates’ discussion of his ‘spiritual sign’ (daimônion). Olympiodorus later (22,3) describes the usage from the Chaldaean Oracles that became customary after Iamblichus (cf. Saffrey 1981, and for the Oracles more generally, Majercik 1989). In the Oracles, the expanse between gods and human souls is filled by angels, daimons and heroes. The later Neoplatonic account of the ‘chain of being’, deriving from Iamblichus, can be outlined as follows, although the complete chain is more complex: God (The One, to hen); gods (unities, henades) Archangels Angels Daimons Heroes Souls In such a scheme ‘daimons’ lie ‘below’ finer beings such as angels, archangels, and finally gods, but ‘above’ heroes and human souls. Olympiodorus comments shortly (21,15–22,5) on the now ‘customary’, Christian usage of ‘angel’ in a way that, in his view, best accords with the philosophers’ use of daimôn. It is diffi cult to locate an exact English equivalent for daimôn which is not somehow misleading. The typical connotations of ‘demon’ and ‘spirit’ are either too pejorative or too broad; ‘angel’ is best reserved for the Greek angelos and the Neoplatonic entity called by that name, and ‘divinity’ is best reserved for words associated with theos.
[63] It is a general rule of Neoplatonic metaphysics that causes are ‘better’ than their effects, in the sense of ontological superiority and independence, and also in the sense of value (see Proclus El. Theol. pr. 7, and further discussion below). See also Proclus’ corresponding discussion at in Alc. 62,8–63,11.
[64] For the following account of daimons (demonology), see also Proclus in Alc. 73,16–75,1.
[65] A diagram in the margins of the manuscript offers a helpful illustration of the three kinds of daimons discussed here. Here is a lightly augmented version (with added detail in square brackets): Analogical daimons are so Causally (kat’ aitian) [These are gods] Essential daimons are so Really (kath’ huparxin) [These are daimons proper] Relational daimons are so by Participation (kata’ methexin) These are the souls of those who have lived well.
[66] Compare Proclus De Mal. Subst. 17, where Proclus distinguishes entities that are daimons by nature (phusei) from those that are daimons by relation or disposition (skhesei); the latter, notably, can change. Opsomer and Steel (2003, 112) explain, ‘The latter are souls that have succeeded in ascending to a demonic pattern of life. Whereas someone’s nature is unalterable, one’s acquired behaviour may very well change.’ In addition to Proclus in Alc. 73,16–75,1, Opsomer and Steel point out a number of helpful comparanda: in Tim. 3,158,22–159,7; in Crat. 117, p. 68,13–19 Pasq.; 74, pp. 35,27–36,6; and in Remp. 1,41,11–25. They also note that Theodorus of Asine offers this distinction at in Tim. 3,154,19–24.
[67] To follow Olympiodorus’ argument here and following, it might be helpful to consider how the term ‘house’ could be applied to (1) the architect’s blueprint for a house, (2) the completed house itself, and (3) an artist’s later sketch of the same house. On the Olympiodorean scheme, the term applies properly to the middle term – (2) the built house – and only ‘analogically’ or ‘metaphorically’ to (1) the blueprint. It could also be used for (3) the later sketch, but only in a dependent way, in virtue of its ‘relation’ to the house itself. Olympiodorus’ hierarchy of daimons is similar: (1) ‘analogical’ daimons are like the blueprint, containing the formulas of (2) the essential daimons, which are in turn like the house itself; (3) ‘relational’ daimons are like the sketch, representations of the real thing. There is an important difference, however: here, the ‘blueprint’ is not merely a plan in the architect’s mind, but the paradigmatic or exemplary cause of the next term. (Compare the notion of ‘exemplary excellence’ in the Introduction §2.1.)
[68] For the underlying metaphysical triad, see for example Proclus El. Theol. pr. 65: ‘All that subsists in any fashion has its being either in its cause, as an originative potency; or as a substantial predicate; or by participation, in the manner of an image.’
[69] The Greek noun logos is notoriously diffi cult to translate. It can refer to language, reason or rationality, and in Neoplatonic ontology, a ‘reason-principle’ or ‘formative principle’ that conveys a timeless Platonic Form in intellect (nous) to soul (psukhê), and finally to fruition in nature (phusis). I have tried the English noun ‘formula’ here (and above, 10,8), since it imperfectly gestures toward the concepts of a verbal formula (OED 1c), a prescription or recipe (OED 2), and (through its etymology) a form. In the Neoplatonist sense relevant in this passage, a ‘superior’ cause contains in a seminal way the ‘reason-principles’ or ‘formulas’ that will come to fruition in its effect. For instance, intellect (nous) contains the Form of a human being in a seminal way, and that Form flowers as particular human beings. Similarly here, the gods (or ‘analogical’ daimons) contain as if in a seed the principles of ‘essential’ daimons, who are manifest that seminal potential. For the illustrative imagery of a seed, which the Neoplatonists adopted from the Stoics, see for example Plotinus Enn. 3.2.2,18–23: ‘... just as in the formative principle (logos) in a seed all the parts are together and in the same place, and none of them fights with any other... then something comes to be in bulk, and the different parts are in different places... so from intellect (nous) which is one, and the formative principle (logos) which proceeds from it, this All has arisen and separated into parts’ (tr. Armstrong 1988, lightly adapted). See also Proclus in Parm. 754,10–14.
[70] The Neoplatonic rule that ‘every productive cause is superior to that which it produces’, Proclus El. Theol. pr. 7. For the distinction between a property possessed causally (kat’ aitian) and existentially (kath’ huparxin), consider fire as an illustration: if I sit near a fire for an hour, the fire and I are both ‘hot’. But the fire is hot as a cause (kat’ aitian), and has to be present first in order for me to be heated.
[71] Isocrates 1.13. Olympidorous’ choice of citations is interesting. He is happy to use Isocrates (though he is hardly a Platonist) as an authority, presumably because he testifies to classical usage and has an important place in the rhetorical curriculum. In To Daimonikos (1.13), Isocrates exhorts a young man, coincidentally named Daemonicus, to demonstrate devotion to the gods (theoi) by sacrifice and maintenance of one’s vows. He goes on to advise Daemonicus to honour to daimonion, ‘the daimonic power’, at all times, but particularly in civic festivals; in context, daimonion seems to refer to the gods of the state, whom Olympiodorus is discussing as higher powers, or ‘daimons by analogy’.
[72] Throughout the translation, I have usually lightly adapted Richmond Lattimore’s translation of passages from Homer’s Iliad (Lattimore 1951) and James Huddelston’s translation of passages from Homer’s Odyssey for the Chicago Homer (Huddleston 2006), with modifications to suit Olympiodorus’ use of the texts.
[73] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 74,5–6; fr. 155 Kern; Kern cites Proclus in Crat. 27,21. Olympiodorus’ point here is that the gods (theoi) are often called ‘daimons’ by analogy, although they are truly greater than daimons.
[74] Works and Days 122–3.
[75] This might be a subtle gesture toward the view, originating with the Stoics, that human beings share ‘common concepts’ (koinai ennoiai) that are basically true, such as the ‘concept’ that divine beings exist. For Olympiodorus’ use of common concepts, see below, 18,3–4 (‘we know certain things... even without demonstration’ by means of common concepts), 40,20, and in Gorg. 44.7. See also Tarrant 1997, 189–91 and for the role of the common concepts in Neoplatonism more broadly, see van den Berg 2009; for the form of the ‘argument from consensus’ in antiquity and the common concepts more generally, see Obbink 1992 and Brittain 2005.
[76] I have structured and numbered the following lengthy and complex sentence to show the structure of the thought more plainly in English. There are many parenthetical clauses in the Greek and the syntax is interrupted in several places (16,11; 17,4); this might reflect Olympiodorus’ speech or the note-taker’s process. A more direct translation would run roughly as follows. Just as our soul, streaming with life, bubbling over with it, and unable to exist without engendering life (zôopoiein), (there are times when it is inactive with respect to the cognitive [faculties] (kata tas gnôstikas), for instance when it is overcome by lethargy, but with respect to the life-engendering (zôtikos) [part] this is never the case), since the shell-form body was not always attached to it, the ovoid (ôioeidês) vehicle, or luminous (augoeides) vehicle, was invented (epenoêthê) for it, (for it goes by both names: [it is called] ‘ovoid’ on account of its shape (skhêma), for it is not altogether spherical like the heavenly [bodies], but less and it is called ‘luminous’ from its essence (ousias), because it is transparent and aetherial); and so, just as they assigned this luminous vehicle to the soul, in order for our souls are not always fastened to them on account of our shedding our This [daimonic race], then, being intermediary, is the interpreter for [people] here [on earth] of [messages] from the gods.
[77] The soul’s capacity of generating life is fundamental, and always active: indeed, the usual Greek word for ‘alive’ is empsukhos, literally ‘having soul in it’. (As Plato’s Socrates argues in the Phaedo (102B–107B), one cannot imagine a soul without life). The soul’s capacities for consciousness and cognition are treated as ‘stacking’ on top of elementary capacities like life, growth, and sensitivity to the environment; the ‘lower’ functions can continue while the ‘higher’ functions rest.
[78] In later Neoplatonist thought, as a soul descends into embodied existence, it ‘collects’ a series of envelopes or vehicles on the way; as the soul reascends, these vehicles are sequentially left behind in their natural spheres. The highest vehicles are extremely rare and fine; in fact, the highest of all is simply pure light, a ‘luminous vehicle’ that Proclus identified with place (topos) (see Griffi n 2012, 161–86). The lower vehicles are increasingly dense, and come with various functions and limitations. For an overview of the theory of the soul’s vehicle in Neoplatonism, especially in the theory’s seminal form in Iamblichus, see Finamore 1985; for the theory in Proclus see Chlup 2012, 104–5 and Siorvanes 1996, 131–3.
[79] This refers to the ‘sowing’ or ‘implanting’ of each human soul into a star at Timaeus 41D–E. Olympiodorus’ plural (‘they assigned’) suggests that he has the ‘young gods’ in mind here, although in the Timaeus the Demiurge himself implants souls in stars. Later (42E–47E), the young gods develop bodies for the souls; for the Neoplatonist, these natural bodies would be the final step after a series of layers of denser ‘vehicles’, descending from the luminous vehicle (see previous note).
[80] For this notion, and the discussion that follows, see Plato Symposium 202E, where Love is a great daimon located between (metaxu) the divine and the mortal.
[81] Thus each heavenly being contains a more or less complete ‘chain of being’, reaching from the One (the peak of the Neoplatonic ontology) all the way ‘down’ to the pure potentiality of Matter.
[82] For the following discussion, see also Proclus in Alc. 71,3–72,12.
[83] The Neoplatonists maintained that common concepts (koinai ennoiai) must precede and lie beyond demonstration. This has common Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic roots; compare for example Aristotle’s position (An. Post. 1.2) that every process of proof must begin from the indemonstrable (anapodeikton).
[84] Od. 3.27. In this passage, Athena replies to Telemachus, who wonders how he can greet Nestor, that he will find a plan in his own mind (phrenes) or a daimon will put it there. This Homeric passage, together with Od. 19.138 below, are also cited by Proclus in Remp. 2.298, 24–7.
[85] Od. 19.138. Penelope describes how she came by her strategy to set up a great web and weave, to delay her suitors.
[86] The source of this saying is unclear.
[87] Westerink compares Orphic fr. 353 Kern and Chaldaean Oracles p. 10 Kroll.
[88] See above, 17,12–13.
[89] The reference probably points to Iliad 14.279, where those under Tartarus are called ‘Titans’, though our standard text of Homer reads slightly differently: tous hupotartarious hoi Titênes kaleontai.
[90] Compare Proclus in Alc. 72,12–73,8.
[91] The Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus was represented by his pupil Porphyry as having such a divine daimon (Life of Plotinus 10.15–25): ‘An Egyptian priest who came to Rome... asked Plotinus to come and see a visible manifestation of his own daimon evoked. Plotinus readily consented... When the daimon was summoned to appear a god came and not a being of the daimonic order, and the Egyptian said, “Blessed are you who have a god for your daimon and not a companion of the subordinate order” ’ (tr. Armstrong 1966). Olympiodorus also suggests (below, 21,5) that Socrates’ daimon was divine.
[92] In this discussion there are aspects of various Platonic views, including the Phaedrus myth (246Aff.), where souls follow in the train of specific gods, and the ‘chains of inspiration’ in the Ion, where poets are inspired through chains suspended from the gods. But in the context of this discussion of our ‘allotted daimon’, the thought here about the possibility of ascent by following a divine example may also owe a debt to Plotinus, Enneads 3.4 (‘On our allotted daimon’). For example, at 3.4.3, 21–4, Plotinus explains that ‘if a human being is able to follow the daimôn which is above him, he comes to be himself above, living that daimôn’s life, and giving the dominion to that better part of himself to which he is being led; and after that spirit he rises to another, until he reaches the heights. For soul (psukhê) is many things, and all things, both those above and those below [cf. Aristotle DA 3.6–7], down to the limit of all life, and we are each an intelligible cosmos (kosmos noêtos), making contact with this lower world by the powers of soul below, but with the intelligible world by its powers above, and the powers of the cosmos’ (tr. Armstrong 1967, adapted).
[93] The thought here draws, among other sources, on a number of Platonic dialogues: the notion that we are all linked to a certain god in our nature and for our inspiration draws on the Ion and the Phaedrus, for instance, while the insistence that each person ‘does his own work’ is indebted to Republic (see for example 435B, 443D–E).
[94] See Proclus in Alc. 78,7–82,8.
[95] Cf. 39,1–3 below.
[96] As mentioned above, Plotinus was said to have a god for a daimon (Life of Plotinus 10.15–25), an important hagiographical point for Neoplatonists that may lie in the background in this account of Socrates. On the hagiographies of Neoplatonic philosophers, see for example M.J. Edwards, Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students (Liverpool, 2000).
[97] The ‘guardian’ of Alcibiades, to whom Socrates compares his divine guardian, is the celebrated Athenian statesman Pericles (124C).
[98] For cases of Socrates’ ‘hearing’ the divine voice, see for example Phaedrus 242C (where the voice prevents Socrates from leaving before he offers a ‘palinode’ to love, countering his earlier speech), and Theages 128D–129C (where the voice intervenes when Charmides plans to train for a race at Nemea, and again when Timarchus is about to leave a banquet, and the departure leads to his death).
[99] As again below, this phrase signals the popular religion of Christianity. See Introduction §1.2.
[100] Westerink (1990, 335) comments that ‘the last clause is not quite clear; Olympiodorus may mean that the phrase was usually addressed to monks’. The marginal comment in the manuscript, which dates to the ninth century, paraphrases ‘may your angel be disposed in such-and-such a way (toward you), if you do this’.
[101] Perhaps a gentle pun on Plato’s name; compare 2,35–41 above.
[102] The Chaldaean Oracles are a collection of hexameter verses ‘purported to have been “handed down by the gods” to a certain Julian the Chaldaean and/or his son, Julian the Theurgist, who flourished during the early second century AD’ (Majercik 1989, 1). They were deeply influential on later Neoplatonists from Porphyry (c. 232–303 AD) to Damascius (c. 462–537 AD); they have been called the ‘Bible of the Neoplatonists’ (Majercik 1989, 2–3). Especially important work on the Neoplatonists’ relationship to the Oracles was done by H.-D. Saffrey; see for example Saffrey 1981.
[103] Westerink compares Chaldaean Oracles p. 44 Kroll = frr. 88–9 Des Places, which discusses problematic, material daimons that ‘draw down souls’ and are ‘turned toward nature’ (tên phusin epistrephomenon); cf. Majercik 1989, 82–5.
[104] Cf. Symp. 178A, 189C, 195A, 202D. The Greek noun erôs can be translated as love in the sense of passionate desire.
[105] Orph. fr. 82 Kern.; cf. Proclus 65,1.
[106] Epicharmus, fr. 12 Diels.
[107] That is, Christianity.
[108] Perhaps an oblique allusion to the risks that Olympiodorus might face for lecturing on religious matters at odds with the position of the state. See Introduction §1.
[109] Olympiodorus, with his usual diplomacy, is interpreting the doctrine of daimons in ethical terms that are familiar and welcome to a Christian audience, and unlikely to provoke dissent and criticism (cf. Introduction §1). His gentle allusion to the condemnation of Socrates is a nice touch.
[110] akron aôton: see Callimachus, in Apoll. 112.
[111] The adjective anamartêtos literally means ‘without (an) error, fault, or sin (hamartia)’. It might imply either infallibility or moral blamelessness; the latter is more likely here.
[112] For the judgement of Minos and Rhadamanthys in Plato, see for example Gorgias 523Aff. and Apology 41A.
[113] For the use of ‘recoil’, or ‘rolling back up’ (aneillein), compare Symp. 206D, where Diotima explains that ‘... whenever pregnant animals or persons draw near to beauty, they become gentle or joyfully disposed and give birth and reproduce; but near ugliness they are foul faced and draw back in pain; they turn away and coil back up (aneilletai) and do not reproduce...’ (tr. Nehamas and Woodruff, lightly adapted).
[114] The Greek pros to deon (‘toward what is right or necessary to do’) echoes a passage of Plutarch: worse souls are driven pros to deon by the daimôn using metameleia (change of purpose, repentance) and shame (On the Daimonion 592C). Olympiodorus nowhere else talks about turning back pros to deon, although he does often use the phrase pros to theion, that is ‘to the divine’ (e.g. in Grg. 26.18, in Alc. 18,1). With Plato’s Symposium in the air, it is almost tempting to read pros to theion here instead of the MSS reading deon.
[115] Pindar, fr. 214 Schroeder = Republic 1, 331A.
[116] Supplied by Westerink 1982, v, comparing Damascius in Phaed. 1.271 (with his note).
[117] That is, the Greek noun suneidos can mean (1) a genus ‘consciousness’, as well as (2) cognitive consciousness (in English, ‘understanding’) concerned with true and false, a species of that genus, and (3) moral consciousness (in English, ‘conscience’), another species of the genus which has just been discussed above. One might bring this out in English by translating (1) the genus ‘awareness’, (2) its cognitive species ‘intellectual awareness’, and (3) its moral species ‘moral awareness’.
[118] I have added this line to mark the transition from the theôria (survey) to the lexis (line—by-line commentary), maintaining consistency with these delineations in later lectures.
[119] See Proclus in Alc. 24,10–27,12. Proclus suggests (1) that the use of Alcibiades’ father’s name renders him more accommodating to Socrates, thanks to Clinias’ fame; (2) that reminding Alcibiades of Clinias’ excellence is a good tactic for exhorting him to excellence in his own right; and (3) in a metaphysical register, that the reminder of Alcibiades’ father ‘is a symbol of the reversion of souls to their invisible causes’.
[120] Hom. Il. 10.68–9.
[121] The battle of Coronea was fought in 447 BC between the Delian League led by Athens, and the Boeotian League, as part of the First Peloponnesian War. It is described by Thucydides (1.113) and Herodotus (8.17), who also notes the bravery of Alcibiades’ father: Cleinias brought to the war two hundred men and a ship at his own expense. Cleinias’ participation is also mentioned by Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 1, who describes how Alcibiades subsequently came to be the ward of Pericles.
[122] Cf. Plato Phaedrus 238C.
[123] Hom. Il. 6.209. The saying occurs during Glaucus’ meeting with Diomedes on the battlefield, which results in both heroes going their separate ways. Glaucus reports the instructions of his father Hippolochus, which includes this commandment alongside the famous instruction aien aristeuein (‘always to excel’).
[124] Compare Socrates’ suggestion at Phaedrus 271A–272B that the true orator must first recognise and distinguish the different types of souls of his audience, before attempting to persuade them.
[125] Cf. Theaetetus 155D.
[126] As Westerink points out, this is the first of the traditional definitions of philosophy (see Ammonius Isagoge 2,22–3; Elias 8,30–1; David 20,27). The study of ‘being qua being’ is one of Aristotle’s celebrated definitions of first philosophy (metaphysics) in Metaphysics G (4), E (6), and K (11).
[127] So Hesiod Theogony 265–6 and 780 describes the parentage of Iris (the Rainbow).
[128] This rather mystifying remark might, with Westerink, be a very liberal reminiscence of Aristotle Metaphysics A 2, 983a12–20 (describing the ‘wonder’ provoked by various real phenomena, including geometrical phenomena such as the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square).
[129] Cf. Demosthenes 19.136. Philip was informed ‘that a democracy is the most unstable and capricious thing in the world, like a restless wave of the sea ruffl ed by the breeze as chance will have it. One man comes, another goes; no one attends to, or even remembers, the common weal’ (tr. Vince). Olympiodorus’ compressed point is just this: if it is insulting to call the ‘people’ of a state a ‘mob’, then a mob is worse than the people.
[130] So also Proclus in Alc. 46,13–47,12.
[131] The genitive measuring time within which or during which is a classical usage that felt unfamiliar or archaic to Olympiodorus’ sixth-century AD audience.
[132] That is, the Greek word kai is not functioning here as a conjunction like ‘and’, and plays no role in the meaning of the clause (I have positioned the English ‘too’ to suggest the ambiguity). As Denyer 2001 points out ad loc. (103A6), the words (kai husteron...) are an idiomatic formula in Plato for ‘dropping a subject’ for the time being, for example at Symp. 175E, ‘We’ll sort this out kai oligon husteron.’ Denyer paraphrases the Greek, ‘you will have another opportunity to ask about it later, and therefore we will not discuss it now’, and observes that Socrates never seems to return to the subject explicitly in Alc.; Olympiodorus, on the other hand, as the next paragraph shows, thinks the promise is fulfilled shortly, at Alc. 105E–106A.
