The Histories (Books XVI–XXVII) — Polybius ========================================== ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ Translation/edition: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (1889) Language: English Read in Plato Scroll: https://plato-scroll.com/s/polybius-5/ This file: https://plato-scroll.com/text/polybius-5.txt Other editions of this work: - Greek text: https://plato-scroll.com/text/polybius-5-e.txt Sources and licences: https://plato-scroll.com/attribution.html Numbers in [brackets] are the edition's reference loci (Stephanus, Bekker, book.line, page...). Superscript numerals refer to the Notes at the end. ## The Histories (Books XVI–XXVII) ## Book XVI ### Philip V. Wages War with Attalus, King of Pergamum, and the Rhodians. [16.1] See supra 15, 20-24; Livy, 31, 17, sqq. [16.1] King Philip having arrived at Pergamum, and believing that he had as good as made an end of Attalus, gave the rein to every kind of outrage; and by way of gratifying his almost insane fury he vented his wrath even more against the gods than against man. For his skirmishing attacks being easily repelled by the garrison of Pergamum, owing to the strength of the place, and being prevented by the precautions taken by Attalus from getting booty from the country, he directed his anger against the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures; in which, as it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself. He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had destroyed might be rebuilt. After spoiling the Nicephorium, cutting down its grove, and demolishing its ring wall, and levelling with the ground many costly fanes, he first directed his attack upon Thyatira, and thence marched into the plain of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him with the richest spoil. But finding himself again disappointed in this respect, on arriving at the “Holy Village” he sent a message to Zeuxis, demanding that he would furnish him with corn, and render the other services stipulated for in the treaty.¹ Zeuxis, however, though feigning to fulfil the obligations of the treaty, was not minded to give Philip real and substantial help. . . . [16.2] As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and the enemy were blockading him with an increasing number of decked vessels, he felt uncertain and uneasy as to the result. But as the state of affairs left him no choice, he suddenly put to sea quite unexpectedly to the enemy; for Attalus expected that he would persist in pushing on the mines he had commenced. But Philip was especially keen to make his putting to sea a surprise, because he thought that he would thus be able to outstrip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along the coast to Samos in security. But he was much disappointed in his calculations; for Attalus and Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they saw him putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although, from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where he was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simultaneously, still by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to overtake him, and attacked,—Attalus the enemy’s right wing, which was his leading squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus intercepted and surrounded, Philip gave the signal to the ships of his right wing, ordering them to turn their prows towards the enemy and engage them boldly; while he himself retreated under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in the way, with some light galleys, and thence watched the result of the battle. The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip’s side, fifty-three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty; for he had not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On the side of the enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels, besides those which came from Byzantium, and along with them nine triemioliae (light-decked vessels), and three triremes. [16.3] The fight having been begun on the ship on which King Attalus was sailing, all the others near began charging each other without waiting for orders. Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and having struck it a well-directed blow below the water-line, after a prolonged struggle between the combatants on the decks, at length succeeded in sinking it. Philip’s ten-banked ship, which, moreover, was the admiral’s, was captured by the enemy in an extraordinary manner. For one of the triemioliae, having run close under her, she struck against her violently amidships, just beneath the thole of the topmost bank of oars, and got fast jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to check the way of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging suspended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn one way or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes charged her on both sides at once, and destroyed the vessel itself and the fighting men on her deck, among whom fell Democrates, Philip’s admiral. At the same time Dionysodorus and Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals of the fleet of Attalus, charged, the one upon a seven-banked, the other upon an eight-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most extraordinary adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the first place, came into collision with an eight-banked ship, and had his ship struck above the water-line; for the enemy’s ship had its prow built high; but he struck the enemy’s ship below the water-line,² and at first could not get himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water; and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought with great gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent danger. Presently, upon Attalus coming to his aid, and by a vigorous charge separating the two ships, Deinocrates unexpectedly found himself free, and the enemy’s boarders were all killed after a gallant resistance, while their own vessel being left without men was captured by Attalus. In the next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious charge, missed his blow; but running up alongside of the enemy lost all the oars on his right side, and had the timbers supporting his towers smashed to pieces, and was thereupon immediately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud shouts and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to escape by swimming to the triemiolia which was coming up to the rescue. [16.4] The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an undecided one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip’s galleys was compensated for by Attalus’s superiority in the number of his decked ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip’s fleet the state of things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind the enemy, but being much their superiors in speed they managed to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they charged the vessels on the stern as they were retiring, and broke off their oars; but upon Philip’s ships swinging round and beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to sail through the enemy’s line or to avail themselves of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns, thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular manœuvre. By depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line, while by staving in the enemy’s ships below the water-line they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy’s ships by breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning; and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of the enemy’s ships. [16.5] But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those of three quinqueremes: the flagship on which Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy’s ship, and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus struck sank with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades, as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines after a gallant struggle on their part; and after receiving three wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and vehement in spirit than before. [16.5] So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable distance from each other. For the right wing of Philip’s fleet, continually making for land in accordance with his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast; while the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance from Chios. [16.6] As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under cover of which Philip was moored watching the result of the battle, Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an enemy’s ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two quadriremes. The enemy’s ship turning to flight, and making for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three hemioliae, as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus got safe away to Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus, that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by assuring them that they were the victors. For when they saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set about collecting his own ships by raising a signal; and this being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those Macedonians who were engaged with the Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed away to Chios. [16.7] In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three triemioliae, twenty-five galleys and their crews. In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus one triemiolia and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed, but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty, Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of their opponents six hundred. [16.8] Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts. First, because he had driven Attalus ashore and had captured his ship; and secondly, because, as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after communication with each other they sailed out to attack him, but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts. Besides everything else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter and destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and wrecks; while on the subsequent days the strands might be seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians. [16.9] Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having written a despatch home with an account of the battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him in his command, died from his wounds. He had shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip’s audacity. But by beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not to lose time in mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war energetically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, therefore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time, but to future generations also, to prompt service in their country’s cause. . . . [16.10] After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any other of Philip’s infatuation in acting as he did. What, then, prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what always occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason; but when they approach the moment of action they quite as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and difficulties which meet them. . . . ### Philip’s Operations in Caria, B.C. 201 [16.11] Having made some assaults which proved abortive owing to the strength of the place, Philip went away again, plundering the forts and villages in the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus and pitched his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely: but when Philip sent them a message informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered the city. [16.12] The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf between the temple of Poseidon, the territory of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the gulf [of Iassus by some], but by most the gulf of Bargylia, from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast. The Iassians boast of being originally colonists from Argos, and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited to their town the son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to the Artemis Astias.