[133] On Alcibiades’ advice to Sparta to fortify Deceleia in Attica, an important symbolic and strategic turning-point against his own city of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, see Plutarch Life of Alcibiades 23.
[134] In about 432 BC (just before the Peloponnesian war broke out in 431) Athens imposed controversial economic sanctions on the city of Megara, preventing Megarians from accessing the markets of the Athenian Empire. Although the ostensible motives for the decree were not economic or military, the decree has been viewed as Pericles’ deliberate provocation of Sparta (with which Megara was allied), or conversely as a pretext for Sparta to go to war (cf. Thucydides 1.139).
[135] Cf. Plutarch Life of Alcibiades 7: Alcibiades hears that Pericles is busy considering how to render his accounts to the Athenians, and comments that it would be better if Pericles did not have to render his accounts at all. The famous statue of Athena Parthenos by Pheidias was regarded as one of the greatest images of antiquity, and, like the rest of Pericles’ building project on the Acropolis, it was not an inexpensive enterprise.
[136] On the eve of the Athenian military expedition to Syracuse in Sicily (415 BC), which Alcibiades was slated to command, allegations were levelled by his political rivals that he had defaced the sacred images of Hermes (herms) and mimicked the Eleusinian mysteries (cf. Plutarch Life of Alcibiades 19, Thucydides 6.53). The result was that Alcibiades was recalled in mid-voyage to Sicily; but instead of returning to Athens to stand trial, he defected to Sparta. The Athenian expedition was ultimately routed and destroyed at Syracuse; whether the result would have been different under Alcibiades’ military leadership has been a subject for speculation since antiquity.
[137] The following explanations substantially compress Proclus’ corresponding discussion at in Alc. 86,7–92,3. Proclus expressly sets out the constraints on a viable solution: it must vindicate both the daimonion and Socrates in allowing the conversation to take place, and it must show that Alcibiades benefits from the conversation. The answers in play, in brief, are: (1) Alcibiades would have done worse if he had not spent time with Socrates (attributed to unnamed parties); (2) Alcibiades was good only as long as he was with Socrates (attributed to Xenophon, and also the view expressed by Alcibiades himself in Plato’s Symposium); but (3) the daimonion still allowed Socrates to converse with Alcibiades, not out of ignorance or the ‘unpredictability’ of human choice, but with regard to the whole cycle of multiple lives (endorsed by Proclus).
[138] Platonists used solar imagery to convey the boundless compassion of the Good or the One, which can and does overflow throughout the entire chain of being without diminishing itself (see for example Plotinus Enn. 5.3.12,33–53). That imagery has roots in Plato’s own analogy of the Good with the Sun (Republic 6, 508C).
[139] There is support for this explanation in Socrates’ comment that he will do philosophy with anyone he meets, ‘young and old, foreigner and citizen’, without discrimination (30A). But universal care does not explain why Socrates would especially follow Alcibiades about (e.g. Protagoras 309A, Symposium 213C), not least if Alcibiades proves to be a faulty subject of his attention. Perhaps a Neoplatonist would reply that only the highest principles can reach the lowest (compare Olympiodorus’ remarks on the ‘Proclan rule’ at in Alc. 109,18–110,15). Thus the lower Alcibiades ‘tumbles’ in the hierarchy of being, the more Socrates must reach out to rescue him. (In a metaphysical register, Socrates represents the ‘intellect of the soul’, and Alcibiades represents the soul’s capacity for reason, which may be confused in the sea of temporality and materiality: cf. Proclus in Alc. 43,7–10, and Griffi n 2014b.)
[140] There may be a problem with the text here; I have suggested a sentence that I think gives the right sense.
[141] Olympiodorus elides two possible solutions distinguished by Proclus (whose corresponding discussion is at in Alc. 86,7–87,2): that Socrates actually did make Alcibiades better, since he would presumably have become even worse without Socrates’ aid (a view attributed to unnamed sources); and that Alcibiades was good just as long as he was with Socrates, but declined when he left his company (which is Xenophon’s main point at Mem. 1.2.24–5).
[142] Ancient Platonists developed a more or less systematic picture of the transmigration of souls, in dialogue with Platonic texts such as the ‘Myth of Er’ (Republic 10, 614A–621D), the myth of the winged soul (Phaedrus 246A–249D), and the myth of the soul’s judgement (Gorgias 523A–527A). Upon moving on from this embodied, human existence, the soul of Alcibiades would have proceeded to the waystation portrayed in the Myth of Er for judgement, purification if necessary, and eventually the voluntary choice of a new life.
[143] Hom. Il. 5.201.
[144] Proclus stresses that the divine remains just where it is, and it is actually we who change and approach the god, even if the god seems to us (‘in invocations and visions’, 92,8–10) to approach us. He also suggests that Socrates might treat Alcibiades as similar to a statue of the divine, approaching visible beauty as a sacred ‘image’ (agalma) of intelligible beauty (in Alc. 92,10–16): ‘As those who are skilled in theurgy reverence even the images of the gods evident to our senses, so also the perfect lover pursues even the image of divine beauty that has proceeded to the lowest levels, as depending therefrom’ (tr. O’Neill 1965). This imagery has roots in Plato’s Phaedrus, where the lover treats his beloved like a sacred image (agalma) of a god (252D–E). Olympiodorus does not mention the analogy from theurgy here, possibly because he is sensitive to the concerns of his Christian audience, although in general Olympiodorus’ discussion is simply more compressed.
[145] This seems slightly puzzling, but see Proclus 92,16–18, who explains that ‘the term “good hope” (euelpis) endears (oikeioi) the young man to [Socrates] in an amazing way (for to call help given to Alcibiades “good hope” on his own part is surely altogether endearing)’ (tr. O’Neill 1965, modified).
[146] The quote appears in Vatican Gnomology 375, published by Leo Sternbach in Wiener Studien 11 (1889), 54–5 (but there attributed to Anacreon); in Stobaeus 4.47.12 (attributed to Pindar), in Diogenes Laertius 5.18 (attributed to Aristotle), in Aelian VH 13.29 (attributed to Plato), and in Olympiodorus in Phaed. 39,11–12.
[147] Proclus explains: ‘to allow him at all is evidence that Alcibiades was not altogether disinclined to good offi ces on Socrates’ part. So the more the young man advanced as a result of philosophical discussion, the more Socrates considered the daimonic power would assist him toward his love’ (see in Alc. 93,7–10).
[148] The Greek is neanikôtatos, literally ‘youngest’, ‘freshest’, but perhaps (as with Denyer ad loc.) here ‘vigorous’ or ‘brash’. Later, it will be the antiquity of Socrates’ and Alcibiades’ lineages that will be playfully boasted (cf. Alc. 121A).
[149] This was Olympiodorus’ focus in Lecture 2.
[150] The device is called ‘chiasmus’ for the Greek letter khi (written X). It runs: AB BA In the Homeric example that follows, ‘Laodameia’ ends the line at Iliad 6.197, and begins line 198. Compare Olymp. in Meteor. 124,5.
[151] Il. 6.197–8.
[152] Antisthenes fr. 14 Mullach.
[153] Iliad 2.673–4.
[154] Thucydides 2.65.9.
[155] Eupolis fr. 94,3 Kock; cf. Westerink 1966.
[156] See above, 6,6–7.
[157] In the following part of the lecture, Olympiodorus argues that Socrates praises Alcibiades’ natural excellence (phusikê aretê) in order to prepare him for a criticism of his lack of higher, philosophical grades of excellence, and to help him to advance to those grades, beginning with civic excellence (politikê aretê). See Introduction §2.1.
[158] Phaedo 69B.
[159] Hippolytus 352.
[160] The text is corrupt at 31,1, but I translate Westerink’s conjectural emendation of M’s protreptên to propetê (from propetês, ‘precipitate, reckless, out of control’). I am grateful to Carlos Steel for this suggestion, and for helping me through this diffi cult passage.
[161] That is, no human being is entirely independent, and Alcibiades’ vanity makes him especially dependent on (the evaluations of) others. Many ancient philosophical schools regarded self-suffi ciency (autarkeia) as a feature of the good life. Withdrawal from, or moderation of, the pleasures of the sense-sphere could be an important instrument in achieving it. For example, the Epicureans pursued self-suffi ciency in moderation (Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus 127–32, LS 21B: ‘We also regard self-suffi ciency as a great good, not with the aim of always living off little, but to enable us to live off little if we do not have much’), while the Stoics argued that ethical excellence or virtue (aretê) alone was suffi cient for the good life (Cicero Tusc. 5.40–1, 81–2 = LS 63 LM), allowing a good person to be wholly self-suffi cient.
[162] The allusion is to a verse allegedly delivered from the Oracle at Delphi (Anth. Pal. 14.73): when it came to determining the best people of Hellas, the Megarians were ‘out of the reckoning’ – we should say ‘not even in the running’. The idea is an old one in the Socratic and Platonic tradition, that by obsessing over external goods we devalue our own soul. For this idea in the Alcibiades itself, as well as Plato and Xenophon, see Introduction §3.2–3; for its Neoplatonic adaptation, see for example Plotinus Enn. 5.1[10] 1–3.
[163] From the Fift eenth Epigram ascribed to Plato (15,3–4 Diehl), Greek Anthology 6.1. The full epigram runs, ‘I, Laïs, who laughed so disdainfully at Greece and once kept a swarm of young lovers at my door, dedicate this mirror to the Paphian – for I do not wish to see me as I am, and cannot see me as I was’ (tr. Edmonds, rev. Cooper and Hutchinson 1997). Many of the epigrams in the collection attributed to Plato treat similar themes. For example, ‘I throw the apple at you, and if you are willing to love me, take it and share your girlhood with me; but if your thoughts are what I pray they are not, even then take it, and consider how short-lived is beauty’ (Epigram 7, Greek Anth. 5.79).
[164] Proclus expands on the limited value of ancestry at in Alc. 112,19–113,1: ‘Of such nobility of birth [from the divine], that according to natural succession is a mere image, concentrating whereon souls are filled with an empty arrogance, not recognising this very saying in the Theaetetus that there is nothing surprising if “one who prides himself on a list of twenty-five ancestors” should in the course of unlimited generations be, more remotely, descended from slaves. All such matters admit of many variations, but the stable and eternal nobility of birth in souls depends upon the gods around whom they have been sown...’ (tr. O’Neill 1965). Compare Theaetetus 175A: ‘[E]very single man has countless hosts of ancestors, near and remote, among whom are to be found, in every instance, rich men and beggars, kings and slaves, Greeks and foreigners, by the thousand. When men pride themselves upon a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, and trace their descent back to Heracles the son of Amphitryon, they seem to him to be taking a curious interest in trifles.’
[165] See Iamblichus Vit. Pyth. 29.162. Westerink also compares Diogenes Laertius 8.10, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 8.7, 1157b36, and Eudemian Ethics 7.6, 1240b2 and 1241b13.
[166] Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a31–32: ‘the good person... is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self)’. Westerink also compares Eudemian Ethics 7.12, 1245a30, and ps.-Aristotle Magna Moralia 2.15, 1213a13.
[167] Gorgias 515C–516D.
[168] Aristides was an Athenian statesman of the generation before Pericles, and he was reputed for good and just leadership; for example, Socrates remarks on his fairness at Gorgias 526A–B, and Plutarch wrote a Life about him. On the attribution of this reference to ‘the comic’, see Westerink 1996, 175–6.
[169] On the common concepts, see above, 18,3 with note. Olympiodorus’ point is that there is always some degree of truth in our conceptual framework: our ‘common concepts’ are never completely divorced from reality.
[170] Throughout the following discussion, Olympiodorus argues that Alcibiades always had in mind some higher, intelligible reality (like the true Form of Beauty) even as he mistakenly took an illusory image for the reality – and so he was not entirely in error.
[171] For this image of ‘fighting over shadows’, or ‘shadow-boxing’, see Republic 7, 520C–D, a reflection on Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Philosophers who revisit the ‘cave’ would find there ‘cities inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream by people who fight one another for shadows’, unless philosophers who have seen the truth are able to bring about a change. See also below, 42,14–15.
[172] Hom. Il. 5.451–3. At this point in the narrative, Aeneas has just been wounded, and Apollo whisks him to safety and replaces him in the battle with an image or phantom (eidôlon).
[173] Cf. Timaeus 28A–29A: ‘But whenever the Demiurge looks at what is always changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were he to look at a thing that has come to be and use as his model something that has been begotten, his work will lack beauty’ (tr. Zeyl in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997).
[174] Reading hen, hênôtai after Westerink. I understand Olympiodorus to refer here to the hypostasis ‘the One’, the highest grade of reality among the classical Neoplatonic hypostases ‘One, Intellect, Soul’. The One, which lies properly beyond being, is the principle of the good and unification of all beings: see Proclus, Elements of Theology propositions 1–13, especially 11–12.
[175] For this episode see Plutarch Life of Alcibiades 10. In terms of purchasing power, ten Athenian talents would equal roughly 200,000 dollars in early twenty-first-century American currency.
[176] See Republic 440B–C.
[177] For the following discussion, compare Proclus in Alc. 97,15–98,10.
[178] Referring to 14,20–6 above. Taking prôên literally (it can mean ‘the day before yesterday’, LSJ A II), this might imply that Lecture 4 was delivered two days after Lecture 3. If that spacing was typical, it is tempting to speculate that Olympiodorus might have delivered the course of twenty-eight lectures at a rate of about three per week, finishing the course in about nine to ten weeks.
[179] Compare Proclus in Alc. 100,10–22.
[180] At Theaetetus 175B, the philosopher laughs at those persons who cannot free their mindless soul (anoêtou psukhês) from vanity or conceit (khaunotês, literally ‘porousness’) on account of their family lineage.
[181] Compare Proclus in Alc. 107,19–24.
[182] Above, 31,15–16.
[183] See above, 7,4–8, and cf. 30,2–4.
[184] If this is meant to be a direct quotation, it is hard to find anything similar in Theaetetus. But Olympiodorus often uses this kind of locution (‘he says’, phêsin) to refer, not to direct speech, but to his interpretation of a doctrine in a work; he might mean that the power of knowledge is a lesson that the reader can draw from the Theaetetus as a whole. In any case, this is certainly a view that occurs in Plato: Westerink compares Protagoras 352B–D, Republic 5.477D, and Proclus in Alc. 155,8–9; see also our text, 55,17–19 below.
[185] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 199,6–7.
[186] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 119,14–23.
[187] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 120,1–8.
[188] Here, the Greek noun logos means something like ‘meaningful speech’, as opposed to meaningless utterances. In general, logos can be translated by many English nouns, including ‘reason’, ‘argument’, and ‘speech’. Olympiodorus’ opening serves to contrast Socrates’ rational arguments with Alcibiades’ less rational remarks; note that we ‘learn from’ (manthanein) Socrates’ words but ‘examine’ (exetazein) Alcibiades’ utterances. ‘Examination’, of course, is crucial to the Socratic life (cf. Apology 38A5, where ‘the unexamined life’ is not worth living). I am grateful to the anonymous reader for this lecture for these points.
[189] It was a commonplace of ancient class logic that human beings are distinguished from other animals by our possession of reason or language; see for example Porphyry Isagoge 4,21–32, with commentary by Barnes 2003, 110–11; but Porphyry also argues strongly in ch. 3 of his On Abstinence that animals possess reason (on this puzzle, see recently Edwards 2014).
[190] That is, chiastically.
[191] The account of caring for reputation here (and above and below) is indebted to Plato’s imagery of the tripartite soul and state in Republic 4.
[192] See also 135,11–13, Olymp. in Gorg. 2.3 (16,5–10), 12.2 (63,25–8). For the dichotomy, see for example Frede 1988.
[193] Dunamis can mean a power, potential or capacity, while energeia can mean the actualisation of that potential: Aristotle works out this technical vocabulary in detail in Metaphysics Th. [9]. ‘Potential’ and ‘actuality’ would represent that vocabulary more clearly here than ‘power’ and ‘activity’, but it is easier to maintain the latter consistently throughout this section of the translation.
[194] See Proclus El. Theol. pr. 77: ‘All that exists potentially is advanced to actuality by the agency of something which is actually what the other is potentially’ (tr. Dodds).
[195] The text is uncertain here; I adopt Westerink’s proposed supplement < ei kai mê tôi khronôi> and translate what I hope is the intended force of the sentence.
[196] The intended subject of ‘he says’ (phêsin) might be Socrates (the idea could then be that Socrates, when he acknowledges Alcibiades’ state of amazement, is implicitly stating and endorsing the reasons for his amazement), or Plato, or perhaps Olympiodorus’ source for this explanation, such as Proclus or Damascius.
[197] I take the idea to be the following: Socrates could not have approached Alcibiades just as the latter was about to approach him (with apparent clairvoyance), unless these facts were true: the leadership of the daimon, and the priority of the actual to the potential in nature; and these facts are genuinely worthy of wonder.
[198] For the quotation, see Hippocrates De Morbis 1.5; cf. Proclus 120,14–15, Olymp. in Phaed. 56,7–8. The force of the saying may be that the real ‘soul’ of a course of treatment lies in good timing; or, read differently, it might mean that the patient must be willing, in their soul or mind (psukhê), to implement the doctor’s instructions. The anonymous reader for this section also points out that this could allude to the first Hippocratic Aphorism: ‘Life is short, and Art long; the crisis (kairos) fleeting; experience perilous, and decision diffi cult. The physician must not only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also to make the patient, the attendants, and externals cooperate’ (tr. Adams).
[199] These seem to be recollections in broad brush strokes of Aristotelian passages like Nicomachean Ethics 1.4 (1096a26–7), where the good in the category of When is the right moment or opportunity (kairos).
[200] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 121,11–13: ‘As place is determined by nature in a manner appropriate to each body, so also different portions of time are suited to different activities... Such time is the right moment for each activity as supplying the good and the ultimate purpose to the doers and to what is actually being done’ (tr. O’Neill 1965, lightly modified).
[201] That is, any being that is subject to coming-to-be, such as a plant or animal; such beings undergo a process of entelechy, beginning from their raw potential to be something (dunamis), to ‘actualise’ their natural goal or telos. Particularly in a Neoplatonic context, such beings require another fully actualised being to bring them to completion (cf. Proclus El. Theol. pr. 77, cited above); there is also a religious or initiatory sense to ‘completion’ or ‘perfection’ (teleiôsis).
[202] As Olympiodorus discussed in the preceding survey, Socrates and Alcibiades, though not physically present together, should maintain the relationship of an actual being (Socrates) to a being with the potential to be actualised (Alcibiades). Compare Proclus in Alc. 122,10–15: ‘On one side, the future agent must be full to overflowing and so prepared for activity that, although he destined recipient is not present, it is itself at full strength and stimulated to communication; and on the other side, the subject to be acted upon must be eager for participation and apply itself to the power of fulfilment, and if that not be present, through the greatest suitability be aroused toward participation’ (tr. O’Neill 1965, lightly modified).
[203] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 125,2–15. Proclus stresses that Plato’s Demiurge desired for all things to be good (Timaeus 30A). It is a standard Neoplatonist view that all things ‘want’ the Good (see for example Proclus El. Theol. prr. 8–13), with roots in both Plato and Aristotle (see for example Arist. Metaph. 12.7, 1072a27–b4).
[204] Proclus also stresses that Socrates ‘has the form of the good’ (is agathoeidês), 45,4, and that he functions as a ‘good daimon’ to Alcibiades (45,8).
[205] Gorgias 467C–468D.
[206] Olympiodorus anticipates studying the Gorgias with the class, as the second dialogue to be read in the Iamblichean curriculum following the Alcibiades. The same language (‘with the god’s favour’) occurs in the heading of each lecture.
[207] Compare Olympiodorus in Gorg. 15.4–5 (80,4–81,1).
[208] For example at Hom. Il. 2.157; Od. 4.762.
[209] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 126,22–127,4.
[210] This may be a quotation, but I am not aware of the source.
[211] For this label of the chief or ‘chorus-leading’ philosopher, see also Olympiodorus’ comments on the Theaetetus above (Lecture 1) at 1,12 and Theaet. 173C–177B. Olympiodorus means the dialectician, in Plato’s sense at Republic 7, 511B: the power of dialectic grasps ‘the unhypothetical first principle of all’. Below, Olympiodorus also uses Aristotle’s label of ‘first philosophy’ for the activity of this philosopher, namely, metaphysics. But Olympiodorus also goes on to explain this concept of the ‘unhypothetical’ using the post-Platonic doctrine of the common concepts (koinai ennoiai), for which see the following note.
[212] For the role of the common concepts in Neoplatonism (also discussed above: see 18,3 with note), see for example van den Berg 2009, and on Olympiodorus, see the Introduction and Tarrant 1997; for the form of the ‘argument from consensus’ in antiquity and the common concepts more generally, see Obbink 1992 and Brittain 2005.
[213] Thus Aristotle argues, for example, that ‘first philosophy’ must concern itself with the basic axioms used in all other reasoning in the special sciences, such as the principle of non-contradiction (Metaph. G [4], 1005b19).
[214] Cf. Alc. 104D, 106B, and Proclus in Alc. 128,2–9.
[215] Cf. Alc. 105E.