³ All these stories have been repeated by certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole course of my work set myself against such statements of our historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children, when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to which I have just referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain allowance may be made for some historians when they record these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment, such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned if they do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in them should be rejected. . . . ### Affairs in Greece [16.13] I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave them the wives and daughters of their masters. How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of bad characters in Sparta. I will now proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths and treaties to support one and all of those peoples in case of any one attacking them, he yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make a treacherous attack on Messene. . . . [16.14] As some episodical historians have written on the period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly. I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion. These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, for more than one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged in practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs are peculiarly the province of Rhodians, some students may prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them. [16.14] Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of Lade as not less severe than that of Chios, but more fiercely and daringly contested, both in detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to their own countries; not however that they should state what is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance, and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid: but if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country, friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes. [16.15] The present matter is an example. When coming to details of the battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it “two quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict, owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea; and that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was forced to follow their example. That for the present they were forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos; while the enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover, the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland of victory on his entrance to their territory.” And yet, though they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in the whole battle; and that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies, still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine. [16.16] Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt upon Messene. Zeno says that “Nabis started from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the tributary called the Hoplites, and advanced along the narrow road past Poliasium until he arrived at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae, and so to the river Pamisus.” About which I do not know what to say. It is just as if one were to say that a man started from Corinth and marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the Scironean way, and then came straight to the Contoporian road, and journeyed past Mycenae to Argos. For such a statement would not be merely slightly wrong but wholly contradictory. For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east of Corinth, while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due south-west; so that it is completely impossible to go by way of the former to the latter. The same may be said about Lacedaemon; for the Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north-east of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are to the south-west. Therefore it is not possible to go to Sallasia, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a man means to go to Messenia by way of Thalamae. [16.17] Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis started on his return from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea. This is another absurdity; for Megalopolis is between Tegea and Messene, so that it is impossible that a gate at Messene should be called the “Gate to Tegea.” The fact is that there is a gate there called the “Tegean Gate,” by which Nabis commenced his return; and this led Zeno into the mistake of supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the fact: for the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis, lies between that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says that the Alpheus flows underground from its source for a considerable distance, and comes up near Lycoa, in Arcadia. The truth is that this river does go down underground not far from its source, and, after remaining hidden for about ten stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining volume, and watering that whole district in a splendid manner for two hundred stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by the tributary stream of the Lusius, and become unfordable and deep. . . . [16.17] However, I think that the points I have mentioned, though all of them blunders, admit of some palliation and excuse; for the latter arose from mere ignorance, those connected with the sea-fight from patriotic affection. But is it not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow as much pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his subject, as upon the ornaments of style; and shows on many occasions that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many other famous writers do? To my mind it is quite right to take great care and pay great attention to the presentation of one’s facts in correct and adequate language, for this contributes in no small degree to the effectiveness of history; still I do not think that serious writers should regard it as their primary and most important object. Far from it. Quite other are the parts of his history on which a practical politician should rather pride himself. [16.18] The best illustration of what I mean will be the following. This same writer, in his account of the siege of Gaza and Antiochus’s pitched battle with Scopas in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,⁴ showed such extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that he made it quite impossible even for professional rhetoricians or mob-orators to outstrip him in theatrical effect; while he showed such a contempt of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable carelessness and inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first position in the field taken up by Scopas, he says that “the right extremity of his line, together with a few cavalry, rested on the slope of the mountain, while its left with all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch, despatched his elder son Antiochus with a division of his army to occupy the high ground which commanded the enemy; and that at daybreak he led the rest of his army across the river which flowed between the two camps, and drew them up on the plain; arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one line, facing the enemy’s centre, and his cavalry, some on the right and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which were the heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of the younger of the king’s sons Antiochus. That in advance of this line he stationed the elephants at certain intervals, and the Tarentines⁵ commanded by Antipater; while he filled up the spaces between the elephants with archers and slingers. And finally, that he took up his own station on the rear of the elephants with a squadron of household cavalry and bodyguards.” After this preliminary description he continues: “The younger Antiochus”—whom he had described as being on the level ground with the heavy-armed cavalry—“charged down from the high ground and put to flight and pursued the cavalry under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who was in command of the Aetolians in the plain on the left wing; but the two lines, when they met, maintained a stubborn fight.” But he fails to observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantry were in front, the two lines could not possibly meet at all. [16.19] Next he says that “the phalanx, outmatched in agility and forced backwards by the Aetolians, retired step by step, while the elephants received the retreating line, and did great service in charging the enemy.” But how the elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not easy to understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once at close quarters, the animals would no longer have been able to distinguish friend from foe among those that came in their way. Again, he says that “the Aetolian cavalry were thrown into a panic during the engagement, because they were unaccustomed to the look of the elephants.” But, by his own account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the right wing remained unbroken; while the other division of the cavalry, that on the left wing, had all fled before the successful attack of Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry was it, then, that was on the centre of the phalanx, and was terrified by the elephants? And where was the king, or what part did he take in the battle, seeing that he had with him the very flower of the infantry and cavalry? For not a word has been told us about these. And where was the elder of the young Antiochi, who, with a division of the troops, occupied the high ground? For this prince is not represented even as returning to his quarters after the battle. And very naturally so. For Zeno started by assuming two sons of the king named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in the army on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to him, Scopas returned first and also last from the field? For he says: “when he saw the younger Antiochus, after returning from the pursuit, on the rear of his phalanx, and accordingly gave up all hopes of victory, he retired.” But afterwards he says that “he sustained the most imminent peril when his phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and was the last man to retire from the field.” [16.20] These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect very great discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore, to endeavour to make one’s self master of all departments of history alike. That is the ideal; but if that is impossible, one ought at least to be excessively careful on the most essential and important points in it. I have been induced to say this because I have observed that in history, as in other arts and sciences, there is a tendency to neglect the true and essential, while the ostentatious and the showy secure praise and emulation as something great and admirable. The fact being that in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation. As to his ignorance of the topography of Laconia, considering that his error was an important one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno personally. For I thought it a point of honour not to look upon the mistakes of others as personal triumphs, as is the way with some writers; but to do the best I could to secure correctness, not only of my own historical writings, but of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at large. When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible to make the correction, because his history was already published, he was much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the most friendly interpretation on my proceeding; and, in regard to this point, I would beg my own readers, whether of my own or future generations, if I am ever detected in making a deliberate misstatement, and disregarding truth in any part of my history, to criticise me unmercifully; but if I do so from lack of information, to make allowances: and I ask it for myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and the extent of ground covered by its transactions. . . . ### Egypt — Character of Tlepolemus [16.21] Tlepolemus,⁶ the chief minister in the kingdom of Egypt, was a young man, but one who had spent all his life in the camp, and with reputation. By nature aspiring and ambitious, he had done much that was glorious in the service of his country, but much that was evil also. As a general in a campaign, and as an administrator of military expeditions, he was a man of great ability, high natural courage, and extremely well fitted to deal personally with soldiers. But on the other hand, for the management of complicated affairs, he was deficient in diligence and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for the keeping of money or the economical administration of finance. And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall, but seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he had complete control of the exchequer, he spent the greater part of the day in playing ball and in matches in martial exercises with the young men; and directly he left these sports he collected drinking parties, and spent the greater part of his life in these amusements and with these associates. But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing away the royal treasures among the envoys from Greece and the Dionysian actors, and, more than all, among the officers and soldiers of the palace guard. He was utterly incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything there was at hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil which he himself thus began continually increased. For every one who had received a favour expressed his gratitude in extravagant language, both for the sake of what he had got and of what he hoped to get in the future. And thus being informed of the universal praise which was bestowed on him, of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets, of complimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the public singers all through the town, he became entirely befooled, and grew daily more and more puffed up with conceit, and more reckless in squandering favours upon foreigners and soldiers. [16.22] These proceedings were very offensive to the other members of the court; and, therefore, they watched everything he did with a jealous eye, and conceived a detestation for his insolence, which they began to compare unfavourably with the character of Sosibius. For the latter was considered to show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his age gave reason to expect; and, in his dealings with other persons, to maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the royal seal and person. Just at this time, Ptolemy, the son of Sosibius, returned from his mission to Philip. Before he left Alexandria on his voyage, he had been full of foolish pride, partly from his own natural disposition and partly from his father’s success. But upon landing in Macedonia, and mixing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion that the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better fashion of their boots and clothes; he therefore came home, got up in imitation of all these peculiarities, and fully persuaded that his foreign tour and association with Macedonians had made a man of him. He therefore immediately began showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing against him; and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the state as though he were its heir and not its guardian, the quarrel quickly grew. Meanwhile Tlepolemus, being informed of certain unfriendly speeches, originating in the jealous observation and malignity of the courtiers, at first turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise them; but when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground of his maladministration of the government of the kingdom, he grew angry; and, summoning the council, came forward and said that “they brought their accusations against him secretly and in private, but he judged it right to accuse them in public and face to face.” . . . [16.22] After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived Sosibius of the custody of the seal also, and having got that into his hands, thenceforth conducted the administration exactly as he chose. . . . ### The War in Coele-Syria [16.22a] It seems to me to be at once just and proper to give the people of Gaza⁷ the praise which they deserve. For though they do not differ as to bravery in war from the rest of the inhabitants of Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an international agreement, and in their fidelity to their promises, they far surpass them, and show altogether a courage in such matters that is irresistible. In the first place, when all the other people were terrified at the invasion of the Persians,⁸ in view of the greatness of their power, and one and all submitted themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced the danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion of Alexander, when not only did the other cities surrender, but even Tyre was stormed and its inhabitants sold into slavery; and when it seemed all but hopeless for any to escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and violent attack of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood him, and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Following the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they omitted nothing within their power in their determination to keep faith with Ptolemy. Therefore, just as we distinguish by special mention in our history individuals of eminent virtue, so ought we, in regard to states as such, to mention with commendation those which act nobly in any point from traditional principles and deliberate policy. . . . [16.23] Italy (Livy, 30, 45) [16.23] Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the events I have narrated. The expectation of the people concerning him was proportionable to the magnitude of his achievements: and the splendour of his reception, and the signs of popular favour which greeted him were extraordinary. Nor was this otherwise than reasonable and proper. For after despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or of averting that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every fear and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their enemies. Their joy therefore knew no bounds; and when Scipio came into the city in triumph, and the actual sight of the prisoners who formed the procession brought still more clearly to their memories the dangers of the past, they became almost wild in the expression of their thanks to the gods, and their affection for the author of such a signal change. For among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession was Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards died in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens celebrated games and festivals for several days running with great splendour, Scipio, in his magnificent liberality, supplying the cost. . . . ### War Between Rome and Philip V [16.24] At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was elected consul at Rome, king Philip, who was staying at Bargylia, was rendered exceedingly uneasy and filled with many conflicting anxieties for the future, when he observed that the Rhodians and Attalus, far from dismissing their navy, were actually manning additional ships and paying more earnest attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He had a double cause, indeed, for uneasiness: he was afraid of sailing from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would have to encounter danger at sea; and at the same time he was not satisfied with the state of things in Macedonia, and therefore was unwilling on any consideration to spend the winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and the Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to Rome to denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the war in Libya was ended. These considerations caused him overwhelming perplexity; but he was compelled for the present to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf, to use the common expression: for he robbed and stole from some, and used force to others, while he did violence to his nature by fawning on others, because his army was suffering from famine; and by these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, sometimes figs, and sometimes nothing but a very short allowance of corn. Some of these provisions were supplied to him by Zeuxis, and some by the people of Mylae, Alabanda, and Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him anything, and barked at and plotted against when they did not. Finally, he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of Philocles, but failed from the clumsiness with which the scheme was contrived. The territory of Alabanda he harried as though it were an enemy’s, alleging that it was imperatively necessary to get food for his troops. . . . [16.24] When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus overrunning Asia, being unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted a present of figs from the Magnesians, as they had no corn. For which reason, when he conquered Myus, he granted its territory to the Magnesians in return for their figs. . . . [16.25] The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both to thank him for the past, and to urge him to come to Athens to consult with them on the dangers that still threatened them.⁹ The king was informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors had arrived at the Peiraeus; and, believing that it was necessary to have an interview with them, he put to sea in haste. The Athenian people, being informed of his coming, passed very liberal votes as to the reception and general entertainment of the king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus spent the first day in transacting business with the Roman ambassadors, and was extremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of their ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the Athenian magistrates, he began his progress to the city in great state. For he was met, not only by all the magistrates and the knights, but by all the citizens with their children and wives. And when the two processions met, the warmth of the welcome given by the populace to the Romans, and still more to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his entrance into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses lined the street on both sides: all the temples were then thrown open; victims were placed ready at all the altars; and the king was requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted him such high honours as they had never without great hesitation voted to any of their former benefactors: for, in addition to other compliments, they named a tribe after Attalus, and classed him among their eponymous heroes. [16.26] They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king to address them. But upon his excusing himself, on the plea that it would be ill-bred for him to appear before the people and recount his own good services in the presence of those on whom they had been bestowed, they gave up asking for his personal appearance; but begged him to give them a written statement as to what he thought was the best thing to do in view of the existing circumstances. On his consenting to do this, and writing the document, the magistrates produced the despatch to the ecclesia. The contents of this written communication were briefly these: he recalled the good services he had done the people in the past; enumerated the things he had accomplished in the existing war against Philip; and lastly exhorted them to activity in this war, and protested that, if they did not determine resolutely to adopt this policy of hostility to Philip in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and himself, and yet afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had been secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the people, influenced both by its contents and by their warm feeling towards Attalus, were prepared to vote the war: and when the Rhodians also entered and argued at great length to the same effect, the Athenians at once decreed the war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a magnificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of valour, and voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at Athens, on the ground of their having, besides other things, restored the Athenian ships which had been captured with the men on board them. After concluding this arrangement, the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their fleet to visit the islands. . . . [16.27] While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens, Nicanor, by the command of Philip, made a raid upon Attica, and came as far as the Academy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald to him, and bade him announce to his master Philip that “The Romans