[216] See 21,4–5 above.
[217] See 38,25–39,5 (with notes) for the idea that Socrates can ‘bring to fulfilment’ Alcibiades’ potential.
[218] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 153,10–154,2.
[219] Hom. Il. 6.138, Od. 4.805.
[220] See above, 32,13–19. For Olympiodorus, the divine bliss alluded to by Homer in these passages is something much greater than sensual or perceptible pleasure or experience: it is the true joy and ‘ease’ of the intelligible world (cf. Plotinus Enneads 5.8.4: ‘For it is “the easy life” there [in the intelligible], and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food... ’, tr. Armstrong 1984). A person who pursues lesser goods is fighting over shadows (as discussed in the cave allegory; see note to 32,13–19 above), or reflections of this authentic comfort. ‘Fighting over the image (eidôlon)’ would also apply to the tale of the Greeks’ battle over a mere phantom of Helen, for example in Herodotus 2.120 and Euripides’ Helen (I am grateful to Carlos Steel for this point).
[221] See 31,1–4, with note.
[222] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 146,12–13. After this registration, Athenian adolescents could participate in public life. For the process and the oath sworn by ephebes, see for example Sommerstein and Bayliss 2012, 14–15.
[223] Compare Proclus in Alc. 142,1–143,4. Proclus adds that ‘we all naturally declare our thoughts to the gods, and our emotions and desires, since we are convinced by incontrovertible preconceptions (adiastrophous prolêpseis) that what is divine knows all things, even the invisible motions of our souls’ (142,14–17, tr. O’Neill 1965).
[224] The force of the verse is that god is omnipresent. Compare Philoponus in De An. 188,26–7. Philoponus explains that ‘it is necessary for the activities [of god] to be everywhere, since it has been demonstrated that he is the cause of everything’ (188,24–5).
[225] The ‘god from the machine’ (in Latin, the ‘deus ex machina’) refers to the dramatic device of a divinity sweeping in from a crane (mêkhanê) at a tragedy’s critical moment to resolve an apparently insoluble dilemma; for example, Apollo’s appearance at the end of Euripides’ Orestes prevents apparently inevitable bloodshed. Particularly associated with Euripides, the device was sometimes criticised in antiquity; Aristotle argued that a play’s solution should come from within the plot (Poetics 1454a33–b9), while Horace argued that the deus ex machina should only be used to resolve a challenge worthy of a god (Ars Poetica 191–2).
[226] This refers to Euripides Alcestis 1–71. Apollo’s appearance at the beginning of the play may be technically ‘from the machine’, but in a literary sense he is not there to resolve the plot; that role falls to Heracles, who rescues Alcestis from the grip of Death at the end of the play.
[227] That is, on Olympiodorus’ symbolic exegesis, Socrates demonstrates both compassion for Alcibiades (sumpatheia) and judgement on his behalf (krisis), and these traits belong to the divine; thus it is appropriate for Socrates to speak for the god here.
[228] The idea of a complex medium between two extreme terms can be found in Timaeus 32A–C. The principle that extreme terms should be joined by a participating medium is a familiar commonplace of the ‘triadic’ Neoplatonic metaphysics elaborated by Proclus. The point here is that the god is a loft y being, Alcibiades a lower being, and Socrates himself must ‘mediate’ between the extreme terms by speaking for the god and answering for Alcibiades. See also Proclus in Alc. 143,14–18, who draws an analogy with the Choice of Lives in Plato’s Myth of Er (see Republic 10, 617D–E). There, Lachesis holds lots for the order in which souls will choose their future lives; a Spokesman dispenses the lots; and souls have the freedom to select from the lives available. Proclus suggests that the god who questions Alcibiades is analogous to Lachesis; Socrates to the spokesman, and Alcibiades himself to the souls.
[229] The full quotation is from Republic 10, 617E, which Olympiodorus will go on to cite in the next line. Westerink (IX) understandably suggests that Olympiodorus made a slip in attributing the quotation to Timaeus. But Olymp. may have in mind Timaeus 42A–D, where the Demiurge remains ‘blameless’ (anaitios, 42D) as far as the implanting of souls in bodies via Necessity is concerned (42A); then Olymp. could just mean to imply that the idea behind the Republic passage – theos anaitios – can also be found in the Timaeus.
[230] For the Neoplatonist approach to the question of personal responsibility and ‘what is up to us’ (eph’ hêmin), see Sorabji 2005.1, 14(a).
[231] See also Proclus’ corresponding discussion at in Alc. 143,4–14. Proclus argues that the Choice of Lives in the Myth of Er depicts ‘autonomy embraced in the midst of providence’. Proclus’ view of providence, choice, and necessity is worked out in more detail in Ten Problems Concerning Providence (tr. Opsomer and Steel 2012) and On Providence (tr. Steel 2007).
[232] ‘Holy wanderer’ (hierophoitis) is a variant reading for ‘mist-wanderer’ (êerophoitis) at Il. 19.86–7; the latter is also an epithet of Fury (Erinus) at Il. 9.571. Olympiodorus repeats the quotation at in Alc. 101,17–18 and in Gorg. 24.3,27.
[233] This is also Proclus’ interpretation at in Alc. 144,2–9; he adds that this is not a literal interpretation of the passage, but follows logically from it.
[234] Reading dia tên for di’ autôn, as suggested by Westerink (1982, Addenda).
[235] Proclus suggests that Alcibiades’ desire to ‘fill all humankind with his name’ indicates not only limitless desire, but also a kind of longing for likeness with god, who actually does ‘fill the whole world’. Proclus adds that according to the theurgists, the ‘secret names of the gods’ do in fact ‘fill the whole world’: souls that yearn for likeness to god, therefore, hope to see their names do the same (150,10–19). ‘So the concepts (ennoiai) of such [ambitious] souls are grand and admirable, but their translations into practice are petty, ignoble and illusory, pursued without true knowledge; their concepts are in character, but their actions are out of it, the former the stirrings of birth-pangs in keeping with nature, the latter the products of oblivion and unawareness’ (in Alc. 150,19–23, tr. lightly adapted from O’Neill 1965).
[236] Cyrus the Great (c. 600 or 576–530 BC), founder of the Achaemenid Empire.
[237] Xerxes I (519–465 BC), who succeeded Darius I as king of the Achaemenid Empire, and undertook a second major invasion of Greece after Darius’ first campaign ended in failure at the Battle of Marathon (490 BC).
[238] Aristides, Oration 46, p. 180 Jebb. Westerink also compares Isocrates 4.89.
[239] Darius I (c. 550–486 BC), king of the Achaemenid Empire and father of Xerxes, here portrayed by Olympiodorus as a ‘mean’ (chronologically and temperamentally) between Cyrus and Xerxes.
[240] Herodotus Hist. 3.86.
[241] See 38,22–39,7.
[242] See 39,19–20.
[243] See 40,6–16.
[244] This is a commonplace of the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates. Alcibiades’ astonished reaction when he notices Socrates in Plato, Symposium 213C: ‘Good lord, what’s going on here? It’s Socrates! You’ve trapped me again! You always do this to me—all of a sudden you’ll turn up out of nowhere where I least expect you! Well, what do you want now?’ (tr. Nehamas and Woodruff).
[245] See 42,12–15.
[246] That is, first philosophy or metaphysics. See above, 40,19, with note.
[247] At Alc. 105E.
[248] Proclus also remarks that this interrogative approach arouses Alcibiades’ receptivity to Socrates and restrains his impulse to behave irrationally (in Alc. 129,10–11).
[249] Discussed above at 41,8–12.
[250] For the following discussion, see also Proclus in Alc. 130,4–131,12: Proclus also stresses that judgement and compassion are elementary for the divinely inspired lover, and explains that Socrates’ judgement is the cause of his reluctance to begin, while his compassion explains his reluctance to stop.
[251] For these two qualities of the divinely inspired lover (judgement and compassion), see above, 41,10–15.
[252] Proclus expands: ‘while many persons commit many errors, their corrective punishment (kolasis) is slow to begin, and once begun, endures for a very long time indeed; and while many perform good actions, their recompense from providence is slow to begin and extends as far as possible’ (in Alc. 130,22–131,3). While kolasis and the verb kolazein can mean ‘punishment’, in the Platonic tradition they are seen as corrective and healing treatments, following Plato in the Gorgias; see following note, and Olympiodorus’ following discussion.
[253] That is, corrective punishments for past errors. These corrections help to purify and ultimately heal the soul; for the Platonic context, see for instance Gorgias 525B–C.
[254] See 39,17.
[255] See 42,1–6.
[256] See also Proclus in Alc. 132,11–14. In Neoplatonism and Neopythagoreanism, the initial separation of the Dyad from the Monad marks the beginning of multiplicity, and the emanation of metaphysically ‘lower’ principles from the One. The nomenclature of ‘daring’ for this separation was attributed to Pherecydes in antiquity (fr. B14 Diels). The Monad represents unification, but the Dyad represents separation (Iamblichus Theology of Arithmetic 9,5–7 De Falco). The Neoplatonic view of the soul’s progress from higher principles is vividly expressed by Plotinus Enn. 5.1.1: ‘The beginning of trouble for [souls] was daring, and coming to birth, and the first otherness, and wishing to be on their own...’ (tr. Armstrong 1984, lightly adapted). Plutarch, a Platonist of the first and second centuries AD, suggests that Pythagoreans used names from mythology to illustrate this metaphysical emanation: ‘The number one [the Pythagoreans] called Apollo [a- pollôn, using a folk etymology ‘not-many’] because of its rejection of plurality and because of the singleness of unity. The number two they called “Strife,” and “Daring,” and three they called “Justice,” for, although the doing of injustice and suffering from injustice are caused by deficiency and excess, Justice, by reason of its equality, intervenes between the two. The so-called sacred Tetraktys, the number thirty-six, was, so it is famed, the mightiest of oaths, and it has been given the name of “Cosmos” since it is made up of the first four even numbers and the first four odd numbers added together’ (Isis and Osiris §75, 381F–382A, tr. Babbitt, lightly adapted).
[257] Cf. Republic 10, 617E.
[258] This likely refers, not to Valerius Harpocration (a Greek grammarian in Alexandria and avid collector of sayings), but to the Platonist Harpocration of Argos. I am grateful to George Boys-Stones for this correction.
[259] For the distinction between apparent and real goods, and Alcibiades’ ‘fighting over shadows’, see above, 42,15 and 47,2, with notes.
[260] See Proclus in Alc. 146,12–14.
[261] In Greek, hestia and oikos can mean ‘hearth and home’ literally or symbolically. Olympiodorus may be playing here on the idea that ambition is at Alcibiades’ ‘core’, but Pericles also belongs to his ‘home’, as his guardian. Hestia is here translated as ‘source’ in keeping with its meaning of ‘beginning’ (LSJ II.1).
[262] Aristophanes Plut. 196.
[263] See above, 42,7–43,8, with notes. ‘Concept’ is used here in the sense of a ‘common concept’ (koinê ennoia): see notes on 18,3–4.
[264] Olympiodorus revisits this point later in the commentary, at 98,16–20 and 101,3–7. See also Proclus in Alc. 138,8–139,3 and Olympiodorus in Phaed. 34,10–35,7.
[265] See Plato Republic 4, 440B.
[266] Hom. Od. 22.1.
[267] That is, even though gods are not limited by space, our imaginations formulate images of them that are spatial. For the commentators’ notion of phantasia (appearance, imagination), see Sorabji 2005.1, section 2.
[268] The quote occurs at Il. 10.279–80, where the speaker is Odysseus. Diomedes is, in fact, the next speaker. See also below, 68,23–4.
[269] In the basic Neoplatonist ontology of three hypostases (One, Intellect, and Soul), the entities that follow from the One are the Platonic Forms, the objects of intellect, which are also ‘real beings’ (onta). Later Neoplatonism stresses the mediating role, between the One and the Forms, of individual unities (henades) or divinities. See for example Plotinus Enn. 5.1 and Proclus El. Theol. prr. 113–165 (divine unity), 166–182 (intellect), and 184–211 (soul).
[270] Because of his ambitious temperament.
[271] At 45,21–2.
[272] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 156,17–20.
[273] Hom. Iliad 10.279–80, where the speaker is in fact Odysseus.
[274] For the portrayal of Socrates’ irony or eirôneia, see for example Lane 2011. On the Neoplatonic portrayal of Socrates, see recently Layne and Tarrant 2014.
[275] Republic 1, 337A.
[276] Apology 21A–23D. Socrates explains that the Oracle must have meant that ‘human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, as if he said: “This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless” ’ (23A, tr. Grube).
[277] See also Proclus’ corresponding discussion at in Alc. 155,13–156,9.
[278] Theaetetus 151D–E.
[279] Apology 30C–D.
[280] As Olympiodorus explains below (57,22), the use of such a ‘material’ preposition suggests modesty on the speaker’s part: to say that ‘you can’t achieve this goal without me’ amounts to saying that I am only the material cause of the goal’s accomplishment (and so, in the Neoplatonic scheme of causation, a relatively low-grade contributor).
[281] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 154,13–155,5.
[282] Hippocrates Aphorisms 1.22, 4.468 Littré.
[283] Cf. Olymp. in Gorg. 35.3 (164,29–30).
[284] At Lecture 1, 6,6–7,8.
[285] The ‘Stoic’ method was described as Aristotelian (Peripatetic) in Lecture 1. The present passage is included by von Arnim as SVF 3.489.
[286] Cf. Hippocrates Aphorisms 2.38 Littré: ‘An article of food or drink that is slightly worse (smikrôi kheiron), but more pleasant to the taste, is preferable to one that is better, but less pleasant.’
[287] Hom. Iliad 4.86–103 and 5.290–3. See also above, 48,4–7.
[288] See also above, 42,7–43,8.
[289] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 155,5–12.
[290] Reading oun for the MSS’ hous, as suggested by Westerink in his apparatus.
[291] Olympiodorus attributes this remark to Plato’s Theaetetus at 36,14–16, but it is diffi cult to find any matching passage there. Protagoras 352B–D and Republic 5, 477D offer similar ideas.
[292] SVF 3.618; cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.121–2 (LS 67M) and Proclus in Alc. 164,17–165,10: ‘For what other conclusion may be drawn from what [Socrates] has said other than that the good man alone is ruler, he alone wields power, he alone is king, alone is leader of all, alone is free, and everything which belongs to the gods belongs to good men’ (tr. O’Neill 1965).
[293] See 41,5.
[294] Phaedrus 264C.
[295] Cf. Timaeus 92C: ‘And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its conclusion. This world of ours has received and teems with living things, mortal and immortal. A visible living thing containing visible ones, perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection are unexcelled. Our one universe, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be’ (tr. Zeyl).
[296] For the similarity of a Platonic dialogue to the cosmos, see Proclus in Alc. 10,2–14.
[297] I take the point to be that in the cosmic drama, the actions of beings are analogous to the voices of the actors in an earthly drama.
[298] See also Proclus in Alc. 170,5–11. For the meaning of the soul’s ‘reversion’ to itself, also discussed by Olympiodorus above, see for example Proclus El. Theol. prr. 15, 17.
[299] Cf. Aeschines 3.192, describing jurors whose minds wander while the charges are read aloud. Olympiodorus returns to this point at 108,10–11. The anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy expands on the example (15, 210,3–11): ‘[The object of the dialogue form] is to make us pay attention to the contents by the very variety of the speakers; otherwise, if it is always one and the same person teaching us, we might, so to speak, doze off and the same thing might happen that happened during an address of the orator Aeschines, because in his case it was one and the same person who spoke from the beginning to the end. Standing on the platform and making his speech, he failed to keep his audience awake because there was no discussion, no asking and answering of questions, and the jurymen fell asleep; when the orator saw this he said to them: “I hope you have had sweet dreams about the trial.” ’ (tr. Westerink).
[300] In fact, Olympiodorus is not quite finished with the proem: what follows immediately is his discussion of the text (lexis). The discussion of the ‘refutative’ part of the dialogue begins in the following lecture.
[301] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 157,3–9.
[302] 105A–B; see above, 43,9–19.
[303] See above, 45,15–46,9.
[304] See above, 54,3–8.
[305] In the sense that, for the Neoplatonist metaphysician, the soul is the authentic being of a person, but their activities (energeiai), including the function of enlivening the body, emanate into the perceptible world: see Proclus El. Theol. pr. 9. See also Proclus in Alc. 157,10–13.
[306] Apology 30B–C.
[307] Cf. Aristotle De Caelo 1.4, 271a33.
[308] See also Proclus in Alc. 162,15–18.
[309] See also Proclus in Alc. 159,11–22.
[310] Westerink compares Plato Gorgias 447A (where Gorgias has just completed a splendid ‘display’) and Phaedrus 235A (where Lysias’ speech provides a similar ‘display’).
[311] Cf. Alc. 103A and Olympiodorus’ comments above, 26,17–21.
[312] In other words, by introducing the agency of a god into the conversation, Socrates is raising the stakes and making it more likely that Alcibiades will take him seriously.
[313] See also Proclus in Alc. 165,11–12.
[314] Compare Proclus in Alc. 166,2–6: ‘The more we become consciously aware of the influence of the superior beings, the more we stand in wonder at them. For instance, although the saviour Asclepius even now gives us health and ever preserves us and possesses in himself activities more divine than those which proceed externally, nevertheless we praise him more when we are favoured with an epiphany: for we desire our living organism to share in the perception of the god’s giving’ (tr. O’Neill 1965). For the notion of a visible illumination from the divine, cf. Iamblichus De Mysteriis, Book I.
[315] See also Proclus in Alc. 166,18–167,10.
[316] For the notion of Socrates as more ‘fulfilled’ or ‘complete’ (teleios) than Alcibiades – that is, a more perfect, realised being in the metaphysical hierarchy – see also above, 39,11–15, and the Introduction, §2.1 on the scale of human excellences, and §2.2 on the role of the Alcibiades in fostering excellence.
[317] Later Neoplatonism posits six modes of causation (cf. Sorabji 2005.2, 6(d)): three true causes (aitia), the effi cient and final and paradigmatic, and three auxiliary causes (sunaitia), the formal and material and the instrumental. The preposition dia (‘through’) with the genitive case can describe the instrument of an action, and is therefore appropriate to the instrumental cause; Olympiodorus asks why Alcibiades should treat the (superior) Socrates as an instrument. (To the Neoplatonist scheme of six causes, contrast the Aristotelian framework of four causes, material, effi cient, formal and final, from Physics 2.3. The Neoplatonists acknowledged and accepted this scheme, but argued that Plato endorsed the broader scheme of six causes, which made room especially for the ‘paradigmatic’ or exemplary role of the Platonic Forms.)
[318] Cf. Phaedrus 246B–C.
[319] See Laws 9, 870D–E. For the kind of situation that Olympiodorus envisages – where perhaps the gods might put a present-day murderer to good use in punishing a past (perhaps long past) murderer – see for example Proclus Ten Problems Concerning Providence §49, and Plutarch On the Delays of God’s Punishment.
[320] See also Proclus in Alc. 169,17–170,5.
[321] See above, 40,19, with notes.
[322] The capacities for self-motion, self-constitution and self-reversion are essential to the later Neoplatonist understanding of the soul (see for example Proclus El. Theol. prr. 40–51, 80–3). Self-movement was already essential to the Platonic soul in the Phaedrus (245C–246A).
[323] Republic 1, 336B–354B. Olympiodorus (or the redactor of our text) refers to Gorgias here, but this appears to be a slip of the tongue or the pen in anticipation of the description of Polus and Callicles forthcoming in the next sentence (61,10–11). (Olympiodorus, who lectured on the Gorgias, can hardly have genuinely mistaken Thrasymachus for a character in that dialogue.) Olympiodorus tends to refer to Thrasymachus, Polus and Callicles in the same breath, as in the proem of the in Gorg. (‘He criticises Gorgias, you see, and Polus, Callicles and Thrasymachus, too as shameless and never given to blushing... ’, tr. Tarrant et al.) On correcting ‘slips’ of tongue or pen in our text, see the Introduction and Westerink 1982, IX.
[324] At Gorgias 481B–527E, 461B–481B.
[325] This likely refers to the Protagorean thesis that ‘every appearance (phantasia) is true’ (Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 7.389–90), as Plato critiques it (Theaetetus 170C–171C). Compare Olympiodorus in Gorg. 13.2,24–6: ‘Protagoras argues sophistically that nothing is false, but everything is true.’
[326] Because Socrates, who possesses knowledge, represents a higher level of being than Alcibiades, who lacks knowledge (cf. Proclus in Alc. 172,23–173,1).
[327] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 173,2–4.
[328] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 171,9–18 on the challenges inherent in answering an expert sophist. The (occasional) Neoplatonist view of Aristotle as a challenging, eristic dialectician is mirrored by Syrianus in the preface to in Metaph. 13–14 (80,4–81,6).
[329] Cf. Ammonius in Isag. 6,25–9,6.
[330] For Socrates as a midwife, cf. Theatetus 148E–151D.
[331] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 184,11–185,4.
[332] I have broken the long and periodic Greek sentences down somewhat in English, and numbered the main headings. For the proof and Olympiodorus’ discussion, compare Proclus in Alc. 176,10–178,24 and 187,19–188,15.
[333] For this portrayal, see for example Hom. Od. 14.435; the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 1.3; and Hesiod Theogony 938–39.