admonished him to make no war upon any Greek State, and to submit to an arbitration before a fair tribunal as to the injuries he had inflicted upon Attalus: that, if he did this, he might have peace with Rome, but, if he refused to obey, the opposite would immediately follow.” On the receipt of this message Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of Epirus and delivered a similar announcement in regard to Philip in the town of Phoenice; also to Amynandrus in the district of Athamania; also to the Aetolians in Naupactus, and the Achaeans in Aegium. And having thus by the mouth of Nicanor given Philip this clear warning, the Roman envoys themselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a view to settle their controversies. . . . [16.28] It appears to me that to make a good beginning, and even to maintain enthusiasm long enough to secure a considerable measure of success, is an achievement of which many have been found capable; but to carry a purpose through to its end, and, even though fortune be adverse, to make up by cool reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm is within the power of few. From this point of view one cannot but disparage the inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding with admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and his constancy to his purpose,—not meaning to speak in praise of his character as a whole, but simply commending the vigour with which he acted on this occasion. I make this distinction to prevent any one supposing that I contradict myself, because I recently praised Attalus and the Rhodians and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing the reverse. This is just such a case as I referred to at the beginning of my history, when I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise, and sometimes to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter men’s original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the better; and sometimes too it is the case that from natural temperament men are at one time inclined to what is right, at another to the reverse. And it is a variation of this sort that I think occurred to Philip in this instance. For, irritated by his defeats, and influenced in a great degree by anger and passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane or inspired eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour; and it was in this spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced to make these remarks, because I observe that some men, like bad runners in the stadium, abandon their purposes when close to the goal; while it is at that particular point, more than at any other, that others secure the victory over their rivals. . . . [16.29] Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in seizing bases of operation and landing-places in this country (Asia). . . . [16.29] In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to Asia, he might have a landing-place at Abydos. . . . [16.29] The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advantages of the situation of those towns it would, I think, be waste of time for me to state in great detail, because the singularity of those sites has made them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still I imagine that it will not be otherwise than useful to remind my readers briefly of the facts, by way of attracting their attention. A man would best realise the advantages of these cities, not by regarding their sites by themselves, but by comparing and contrasting them with those about to be mentioned. For just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean,—or as some call it the Atlantic,—into our sea, except by passing between the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea into the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel separating Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had designed these two straits to counterbalance each other, the passage between the Pillars of Heracles is many times as broad as that of the Hellespont,—the former being sixty, the latter two stades; the reason being, as far as one may conjecture, the great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our sea: while the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides by human habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting mutual intercourse, sometimes being bridged over by those who determine to cross on foot, and at all times admitting a passage by sea. But the channel at the Pillars of Heracles is seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to the lack of intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote parts of Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our knowledge of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is enclosed on both sides by two European promontories, and possesses a harbour capable of sheltering ships anchoring in it from every wind; while there is no possibility of anchoring at any point near the city outside the harbour mouth, owing to the rapidity and violence of the current setting through the strait. [16.30] Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and partly by an earthwork, Philip began blockading it by land and sea together. This siege was not at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery employed, or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill against each other; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be remembered and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary gallantry exhibited by the besieged. At first, feeling full confidence in themselves, the inhabitants of Abydos maintained a courageous resistance to the attempts of Philip; struck and dislodged some of his engines, which he brought against their walls by sea, with stones from their catapults, and destroyed others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the enemy were barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered an undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately overpowering the enemy. But when their outer wall was undermined and fell, and when moreover the Macedonians by means of these same mines were approaching the inner wall, which had been erected by the besieged to cover the breach: then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as ambassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the city, on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and Attalus depart under a truce; and of permitting all free persons to depart as they could, and wherever each might choose, with the clothes that each was wearing. But on Philip bidding them “surrender at discretion or fight like men,” the ambassadors returned to the town. [16.31] On being informed of the message the people of Abydos met in public assembly, and with feelings of utter despair deliberated upon their position. They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the slaves, that they might secure their sincere interest and loyalty; next, to collect all the women into the temple of Artemis, and the children with their nurses into the gymnasium; and finally to bring together their silver and gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes which were of any value into the quadrireme of the Rhodians and the trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed these resolutions and acted on the decree with unanimity, they again assembled in public meeting, and elected fifty of the older and most trusted men, who at the same time were possessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry out what had been determined upon; and these they bound on oath in the presence of the whole of the citizens, that “whenever they saw the inner wall being captured by the enemy, they would kill the children and women, and would burn the above-mentioned ships, and, in accordance with the curses that had been invoked, would throw the silver and gold into the sea.” After this they brought the priests forward, and all the citizens swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting for their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled the priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this imprecation over the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves by this solemn agreement, they left off attempting to countermine the enemy, and resolved that, directly the interior wall fell, they would fight to the last in the breach with the enemy’s storming party and there die. [16.32] This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian recklessness and Acarnanian courage.¹⁰ For the Phocians have the reputation of having adopted a similar resolution as to their families, but not because they despaired of victory, for they were about to fight a pitched battle with the Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acarnanians, upon the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like resolution; the details of which I have already narrated. But the Abydenians, at a time when they were closely invested and in all but complete despair of being saved, elected by a unanimous resolution to meet their fate along with their children and wives, rather than to live any longer with the knowledge that their children and wives would fall into the power of the enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for having, in the former cases, given victory and safety to those who despaired of them, while she adopted the opposite decision in regard to the Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the city was taken, but the children with their mothers fell into the hands of the enemy. [16.33] As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men, according to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins and fought the enemy with such desperate courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending the Macedonians to the front in relays till nightfall, at last abandoned the contest in despair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not only did the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with fury; nor was it only that they fought gallantly with mere swords and spears; but when any of these weapons had been rendered useless, or had been knocked out of their hands, they grappled with the Macedonians, and either hurled them to the ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae, and stabbing their faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the broken ends, threw them into a complete panic. But the fight being interrupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in the breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the older men together, and, instigated by hopes of personal safety, lowered the special eminence and unique glory which their fellow-citizens had acquired. For they resolved to save the children and women alive, and at daybreak to send the priests and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat his mercy and surrender the city to him. [16.34] While this was going on, king Attalus, having heard that Abydos was being besieged, sailed through the Aegean to Tenedos; and similarly the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus Aemilius, arrived on board ship at Abydos itself. For the Roman ambassadors, having learnt at Rhodes the fact of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance with their commission to deliver their message to Philip personally, put off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he explained to him that “The Senate had resolved to order him not to wage war with any Greek state; nor to interfere in the dominions of Ptolemy; and to submit the injuries inflicted on Attalus and the Rhodians to arbitration; and that if he did so he might have peace, but if he refused to obey he would promptly have war with Rome.” Upon Philip endeavouring to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay hands on him, Marcus interrupted him by saying: “But what about the Athenians? And what about the Cianians? And what about the Abydenians at this moment? Did any one of them also lay hands on you first?” The king, at a loss for a reply, said: “I pardon the offensive haughtiness of your manners for three reasons: first, because you are a young man and inexperienced in affairs; secondly, because you are the handsomest man of your time” (this was true); “and thirdly, because you are a Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the Romans is that they should not break their treaties or go to war with me; but if they do, I shall defend myself as courageously as I can, appealing to the gods to