[334] The Greek preposition hina is here used to express a consequence, which is not uncommon in later Greek; the anonymous reader for this lecture points out to me that this is rare with the infinitive.
[335] For the later ancient distinction of synthetic and analytic reasoning, and its sources, see for example Menn 2002, 193–223. Analysis is reasoning from first principles, or from the general to the specific; synthesis is reasoning to first principles. Proclus discusses the distinction between the ‘apophatic’ (affi rmative) and ‘kataphatic’ (negative) syllogisms as follows: ‘... the affi rmative syllogism proceeds from the more to the less fulfilled, and therefore resembles a descent, but the negative moving toward the more fulfilled resembles an ascent’ (in Alc. 180,17–19).
[336] Od. 22.1.
[337] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 200,13–201,9.
[338] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 202,1–203,13.
[339] Il. 1.62–7.
[340] Herodotus 7.141–3.
[341] Cf. Ammonius in Isag. 6,25–9,6.
[342] This goes back to the Socratic distinction between an ignorant person who fails to realise their ignorance (and so is doubly ignorant), and an ignorant person who recognises their ignorance (and so is simply ignorant). The former is better off than the latter. See the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy §5 (16,19–27, tr. Westerink 1962): ‘Simple ignorance occurs when a person does not know a particular thing and knows that he does not know; double ignorance when he does not know a thing and is not aware that he does not know....’
[343] The cithara was a stringed instrument similar to a lyre, which was used to accompany epic and lyric songs. For this passage, compare above, 2,44–8 and Proclus in Alc. 193,21–196,1.
[344] For the following discussion, cf. Aristotle Politics 8.6, 1341a18–28; Proclus in Alc. 197,17–198,11; and Olympiodorus in Phaed. 20,25–21,5.
[345] Again here the Greek logos is used to mean both reason and words: since one cannot speak while playing the flute, in a sense it is less compatible with ‘reasoning’ than a stringed instrument.
[346] Cf. Aristotle Politics 8.6, 1341b3–8.
[347] ‘Cithara-song’ (kitharôidia) was a familiar Greek word, but ‘flute-song’ (aulôidia) was not. For the contrast of different kinds of music here, see also Plato Laws 3, e.g. 700D.
[348] Cf. Hom. Il. 9.186, Od. 1.155, etc.
[349] Hom. Il. 3.1.
[350] For the association of Phrygians with orgiastic rites in Neoplatonism, and the comparison with Plato’s considered views on appropriate music, see also Proclus Essays on the Republic 61.19, with commentary by Sheppard 1980, 113–14.
[351] Paides Th êbaiôn may be simply periphrastic for ‘the Thebans’ (LSJ s.v. pais I.3), although in Olympiodorus’ pedagogical context, ‘children’ may be warranted.
[352] Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 2: ‘Flutes, then’, said he, ‘for the sons of Thebes; they know not how to converse. But we Athenians, as our fathers say, have Athena for foundress and Apollo for patron, one of whom cast the flute away in disgust, and the other flayed the presumptuous flute-player’. Thus, half in jest and half in earnest, Alcibiades emancipated himself from this discipline, and the rest of the boys as well (tr. Perrin).
[353] That is, Alcibiades’ oratorical capacity is a matter of inborn ability and upbringing, not of human excellence (aretê). See Introduction §§2 and 3.2.
[354] That is, Alcibiades’ good behaviour arose from these factors and not from intentional, reflective action based on foresight (prohairesis).
[355] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 186,4–10: ‘To bring before his eyes, as if upon the stage of the assembly, the people and the actual podium with Alcibiades hastening to seize the position of adviser and himself taking hold of him and as it were applying reason as a bridle to his onrush, presents a very vivid picture, and at the same time makes it clear that one should do nothing without examination...’ (tr. O’Neill 1965).
[356] At 63,12–13.
[357] As we have seen earlier (e.g. 25,24), Greek had changed suffi ciently by Olympiodorus’ time that some Attic words required a gloss. Here, the passive form didaskesthai (‘to be taught’) is glossed by the more familiar active form of manthanein (‘to learn’).
[358] The ‘prosyllogism’ is a syllogism whose conclusion provides the major premiss of another syllogism. The prosyllogism that Olympiodorus describes is in the first figure (the major premiss is universal, and the minor premisses are affi rmative); the syllogism is in the second figure (the major premiss is universal, and the minor premiss is negative).
[359] See Proclus in Alc. 178,11–24.
[360] Perhaps a ‘gaming implement’ like dice, in the sense of Aeschines 1.59.
[361] See above, 67,4–5, with note.
[362] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 198,12–199,3.
[363] Cf. above, 52,3. In Homer, it is actually Odysseus who speaks these lines, with Diomedes as the next speaker.
[364] Hom. Il. 10.279–80.
[365] The Greek suneidôs, discussed elsewhere by Olympiodorus (see 23,2–17 and below, 87,19), also means ‘witness’ and can refer to a guardian angel or daimôn as well as personal conscience. Westerink 1962, XVIII–XIX notes that Proclus uses the word daimôn in places where Olympiodorus prefers ‘conscience’ (Proclus in Alc. 199,9–14 and Olympiodorus in Alc. 68,24; Proclus in Alc. 229,20–2 and Olympiodorus in Alc. 87,19), and speculates that Olympiodorus might avoid using the word when unnecessary (but compare 15,5–23,17, where the discussion is clearly necessary), thanks to its pejorative connotations in Jewish and Christian usage.
[366] At 65,10–19.
[367] Compare also Protagoras 319A–320B for Socrates’ construction of a similar argument.
[368] At Phaedrus 244C, Socrates suggests that prophecy (the ‘mantic’ art) has its roots in divine madness (mania), as does love.
[369] The implication is that the ‘investigatory’, skilful mode of prophecy is properly deserving of the name ‘skill’ (tekhnê), which is not as appropriate to the loft ier, inspired mode of prophecy.
[370] I take the point here to be that these terms have proper philosophical definitions in Olympiodorus’ terms: in the strictest sense, ‘we’ are our souls, and our ‘affairs’ are our bodies, possessions and actions. If Alcibiades’ answer had employed these most strictly correct philosophical meanings, he would not have fallen into the error of using vague or ambiguous terminology. But in fact he was using these words according to their loose and ordinary meanings, and so he has failed to make his meaning clear.
[371] That ‘the wooden wall’ would survive a Persian assault; Themistocles interpreted the oracle to mean a fleet of ships, and advised the Athenians to prepare for a naval battle. See Herodotus 7.140–4.
[372] Rhetoric 1.4, 1359b19–23.
[373] The allusion is to the five kinds of psychological constitutions in Republic Book 8: aristocracy (the best kind of rule, corresponding to a soul with reason or logos in charge), timocracy (rule driven by love of honour), oligarchy, democracy and tyranny.
[374] For example, the Athenian sanctions against Megara (in 432 BC) contributed to the onset of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 1.67.4, 1.88.1, 1.139–40).
[375] 71,7–14.
[376] At 72,26–74,7 below.
[377] Three epikheirêmata: cf. Aristotle Topics 1.11, 162a12–18.
[378] The introductions to Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ histories help to lend colour to this assertion; for instance, for the theme of justice (dikê) as a motivation for war in Herodotus, and the historian as ‘judge’, see Baragwanath 2008, 17–19.
[379] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 222,2–7. For example, when a subject (like a human being) becomes warm and then cold, this can be understood as a struggle between contraries, the hot and the cold. This way of thinking traces its roots at least to the Presocratic philosophers. Compare the following celebrated fragment of Anaximander: ‘The things that are perish into the things from which they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice in accordance with the ordering of time’ (Simplic. in Phys. 24,13–21 = B1). The word translated here as ‘penalty’ (dikê) can also be rendered ‘justice’.
[380] Drawing on Plato’s account of the tripartite soul – logos (reason), thumos (spirited emotion) and epithumia (desire, appetite) – in Republic 4. See also Olympiodorus’ discussion of the Athenian training for the three parts of the soul in his Life of Plato (Lecture 1, above).
[381] Reading estê (‘stands still’) with Dodds, in place of the manuscript’s esti (‘it is’). Alternatively, Westerink proposed retaining esti and adding henos moriou (‘of one part’), which would give the sense ‘justice does not belong to one part of the soul’.
[382] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 213,14–214,6: the statesman ‘considers only what is just and stirs up war only so far as he thinks the enemy are doing wrong. Therefore he will first resort to oratory, striving to put a stop to the wrongdoers through timely persuasion, and then to the art of generalship, inducing moderation by force of arms in those whom he has not won over by words. So in this way Nestor... first made representation to the Trojans... through the medium of speakers; but aft erward... he attacked them. For this reason too, the Socrates of Republic [perhaps 5, 469D, 471B] deems that a city should possess only as much power as is suffi cient to save both it and its neighbours from suffering mutual wrong.’ (tr. O’Neill)
[383] Hom. Il. 3.205–224.
[384] Euripides Andromache 696.
[385] Cf. Plato Alc. 134B–C, Gorgias 515D.
[386] A victory that defeats its own purpose. Plato contrasts military victories, which can be Cadmean, with education, which is never Cadmean (Laws 1, 641C). The reference is to Cadmus, the legendary king of Thebes. He defeated a serpent who guarded the fresh water supply of the new foundation (e.g. Euripides Phoen. 1062–3), but at the cost of the lives of most of his future citizens. (The concept is similar to that of the ‘Pyrrhic victory’, after Pyrrhus, who defeated the Romans in battle but sustained very heavy losses in the victory.)
[387] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 221,9–16.
[388] Cf. Alc. 113E: ‘If you say something wrong, and if there’s a previous argument that can prove that it was wrong, you think you ought to be given some new and different proof, as if the previous one were a worn-out scrap of clothing that you refuse to wear again. No, you want an immaculate, brand-new proof’ (tr. Hutchinson in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997).
[389] Cf. Proclus in Alc. fr. 1: ‘In correcting Alcibiades, Socrates unobserved puts forward by way of example the art of physical training, which is divided into “grappling at arm’s length and close wrestling”. So also war and peace are different divisions of just action. Naturally Socrates puts forward the arts of physical training and music as being familiar to Alcibiades since he was brought up on them from childhood. And war resembles physical training, but peace resembles music’ (Schol. in Alcibiadem 277,1–7 Hermann, tr. O’Neill 1965).
[390] Some preliminary, prior knowledge is required for Socrates’ method of midwifery to succeed. (For Socrates as midwife, cf. Theaet. 150C–D, and elsewhere in this volume, 12,10–12; 63,15–17; 74,21.)
[391] By talking Alcibiades through the example of athletic activity.
[392] Rather scholastically, Olympiodorus wants to explain why Socrates teaches Alcibiades directly about one point (wrestling), but asks him questions about the other two (music and statecraft). He teaches him first to ensure that the inquiry will be fruitful; and he has more questions than lessons in order to show that midwifery, which teases out Alcibiades’ own innate ideas, is more productive than mere teaching.
[393] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 208,5–8.
[394] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 223,5–16. In the strict sense described in Aristotle’s Categories, ‘When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery’ (Cat. 1, 1a13–15).
[395] Cf. Olympiodorus On the Categories 34,22–9, and for the Neoplatonic metaphysical background Proclus Elements of Theology prop. 110. For ‘focal meaning’ in Aristotle and in general, see for example Owen 1960 and Hamlyn 1977–8.
[396] The Greek title of the Republic, Politeia, literally means ‘constitution’ or ‘polity’. Olympiodorus alludes here to the city-soul analogy of Republic 2, in which Socrates suggests that justice within a soul might be studied by drawing an analogy with a political organisation. Westerink compares Republic 2, 368D–E; 4, 434C–435C; 443C–444A; and Olympiodorus in Metaph. 100,19–23.
[397] The fivefold list developed from Aristotle Rhetoric 1.4 (1359b19–23), and discussed in the preceding survey, 71,7–14.
[398] See for example the anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades §31.4, where Alcibiades carries the right wing of an Athenian army to victory, and 173,8–9 later in this commentary.
[399] Cf. 72,20–2.
[400] Rather, Alcibiades at 108D arrives at the conclusion that performing ‘musically’ is the goal of musical skill, and does not suggest that he is confused about the kind of answer that Socrates wants.
[401] Lapis lazuli. The eye is the most precious sense, but a skilful painter does not use the most precious materials to paint it.
[402] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 208,1–4: the word ‘come’ is ‘appropriate to our soul’s knowledge, since it is in movement and does not subsist all at once and without change, like the stable and enduring activity of the intellect (nous)’ (tr. O’Neill 1965). Olympiodorus elaborates on the point at in Phaed. 7.6,10–16: ‘The expressions “when I have reached” and “where I am going” are appropriate to soul, which apprehends things in time, not out of time, and fragmentarily, not undecidedly and simultaneously, as intellect (nous) apprehends them, without transition and eternally and simultaneously. Motion, indeed, is proper to soul, because the first of motions is locomotion and the first thing moved is the self-moved; for anything must be one of these three: unmoved, self-moved, or moved from without’ (tr. Westerink 1976).
[403] That is, Socrates’ unified understanding of musical performance, contrasted with Alcibiades’ divided understanding, at 78,9–12.
[404] For the Neoplatonist view of universals as before, in, and posterior to particulars, see Sorabji 2005.3, 5(a), 5(c). But the application here is more or less common sense. Westerink offers a number of helpful additional references, including Plato Theaetetus 204A–205C (on the combination of a whole out of parts, as the syllable arises from its elements); Statesman 262A–263B; Timaeus 33A; Proclus El. Theol. pr. 67; Proclus Platonic Theology 3.25; and Hermias in Phaed. 90,9–15.
[405] Even though, say, a child loses this particular tooth, there is a universal pattern set up in her nature (phusis), according to which she can regrow the tooth. This Neoplatonic concept of seminal logoi informing nature, common already in Plotinus, can be traced to Stoicism; see for example LS 46A.
[406] Memory (Mnêmosynê) is the mother by Zeus of the nine Muses.
[407] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 214,13–216,9.
[408] For this example, see Plato Republic 331C.
[409] Hom. Od. 3.20.
[410] Hom. Od. 19.395–6.
[411] The recollection combines a portion of Od. 19.395–6 – describing Autolycus, Odysseus’ grandfather, ‘who surpassed all men in thievishness (kleptosunêi) and oaths’ – with the familiar Homeric praise of a person ‘who is honoured about his country as a god is’ (e.g. Il. 5.78, 10.33, etc.).
[412] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 216,12–15.
[413] See 74,9–11.
[414] See e.g. 63,12–13.
[415] This is the technical verb in Neoplatonic metaphysics for the relationship of ‘participation’. See for example Proclus El. Theol. pr. 65, and for the soul as ‘self-constituted’ and source of life and motion in bodies, El. Theol. prr. 40–51, 188.
[416] Cf. Phaedrus 245C–E: ‘Every soul is immortal. That is because whatever is always in motion is immortal, while what moves, and is moved by, something else stops living when it stops moving. So it is only what moves itself that never desists from motion, since it does not leave off being itself....’ See also Proclus in Alc. 225,11–226,10.
[417] Olympiodorus alludes to a saying, now obscure, concerning the intelligible world – the realm of Platonic Forms. In the intelligible world, feet and the head have no distinct places of their own, since forms have no spatial differentiation. Once forms are enmattered, however, they become spatially distinct. The saying can also refer to the fertilised egg, where the seminal ‘form’ of the human being can be found. For a fuller explanation, see Olympiodorus in Phaed. 4.4,13 (24,22 Norvin), 13.2,30 (76,2–3 Norvin). Westerink also compares Plotinus Enn. 6.4.8 on the omnipresence of being.
[418] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 189,4–11: ‘... although souls descend to birth filled essentially with knowledge, yet as a result of birth, they contract forgetfulness; and by possessing the innate ideas of reality as it were pulsating within them, they have concepts about them, but overcome by the draught of oblivion they are unable to articulate their own concepts and reduce them to knowledge. Therefore they carry them around as it were swooning and scarcely breathing, and for this reason they acquire twofold ignorance... and hence comes deceit and the illusion of knowledge’ (tr. O’Neill 1965, lightly adapted).
[419] For the Neoplatonist, every soul innately possesses logoi, formulas or ‘reason-principles’, of the Forms. (For the translation ‘formula’, see note to 15,11, above.) Learning is a process of recollecting these; for the Platonic sources of the view, see Plato Phaedo 73Cff. and Meno 80Dff.
[420] Westerink compares Plato Theaetetus 208B (where a previously offered definition of knowledge proves to be ‘a poor man’s dream of gold’) and Lysis 218C (where, similarly, a previously offered account of friendship proves to be like a dream of wealth).
[421] That is, Alcibiades answered in terms of knowledge of justice that was latent in his mind (which had always been there, because the formula of justice had always been implanted in his soul), but Socrates asked for an answer in terms of actively used knowledge. For the distinction, see for example the ‘aviary’ thought-experiment in Plato Theaetetus 196D–200D. See also Proclus in Alc. 240,10–20: ‘I think this clearly shows which is the knowledge that precedes all time in us, and which is the knowledge that accrues in time. Socrates, considering only knowledge in act, enquires, what was the time before this; but Alcibiades, possessing knowledge in essence, on account of which he thinks he knows what he doesn’t, cannot name a time of his participation therein, since we possess it from eternity’ (tr. O’Neill 1965); see also note to 82,13 above.
[422] See 78,26–79,2.
[423] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 222,20–223,5.
[424] The Greek adjective mousikos (‘of the Muses’, ‘musical’, ‘to do with arts and letters’), when it stands alone in the feminine gender as mousikê, normally assumes the noun tekhnê (skill, art) (LSJ s.v. mousikê). As Olympiodorus’ examples show, it has to do especially with poetry sung to music, but it can refer more broadly to literature and art.
[425] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 208,5–8.
[426] It is taken in this latter sense, for example, in the modern English translation by D.S. Hutchinson (in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997), which I have used as a reference in my rendering of the lemma (with minor divergences to reflect Olympiodorus’ interpretation): ‘In these last two examples you said that what was better was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now try to tell me what’s better in this case, too.’
[427] Olympiodorus suggests that we use ‘each’ (hekastos) for the unit in a group of three, but a different word like ‘both’ or ‘either’ in a group of two: thus he takes hekastos as necessarily referring to each of the three kinds of music, not either of the two examples (the musical and athletic).
[428] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 208,9–13.
[429] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 209,17–210,1.
[430] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 210,15–211,15.
[431] For similar views in the Hippocratic corpus, Westerink compares Epidemics 6.4.18, 5.312.
[432] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 212,18–213,1.
[433] Olympiodorus’ point builds on a basically Aristotelian principle – that knowledge proceeds from what is more familiar to us, to what is more truly knowable by nature (Phys. 1.1, 184a17–21) – and adds the Neoplatonic language of ‘participant’ and ‘participated’: the participant is the ordinary, composite entity that we encounter with sense-perception, whereas the participated is the simple, indivisible form. (See for example Proclus El. Theol. pr. 65.)
[434] Hom. Il. 2.33.
[435] ‘Totally, every bit’ is a mildly awkward translation of holon te kai pan (wholly and totally), but helps to bring out the force of Olympiodorus’ comments in the following paragraph.
[436] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 217,9–15. See also Theaetetus 204A–205A.
[437] Thersites was a Greek solider at Troy, notoriously deformed, weak and unlikeable (see Il. 2.211–77). Theano was a priestess of Athena at Troy, much respected by the Greeks, who spared her home in the destruction of the city. Coroebus was a proverbially foolish and unhelpful ally of Priam at Troy. See also Plato, Republic 5: women and men are equally qualified by nature for education, power and jobs (454B–456B), and ‘women share by nature in every way of life just as men do’. And granted that ‘on the whole’ women are less strong than men, Glaucon notes that there are individual exceptions, where many women are better than many men at many things (455D); Plato’s point there is similar to Olympiodorus’ point here.
[438] See Gorgias 483C–484C, Republic 1, 348B–349D. Olympiodorus, or the student redactor of these notes, has inadvertently dropped the name ‘ Republic ’, but we should probably not conclude that Olympiodorus (who also lectured on the Gorgias) supposed Thrasymachus to be a character in that dialogue.
[439] See also Proclus in Alc. 218,13–219,1.
[440] To ‘make progress’ (from the Greek verb prokoptô, literally ‘to cut forward’) is a somewhat technical description of a disciple already along the road to moral and philosophical achievement, especially in the Stoic tradition; see for example Epictetus Diss. 1.4.1.
[441] In the rhetorical figure of paraleipsis, the speaker intentionally omits a topic or phrase, and the omission draws attention to what is left out.
[442] See 6,6–7 and 30,2–3 above.
[443] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 228,21–4; 232,10–233,7.
[444] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 233,7–14.
[445] See above, 55,23–56,1, with note.
[446] meta men dê Dios eimi, a loose remembering of Phaedrus 250B, which actually reads ‘ We [i.e. philosophers] were with Zeus’.
[447] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 229,14–17.
[448] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 229,18–230,1.
[449] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 230,14–15: ‘the clause “that you can introduce me to him as a pupil” should not be thought of as mere irony, but also as the truth, since Socrates would not have shunned listening to a person of true knowledge’ (tr. O’Neill 1965).
[450] At Phaedrus 279C, Phaedrus shares in Socrates’ prayer, commenting that friends have all things in common. At Euripides Orestes 735, Orestes says to his friend and collaborator Pylades that he is ruined and Pylades replies that he must himself be destroyed as well, since friends have all things in common.
[451] For this and the following explanations, compare Proclus in Alc. 234,6–23: ‘Now let us not think of Socrates as saying “whom I would be least likely to forswear” in the sense that “perhaps I might forswear myself in the case of other gods, but never in the case of the god of friendship”, since we have learned in the Gorgias [466E; cf. Olymp. in Gorg. 81,22–3] and the Philebus [12B–C] of Socrates’ carefulness as regards both oaths and the actual orders of gods. The distinction is not in relation to other gods (for there is a single piety that unites us with them all), but to the young man who is listening; he would least of all forswear the god of friendship in his converse with Alcibiades, least of all the god of strangers in his converse with a stranger, least of all the god of suppliants in his converse with a suppliant... so when one’s conversation is with someone loved one should least of all forswear the god of friendship’ (tr. O’Neill 1965).
[452] As Westerink points out, it is diffi cult to see where in the Cratylus Olympiodorus could have in mind. (Plato does elsewhere comment on the penalties that Zeus Homognios (‘of kinship’) or Xenios (‘of strangers’) might mete out upon offenders; see for example Laws 9, 881D, where a bystander who fails to stop an attack by a child on his parents will be liable by law to the curse of Zeus Homognios.) The Neoplatonists did, however, read the Cratylus as emphasising the sanctity and value of divine names; Westerink cites Proclus in Crat. 11,26 and 25,10–12 in this connection.
[453] I take Olympiodorus to mean that Socrates would forswear himself least by Friendship and all the other gods too.
[454] That is, here the argument proceeds to first principles, where previously it proceeded from first principles. See above, 64,9, and Menn 2002, 193–223.
[455] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 235,4–5. Westerink also compares 237,15–17: Proclus argues that Socrates would not destroy Alcibiades’ confidence in his good nature (phusis), but would cultivate it in order to encourage Alcibiades to pursue higher grades of excellence. (On the grades of excellence, see Introduction §2.1.)
[456] Cf. Olymp. in Phaed. 2.16: ‘before the judges, the point under discussion was an individual life, and particular points can be proved only by inquiry’ (tr. Westerink 1976).
[457] Cf. Proclus in Alc. 238,8–15.
[458] By ‘the material’ Olympiodorus means the premises. (Following Aristotle, he regards the premises of a formal (syllogistic) argument as material for the conclusion: loosely, the dialectician uses premises to build the conclusion as the builder uses bricks to build the house). Consider a syllogism with false premises and a true conclusion: ‘Socrates is a duck’; ‘all ducks are mammals’; ‘therefore Socrates is a mammal’. The ‘material’ of the premises permits the true conclusion, but it does not follow necessarily from them.
[459] ‘The ephêbeia generally described a life stage in Greece between childhood and manhood, more specifically puberty, and in the more narrow sense the phase at its conclusion.... At the age of eighteen the young Athenians in their respective demes were entered into the lists of citizens after checking their personal legal status, and then admitted into the ephebeia by phyle. A kosmêtês and ten sôphronistai, one per phyle who were chosen by the people, were responsible for their training. In addition, there were teachers for athletic and military training (two paidotribai as well as trainers for hoplite fighting, archery, spear throwing, and handling catapults); furthermore, there were military ranks (taxiarkhoi, lokhagoi)’ (Gehrke 2006, I–II).
[460] See Introduction §1.2 and Tarrant 1997 on Olympiodorus’ use of ‘common concepts’ – building on the Stoic view that human beings share a set of essentially true ideas about the world that are not necessarily conscious, but can, with effort, be uncovered and articulated philosophically. Annas, J. (1985) ‘ Self-knowledge in Early Plato ’, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.) Platonic Investigations, 111 – 38. Washington: Catholic University of America Press. Armstrong, A.H. (1966) Plotinus, vol. 1: Porphyry on Plotinus; Ennead I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; revised 1989. —— (1967) Plotinus, vol. 3: Ennead III. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; repr. with corrections 1993. —— (1984) Plotinus, vol. 5: Ennead V. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —— (1988) Plotinus, vol. 6: Ennead VI.1–5. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Assmann, J. (2008) Of God and Gods: Egypt, Israel, and the Rise of Monotheism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Athanassiadi, P. (ed.) (1999) Damascius: The Philosophical History. Athens: Apamea Cultural Association. Aubry, G. (2004) Plotin: Traité 53, I, 1. Introduction, traduction, commentaire et notes par Gwenaëlle Aubry. Paris: Cerf. Bagnall, R.S. (1996) Egypt in Late Antiquity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Baragwanath, E. (2008) Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barnes, J. (1997) ‘ Roman Aristotle ’, in J. Barnes and M. Griffi n (eds), Philosophia Togata II, pp. 1 – 70. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (2003) Porphyry: Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barnes, J. and Griffi n, M. (1997) Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bénatouïl, T. and Bonazzi, M. (2012) Theoria, Praxis, and the Contemplative Life after Plato and Aristotle. Leiden: Brill. Betegh, G. (2003) ‘ Cosmological Ethics in the Timaeus and Early Stoicism ’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24, 273 – 302. Blank, D. (2012) ‘ Ammonius ’, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ ammonius/> Blumenthal, H.J. (1993 a) ‘ Marinus’ Life of Proclus ’, in Blumenthal (1993 b) 469 – 94. —— (1993 b) Soul and Intellect: Studies in Plotinus and later Neoplatonism. Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum.
[461] Each lecture is preceded by a lemma from the primary text, which a student read aloud to the class. The lecture proper is divided into two components: (1) a survey (theôria) discussing themes, questions, or puzzles (aporiai) relevant to this portion of the text, and (2) a lecture in the form of line-by-line analysis (praxis), which sometimes covers the same ground as the theôria in more detail.
[462] Although a monotheistic divinity may be implied here, I have generally used a definite article with the lower-case noun (‘the god’) throughout the translation, to capture the possibility that a particular god is intended. As an exception, I capitalise ‘God’ as an hypostasis (as at 103,10), along with Intellect and Soul. See also Griffin 2014d: 176 n. 100.
[463] Traditionally, the phrase sun theôi connotes an action taken ‘with god’s help’ or ‘with god’s blessing’ (e.g., Il. 9.49, Od. 13.391). In a verbal context, it can also describe words spoken ‘with god’ in the sense ‘with inspiration’ (e.g., Herodotus 1.86; cf. LSJ s.v. sun A.2). Its force here in Olympiodorus might be ‘with divine inspiration’ (on which he places substantial value: ‘all people... wish to quench their thirst with Plato’s inspirations, 1,8–9), or ‘delivered with god’s help’ or ‘with god’s grace’, indicating the piety of the lecture’s content.
[464] The translation of each passage extends beyond the short excerpts included in the manuscripts, but I have also omitted some material, particularly sentences that receive no commentary from Olympiodorus. (See also n. 5, below).
[465] Here and in the remainder of the translation from the First Alcibiades, I have lightly adapted portions of D.S. Hutchinson’s translation of the dialogue (in Cooper 1997). Whereas Olympiodorus’ Greek is often relatively repetitive and technical, the dialogue’s language is usually lively, and the translation hopefully conveys the flavour of that difference. In Lecture 10, I have supplied nearly the entire Platonic passage on which Olympiodorus comments here, at the head of the survey (theôria); in subsequent lectures, I translate the short initial lemma, and supply further translation as needed alongside Olympiodorus’ discussion of the text (lexis).
[466] Olympiodorus paints Alcibiades as representative of ‘natural excellence’ or phusikê aretê (see Introduction); one example of this natural talent is his skill in debaters’ dodges.
[467] Olympiodorus refers back to his schematic analysis of Socrates’ argument (see 64,9 and 89,1, translated in Griffin 2014). Alcibiades maintains that he will be a good adviser to the Athenian Assembly (106C). He also grants that the good adviser understands his subject (106C–D), and that his own subject is justice (ta dikaia, 109B). He is therefore committed to the view that he himself understands justice. He has further accepted Socrates’ exclusive division of the sources of knowledge (epistêmê) about a subject: one either (1) learns the subject from a competent teacher, or (2) finds out about it for oneself (106D). After Socrates proved that Alcibiades did not (1) learn about justice from a teacher (106E), Alcibiades endorsed (2) the alternative that he found out about it (cf. Olymp. 89,1–9). Now that this second alternative has also been refuted (110D), Alcibiades rejects it, and returns to the possibility that he learned from a teacher, offering ‘the many’ or ‘ordinary people’ (hoi polloi) as his teachers.
[468] Socrates previously persuaded Alcibiades that he had not learned about justice from a teacher, on the grounds that he is unable to identify a teacher, or to name a time when he learned (cf. 106E).
[469] See also Proclus, in Alc. 259,19–260,6. Proclus and Olympiodorus will both stress a distinction between ‘speaking Greek’ in the rough sense of using the language competently, and ‘speaking Greek’ in the sense of a cultured fluency with Attic speech.
[470] Plato’s Cratylus (e.g., 421C–26C) served as a locus classicus for the question whether names were imposed on beings by nature (phusei) or by convention (thesis). For this formulation of the question, see for example Sextus, Adv. Math. 1.143–4; 11.241–42; P.H. 3.267–68; for its Neoplatonic legacy, see for example van den Berg 2008.
[471] From the later Neoplatonist standpoint, the meaning and use of the noun ‘justice’ do have conventional and culturally relative elements, but ultimately derive from the real Form of justice in Intellect (nous); see Simplicius in Cat. 12,26–13,4, with Hoffmann 1987, Griffin 2013.
[472] Ordinary people (hoi polloi) presumably could instruct Alcibiades in the rules of a game of chance played with knucklebones, but I take the point to be that they can’t teach him a consistent strategy for winning the game. (Admittedly, ‘knucklebones’ seems to have described an amorphous cluster of children’s activities rather than a single game).
[473] For the construction of the body from the elements, Westerink compares Hipp. de Carnibus 2 (Littré vol. 8 p. 584).
[474] See Proclus in Alc. 254,3–255,3. Proclus concludes that ‘If hoi polloi are unable to teach the matters of less moment in which they engage, to which they are addicted and with which they are familiar, neither could they teach the matters of greater importance of which they have less experience and with which they are less familiar’ (tr. O’Neill 1971).
[475] Damascius takes Socrates’ point to be something like this: mastering knucklebones requires a less advanced exercise of the same capacity as understanding justice; someone who has mastered a more advanced subject will also display mastery of the easier subject (assuming they depend on the same capacity); since hoi polloi don’t display mastery of the easier subject, they don’t understand the more advanced subject.
[476] See Democritus A37, and for a short overview of Democritus’ theory, see Berryman 2009.
[477] Proclus’ corresponding example is contemporary Christianity: ‘at the present time hoi polloi agree that gods do not exist, but this has happened to them through lack of knowledge’ (92,4–9); Olympiodorus may have substituted the example of the Democriteans to avoid ruffling feathers, but it is also a traditional example in its own right.
[478] According to the rule of contraposition in traditional logic, ‘every S is P’ is equivalent to ‘every non-P is non-S’. Then the contrapositive of the claim ‘all those who disagree are ignorant’ is ‘all those who are non-ignorant do not disagree’.
[479] At 73,5–12. The reference is to Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul (Republic 4). Some excellences attach only to one part of the soul: self-control (sophrosunê), for instance, attaches only to appetite (epithumia). But justice ranges through the whole soul; Olympiodorus suggests that this is why we are prepared to fight especially vigorously to defend justice.
[480] The word barbaros simply means ‘non-Greek’ or ‘foreigner’, so it embraces the Trojans as well as Medea (whose family hailed from Colchis on the eastern coast of the Black Sea).
[481] A reference to the legendary voyage of the Argonauts.
[482] Hist. 1.2–4.
[483] Od. 2.35–223.
[484] The First Battle of Coronea was waged in 447 BC between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Boeotian League. Clinias fought with distinction in the battle before falling there.
[485] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 273,17–21.
[486] Il. 1.260–73.
[487] Isoc. 9.16.
[488] Il. 24.486.
[489] Characteristically of Olympiodorus, the ‘survey’ (theôria) or general discussion begins each lecture, and is followed by a line-by-line discussion of the text (lexis).
[490] Homer, Iliad 1.106–7.
[491] The Seven Sages, whose names became synonymous with wisdom in the Hellenic tradition, were Cleobulus of Lindos, Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, Bias of Priene, Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, and Periander of Corinth. Socrates colleccts them as a group at Plato, Protagoras 342E–343B. Each was associated with an ‘apophthegm’ or pithy saying; the apophthegm below is associated with Bias of Priene.
[492] Less compendiously, ‘The more people there are, the worse they become’. The line is credited to Bias by Diogenes Laertius 1.87 (see also Homer, Od. 2.277).
[493] Aristotle associates what occurs ‘for the most part’ (epi to polu) with what comes about by nature (phusis): see for example GA 777a19–21, 727b29–30, Metaph. 1027a8–28.
[494] For the following discussion, compare Proclus, in Alc. 256,7–258,9.
[495] That is, into a body.
[496] Likely a memory of Plotinus, Enn. 1.6.8, 21: ‘Our country from which we came is there, our father is there’.
[497] At 91,16–92,1.
[498] The connection is made more explicit in Proclus’ discussion at in Alc. 258,20– 259,18. Proclus divides three senses of ‘speaking Greek’ – (1) observing the ordinary usage of names, (2) speaking cultured Greek fluently, and (3) applying names to realities by nature, which only the philosopher can accomplish. He cites Pythagoras, who praised the discoverer of Number first, and the Name-Giver second. He suggests that Pythagoras intended to praise understanding at the levels of Intellect and Soul, respectively, since Soul is concerned with the application of names. For the Pythagorean allusion, Westerink compares Aelian’s Various Histories 4.17 and Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras 18,82. Proclus introduces a similar point at in Crat. 5,27–6,19: ‘Pythagoras, for instance, when asked what is the wisest being of all, said, “Number”. What is second in wisdom? “He that puts the names to things”. By “Number” he hinted at the intelligible order encompassing the multitude of the intellectual Forms...’
[499] Neoplatonic ontology described three levels of reality that arose from a sequence of emanation: from the One (to hen) flowed Intellect (nous), and from Intellect, Soul (psukhê). Intellect apprehends (and contains) the Platonic Forms or Ideas, and one of the characteristic activities of the Soul is the generation of names, on which see Simplicius, in Cat. 12,26–13,4 (cf. Hoffmann 1987, Griffin 2013).
[500] For the course of education in Hellenised Egypt and late antiquity more broadly, see Cribiore 2001, Kaster 1988.
[501] Modern scholars, especially following Pierre Hadot, have also emphasised the interdependence of ancient philosophical doctrines and ways of life: see for instance Hadot 2002, Cooper 2012.
[502] This entailment is characteristic of ancient Mediterranean philosophy, but not of modern philosophy. For example, we do not require a philosopher who defends utilitarianism in journal articles to live by the utilitarian calculus, but an ancient Epicurean would be expected to live consistently with Epicurus’ ethical views.
[503] Compare Proclus, in Alc. 266,5–8, and notes above.
[504] See Proclus, in Alc. 267,6–21.
[505] Sixth-century pupils of elementary Attic Greek would have learned that one uses the adverb ma to swear negatively by Zeus, but nê to swear positively, so Alcibiades’ colloquial expostulation ‘far from it, by Zeus (nê dia)’ ought to have used the particle ma (compare Smyth 1920, §1596). Olympiodorus, obliged to comment on this, explains that hêkista (‘far from it’) stands in for the expected negative.
[506] Compare Proclus, in Alc. 273,6–10.
[507] Compare Olympiodorus’ remarks on double ignorance at 11,9–10 and 65,14–15. Olympiodorus draws on the Socratic distinction between an ignorant person who fails to realise their ignorance (and so is doubly ignorant), and an ignorant person who recognises their ignorance (and so is simply ignorant). The former is better offthan the latter. See the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy §5 (16,19–27, tr. Westerink 1962): ‘Simple ignorance occurs when a person does not know a particular thing and knows that he does not know; double ignorance when he does not know a thing and is not aware that he does not know....’
[508] See for example 51,1–2.
[509] Olympiodorus suggests that the soul ‘puts on’ love of reputation first in descending into embodiment, and discards it last on ascending. (Love of pleasure is discarded sooner, as he suggests next). He likely has in mind the theory of the soul’s vehicle. In later Neoplatonist thought, as a soul descends into embodied existence, it ‘collects’ a series of envelopes or vehicles on the way; as the soul re-ascends, these vehicles are sequentially left behind in their natural spheres. For an overview of the theory of the soul’s vehicle in Neoplatonism, especially in the theory’s seminal form in Iamblichus, see Finamore 1985; for the theory in Proclus see Chlup 2012, 104–5 and Siorvanes 1996, 131–3.
[510] See also above, 12,8, and Proclus, in Alc. 283,1–286,18. See also Kakkuri-Knuuttila 2012.
[511] In rhetorical and philosophical terminology, indebted to the Stoics, an erôtêma is a question that requires the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (cf. LSJ I.2), whereas a pusma is a more open-ended query that allows more complex answers. See Fink 2012: 8.
[512] Adding ou lanthanei, at 99,5 which appears to be required for the sense (as suggested by Westerink in his apparatus).
[513] cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation 9.
[514] On Socrates’ role as ‘midwife’ of ideas (Theaetetus 148E–151D), see above, 12,5–12, 63,15–17, and 74,21.
[515] For what follows. cf. Proclus, in Alc. 303,1–16.
[516] Proclus and Olympiodorus describe an earlier tradition that divided the First Alcibiades into a sequence of ten syllogisms (cf. Proclus, in Alc. 12,18–13,1): the third syllogism concludes that in a question-and-answer context, the ‘speaker’ is the one who gives answers.
[517] See below, 105,6–16.
[518] See below, 106,23–107,13. As that passage illustrates, the word skeuaria would have sounded like ‘utensils’ or ‘equipment’ to Olympiodorus’ pupils, and so I retain these rather odd-sounding English translations. As Olympiodorus goes on to explain, however, Plato uses the word here in the sense of ‘clothing’.
[519] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 299,12–15.
[520] Epictetus, Handbook 5 (Loeb tr., lightly adapted).
[521] Agamemnon is explaining why his quarrel with Achilles was not his fault or responsibility (aitios), but he attributes fault to the gods.
[522] Following Olympiodorus in reading hierophoitis, ‘holy wanderer’, a variant for the Homeric manuscripts’ usual reading êerophoitis (‘who walks in mist or air’).
[523] Euripides, Hippolytus 352 (cf. Proclus, in Alc. 292,7–13).
[524] ‘Interrogative’ (pusmatikos) questions require more than a yes-or-no answer: see above, 99,3, with note.
[525] For what follows, see Proclus, in Alc. 289,2–290,12.
[526] Iliad 7.125–31.
[527] Demosthenes, Or. 8.34–37.
[528] Olympiodorus paints Alcibiades’ shortcomings against the canvas of the three primary levels of being and understanding (hupostaseis) in Neoplatonism: the One (or God), which is the principle of unity, individuality, and goodness; Intellect (nous), which is the principle of being and basic, non-discursive awareness; and Soul (psukhê), which is the principle of life and reflexive, discursive cognition and experience. Plotinus, Enn. 5.1 is a classic exposition of the three hypostases; Proclus’ Elements of Theology works out the system in the ‘classical’ late antique form that Olympiodorus would have known especially well (see Dodds 1963). For what follows, see also Proclus, in Alc. 291,1–4.
[529] For what follows, see also Proclus, in Alc. 293,14–19.
[530] Sophocles, Ajax 18–65.
[531] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 290,16–19.
[532] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 292,1–7.
[533] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 292,17–293,6.
[534] In Republic 617D–E, the soul freely chooses a daimôn; then, in an order assigned by lot, the soul chooses a life (and the life will later influence the soul, although ‘excellence knows no master’, so that the soul remains responsible for its actions); and the responsibility for its choice remains firmly with the soul.
[535] At 103,26.
[536] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 294,8–14.
[537] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 295,4–9.
[538] Deleting esti at 104,20, following Westerink.
[539] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 296,2–297,2.
[540] Anaxarchus at DL 9.59: ‘[W]hen after the king’s death Anaxarchus was forced against his will to land in Cyprus, [Nicocreon] seized him and, putting him in a mortar, ordered him to be pounded to death with iron pestles. But he, making light of the punishment, made that well-known speech, “Pound, pound the pouch containing Anaxarchus; ye pound not Anaxarchus”’ (Loeb tr.) See also Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 170,13–15.
[541] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 294,19–295,9.
[542] Westerink compares Hermogenes, On Staseis §1, §7, and Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 11.
[543] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 327,21–328,4.
[544] The reference may be to Clitophon’s interjection on Thrasymachus’ behalf in Republic 1, 340A–B.
[545] Perhaps a loose allusion to Republic 2, 367A, where Clitophon might be included with Thrasymachus in the phrase ‘Thrasymachus or anyone else might say...’ As Westerink points out, the words are taken from Phaedo 103A4–5, but the reference is to the fourth guest in Tim. 17A1–3 (cf. Proclus, in Tim. 1.20,7–9; the Platonist Ptolemy identified the missing guest with Clitophon. See also Proclus in Tim. 23,4–11; in Parm. 671,25–32).