defend my cause.” With these words they separated. On becoming master of Abydos, Philip found all the property of the citizens collected by themselves ready to his hand. But when he saw the numbers and fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their children and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; and resenting these proceedings he published a proclamation, announcing, that “he gave three days’ grace to those who wished to hang or stab themselves.” The Abydenians, already bent on executing their original decree, and looking upon themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died for their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms; and, accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously been put in chains or some similar restraint, they all without delay hastened to their death, each family by itself. . . . [16.35] After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the Achaean nation to Rhodes urging the Rhodians to make terms with Philip. But upon these being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors from Rome, who argued that they should make no terms with Philip without consulting the Romans, the Rhodian people voted to listen to the latter and to hold to their friendship with them. . . . [16.36] Philopoemen calculated the distances of all the cities of the Achaean league, and from which of them men could arrive at Tegea along the same roads. He then wrote despatches to each of them, and sent them to the most distant cities, so dividing them that each city that was farthest on a particular road should get, not only the one addressed to itself, but those also of the other cities on the same road. The contents of these first despatches addressed to the chief magistrate were as follows: “As soon as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause all the men of military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for five days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as soon as they are thus collected, march them out and lead them to the next city. As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the despatch addressed to its chief magistrate and follow the instructions therein contained.” Now, this second despatch contained exactly the same words as the former, except of course that the name of the next town was changed to which they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated right along the road, in the first place no one knew for what purpose or undertaking the expedition was directed; and in the next place, every one was absolutely ignorant where he was going, beyond the name of the next town, but all marched forward in a state of complete mystification, taking on the successive contingents as they went. But as of course the most remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters were not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each in proportion to its distance. By which arrangement, without either the Tegeans or the new arrivals knowing what was going to happen, all the Achaeans marched into Tegea under arms by all the gates simultaneously. [16.37] What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the great number of the tyrant’s eavesdroppers and spies. On the day then on which the main body of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he despatched a band of picked men, so timing their start, that they might pass the night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid on Laconia. They had orders that, in case the mercenaries of Nabis left their quarters and attacked them, they were to retire on Scotita, and in other respects follow the directions of Didascalondas of Crete; for Philopoemen had given his confidence to this officer, and full directions as to the whole expedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued orders to the Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from Tegea, and after a rapid night’s march halted it about the time of the morning watch in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When day broke the mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of the raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the rescue, as was their custom, and bore down upon them; and when the Achaeans, in accordance with their instructions, retired, they followed, harassing them with bold and daring assaults. But as soon as they came to the place where Philopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners. . . . [16.38] Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to hesitate about undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by every means to rouse their feeling of hostility. . . . ### Coele-Syria [16.39] Ptolemy’s general Scopas marched into the upper region during the winter and subdued the Jewish nation. . . . [16.39] The siege having been conducted in a desultory manner, Scopas fell into bad repute and was attacked with all the petulance of youth. . . . [16.39] Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea, Samaria, Abila, and Gadara; and after a while those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred town called Jerusalem submitted to him also. On the subject of this town I have a good deal more to say, and especially on account of the splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to another opportunity. ## Book XVII [17] According to Hultsch no fragments or extracts of book 17 are preserved. In it would have been contained the campaign of B. C. 199, in the war between Rome and Philip, for which see Livy, 31, 34-43. And the operations of Flamininus in the season of B. C. 198, Livy, 32, 9-18. The first seventeen chapters of this book are generally classed in book 17. ## Book XVIII ### The War with Philip [18.1] When the time appointed arrived, Philip put to sea from Demetrias and came into the Melian Gulf, with five galleys and one beaked war-ship (pristis), on the latter of which he himself was sailing. There met him the Macedonian secretaries Apollodorus and Demosthenes, Brachylles from Boeotia, and the Achaean Cycliadas, who had been driven from the Peloponnese for the reasons I have already described. With Flamininus came king Amynandrus, and Dionysodorus, legate of king Attalus. The commissioners from cities and nations were Aristaenus and Xenophon from the Achaeans; Acesimbrotus the navarch from the Rhodians; Phaeneas their Strategus from the Aetolians, and several others of their statesmen with him. Approaching the sea near Nicaea, Flamininus and those with him took their stand upon the very edge of the beach, while Philip, bringing his ship close to shore, remained afloat. Upon Flamininus bidding him disembark, he stood up on board and refused to leave his ship. Flamininus again asked him what he feared, he said that he feared no one but the gods, but he distrusted most of those who were there, especially the Aetolians. Upon the Roman expressing his surprise, and remarking that the danger was the same to all and the risk common, Philip retorted that “He was mistaken in saying that: for that, if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many who would act as Strategi for the Aetolians; but if Philip were to perish at the present juncture, there was no one to be king of the Macedonians.” Though all thought this an unconciliatory way of opening the discussion, Flamininus nevertheless bade him speak on the matters he had come to consider. Philip however said that “The word was not with himself but with Flamininus; and therefore begged that he would state clearly what he was to do in order to have peace.” The Roman consul replied that “What he had to say was simple and obvious: it was to bid him evacuate Greece entirely; restore the prisoners and deserters in his hands to their several states; hand over to the Romans those parts of Illyricum of which he had become possessed since the peace of Epirus; and, similarly, to restore to Ptolemy all the cities which he had taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator.” [18.2] Having said this Flamininus refrained from any further speech of his own; but turning to the others he bade them deliver what they had been severally charged to say by those who sent them. And first Dionysodorus, the envoy of Attalus, took up the discourse by declaring that “Philip ought to restore the king’s ships which had been captured in the battle at Chios and their crews with them; and to restore also the temple of Aphrodite to its original state, as well as the Nicephorium, both of which he had destroyed.” He was followed by the Rhodian navarch Acesimbrotus, who demanded “That Philip should evacuate Peraea, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garrisons from Iasus, Bargylia, and Euromus; restore the Perinthians to their political union with Byzantium; and evacuate Sestos, Abydos, and all commercial ports and harbours in Asia.” Following the Rhodians the Achaeans demanded “The restoration of Corinth and Argos uninjured.” Then came the Aetolians, who first demanded, like the Romans, that “Philip should entirely evacuate Greece; and, secondly, that he should restore to them uninjured all cities formerly members of the Aetolian league.” [18.3] When Phaeneas the Aetolian strategus had delivered this demand, a man called Alexander Isius, who had the reputation of being an able politician and good speaker, said that “Philip was neither sincere at the present moment in proposing terms, nor bold in his manner of making war, when he had to do that. In conferences and colloquies he was always setting ambushes and lying in wait, and using all the practices of war, but in actual war itself took up a position at once unjust and ignoble: for he avoided meeting his enemies face to face, and, as he fled before them, employed himself in burning and plundering the cities; and by this policy, though himself beaten, he spoilt the value of the victor’s reward. Yet former kings of Macedonia had not adopted this plan, but one exactly the reverse: for they were continually fighting with each other in the open field, but rarely destroyed and ruined cities. This was shown clearly by Alexander’s war in Asia against king Darius; and again in the contentions between his successors, when they combined to fight Antigonus for the possession of Asia. So too had the successors of these kings followed the same policy down to the time of Pyrrhus: they had been prompt to war against each other in the open field, and to do everything they could to conquer each other in arms, but had spared the cities, that they might rule them if they conquered, and be honoured by their subjects. But that a man should abandon war, and yet destroy that for which the war was undertaken, seemed an act of madness, and madness of a very violent sort. And this was just what Philip was doing at that moment; for he had destroyed more cities in Thessaly, on his rapid march from the pass of Epirus, though he was a friend and ally of that country, than any one who had ever been at war with the Thessalians.” [18.3] After a good deal more to the same effect he ended by asking Philip, “On what grounds he was holding the town of Lysimacheia with a garrison, having expelled the strategus sent by the Aetolian league, of which it was a member? Also on what grounds he had enslaved the Ciani who were also in alliance with the Aetolians? Lastly, on what plea he was in actual occupation of Echinus, Phthiotid Thebes, Pharsalus, and Larisa?” [18.4] When Alexander had concluded his speech, Philip came somewhat nearer to the shore than he was before, and, rising on board his ship, said that “Alexander had composed and delivered a speech in the true Aetolian and theatrical style. For every one knew quite well that nobody willingly destroys his own allies, but that, at times of special danger, military commanders are compelled to do many things contrary to their natural feelings.” While the king was still speaking, Phaeneas, who was very short-sighted, interrupted him by saying, “You are trifling with us; you must either fight and conquer, or obey the commands of the stronger.” Philip, in spite of the unfortunate position of his affairs, could not refrain from his habitual humour: turning towards Phaeneas he said, “Even a blind man could see that.” Such a knack had he of cutting repartee. Then he turned to Alexander again and said, “You ask me, Alexander, why I took possession of Lysimacheia. I reply, in order that it might not by your neglect be devastated by Thracians, as it has now actually been; because I was compelled by this war to remove my soldiers, who indeed were no hostile garrison, as you