[546] An allusion to the view, originating with the Stoics, that human beings share ‘common concepts’ (koinai ennoiai) that are basically true, such as the ‘concept’ that divine beings exist; Olympiodorus implies that someone who speaks against the common concepts virtually fails to be a ‘speaker’ in the proper sense. For Olympiodorus’ use of common concepts, see for example 18,3–4 (‘we know certain things... even without demonstration’ by means of common concepts), 40,20, and in Gorg. 44.7. See also Tarrant 1997, 189–91 and for the role of the common concepts in Neoplatonism more broadly, see van den Berg 2009.
[547] This is rather obscure, and may be a slip of the pen or tongue; as the scholiast points out, the letters of Democritus’ name actually add up to 822 in Greek numerals.
[548] 101,13–14.
[549] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 303,17–304,22.
[550] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 301, 1–3.
[551] Proclus also comments on Alcibiades’ notorious luxury (in Alc. 302,18–21); Aristippus wrote about his daintiness and expenses in a work On the Luxury of the Ancients (DL 2.23), and Athenaeus describes a Life of Alcibiades by Satyrus. See also below, 161,14–16.
[552] For an overview of the theory of the soul’s vehicle in Neoplatonism, especially in the theory’s seminal form in Iamblichus, see Finamore 1985; for the theory in Proclus see Chlup 2012, 104–5 and Siorvanes 1996, 131–3.
[553] Proclus, in Alc. 301,7–15 explains that the discussion of ‘stainless clothes’ is metaphorical for souls of a nobler nature. Such souls, ‘possessing a concept of the spotless purity of the gods and carrying it around in images, lay hold of purity in appearance; since the being of the divine vestures is spotless and their purity free from matter: this purity souls must don by thoroughly cleansing their congenital vestures and preserving their “garments” spotless from birth, but not by considering all-important the cleanliness of exterior clothes (tr. O’Neill)’.
[554] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 305,1–3.
[555] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 303,1–16.
[556] cf. Aeschines 3.192, describing jurors whose minds wander while the charges are read aloud. Olympiodorus used the same example at 57,2. The anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy expands on the example (15, 210,3–11): ‘[The object of the dialogue form] is to make us pay attention to the contents by the very variety of the speakers; otherwise, if it is always one and the same person teaching us, we might, so to speak, doze offand the same thing might happen that happened during an address of the orator Aeschines, because in his case it was one and the same person who spoke from the beginning to the end. Standing on the platform and making his speech, he failed to keep his audience awake because there was no discussion, no asking and answering of questions, and the jurymen fell asleep; when the orator saw this he said to them: “I hope you have had sweet dreams about the trial.” ’ (tr. Westerink).
[557] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 306,10–15.
[558] See above, 106,23–107,13.
[559] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 315,5–317,15.
[560] For what follows, cf. Proclus, in Alc. 319,12–322,17.
[561] I have retained ‘beautiful or noble’, or simply ‘noble’, in rendering to kalon here here. Where the following discussion will make use of the idea that to kalon is a Form, existing (from the Neoplatonist perspective) at the ontological level of Intellect (nous), I will render the same word as ‘beauty’.
[562] According to the ‘Proclan rule’, the ‘higher’ in the chain of being an entity is, the further ‘down’ its effects can reach. See Proclus, Elements of Theology §57: ‘Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms’.
[563] An allusion to the story that Aphrodite, goddess of beauty and love, was born of the foam (aphros) that arose from the genitals of Ouranos after they were cast into the sea (Hesiod, Theogony 190–92).
[564] See also Olymp. in Phaed. 13.2, 75,25–76,3: ‘Further [intelligible reality] is “indissoluble”, inasmuch as it does not consist of parts... All form, even materialised form, is without parts as far as the inherent principles are concerned; when materialised form, though itself without parts, is nevertheless divided, this is due to matter, and while in any part of the seed all the principles are present, as appears from the fact that even if a part of it is taken away, still the animal is shaped without a defect, it is matter that causes the head, the nose, etc. to be separate (tr. Westerink)’.
[565] The ancients rightly noted that storks took great care in raising their young; the story was also told that they were rewarded by their children’s careful care in their own old age (cf. Aristophanes, Birds 1353ff.). The scholiast on the same passage of Aristophanes states that storks represented justice on sceptres.
[566] The Sophist would be read sixth in the Iamblichean curriculum that Olympiodorus followed, after Alcibiades, Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, and Theaetetus; it marked the beginning of the study of being proper.
[567] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 307,19–308,9.
[568] For what follows, see Proclus, in Alc. 308,17–309,16.
[569] As Olympiodorus later puts it (216,4–17; 221,21), the ability to analyze a group into its constituent individuals ‘one by one’ is an antidote, like Hermes’ ‘moly’, to the control exercised by multiplicity and the many.
[570] That is, Plato doesn’t mean that if I can persuade any one person, I can persuade any other multitude; he means that if I can persuade a multitude as a whole, I have persuaded each individual in the multitude.
[571] I take the point here to be that the arithmetician is persuasive to other knowledgeable experts in his field, regardless of their number, but not necessarily to the crowd.
[572] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 307,9–15.
[573] The text is difficult to construe here, and Westerink obelises the words Sôkratê peri autou. I am very grateful to my anonymous reader for this section of the text, who advanced the plausible interpretation that I have adapted (to the best of my ability) here.
[574] The text is also difficult to construe here, and I am not confident in the sense.
[575] Proclus, in Alc. 313,10–17 expects surprise at Socrates’ admission, and replies that this ‘shows his lofty grandeur and contempt for everything inferior. The undertaking to prove the opposite of Alcibiades’ convictions does not reveal him as pushy in regard to others, but as a contestant on behalf of the truth’ (tr. O’Neill 1971, lightly adapted).
[576] That is, a universal affirmation (‘every human being walks’) can be proven false by proving the contrary (‘no human being walks’) or merely the contradictory (‘some human being does not walk’), and it’s more ‘pushy’ to prove the former than the latter. In the traditional ‘square of opposition’ drawn from Aristotle, Int. 6–7, the contrary of A (‘every S is P’) is E (‘no S is P’), but the contradictory of A is O (‘some S is not P’).
[577] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 314,1–6.
[578] As Alcibiades says at Symposium 218A: ‘Well, something much more painful than a snake has bitten me in my most sensitive part – I mean my heart, or my soul... which has been bitten by philosophy, whose grip on young and eager souls is much more vicious than a viper’s and makes them do the most amazing things’.
[579] Euripides, Hippolytus 345; Aristophanes, Knights 15.
[580] An allusion to the famous Platonic doctrine that learning is a process of recollection. For the later Neoplatonists’ pedagogical analysis of the doctrine, see for example Simplicius, in Cat. 12,26–13,4, with Hoffmann 1987 and Griffin 2014a.
[581] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 314,17–21.
[582] Olympiodorus refers back to the tradition that divided the First Alcibiades into a series of ten syllogisms (cf. Proclus, in Alc. 12,18–13,1).
[583] If everything just is advantageous, and everything advantageous is just, then the extension or referent of the two terms is identical.
[584] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 318,20–23.
[585] I will normally render kalon as ‘noble’ in this moral context. Later, when the same word is used for a grade of being in Neoplatonic ontology, I will use ‘beautiful’ or ‘beauty’, but transliterate the Greek to signal that the same word is meant.
[586] For Alcibiades’ donation (and the appreciation for reputation that allegedly motivated it), see Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 10.
[587] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 332,3–20.
[588] Olympiodorus refers to a story also reported by Aelian, Various Histories 3.44, and by Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Handbook 32. ‘[T]wo men on their way to Delphi fell in with bandits, and while one of them was being killed by them, the other either fled or did not come to his defence fearlessly... [A]gain two other men fell in with bandits, and one of the two was seized by the bandits. The other hurled his spear at a bandit, but missed him and struck and killed his friend’ (tr. Brennan and Brittain 2002). The Oracle criticised the first man who chose not to help his friend, but did not blame the second man who inadvertently killed his friend. (It is the intent that makes the action good or bad, not the consequences).
[589] Understanding akôn as spear; it could also be interpreted as ‘accidentally’ (which is clearly the sense, at any rate).
[590] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 332,21–333,13.
[591] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 334,9–11.
[592] See Proclus, in Alc. 333,15. The Alcibiades belongs particularly to the level of ‘civic excellence’ (politikê aretê), to the rational soul using the body as an instrument (see Introduction, and Olympiodorus’ Lecture 1, translated in Griffin 2014d). From this perspective, it’s permissible to view death, the separation of soul from body, as a kind of harm. From the vantage point of the higher ‘levels’ of excellence, such as purificatory excellence (kathartikê aretê), however, the separation of soul from body can be regarded as good for the soul; this view is developed by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedo, the third dialogue in the Neoplatonic reading curriculum of Plato after Alcibiades and Gorgias.
[593] As Proclus points out in his corresponding comments (in Alc. 333,10–334,5), the same courageous act could be essentially noble, and only incidentally harmful, but sometimes people ‘take the incidental as essential and do not distinguish these from each other according to the custom of philosophical discussion’ (cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 166b28–36).
[594] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 337,10–14.
[595] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 336,5–8.
[596] ‘Some S is P’ implies that ‘some P is S’. Reading an<ti>strephei at 118,9 with Westerink.
[597] This reasoning is highly condensed, but the train of thought might run as follows. (1) Some noble things (e.g., courage) are good; therefore some good things are noble. (2) Olympiodorus imagines a case where it’s been proven, both that everything noble is good, and that the aggregate of all particular noble things under consideration (courage, self-control, justice, and wisdom) are good. (3) Therefore the whole aggregate converts.
[598] cf. Proclus, in Alc. 339,7–15.
[599] See the diagram below in the body text, drawn from the scholia to the manuscript. As Proclus explains, ‘if two terms and their opposites are convertible with each other, the opposite of one of these two terms cannot be consistent with the other’ (Proclus, in Alc. 339,7–15).
[600] Again, noble actions in battle may cause harm that disadvantages the body.
[601] See above, 117,8–10.
[602] In the play Hippolytus by Euripides, the title character has sworn chastity and honours Artemis, goddess of virginity and the hunt, rather than Aphrodite, goddess of beauty, love and sexuality. Aphrodite indirectly brings about his demise, causing Hippolytus’ stepmother Phaedra to fall in love with him, and setting in motion a chain of events that leads to his death.
[603] Inserting ei and deleting katho at 120,6 with Westerink.
[604] Inserting ei and deleting katho with Westerink, as follows: skopei <ei>, êi [katho] kalon esti, kai agathon esti.
[605] See note above on the Hippolytus.
[606] Supplying hexomen hoti pan kalon agathon with Westerink. The text is jumbled here, perhaps on account of a student recorder’s haste at the lecture.
[607] The manuscript text presents the position backwards (literally, ‘Not existing is worse than existing badly’, which is the contrary of the point that Olympiodorus means to make, as 117,15 makes clear). Either this is a slip of the tongue or the pen, but the text should be something nearer to to kakôs einai tou mê einai, ‘existing badly is worse than not existing at all’.
[608] See above, 118,13–22 and 118,22–26.
[609] Aristotle, Post. An. 1.24: the more specific or particular the demonstration, the more indefinite and less explanatory it is.
[610] I shift to ‘beautiful’ here as a rendering of the Greek word kalon, to capture the context of the following paragraph.
[611] That is, Aristotle treated the second Neoplatonic hypostasis, Intellect (nous) or Being (ousia), as primary, rather than recognising the true first principle, the Good (to agathon) or One (to hen). This was a Neoplatonic commonplace.
[612] The reference is to Metaphysics L (12.9–10), where Aristotle considers the nature of divine thought as ‘most divine and precious’, and then investigates how goodness (to eu) belongs to thought. He continues, ‘We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does. For the good (to eu) is found both in the order and in the leader, and more in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him’ (tr. Ross).
[613] Again, it was a commonplace in Neoplatonism that Aristotle treated Intellect (nous) as the highest principle; Olympiodorus is suggesting that the use of the word eu, with its aesthetic overtones, also connotes this.
[614] See also Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 2.9 Westerink (15,21–16,1): ‘It is better to be taken care of by God than by oneself, and in this case being moved from without is superior to self-motion’ (tr. Westerink).
[615] ‘Stated’ at 116B2–3; ‘converted’ at 116B13.
[616] Compare the diagram at 118,15, above.
[617] See also 38,16–18 and Olymp. in Gorg. 2.3 (16,5–10). For the dichotomy between the empirical doctor, who functions by trial and error, and the rationalist doctor, who functions with an explanatory theory, see also Frede 1988.
[618] I occasionally translate aiskhos and cognates with both ‘shame’ and ‘ugliness’ in English to preserve the duality of sense that recurs at 125,16–17 in the contrast with kalon.
[619] See Sophist 227D–228D; also Proclus, in Alc. 210,4–15; and below, 197,1–3.
[620] The idea is that pain in the body arises from the strife between parts or elements, so a single whole would not undergo pain. See Hippocrates, On the Nature of Man 2, vol. 6, p. 34 Littré.
[621] See 103,9–16.
[622] Inserting hoti with Westerink at 125,18.
[623] ‘Noble’ and ‘[morally] beautiful’ translate kalon in the following section.
[624] Reading ge for de at 126,4, as suggested to me by Donald Russell.
[625] The Greek word anôthen can mean literally ‘from above’ or ‘in virtue of being more general’ (in logic), and both might be implied here; in terms of Neoplatonic metaphysics, the Good stands ‘above’ beauty, but in terms of Neoplatonic logic, it’s also a more ‘general’ term.
[626] That is, the two terms have the same extension or referent.
[627] Olympiodorus’ double negative is slightly more circumlocutious: ‘The subject... has only avoided possessing the property of ‘humanity’ in those cases where ‘capable of laughter’ is not predicated of it’.
[628] If every excellence is necessarily good, any person who possesses excellence thereby possesses the good.
[629] Reading mêdeteron for mêden at 126,19, as suggested to me by Donald Russell.
[630] See also Proclus fr. 3; cf. Olymp. in Gorg. 5.2.
[631] The principle that each virtue term (like ‘justice’, ‘courage’, ‘wisdom’, ‘self-control’) refers to one and the same thing goes back to Plato (Protagoras 333b4). There are subtly different views in the dialogues; in the Laches, courage looks like a proper part of excellence (190C–D, 199E), and in Euthyphro, piety is presented as a part of justice (11E–12E). See for example Brickhouse & Smith 1997.
[632] 122,3; 122,19–123,5.
[633] Beauty (to kalon), as a Form, exists at the level of Intellect (nous) in Neoplatonic metaphysics. Therefore it is derivative from the One or Good, which lies above Intellect (see for example Plotinus 1.6.9). Olympiodorus presents ‘[acting] well’ (to eu) as mediating between the Good and Beauty.
[634] See above, 126,3–20.
[635] See 107B.
[636] Aristophanes, Acharnians 530.
[637] Aristophanes, Peace 603–610.
[638] Homer, Iliad 1.249.
[639] In other words, Socrates chooses a question with a clear and unambiguous correct answer to illustrate his point, that there are some things that Alcibiades knows and can speak to confidently.
[640] ‘Loosely’ is a rough rendering of pakhumerôs here: the sense is that the argument has been roughly made with some loose ends that have to be tied up later (cf. 208,11.14 and 209,14 below).
[641] For Olympiodorus’ use of common concepts, see for example 18,3–4 (‘we know certain things... even without demonstration’ by means of common concepts), 40,20, and in Gorg. 44.7. See also Tarrant 1997, 189–91 and for the role of the common concepts in Neoplatonism more broadly, see van den Berg 2009.
[642] See above, 105,11–12.
[643] An allusion to Plato’s analysis of the soul as tripartite, including reason (logos) and unreasoning faculties (thumos, epithumia), and his argument that the unreasoning faculites are educated by different means than reason; see for example Lorenz 2008, Cooper 1984.
[644] See 124,5.
[645] Euripides, Orestes 1–3.
[646] Reading hôd’ epos epein with the manuscripts of Euripides, Or. 1, for Westerink’s oude epos epein; but I am unsure of the sense here. The idea may be that Socrates bemoans Alcibiades’ ignorance in the same spirit as Electra at the outset of the Orestes, and perhaps (if we read oude) that language falls short of describing this suffering.
[647] In the Neoplatonist scale of metaphysics and epistemology, the One is strictly speaking unknowable and unspeakable because it transcends being and knowledge, whereas matter is unknowable and unspeakable because it is beneath being and knowledge, a kind of substrate in which reality can be imaged. See for example Sorabji 2004, vol. 3, §14.
[648] I was not able to locate a source for this anecdote.
[649] See 92,9–19.
[650] See 113A.
[651] See 96,7–12, with notes.
[652] For Olympiodorus’ portrayal of Socrates, see Renaud and Tarrant 2015: 203–206; for the Neoplatonic Socrates, see now Layne and Tarrant 2014.
[653] Slightly later in the Alc. (119A), as in Gorgias 515C–516D, Socrates is portrayed as questioning whether Pericles was really a capable ‘statesman’ (politikos), since he never seems to have improved any of his citizens. The orator Aelius Aristides (AD 147–after 177), a major figure of the second sophistic, produced a counter-argument in his ‘Defense of the Four Politicians’ Miltiades, Cimon, Themistocles and Pericles (Or. 46).
[654] Proclus, in Alc. fr. 4. It is a Platonic commonplace that the good life requires real knowledge (epistêmê), not only true belief; see for example Rep. 5 and 7 (506C: ‘Haven’t you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are shameful and ugly’; 520C: ‘Do you think those who express a true belief without understanding are any different from the blind who happen to travel the right road? [To be good citizens, you must discover] the truth...’). This view was opposed by Plato’s contemporary Isocrates (not to be confused with Socrates); for him, true belief is enough (Antidosis 271).
[655] See 38,16–18 and Olymp. in Gorg. 2.3 (16,5–10). For the dichotomy between the empirical doctor, who functions by trial and error, and the rationalist doctor, who functions with an explanatory theory, see also Frede 1988.
[656] A quotation from Homer (Iiad 22.60, Odyssey 15.246).
[657] Olympiodorus’ view is that the statesman always has the ability to improve his citizens, but may not exercise that ability in practice when he is engaged instead in higher forms of philosophical contemplation; see also 138,18.
[658] Olympiodorus picks up the familiar tension between the politically active and contemplative philosopher, already anticipated in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Books 1 and 10) and in Plato’s Theaetetus. The Neoplatonist solution is to treat both civic and contemplative excellences as valuable steps on a ‘ladder’ of excellences; see Introduction.
[659] For the philosopher in a hostile constitution, see Republic 6, 496C–E; Olympiodorus comments on that passage at in Gorg. 45.2.
[660] Aristippus the Younger – the grandson of Socrates’ pupil Aristippus – was taught philosophy by his mother, Arete (DL 2.86).
[661] cf. Republic 2, 372E.
[662] Hippocrates, Aphor. 2.10, IV 472 L.; cf. below, 226,9, and Olymp. in Cat. 10,7–8.
[663] Reading autôi for autois at 137,13, as suggested to me by Donald Russell.
[664] See Anaxagoras B12 DK.
[665] Olympiodorus has in mind a metaphysical and epistemological contrast between Intellect (nous), as the second Neoplatonic hypostasis, and the faculties of Soul (psukhê) that come ‘after’ or ‘below’ it.
[666] Homer, Od. 3, 265–72.
[667] Hom. Il. 22.60, Od. 15.246.
[668] cf. Republic 3, 400 B–C; 4, 424C; and earlier in this commentary, 2,43–44.
[669] Cf. Olymp. in Gorg. 3.10.
[670] Deleting an and accenting tína at 139,7.
[671] Proclus, fr. 6.
[672] cf. Hom. Od. 4.371.
[673] Hom. Od. 4.372.
[674] Eur. Hippolytus 384.
[675] Callias son of Hipponicus (Callias [4] in Brill’s New Pauly) was a profligate millionaire who spent most of his fortune, is mentioned or alluded to by Aristophanes (Birds 282–84, Frogs 428–30, Assemblywomen 810); Olympiodorus may allude here to Eupolis’ Flatterers, in which Callias was the protagonist.
[676] Callias son of Calliades was an important political figure who tried to strengthen Athens’ position against Sparta (Callias [7] in Brill’s New Pauly). For Zeno of Elea in Athens, see Parm. 126E–128E.
[677] cf. Ol. in Gorg. 189,18–19.
[678] cf. Olymp. in Phaed. 7.5 (42,1–3 Norvin).
[679] Timon fr. 45 Diels.
[680] An expertise with which some sophists were credited, notably including Gorgias.
[681] The story of Zeno’s heroic opposition to the tyrant of Elea was famous in antiquity: see Diogenes Laertius 9.26.
[682] Olympiodorus may allude to a practice by which a philosopher – like himself – could be supported by voluntary donations and gifts, without commanding fees as such.
[683] On this famous passage, see Westerink 1990: 329; Wildberg 2005: 332–34.
[684] The ‘first part’ is concerned with the examination and refutation of Alcibiades’ errors (cf. Olymp. in Alc. 11,7–8), according to the division made standard by Iamblichus (cf. Proclus, in Alc. 13,16–14,23).
[685] The ‘second part’ of the dialogue is protreptic, concerned with exhortation of Alcibiades. (See previous note).
[686] The Stoic technical term (hêgemonikon) refers to the rational ‘commanding aspect’ or ‘ruling part’ of the human person, although ‘part’ can be a misleading translation, since rationality is not a part of the soul; see SVF 2.823–33, Long 1996: 242.
[687] 129E–130C.
[688] These distinctions play a significant role in the later lectures; see for example Lecture 25, below. Olympiodorus refers to several of the stages of virtue in the Neoplatonic scala virtutum; see Introduction.