say, but were there for its protection. As for the Ciani, I did not go to war with them, but only assisted Prusias to take them who was at war with them. And of this you yourselves were the cause. For though I sent envoy after envoy to you desiring that you would repeal the law which allows you the privilege of taking ‘spoil from spoil,’ you replied that rather than abolish this law you would remove Aetolia from Aetolia.” [18.5] When Flamininus expressed some wonder at what he meant by this, the king tried to explain it to him by saying that “The Aetolian custom was this. They not only plundered those with whom they were at war, and harried their country; but, if certain other nations were at war with each other, even though both were friends and allies of the Aetolians, none the less the Aetolians might, without a formal decree of the people, take part with both combatants and plunder the territory of both. The result was that in the eyes of the Aetolians there were no defined limits of friendship or enmity, but they were ready to be the enemies and assailers of all who had a dispute on anything.” “How then,” he added, “have they any right to blame me if, while on terms of friendship with the Aetolians, I did anything against the Ciani in support of my own allies? But the most outrageous part of their conduct is that they try to rival Rome, and bid me entirely evacuate Greece! The demand in itself is sufficiently haughty and dictatorial: still, in the mouths of Romans, it is tolerable, but in that of Aetolians quite intolerable. What is this Greece, pray, from which ye bid me depart? How do you define it? Why, most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greeks; for neither the Agrai, nor the Apodoti, nor the Amphilochi are counted as Greek. Do you then give up those tribes to me?” [18.6] Upon Flamininus laughing at these words, Philip proceeded: “Well, enough said to the Aetolians! But to the Rhodians and Attalus I have to say that, in the eyes of a fair judge, it would be held more just that they should restore to me the ships captured, than I to them. For I did not begin the attack upon Attalus and the Rhodians, but they upon me, as everybody acknowledges. However, at your instance, Titus, I restore Peraea to the Rhodians, and to Attalus his ships and as many of the men as are still alive. As for the destruction of the Nicephorium and the grove of Aphrodite, I am not able to do anything else towards their restoration, but I will send plants and gardeners to attend to the place and the growth of the trees that have been cut down.” Flamininus once more laughing at the king’s sarcastic tone, Philip turned to the Achaeans, and first went through the list of benefactions received by them from Antigonus and himself; then quoted the extraordinary honours Antigonus and he had received from them; and concluded by reading their decree for abandoning him and joining Rome. Taking this for his text, he expatiated at great length on the fickleness and ingratitude of the Achaeans. Still he said he would restore Argos to them, and as to Corinth would consult with Flamininus. [18.7] Having thus concluded his conversation with the other envoys, he asked Flamininus, observing that the discussion was really confined to himself and the Romans, “Whether he considered that he was bound to evacuate only those places in Greece which he had himself acquired, or those also which he had inherited from his ancestors?” On Flamininus making no answer, Aristaenus for the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the Aetolians, were on the point of replying. But as the day was closing in, time prevented them from doing so; and Philip demanded that they should all hand into him a written statement of the terms on which peace was to be granted: for being there alone he had no one with whom to consult; and therefore wished to turn their demands over in his own mind. Now Flamininus was much amused at Philip’s sarcastic banter; but not wishing the others to think so, he retaliated on him by a sarcasm also, saying: “Of course you are alone, Philip: for you have killed all the friends likely to give you the best advice!” The king smiled sardonically, but said nothing. And for the present, all having handed in the written statements of their demands as aforesaid, the conference broke up, after appointing to meet again next day at Nicaea. But next morning, though Flamininus came to the appointed place and found the others there, Philip did not arrive. [18.8] When the day, however, had nearly come to an end, and Titus and the others had almost given him up, Philip appeared accompanied as before, and excused himself by saying that he had spent the whole day in perplexity and doubt, caused by the severity of the demands made upon him. But every one else thought that he had acted thus from a wish to prevent, by the lateness of the hour, the delivery of invectives by the Achaeans and Aetolians: for he saw, as he was going away on the previous evening, that both were ready to attack him and state grievances. Therefore, as soon as he approached the meeting this time, he demanded that “The Roman Consul should discuss the matter with him in private; that they might not have a mere war of words on both sides, but that a definite settlement should be come to on the points in dispute.” On his several times repeating this request and pressing it strongly, Flamininus asked those present what he ought to do. On their bidding him meet the king and hear what he had to say, he took with him Appius Claudius, at that time a military Tribune, and telling the others to retire a short way from the sea and remain there, he himself bade Philip disembark. Accordingly the king, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, left his ship, and, joining Flamininus, conversed with him for a considerable time. What was said by the one and the other on that occasion it is not easy to state. However, when Philip and he had parted, Flamininus, in explaining the king’s views to the others, said that he consented to restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the Aetolians, but not Thebes: and that to the Rhodians he surrendered Peraea, but not Iasus and Bargylia: to the Achaeans he gave up Corinth and Argos: to the Romans he promised that he would surrender Illyricum and all prisoners: and to Attalus the ships, and as many of the men captured in the sea-fights as survived. [18.9] All present expressed their dissatisfaction at these terms, and alleged that it was necessary before all that he should perform the general injunction, that, namely, of evacuating all Greece: otherwise these particular concessions were vain and useless. Observing that there was an animated discussion going on among them, and fearing at the same time that they would indulge in accusations against himself, Philip requested Flamininus to adjourn the conference till next day, as the evening was closing in; and promised that he would then either persuade them to accept his terms or submit to theirs. Flamininus consenting, they separated, after appointing to meet next day on the beach near Thronium. [18.9] Next day all came to the appointed place in good time. Philip in a short speech called on all, and especially on Flamininus, “Not to break off the negotiation for peace now that by far the greater number were inclined to come to some arrangement; but, if possible, to come to an understanding by themselves on the points in dispute; or, if that could not be, to send envoys to the Senate, and either convince it as to this controversy, or submit to whatever it enjoined.” [18.9] On this proposition of the king, all the others declared that they preferred war to such a demand. But the Roman Consul said that “He was quite aware that it was improbable that Philip would submit to any of their demands, yet, as it did not in the least stand in the way of such action as they chose to take to grant the favour demanded by the king, he would concede it. For not one of the proposals actually made at present could be confirmed without the authority of the Senate; and besides the season now coming on was a favourable one for ascertaining its opinion; for, even as things were, the armies could do nothing owing to the winter: it was therefore against no one’s interests, but, on the contrary, very convenient for them all, to devote this time to a reference to the Senate on the present state of affairs.” [18.10] Seeing that Flamininus was not averse to referring the matter to the Senate, all the others presently consented, and voted to allow Philip to send envoys to Rome, and that they too should severally send envoys of their own to plead their cause before the Senate, and state their grievances against Philip. [18.10] The business of the conference having thus been concluded in accordance with his views and the opinions he had originally expressed, Flamininus at once set about carefully securing his own position, and preventing Philip from taking any undue advantage. For though he granted him three months’ suspension of hostilities, he stipulated that he should complete his embassy to Rome within that time, and insisted on his immediately removing his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He was also very careful to insist on behalf of the Roman allies, that no act of hostility should be committed against them during this period by the Macedonians. Having made these terms in writing with Philip, he immediately took the necessary steps himself to carry out his own policy. First, he sent Amynandrus to Rome at once, knowing that he was a man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by his own friends in the city to take any course they might propose; and at the same time would carry with him a certain prestige, and rouse men’s curiosity and interest by his title of royalty. Next to him he sent as personal envoys his wife’s nephew Quintus Fabius, Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius Nero. From the Aetolians went Alexander Isius, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus of Acarnania,— one of those who had fled from Thurium and settled in Ambracia,—and Theodotus of Pherae, an exile from Thessaly who settled in Stratus: from the Achaeans Xenophon of Aegium: from King Attalus only Alexander: and from the Athenian people Cephisodorus and his colleagues. [18.11] Now these envoys arrived in Rome before the Senate had settled the provinces of the Consuls appointed for this year, and whether it would be necessary to send both to Gaul, or one of them against Philip. But the friends of Flamininus having assured themselves that both Consuls would remain in Italy owing to the threat of an attack from the Celts, all the ambassadors appeared and bluntly stated their grievances against Philip. The bulk of their accusations was to the same effect as what they had before stated to the king himself; but they also endeavoured carefully to instil this idea in the minds of the Senators, “That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for the Greeks to think of liberty; for Philip himself had spoken the exact truth when he called these places the ‘fetters of Greece.’ For neither could the Peloponnese breathe while a royal garrison was stationed in Corinth, nor the Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians feel any confidence while Philip was in occupation of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; nor indeed could the Thessalians or Magnesians raise a spark of liberty¹¹ while Philip and the Macedonians held Demetrias. That, therefore, Philip’s offer to evacuate the other places was a mere pretence in order to escape the immediate danger; and that on the very first day he chose he would with ease reduce the Greeks again under his power, if he were in possession of these places.” They accordingly urged the Senate “either to force Philip to evacuate the cities they had named, or to stand by the policy they had begun, and vigorously prosecute the war against him. For in truth the most difficult part of the war was already accomplished, the Macedonians having already been twice defeated, and most of their resources on land already expended.” [18.11] They concluded by beseeching the Senate “not to beguile the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor deprive themselves of the most glorious renown.” Such, or nearly so, were the arguments advanced by the Greek envoys. Philip’s envoys were prepared to make a long speech in reply: but they were stopped at the threshold. For being asked whether they were prepared to evacuate Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they declared that they had not any instructions as to those towns. They were accordingly rebuked by the Senate and obliged to discontinue their speech. [18.12] The Senate then, as I have said before, assigned Gaul to both the consuls as their province, and ordered that the war against Philip should go on, assigning to Titus Flamininus the entire control of Greek affairs. These decrees having been quickly made known in Greece, Flamininus found everything settled to his mind, partly no doubt by the assistance of chance, but for the most part by his own foresight in the management of the whole business. For he was exceedingly acute, if ever Roman was. The skill and good sense with which he conducted public business and private negotiations could not be surpassed, and yet he was quite a young man, not yet more than thirty, and the first Roman who had crossed to Greece with an army. . . . [18.13] It has often and in many cases occurred to me to wonder at the mistakes men make; but none seems to me so surprising as that of traitors. I wish, therefore, to say a word in season on the subject. I know very well that it is one which does not admit of easy treatment or definition. For it is not at all easy to say whom we ought to regard as a real traitor. Plainly all those, who at a time of tranquillity make compacts with kings or princes, cannot be reckoned such off hand; nor, again, those who in the midst of dangers transfer their country from existing friendships and alliances to others. Far from it. For such men have again and again been the authors of manifold advantages to their own countries. But not to go any further for example, my meaning can be made clear by the circumstances of the present case. For, if Aristaenus had not at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to leave their alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, it is clear that the whole league would have been utterly ruined. But as it was, this man and this policy were confessedly the sources, not only of security to individual Achaeans at the time, but of the aggrandisement of the whole league. Therefore he was not looked upon as a traitor, but universally honoured as a benefactor and saviour of the country. The same principle will hold good in the case of all others who regulate their policy and measures by the necessities of the hour. [18.14] From this point of view fault might be found with Demosthenes, admirable as he is in many respects, for having rashly and indiscriminately launched an exceedingly bitter charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for making an alliance with Philip; in Messene the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thrasylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas: and many more besides he has included in the same category, naming them city by city; and yet all these men have a weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct, and above all those of Arcadia and Messene.¹² For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese, and humbling the Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of liberty; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own countries.¹³ In return for this they were bound not to make war on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power, they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet differed in their judgment of politics, and did not consider that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians, it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures everything by the interests of his own particular state, and imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a strange delusion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiades. For what did the Athenians eventually get by their opposition to Philip? Why, the crowning disaster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not been for the king’s magnanimity and regard for his own reputation, their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks to the policy of Demosthenes. Whereas, owing to the men I have mentioned, security and relief from attacks of the Lacedaemonians were obtained for Arcadia and Messenia generally, and many advantages accrued to their states separately. [18.15] It is not easy then to define to whom one may properly apply this name. The nearest approach to truth would be to assign it to those who in times of public danger, either for the sake of personal security or advantage, or to retaliate upon political opponents, put their cities into the hands of the enemy: or indeed to those who, by admitting a foreign garrison, and employing external assistance to carry out private aims and views, bring their country under the direction of a superior power. All such men as these one might include in the category of traitors with perfect reasonableness. Such men, indeed, gain neither profit nor honour, but the reverse, as every one acknowledges. And this brings me back to my original observation, that it is difficult to understand with what object, and supported by what reasoning, men rush upon such a disastrous position. For no one ever yet betrayed his city or camp or fort without being detected; but even if a man here and there managed to conceal it at the moment of his crime, yet all have been detected in the course of time. Nor when known has any such ever had a happy life; but, as a rule, they meet with the punishment they deserve from the very persons in whose favour they act. For, indeed, though generals and princes constantly employ traitors for their own purposes; yet when they have got all they can out of them, they treat them thenceforth as traitors, as Demosthenes says; very naturally considering that those, who have put their country and original friends into the hands of their enemies, are never likely to be really loyal or to keep faith with themselves. Nay, even though they escape violence at the hands of these, yet they do not easily avoid the vengeance of those whom they betrayed. Or if, finally, they manage to evade the designs of both the one and the other, yet all over the world fame dogs their footsteps with vengeance to their lives’ end, suggesting to their imaginations night and day numberless terrors, false and true; helping and hounding on all who design any evil against them; and, finally, refusing to allow them even in sleep to forget their crimes, but forcing them to dream of every kind of plot and disaster, because they are aware of the universal loathing and hatred which attend them. Yet, though all this is true, nobody who wanted one was ever at a loss for a traitor, except in the rarest cases. From which one might say with some plausibility that man, reputed the most cunning of animals, gives considerable grounds for being regarded as the stupidest. For the other animals, which obey their bodily appetites alone, can be deceived by these alone; while man, though he has reason to guide him, is led into error by the failure of that reason no less than by his physical appetites. . . . [18.16] King Attalus had for some time past been held in extraordinary honour by the Sicyonians, ever since the time that he ransomed the sacred land of Apollo for them at the cost of a large sum of money; in return for which they set up the colossal statue of him, ten cubits high, near the temple of Apollo in the market-place. But on this occasion, on his presenting them with ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, their devotion to him was immensely increased; and they accordingly voted him a statue of gold, and passed a law to offer sacrifice in his honour every year. With these honours, then, Attalus departed to Cenchreae.¹⁴ . . . [18.17] The tyrant Nabis, leaving Timocrates of Pellene at Argos,—because he trusted him more than any one else and employed him in his most important undertakings,—returned to Sparta: and thence, after some few days, despatched his wife with instructions to go to Argos and raise money. On her arrival she far surpassed Nabis himself in cruelty. For she summoned women to her presence either privately or in families, and inflicted every kind of torture and violence upon them, until she had extorted from almost all of them, not only their gold ornaments, but also the most valuable parts of their clothing. . . . [18.17] In a speech of considerable length Attalus reminded them of the ancient valour of their ancestors. . . . [18.18] Flamininus being unable to ascertain where the enemy were encamped, but yet being clearly informed that they had entered Thessaly, gave orders to all his men to cut stakes to carry with them, ready for use at any moment. This seems impossible to Greek habits, but to those of Rome it is easy. For the Greeks find it difficult to hold even their sarissae on the march, and can scarcely bear the fatigue of them; but the Romans strap their shields to their shoulders with leathern thongs, and, having nothing but their javelins in their hands, can stand the additional burden of a stake. There is also a great difference between the stakes employed by the two peoples. The Greeks hold that the best stake is that which has the largest and most numerous shoots growing round the stem; but the Roman stakes have only two or three side shoots, or at most four; and those are selected which have these shoots on one side only. The result is that their porterage is very easy (for each man carries three or four packed together), and they make an exceedingly secure palisade when put into use. For the Greek palisading, when set in the front of the camp, in the first place can easily be pulled down; for since the part that is firm and tightly fixed in the ground is single, while the projecting arms of it are many and large, two or three men can get hold of the same stake by its projecting arms, and easily pull it up; and directly that is done, its breadth is so great that a regular gateway is made: and because in such a palisade the stakes are not closely interlaced or interwoven with each other, when one is pulled up the part next to it is made insecure. With the Romans it is quite different. For as soon as they fix their stakes, they interlace them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong, nor on which of these branches the smaller shoots are growing. Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them, owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and the way they lie one upon another, and because the main branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends. Nor, if one is got hold of, is it easy to pull up: because, in the first place, all the stakes are sufficiently tightly secured in the ground to be self-supporting; and, in the second place, because the man who pulls away one branch must, owing to the close interlacing, be able to move several others in its train; and it is quite unlikely that two or three men should happen to get hold of the same stake. But even if, by the exertion of enormous force, a man has succeeded in pulling one or another up, the gap is scarcely perceptible. Considering, therefore, the vast superiority of this method, both in the readiness with which such stakes are found, the ease with which they are carried, and the security and durability of the palisade made with them, it is plain, in my opinion, that if any military operation of the Romans deserves to be admired and imitated, it is this. [18.19] After providing for contingencies by these preparations, Flamininus advanced with his whole force at a moderate pace, and, having arrived at about fifty stades from Pherae, pitched a camp there; and next morning, just before the morning watch, sent out some reconnoitring parties to see whether they could get any opportunity of discovering the position and movements of the enemy. Philip, at the same time, being informed that the Romans were encamped near Thebes, started with his whole force from Larisa in the direction of Pherae. When about thirty stades from that town, he pitched his camp there, and gave orders for all his men to make their preparations early next morning, and about the morning watch got his troops on the march. The division whose usual duty it was to form the advance guard he sent forward first, with instructions to cross the heights above Pherae, while he personally superintended the main army’s advance from the camp as the day was breaking. The advanced guards of the two armies were within a very little of coming into collision in the pass; for the darkness prevented their seeing each other until they were quite a short distance apart. Both sides halted, and sent speedy intelligence to their respective leaders