[689] The Greco-Persian wars, which played a key role in Athens’s rise to political, military, and economic power in the eastern Mediterranean, from 499–449 BC; and the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, from 431–404 BC, which gradually exhausted Athenian power. The wars and their causes are primarily treated by Herodotus (for the Persian wars) and Thucydides (for the Peloponnesian war).
[690] Ar. fr. 51 Rose: see now Hutchinson & Johnson at www.protrepticus.info.
[691] Aristotle, Metaphysics L (12.9).
[692] The ‘noble lie’ of Rep. 3, 414E–415C is a particularly famous, though problematic, example.
[693] cf. Hippocrates Aphorisms 2.38 Littré: ‘An article of food or drink that is slightly worse (smikrôi kheiron), but more pleasant to the taste, is preferable to one that is better, but less pleasant.’ See also 6,5–7,8; 54,15–55,14.
[694] 123D–124B?
[695] cf. 134B–C, where Alcibiades arrives at the conclusion that the good statesman (politikos) must understand virtue or excellence (aretê) and impart it to his citizens.
[696] Hom. Il. 10.43.
[697] See Proclus, fr. 9, and below, 169,13–16; 217,2–3.
[698] Hom. Il. 4.350; Od. 1.64.
[699] Hom. Od. 14.466.
[700] Hom. Il. 3.45.
[701] An Athenian warship.
[702] Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 10.
[703] cf. Demosthenes, Against Meidias (Or. 21).
[704] An allusion to a perceived disintegration of the boundaries between free men and slaves under the Christian empire.
[705] Proclus, fr. 8.
[706] Hom. Il. 2.382.
[707] That is, begin our practice of a new skill on a very large, ambitious project. See also Plato, Laches 187B, Gorg. 514E.
[708] Isag. 2,4.
[709] Andromeda was later placed among the stars by Athena (e.g., Hyginus, Poet. Astr. 2.10).
[710] In Menander’s Man She Hated (Misoumenos), the protagonist Thrasonides grumbles that ‘it seems I ought to carry a Laconic key’ (Lakônikê kleis esti, hôs eoike, moi perioistea) (fr. 343 Kock), but Olympiodorus quotes a different line here, or adapts the text to his purpose. A ‘Spartan key’ would lock a door from the outside, but not from inside; see for example Plautus, Most. 405.
[711] Xenophon (Hellenica 3.3.3) relates a debate over the meaning of the oracle: it said that the Lacedaemonians would run into trouble when their king was ‘lame’ (khôlos), but did this mean literally lame in one foot, or defective in lineage (as Lysander argued)?
[712] Agis II publicly recognised Leotychidas as his son, but suspicions that Leotychidas was the product of a secret liaison between Alcibiades and Agis’ wife Timaea haunted his succession, and Agesilaus was made king instead. See Xen. Hellenica 3.3.3, Plut. Life of Lysander 22 and Life of Agesilaus 3.
[713] cf. Plutarch, Alcib. 1.
[714] The four cardinal excellences or virtues (sophia, dikaiosunê, andreia, and sophrosunê).
[715] Xenophon, Education of Cyrus 1.2,2–12.
[716] On the ‘scale of virtues’ assumed here, a tradition deriving from Plotinus and Porphyry’s distinctive interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, see the Introduction. Olympiodorus envisages a ladder of ‘levels’ of human excellence, beginning with (1) ‘natural’ (phusikos) or innate tendencies, then advancing to (2) qualities cultivated by ‘habituation’ (êthikos) (primarily in childhood), including the ‘good habits’ of practical wisdom, justice, courage, and self-control, and then advancing to (3) ‘social’ or ‘civic’ (politikos) qualities mastered by a self-conscious and philosophically motivated reorganisation of the ‘inner city’ (polis) of the soul, manifesting as the same virtuous behaviours (practical wisdom, justice, courage, and self-control) but now grounded by reason. The higher stages, not mentioned here, include (4) purificatory, (5) contemplative, and (6) inspired or theurgic excellence.
[717] Olympiodorus takes the Socratic thesis of the ‘unity’ or ‘reciprocity’ of excellence (cf. Protagoras 333b4) to apply at the civic and higher levels of excellence: the possessor of one civic excellence thereby possesses all of them.
[718] Here, Olympiodorus argues that Cyrus’ multiple tutors trained him in (2) the habituative grade of excellence, since these habits require teaching (unlike the natural grade) and the possession of one does not automatically imply the possession of the others (unlike the civic and higher grades).
[719] cf. 124B.
[720] For the story, see Herodotus 3.84–87: when it was decided among a group of seven nobles that the king would be that man whose horse was first to neigh at sunrise, Darius agreed a clever scheme with his groom to ensure his selection.
[721] Il. 5.631.
[722] Il. 5.269.
[723] Proclus, fr. 10.
[724] Perseus flew on winged sandals and the winged horse Pegasus: see for example Apollodorus 2.4.1–5.
[725] Pisander, Heraclea fr. 10 Kinkel.
[726] The comedy is Aristophanes, Thesm. 1098–1102, where Euripides, dressed as Perseus, thinks he is flying and bringing the Gorgon’s head to Argos, only to pause to rescue Andromeda. Perseus famously used an adamantine sickle to behead the Gorgon Medusa, whose gaze turned men to stone.
[727] cf. Olymp. in Met. 110,6–7.
[728] ‘For it seems that in Sparta, there was a punishment for failing to marry, for a late marriage, and for a poor marriage; and those were especially subject to the latter penalty who sought alliances with the rich instead of with the good and with their friends’ (Plutarch, Life of Lysander 30, tr. loosely adapted from Dryden).
[729] fr. 204 Kock.
[730] See Iamblichus, Theology of Arithmetic 55,6–7 and 62,20–63,3 de Falco (tr. Waterfield 1988) for this view of the viability of the embryo, and the number symbolism that Olympiodorus draws on here. See also Theon of Smyrna, On the Use of Mathematics 104,4–5 and Philo, On the Creation of the World 124.
[731] See Iamblichus, Theology of Arithmetic 57,15 (tr. Waterfield 1988) for the Pythagorean custom of reverence of the heptad (which they ‘imperceptibly pronounced as “septa” ’).
[732] Drawing on the verbal similarity of the Latin word septem to the Greek word sebastos (‘reverend’, ‘august’) and related roots: see Philo, On the creation of the world 127.
[733] With Westerink 1982: IX, Olympiodorus may take ‘septem’ to be the Roman word for number; the quotation from Homer will be meant as an example of synecdoche, and the point will be that the Romans call all numbers after the name of the number seven, because of the special value of that number. The Neoplatonic numerological tradition also regarded seven as ‘the head’ and ‘the whole’, and Olympiodorus’ point here may be that the Romans use words for augustness (comparing septa and sebastos) for seven because it is the valuable head and whole of number: cf. Proclus in Tim. 1.358,3: ‘the whole is also called the “head” ’. Seven is also called ‘head’ with reference to Athena, who leapt full-grown from the head of Zeus and neither produces (is a virgin) nor is produced (has no mother); see for example Iamblichus, Theology of Arithmetic 71,3–13; Philo On the creation of the world 124.
[734] See Introduction on the scale of aretai.
[735] See Republic 4: wisdom is the excellence of reason (logos), while justice is the excellence of each ‘part’ of the soul (including reason, spirited-emotion, and appetite) doing its own work.
[736] Referring to theurgical practice: see Introduction.
[737] Above, 157,17.
[738] Crat. 397D.
[739] Demosthenes portrays his contemporary and rival Aeschines as assisting his mother with Phrygian mystery rites (On the Crown 18.259–60; see also 18.130, 276).
[740] Presumably reflecting Olympiodorus’ dim appraisal of the standard of paideia and children’s tutors in sixth-century Alexandria. For a rich overview of late antique education, see Watts 2008.
[741] That is, if the human being (anthrôpos) is identical with the soul (psukhê), factors like wealth are extraneous to human excellence.
[742] See also above, 107,4–6. This may be a reference to a book like Aristippus’ On the Luxury of the Ancients, which apparently described Alcibiades’ expensive luxuries in some detail (DL 2.23).
[743] Sybaris (located in Southern Italy, sometimes associated with Sicily) was legendary for its luxurious cuisine, giving rise to the proverbial ‘Sybaritic table’.
[744] Olympiodorus has in mind a division of (1) possessions such as slaves and horses, who enrich their possessors by their own independent actions (autokinêtos); (2) possessions such as gold and silver, which enrich their possessors only when others move them (heterokinêtos); and (3) possessions such as fertile land, which enriches its possessor without moving at all (akinêtos).
[745] The region of Messene was conquered by the Spartans in the early seventh century BC. The Spartans later kept its citizens as slaves (‘helots’). After a series of unsuccessful revolts, Messenia was finally liberated by Thebes in 370/69 BC.
[746] Fr. 4,3 Diehl.
[747] Iliad 3.75.
[748] See Homer, Iliad 7.180, 11.46; Od. 3.304.
[749] Aesop, Fab. 246 Halm.
[750] For the decline of constitutions, see Republic 8–9.
[751] After his ostracism from Athens in 471 or 472, and a Spartan effort to discredit him, the Athenian statesman Themistocles (c. 524–459 BC) escaped Greece and eventually reached Persia, where Artaxerxes I (ruled 465–424) appointed him governor of Magnesia.
[752] See Thuc. 1.138.5.
[753] That is, valuing wealth.
[754] This is a characteristic example of misogynistic and racist assumptions in the literary tradition of classical antiquity. For a general overview of racist assumptions in the ancient world, see for example Isaac 2004; for the experience and portrayal of women in late antique Egypt, when Olympiodorus lived and worked, see Moss 2012. Elsewhere, however, Olympiodorus follows Plato in Republic 5 in insisting that men and women share equally by nature in areas of excellence (e.g., 188,13).
[755] Aristotle, fr. 544 Rose (1886). The saying is in Doric dialect.
[756] Plutarch, Lyc. 9 reports that Lycurgus required the use of iron money, but Olympiodorus also describes the new money as bronze at in Gorg. 44.2. (Thus Westerink deletes sidêra from the MS reading here: ho Lukourgos epetrepe ta nomismata... [sidêra] khalka einai).
[757] For this episode, in which Heracles appeared to Pherecydes in a dream, see DL 1.117. See also Pherecydes A2 DK.
[758] As Olympiodorus explains below, the use of the plural rhetorically builds up the wealth of the Persians.
[759] cf. Menander fr. 343 Kock; see above, 152,12–14, with note.
[760] Aristophanes fr. 902 Kock.
[761] Lais was a legendary Corinthian courtesan, while Helen’s removal to Troy prompted the Trojan War.
[762] Namely appetite (epithumia), which is ‘furthest’ from reason in Plato’s model of the tripartite soul.
[763] Philonikia could also be spelled philoneikia and sound identical, due to the ioticism of late antique pronounciation; Olympiodorus here has in mind alternative possible etymologies, (1) from philia and nikê (‘love of victory’) or (2) from philia and neikos (‘love of strife’), and he defends the first. (It is also possible that he was aware of a variant reading philoneikia at Alc. 122C7).
[764] For the possible underlying comparison between appetite and bestial nature, see Republic 9, 588B–589B.
[765] Anabasis 1.4.9.
[766] Artaxerxes II of Persia.
[767] The later Roman emperors wore togas dyed in purple.
[768] See Isaac 2004 for a general overview of racist assumptions in classical antiquity, and Moss 2012 for a specific treatment of the lived experience of women in late antique Egypt.
[769] See Alc. 121E–122A.
[770] See above, 154,9–155,4: the ‘excellences’ trained by the Persian teachers are actually habituative (êthikos) excellences, not civic (politikos) excellences, which are the first of the ‘true’, philosophical excellences.
[771] That is, Socrates contrasts the relatively ‘ordinary’ parentage of Alcibiades to the lofty parentage of the Persian king, just described.
[772] Added by Westerink, following the Platonic text.
[773] Hesiod, Works and Days 293, 295.
[774] The ‘second section’ has been concerned with exhortation of Alcibiades (cf. Olymp. in Alc. 11,7–8), according to the division made standard by Iamblichus (cf. Proclus, in Alc. 13,16–14,23).
[775] The ‘third part’ is concerned with ‘midwifery’, elicitation of Alcibiades’ ideas (see previous note).
[776] I am not confident in this translation, but I hope that it may capture the sense of koinon katagôgion hupêrkhen (literally, ‘initiated a common descent’ or ‘common return’): as I interpret this, in both of the first two sections, Socrates executed a single project of reaching ‘down’ to Alcibiades and bringing him back ‘up’ by proving his ignorance of himself in soul, body, and possessions.
[777] In Philebus 48C–49A, Socrates enumerates three distinct, and increasingly ‘ridiculous’ (geloion, cf. Phaedrus 229E), grades of self-ignorance: (1) lack of knowledge of one’s possessions (‘If someone thinks he is richer than he is...’); (2) lack of knowledge of one’s physical attributes (‘if people think they are taller and handsomer than they are’); and finally—by far the most common, ridiculous, and dangerous—(3) lack of knowledge of one’s soul’s excellence (to suppose that one possesses wisdom when one does not).
[778] An adaptation from Euripides, Orestes 258–59: there, Electra asks Orestes to stay put on his bed (en demniois) when he thinks he sees the Furies hounding him. But here the ‘poor wretch’ is ‘among his bandages’ (en splêniois), and Olympiodorus attributes the text to ‘Alexander’, addressing a novice doctor who thinks he’s a philosopher: this may be an excerpt from a letter of Alexander of Aphrodisias, or the prominent sixth-century medical writer Alexander of Tralles, but I have not been able to find the quotation in either source.
[779] Thersites was a member of the Greek host at Troy whose physical ugliness was notorious (Il. 2.211–77).
[780] Referencing the Aristotelian hierarchy of functions of the soul, substantially adopted by the Neoplatonist commentators: growth and nutrition belonging to plants (here, the ‘vegetative soul’); locomotion and perception belonging to animals; and reason belonging to human beings in particular (DA 413a23; see Sorabji 2004, vol. 2: 1(d)).
[781] See for example Philebus 48C–49A.
[782] As reason (logos), spirited emotion (thumos), and appetite (epithumia).
[783] For the ladder of excellences or virtues, see the Introduction.
[784] Compare perhaps Odyssey 10.307–372?
[785] Odyssey 18.130.
[786] See Plutarch, Pericles 31–32.
[787] See scholia to Aristophanes, Clouds 859.
[788] An allusion to the view that Pericles kindled the war to avoid giving an account of his use of public funds (e.g., Plutarch, Life of Pericles 32).
[789] That is, Socrates’ desire for knowledge and wisdom was sufficiently powerful that even after attaining a high degree of philosophical excellence, he continued to seek to improve.
[790] Phaedrus is likely a slip of Olympiodorus’ tongue, or his redactor’s pen, for Phaedo.
[791] Aristotle, fr. 544 Rose.
[792] A contrast that Olympiodorus has made often: see, for example, 6,6–7.
[793] For the Oracle’s importance, see for example Republic 4, 427C. The story of the crucial oracle that saved the Athenians is narrated by Herodotus (7.141).
[794] See also 192,8 below, where Olympiodorus adopts this explanation for Socrates’ ‘improving’ alongside Alcibiades.
[795] Note that on Olympiodorus’ view, to have a god as a guardian daimon means to live authentically according to one’s true nature (20,4–10).
[796] cf. Protagoras 336B–C.
[797] Epiphaneia can mean ‘manifestation’ in general, or the ‘epiphany’ of a god.
[798] Adding philotimos at 175,24 with Creuzer and Westerink.
[799] Homer, Iliad 1.599–600. As Proclus explains (in Tim. 2,98,9–13), Hephaestus represents the demiurge of the bodily (sômatikos) world, and as such is symbolically described as ‘lame’ and amusing to the gods. See also Proclus, in Remp. 1,126,5–128,23 and Hermias in Phaedr. 260,22–26.
[800] cf. Iliad 16.98–99.
[801] This is an extremely periodic sentence, which I have attempted to roughly preserve in English despite its complexity; epeidê will not be picked up until 178,1 below.
[802] cf. Lecture 1, 3,3–9,20.
[803] That is, in the hierarchy of levels of the soul corresponding to the levels of excellence, this inquiry concerns the ‘civic’ person – who is ‘above’ non-rationality, but ‘below’ the purificatory and contemplative experience of separation of the rational soul. (See Introduction).
[804] On the Soul 1.5, 411b18–19.
[805] In the Iamblichean curriculum, the Alcibiades is followed by the Gorgias, interpreted as concerned with civic excellence, and then the Phaedo, interpreted as concerned with purificatory excellence. (See Introduction).
[806] In general, I take Olympiodorus to refer by ‘statesman’ or ‘civic person’ (politikos) to ‘the person possessed of civic excellence’ (politikê aretê); by ‘purificatory person’ (kathartikos) to ‘the person possessed of purificatory excellence’ (kathartikê aretê); and so on.
[807] The Aristotelian scheme of ‘four causes’ is usually accepted by Olympiodorus and his fellow commentators, but more strictly, he endorses a scheme of six causes: material, formal, efficient, final, paradigmatic, and instrumental (cf. in Gorg. Proem 5,1–6,1) that had become standard in later Neoplatonism (cf. Proclus, in Tim. 1,3,14–19).
[808] The creator of the cosmos who looks to Form as a model to bring organisation to the raw potential of the receptacle, as depicted in Plato’s Timaeus (e.g. 29A).
[809] See Homer, Iliad 1.62–67.
[810] A quotation from Critias 109C.
[811] Inserting storgê with Westerink, comparing 186,19.
[812] But see 188,13 below, where Olympiodorus (following Plato in Republic 5) maintains that by nature men and women share equally in different areas of excellence.
[813] Hesiod, Works and Days 25.
[814] A saying quoted in Plato, Phaedrus 240C.
[815] See 107B: It’s no good frequenting someone with wealth, or another extraneous resource, to understand a subject; we must find the person with real knowledge of it.
[816] On the development of the later Neoplatonic theory of universals, see Sorabji 2004, vol. 3: 5(a)–(i).
[817] Where wisdom (sophia) involves contemplation of non-contingent truths, and practical wisdom (phronêsis) involves deliberation about contingent ethical choices (cf. Nic. Eth. 6.3).
[818] cf. Republic 2, 368D.
[819] Homer, Iliad 9.63–64.
[820] I take the point here to be that it is for the gods to cure true blindness, so why does the text here suggest that medicine can cure blindness? Olympiodorus suggests that some kinds of blindness (caused by cataracts) can be resolved by human ingenuity.
[821] Reading <ou> with Creuzer.
[822] Iliad 8.57.
[823] ‘When the same thing belongs to all of one term and to none of the other, or to all of each or none of each, I call such a figure the second’ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.5, 26b34, tr. Smith).
[824] Iliad 8.366, etc.
[825] A reference to the category of quantity (Aristotle, Cat. 6, 4b20–6a36); cf. Olymp. in Cat. 82,39–40.
[826] Homer, Iliad 6.506, 511.
[827] That is, Plato can imitate his subject in his subject’s language without being ungrammatical or introducing solecisms. 367a See Aristotle, Topics 8.2, 158a25–8; Fink 2012: 42.
[828] From the city-soul analogy of Republic 2, 368D.
[829] Odyssey 1.170.
[830] Part of the Platonic background here is the ‘city-soul analogy’ of Republic 2, 368D–369A.
[831] Deleting the first de at 188,10, as suggested by Westerink in his apparatus.
[832] Euripides, Medea 245: Medea suggests that men unhappy at home can leave the house for company, an option not available to women.
[833] cf. Republic 5, 454D–457C.
[834] As Socrates explains at Republic 5, 456C, according to the natural law of a just constitution men and women should share equally in governance and education; gender inequality is an accident of the inferior constitution of Athens (and other Greek city-states) in his day. Matters have not changed in Olympiodorus’ Alexandria.
[835] That is, the Amazons show that it is very possible for a woman to become an expert in warfare.
[836] Reading <phêsi>, added by Westerink.
[837] Or. 46.
[838] Adapting a phrase used of Hermes at Iliad 24.344, Od. 5.48 and 24.4; Olympiodorus reads hous for hôn at the beginning of the line.
[839] Plato, Republic 7, 536D.
[840] Homer, Iliad 22.71.
[841] Odyssey 11.315; the giants Otus and Ephialtes planned to invade heaven by piling Mt Pelion on Mt Ossa and Mt Ossa on Mt Olympus, but were struck down by Zeus while they were still young.
[842] cf. Plutarch, Life of Marcellus 14; a variant of the more often quoted saying, ‘give me a place to stand (stô for bô) and I will move the earth’.
[843] For the ‘divine’ allotted daimon, see 20,5.
[844] A reference to Alcibiades’ natural excellence or talent (see Introduction).
[845] This lecture is substantially a review of material from Lecture 21.
[846] LSJ s.v. kheir 6(i).
[847] Perhaps reading the datives storgêi and homonoiâi with huparkhei at 192,15, for the paradosis storgê and homonoia (cf. 193,4–5 below).
[848] An example of modus ponens, phrased in Stoic terms (if p then q; but p; therefore q). Disagreement and agreement, and enmity and friendship, are understood as pairs of contraries, so that if the contrary of A is the contrary of B, then A is B.
[849] Hesiod, Works and Days 25; see also above.
[850] See above, 184,5–10.
[851] That is, earlier in the survey and the preceding lecture (21).
[852] See for example above, 186,20–22.
[853] That is, not discussed in the passage: Olympiodorus goes on to cite the Apology.
[854] Olympiodorus expects his students to be familiar with the rules of the ‘game’ of dialectical question and answer, where questions are posed one at a time, and affirmation or negation (‘yes’ or ‘no’) would be the appropriate response to each question. Olympiodorus is stressing here that the Platonic dialogue context is a different venue: the rules of ‘interrogative questioning’ are looser, and multiple questions can be posed, and answered, at once. He cites the Apology as an illustration; earlier, he cited Homer.
[855] cf. Aristotle, Politics 1.1, 1252a7–21; Economics 1.1, 1343a1–16.
[856] That is, he ‘descended’ from the definable form of affection to particular examples comprised of matter and form, like the mutual intimacy of a family.
[857] From the city-soul analogy of Republic 2, 368D.
[858] Republic 5, 455D–E.
[859] See above, 188,13–15, and Republic 5, 454D–457C. As Socrates explains at 456C, according to the natural law of a just constitution men and women should share equally in governance and education; gender inequality is an accident of the constitution of Athens (and other Greek city-states) in his day. Matters have not changed in Olympiodorus’ Alexandria.
[860] Olympiodorus’ reference is to Menelaus’ yoking of Agamemnon’s mare Aithê together with his own horse Podargus; ‘Agamemnon’ is here a slip of Olympiodorus’ tongue or his recorder’s pen for Menelaus. (Agamemnon is mentioned in the next line).
[861] Iliad 23.295. See also the scholiast’s comments on Proclus, in Remp. 2,374,1–7.
[862] ‘When the same thing belongs to all of one term and to none of the other, or to all of each or none of each, I call such a figure the second’ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.5, 26b34, tr. Smith).
[863] cf. 184,11–20.
[864] For the later ancient distinction of synthetic and analytic reasoning, and its sources, see for example Menn 2002, 193–223. Analysis is reasoning from first principles, or from the general to the specific; synthesis is reasoning to first principles. (See also Proclus, in Alc. 180,17–19).
[865] Soph. 227D–228D; cf. 124,14–125,1.
[866] For the principle that our ‘completion’ or ‘fulfilment’ (teleiotês) varies according to the level of our ‘being’ (ousia), see Proclus, in Alc. 1,1–5: ‘It is surely necessary, in the case of each class of beings, to ascertain their being [ousia] before their perfection [teleiotês]; for perfection is not of itself, but of the being by which it is participated. This, then, must first be considered e.g. whether it is one of the undivided beings or of those divided in association with bodies or of those in middle rank; whether it is of those that are eternal or those that subsist for all time or those that come to be in some portion of time; and whether it is of those that are simple and established prior to all composition, or of those that are composite indeed, but forever composed ‘in indissoluble bonds’, or of those that can be resolved again into the elements from which they were composed’ (tr. O’Neill). Between the basic polarities of divisible being and indivisible being stretches the continuum of psukhê, which ranges from complete division (in association with bodies) to eternal unity. This doctrine of the intermediate soul, forever composed ‘in indissoluble bonds’, derives from Timaeus 35A. For the ancient notion of ‘care of the self’, see also Foucault 1988.
[867] cf. Phaedo 87C–D: the weaver weaves many cloaks; the one who wears them outlives the majority of his cloaks, but is survived by the last.
[868] Hom. Il. 1.288.
[869] This is again a reference to the scale of virtues: the civic person (politikos) harmonises the parts of the tripartite soul (reason, spirited-emotion, and appetite: cf. Republic 4, 443C–E), using the non-rational parts of the soul with moderation, while the purificatory person (kathartikos) works to liberate herself from non-rationality, and the contemplative person (theôrêtikos) is the rational soul contemplating itself independently from what is non-rational in it.
[870] Gorg. 460B.
[871] Deleting tou with Westerink.
[872] Phys. 1.3, 186a31–32: as Proclus explains (in Parm. 714,31–33), Aristotle maintained that Parmenides had failed to distinguish between per se (kath’ hauto) and incidental (kata sumbebêkos) features; Proclus rather cleverly interprets Parm. 128C as implying that Zeno (and by extension, Parmenides) used such a dsitinction.
[873] The following table of columns (sustoikhiai) is adapted from the scholia to 200,5–10.
[874] ap. Stobaeum 3.1, 173γ; 21,12; 13; 26. See also DL 1.40 for the attribution to Thales, with Chilon as ‘appropriator’ of the phrase.
[875] Ion fr. 55 Nauck.
[876] Alc. 129A.
[877] cf. Rep. 2, 365C–D.
[878] In traditional form the syllogism runs as follows: All human beings use the body as an instrument (A); All souls use the body as an instrument (A); All humans beings are souls (A).
[879] In giving this explication of [A], Olympiodorus assumes the standard Platonic description of psukhê as that which moves (kinei) the body however it pleases (compare the description of soma as heterokinêton at 203,16 below).
[880] I have supplied numbered lists in square brackets, and inserted headings in angle brackets.
[881] Olympiodorus points out that the syllogism apparently begs the question (petitio principii) whether the human being is the soul. His solution relies on the hypothetical syllogism which he sets forth in the next lecture: The human being is either the body or the soul or the combination of body and soul (B); But it cannot be the body, because a body never rules a body (B); But it cannot be the combination, for the same reason (B); therefore, The human being is the soul (B).
[882] A paraphrase of Alc. 129C7–129E9.
[883] On the ‘shell-like’ nature of the body of the non-rational soul, cf. 5,9 and n. 60.
[884] From 203,4 to 203,13 the structure of thought is rather compressed. The syllogistic argument of the first section (to 203,8) runs as follows: a.	Every whole (holon) wishes to preserve its parts. (For every whole possesses its existence (hypostasis) in its parts, wherefore the loss of a part would lead to the destruction (pthora) of the whole). b.	The human being, however, is prepared to sacrifice the body in certain circumstances. c.	Therefore the human being as a whole (holon) cannot be identified with any combination (synamphoteron) that counts the body among its parts. In other words, the human being is to be identified with the soul alone. Olympiodorus then raises an objection to this conclusion. What about non-rational animals? According to the argument given (hoson epi toutôi, 203,8), they too will be identical with soul: for they are also unafraid of sacrificing the body in certain circumstances, namely when they face attackers (en tôi makhesthai tois prosiousin, 9–10). Olympiodorus’ solution is characteristically Neoplatonic, adducing the Proclan principle that fulfilment (teleiotês) varies as a function of [level of] being (ousia), i.e. divided, permanently composed, or undivided: cf. 198,6–7 above with n. 406. The being of the non-rational animal stands at the level of non-rational soul (alogos psukhê, 9), whereas the human being is on par with rational soul (logikê psukhê). Thus non-rational animals, like us, are included in the argument given above, but at a different level of being. They, like us, perceive that their life is not really ‘in the shell’ (en tôi ostreinôi, 11) – that is, they recognise that their life is not limited to the ‘shell-like’ vehicle which temporarily conveys the non-rational soul. They are therefore prepared to sacrifice that shell, since they do not share its danger. Olympiodorus finally returns to clarify the underlying metaphysics of the argument. The body is not related to the human being as a part to a whole, but as an instrument to the one who uses it. The user does not share danger with his instrument (the whole, on the other hand, shares danger with the parts in which it has its existence, 203,5–6). Therefore the soul as user does not share in the danger that affects the body.
[885] The individual (atomos) is what remains after every division of kinds has been completed, what cannot be divided any further; in this case it is the unique person Alcibiades, who is concerned with actions (praxeis) in particular cases (kath’ hekasta).
[886] In other words, the ‘individual’ (atomon) is truly the soul and (by definition) wholly unpartitioned; but his actions (praxeis) are concerned with particular cases (ta kath’ hekasta) as they necessarily ‘come to be in a portion of time’ (cf. Proclus in Alc. 4,8–9).
[887] This would be backward, from the later Neoplatonic point of view: the individual (atomos) is the indivisible remainder that is present after all division (diairesis) through genera and species, so it is not comprised of an ‘assemblage’ at all; its nature is indivisibility. But according to Porphyry (Isagoge 7,22) an individual is constituted (sunestêke) of features whose assemblage (athroisma) ‘will never be found the same in anything else’. Barnes 2003: 342–45 provides an invaluable analysis of this definition and its contentious history. In late antiquity Platonists (like Olympiodorus) complained that Porphyry was ‘making the better from the worse’ by constituting individuals of accidents; after all, indivisibility characterises the highest levels of being for the Neoplatonists. Arethas replies that ‘Aristotle does not think that individuals get their being (ousia) from accidents – rather, they are recognised (gnôrismata) from their accidents and characterised (kharaktêrizesthai) by them’ (Scholion 106,1 = in Isag. 64,17–19), a view which draws on Plato’s use of the term ‘assemblage’ (athroisma) at Theaetetus 157B–C to describe the combination of qualities. Philoponus diplomatically talks of ‘certain proper features and accidents from which the particulars are constituted and recognised’ (in An. Post. 437,17–19).
[888] That is, as the smith uses and produces an anvil, and the carpenter uses and produces a hammer, Aristotle uses and produces his logic as an instrument (organon) and a product of philosophy.
[889] That is, the particular examples of the feet and hands are not exclusive, but naturally imply the soul’s use of the whole body as its instrument: cf. 129E (‘doesn’t a man use his whole body, too’?)
[890] cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.22, 730b15–19.
[891] At 130A11–12.
[892] This syllogism assumes the structure of the Stoic ‘fifth indemonstrable’, an argument which, ‘having an exclusive disjunction and the contradictory of one of the disjuncts as premisses, infers the other disjunct as its conclusion’, Mates 1953: 73. In its simplest form it runs: either p or q; not q; therefore p. On the Stoic ‘hypothetical syllogistic’ in general (the term derives from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ observation that Aristotle had promised an account of the syllogism from hypothesis, but no such account survived) see also Speca 2001.
[893] Aristotle introduces the example of melikraton (a mixture of honey with milk or water) at Metaph. 1092a29–30 in arguing that non-arithmetic mixture (outheni logôi) can be qualitatively better than arithmetic measure.
[894] The heavenly bodies are explicitly unmoved by all but still and circular motion, according to the plan of the Demiurge at Tim. 40B.
[895] See Lecture 1, 3,3–9,20, and in the present lecture, 203,20–205,7.
[896] This section is a summary of several points raised by the lecturer, rather than a verbal record or protocol.
[897] Supplying heuren with Westerink.
[898] See also above, 205,1, for Olympiodorus’ emphasis on Proclus’ attention to the text (lexis).
[899] cf. 204,10–11.
[900] The train of thought, I think, is something like this: if the Peripatetics were correct in constructing the individual out of accidents (cf. Barnes 2003: 342–45), then it would not be the case that by we could learn about the individual human being (atomos) by studying the form of the human being.
[901] Examples of instruments used in the agent’s activity, which are also products of that activity.
[902] See Homer Iliad 18.372, 412, and 468, and Olymp. in Gorg. 226,13–14. Olympiodorus plays on the similarity of the words for ‘bellows’ (phúsê, Il. 18.372) and ‘nature’ (phusis).
[903] For the relationship between nature and soul in the commentators, see Sorabji 2004, vol. 2: 1(d).
[904] For the following discussion, see also Proclus, in Alc. 169,1–2: for Aristotle, on the later Neoplatonic view, the material cause is that ‘out of which’ (cf. Metaph. 1013a24–26, Phys. 194b23–26), but for Plato, it is that in which (cf. Tim. 49E–51B).
[905] Olympiodorus’ examples are cases of forms that are already in matter: the human being already in a place (and time), and the image of Achilles already presented in the medium of paint.
[906] i.e., ‘human being’ (anthrôpos).
[907] Which move in circular rotations.
[908] We appear to be missing the target of this reference (cf. Dodds 1957: 357).
[909] For instance, if a nutritive or vegetative soul animated a plant, it not only uses the body of the plant as an instrument for its ends, but it also is that body, in the sense that the plant’s body is the subject for it as form.
[910] Westerink suggests these words might have fallen out from 208,10, comparing 9,4–7, 171,14–16.
[911] That is, Socrates constructs his proof of the major premise (that the human being uses the body as an instrument) by dividing up specific cases, such as the use of speech and the use of the body for crafts.
[912] That is, simply showing that the person ‘uses’ the body in some sense would be inadequate to prove that the person is not the combination of soul and body (since a whole might be said to ‘use’ its parts), without the further proof that the user differs from its instrument.
[913] That is, the first part of the dialogue is refutative, while the conclusion concerns the love and reciprocal love of Socrates and Alcibiades.
[914] cf. Phaedo 107D.
[915] Hippocr. Aphor. 1.3, 4.458 Littré; cf. Olymp. in Cat. 121,20.
[916] Reading Kharmidêi with Creuzer instead of Parmenidêi at 214,9: particularly given the recorder’s evident haste, the latter reading is likely to be a slip of the pen.
[917] The idea here, I take it, is that all gods are complete in containing something of all gods, a version of the rule that ‘all things are in all things, but in a manner appropriate to each’ (see for example Proclus, in Tim. 2,27,25–26). This kind of relationship between beings applies at the ‘level’ of souls (see the fourth corollary below, 215,13–21), intelligibles, and gods or henads. Plotinus, Enn. 5.8.4 presents a particularly striking image of this kind of existence at the intelligible level of being: ‘they see themselves in other things; for all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded; for each of them is great, because even the small is great; the sun there is all the stars, and each star is the sun and all the others. A different kind of being stands out in each, but in each all are manifest...’ (tr. Armstrong). But here, Olympiodorus has in mind the higher existence of gods, ‘individuals’ or ‘henads’ in the proper sense (cf. Proclus, El. Theol. prr. 113–65, in Parm. 1043–64; Siorvanes 1996: 167; Chlup 2012: 112–18).
[918] See Anaxagoras B6 DK, Olymp. in Met. 133,28; 30.
[919] I take the idea to be that reversion is always of the inferior to the superior: if it is of the non-rational to reason, this is obvious; if it is of reason to itself, then insofar as it is the reverting aspect reason is inferior to itself as object of reversion; and if it is of reason to what is superior to itself, this is again obvious.
[920] A reference to Odyssey 10.275–306.
[921] To this section, compare Proclus, in Alc. 243,13–244,11: ‘[T]he multitude... produces within us from our youth defective imaginings and various affections. We must, therefore, straighten out our reason (epistêmonikos logos)... there is in each of us ‘a certain many-headed wild beast’, as Socrates himself has observed [Rep. 9, 588C], which is analogous to the multitude; this is just like the people (dêmos) in a city, the various, non-rational and enmattered form of the soul, which is the most pedestrian part of us. The present argument [of Socrates in Alc. 110D–E] exhorts us to withdraw from our boundless appetite (epithumia), to remove from our lives the multitude and the people (dêmos) within us as not being a trustworthy judge of the nature of things nor in short capable of any true knowledge. For nothing non-rational is by nature such as to partake of knowledge, let alone the most deficient of non-rational things, which by possessing multiplicity is at strife within itself and fights against itself...’
[922] A quotation from Odyssey 19.163, echoed by Socrates at Apology 34D.
[923] See Aelian, Var. Hist. 2.1.
[924] Olympiodorus has in mind Odysseus’ observation of Circe’s isle from a high point (10.197), although Homer speaks specifically of Odysseus surveying one thing at a time earlier, in the Cyclops’ cave at 9.218.
[925] cf. 147,2–4 (Proclus fr. 9), and 169,13–16.
[926] See Symposium 216E. Tarrant (2007) conjectures a brilliant reconstruction of the text on which Olympiodorus may comment here and at 8,2–12.
[927] That is, god is in the soul in virtue of the soul’s relationship to god.
[928] For the descent of the ‘common concepts’ from Intellect and their role in Neoplatonic education, see see for example Simplicius, in Cat. 12,26–13,4, with Hoffmann 1987 and Griffin 2014a. For Olympiodorus’ use of common concepts, see for example 18,3–4 (‘we know certain things... even without demonstration’ by means of common concepts), 40,20, and in Gorg. 44.7. See also Tarrant 1997, 189–91 and for the role of the common concepts in Neoplatonism more broadly, see van den Berg 2009.
[929] Proclus, fr. 12. cf. Proclus, in Remp. 1,290,7–21; in Parm. 840,24–841,1.
[930] cf. Aristotle, Meteor. 3.4, 373a35–b34; Alexander in Meteor. 141,3–144,9; see also Olymp. in Meteor. 209,15–217,19, Philop. de An. 330–341; see also Philoponus [Stephanus] de An. 605,22–31 on authorship, see Golitsis forthcoming.
[931] cp. Plato, Tim. 45B–46C.
[932] That is, the outflowing light from the eye (in the Platonic theory of vision) resembles its source (the crystalline structure of the eye), and when this outflowing light returns from the mirror to its source, ‘like knows like’ and the eye recognises itself.
[933] Homer, Il. 20.392.
[934] I have not been able to locate a source for this argument.
[935] See Aristotle, On Dreams 2, 459b24–460a23.
[936] cf. Phaedrus 238C.
[937] Compare, e.g., Iliad 2.547.
[938] See above, 216,18–20, with note.
[939] That is, the dialogue may concern the rational soul as a moral agent (who uses the non-rational soul and body to commit particular acts or praxeis), and this, Olympiodorus suggests, is Proclus’ interpretation or the dialogue may also concern the rational soul in separation from the non-rational soul and the body, and this, Olympiodorus suggests, is Damascius’ view (referring to the inclusion of ‘the self itself’ (auto to auto) here. Olympiodorus may also have in mind the idea, which he noted in his introductory lectures (2,61), that Platonic dialogues can be interpreted ‘ethically’, in the sense ‘relating to individual character’; ‘naturally’, or ‘theologically’.
[940] Socrates acknowledges the tentativeness of his conclusions here, on Olympiodorus’ view, precisely because they do not capture ‘the self itself’ (cf. 130D) and the rational soul itself.
[941] A reference to Plato’s description of the sun as facilitating sensation and existence in this world, and as analogous to the Good, which facilitates knowledge and existence in the intelligible world.
[942] The Greek word korê, which could mean ‘unmarried girl’, could also mean ‘pupil of the eye’.
[943] Herodotus 7.141: Themistocles interpreted the Oracle’s ‘wooden wall’ as referring to a navy of triremes, and he built the fleet that played a pivotal role in securing Athens’ victory over the Persian invasion force.
[944] See 131A–C, and above, 197,12–198,5 and 200,4–10.
[945] Deleting tôn with Westerink at 225,4.
[946] Here in the sense of ‘nature’ subordinate to soul.
[947] That is, someone who knows A (e.g., hot) knows the contrary of A (e.g., cold).
[948] Odyssey 11.315 cf. 191,13 above.
[949] cf. Rep. 2, 368D–E.
[950] cf. 134C.
[951] Hippocrates, Aphor. 2.10, IV 472 L.; cf. Olymp. in Cat. 10,7–8.
[952] Reading sunnautôn with Westerink at 226,14, for the MS reading sun autôi.
[953] Republic 10, 617E.
[954] So Alc. 135E; cf. Phaedrus 252B.
[955] Hippocr. Aphor. 1.3, 4.458 Littré; cf. Olymp. in Cat. 121,20.
[956] See 225,7–10.
[957] Notionally, knowing what belongs to me and knowing what belongs to others are treated as opposites, falling under the rule that if I know one side of an opposition, I also know the other side.
[958] Deleting ho in ho politikos at 228,21 with Westerink.
[959] Following this discussion.
[960] Inserting ho with Westerink at 228,26.
[961] Insert ou with Westerink at 229,11.
[962] The Platonic text from 133C8–17 is sometimes excised as interpolated by a Neoplatonist or other late antique editor, but Olympiodorus reads and discusses this section.
[963] See Olympiodorus’ excursus on daimons in Lecture 3 (15,5–23,17).
[964] See Nic. Eth. 1.9, 1099a31–32; 1.11, 1101a14–16; 7.14, 1153b17–19. It was a matter of debate especially since Antiochus of Ascalon in the first century BC whether Plato, like the Stoics, maintained that virtue or excellence (aretê) was alone sufficient for happiness: see Sedley 2012.
[965] Odyssey 16.294, 19.13.
[966] In the Neoplatonic metaphysical conception, matter (hulê) is most remote from the One, after the second hypostasis of Intellect, the third of Soul, and after nature and body (for the hypostases, see Sorabji 2004 vol. 3: 14(a)-(b)); it is just the potential for becoming something, like the receptacle of the Timaeus (48E) being graspable only by a kind of ‘bastard reasoning’.
[967] 115A–116D.
[968] From Olympiodorus’ point of view (and Socrates’ own in Apology), Socrates is not ‘overcome’ by the people at his trial, ‘for a good man cannot be harmed in life or in death’ (Ap. 41D); rather, he is only ‘overcome’ by the people insofar as he loves Alcibiades and Alcibiades is so overcome. (However, as Olympiodorus pointed out in Lecture 3 (27,10–14), Alcibiades may still be benefited in future lives by Socrates’ intervention: and in at least one sense, considering the vigour of the tradition of Sôkratikoi logoi about Alcibiades, this prediction rings true).
[969] Theos teleios may be a reference both to the One and to Zeus as the ‘complete’ god and ‘god of fulfilment or completion’, in this sense, the completion of the series of lectures on the Alcibiades.