of what had happened, and asking for instructions. . . . [18.19] [The generals decided] to remain in their intrenchments, and recall these advanced guards. Next morning both sent out about three hundred cavalry and light infantry to reconnoitre, among which Flamininus also sent two squadrons of Aetolians, because they were acquainted with the country. These opposing reconnoitring parties fell in with each other on the road between Pherae and Larisa, and joined battle with great fury. The men under Eupolemus the Aetolian fighting gallantly, and urging the Italian troops to do the same, the Macedonians were repulsed; and, after skirmishing for a long while, both parties retired to their respective camps. [18.20] Dissatisfied with the country near Pherae, as being thickly wooded and full of walls and gardens, both parties broke up their camps next day. Philip directed his march towards Scotusa, because he desired to supply himself with provisions from that town, and thus, with all his preparations complete, to find a district more suitable to his army: while Flamininus, divining his intention, got his army on the march at the same time as Philip, in great haste to anticipate him in securing the corn in the territory of Scotusa. A range of hills intervening between their two lines of march, the Romans could not see in what direction the Macedonians were marching, nor the Macedonians the Romans. Both armies, however, continued their march during this day, Flamininus to Eretria in Phthiotis, and Philip to the river Onchestus; and there they respectively pitched their camps. Next day they advanced again, and again encamped: Philip at Melambium in the territory of Scotusa, and Flamininus at the temple of Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still ignorant of each other’s whereabouts. A violent storm of rain and thunder coming on next day, the whole atmosphere descended from the clouds to the earth about the time of the morning watch, so that the darkness was too dense to see even those who were quite close. In spite of this, Philip was so eager to accomplish his object, that he started with his whole army; but finding himself much embarrassed on the march by the mist, after accomplishing a very small distance he again encamped; but he sent his reserve back, with instructions to halt upon the summit of the intervening hills.¹⁵ [18.21] Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis, being uncertain as to the position of the enemy, sent out ten troops of cavalry and a thousand light infantry in advance, with instructions to keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country. As these men were approaching the ridge of the hills they came upon the Macedonian reserve without expecting it, owing to the dimness of the light. After a short interval of mutual alarm, both sides began irregular attacks on each other, and both despatched messengers to their respective chiefs to give information of what had occurred; and when the Romans began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer heavily at the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to their camp begging for supports. Flamininus accordingly despatched the Aetolians under Archedamus and Eupolemus, as well as two of his own tribunes, with a force altogether of five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, after properly exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of affairs was promptly changed. For the Romans, inspired by the hope which this reinforcement gave, renewed the contest with redoubled spirit; while the Macedonians, though offering a gallant defence, were now in their turn hard pressed, and being forced to make a general retreat, retired to the highest points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the king for help. [18.22] But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indicated above, that a general engagement would take place on that day, happened to have sent a considerable part of his troops out of camp foraging. But when informed of what was taking place by these messengers, the mist at the same time beginning to lift, he despatched, with due exhortation, Heracleides of Gyrton, the commander of his Thessalian cavalry; Leon, the general of his Macedonian horse; and Athenagoras, with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace. The reserve being joined by these troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become a formidable one, they advanced against the enemy, and in their turn drove the Romans back from the heights. But what prevented them, more than anything else, from entirely routing the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian cavalry, which fought with desperate fury and reckless valour. For the Aetolians are as superior to the rest of the Greeks in cavalry for fighting in skirmishing order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they are inferior to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry for the purpose of a general engagement. The enemy being held in check therefore by these troops, the Romans were not forced back again quite on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a short distance, faced round and halted. But when Flamininus saw that not only had the cavalry and light infantry retired, but that, owing to them, his whole force was rendered uneasy, he drew out his entire army and got them into order of battle close to the hills. Meanwhile one man after another of the Macedonian reserve ran towards Philip shouting out, “King, the enemy are flying: do not let slip the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us: now is the day for you to strike: now is your opportunity!” The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dissatisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height; and it was because he foresaw the disadvantages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to accept battle there; but, being excited now by the extravagantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave the order for his army to be drawn out of camp. [18.23] Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his attention at the same time to relieving his advanced guard, and to going along the ranks to encourage his men. His exhortation was short, but clear and intelligible to the hearers: for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his soldiers: “Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their comrades? Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dislodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields and fly right into Macedonia? Why then should you feel any hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal ground? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that past minister courage to you for the present? Therefore, my men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in your might to the struggle! For, with God’s will, I am persuaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the contests in the past.” With these words he ordered his right wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of them; while with his left, supported by the light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to attack the enemy. And the Roman troops already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged their opponents. [18.24] Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his army in position outside the camp, Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the right wing of his phalanx, commencing the ascent of the hills with great rapidity, and having left instructions with Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground: for the Macedonians who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. For when the Roman light infantry found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now, with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and killed a large number of them. When the king first came on the ground, and saw that the fighting between the light armed was going on near the enemy’s camp, he was delighted: but when, on the other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank. At the same time Flamininus also, having received his advanced party into the intervals between his maniples, charged the enemy. [18.25] The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible in the last degree. Philip’s right wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions of the struggle: but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge. Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived that the enemy’s force was not well together—part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,¹⁶— keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight. [18.26] The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and fly; whereupon the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round again and charged them too. At first, as I have said, Philip, judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a complete victory; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot and horse a short distance from the field and took a general survey of the whole battle: and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted in some surprise because the enemy held their spears straight up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. Presently, having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those whom fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed upon these men from some higher ground and put most of them to the sword, while the few survivors threw away their shields and escaped by flight. [18.27] The battle was now at an end in every part of the field; the Romans everywhere victorious; and Philip in full retreat towards Tempe. The first night he passed at what is called Alexander’s tower; the next day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass into Tempe, and there remained, with a view of collecting the survivors of the battle. [18.27] But the Romans, after following the fugitives for a certain distance, returned; and some employed themselves in stripping the dead; others in collecting the captives; while the majority hurried to the plunder of the enemy’s camp. But there they found that the Aetolians had been beforehand with them; and thinking, therefore, that they were deprived of their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the Aetolians and protesting to their general that “he imposed the dangers upon them, but yielded the spoil to others.” For the present, however, they returned to their own camp, and passed the night in their old quarters: but next morning they employed themselves in collecting the prisoners and the remainder of the spoils, and then started on the march towards Larisa. In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred men; the Macedonians eight thousand killed, and not less than five thousand taken prisoners. [18.27] Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly between the Romans and Philip. [18.28] In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics,—it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve. [18.28] Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end.¹⁷ Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive. [18.28] It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison. [18.29] Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer¹⁸— “So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man: and waving horse-hair plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they stood.” And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits. [18.30] With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about. [18.30] Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man—because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing,—it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength. [18.31] Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but manœuvres for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing. [18.32] For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. [18.32] The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy’s reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others. [18.32] I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming. [18.33] Philip having thus done all he could in the battle, but having been decisively beaten, after taking up as many of the survivors as he could, proceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On the night previous to his start he sent one of his guard to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the king’s correspondence. And it was an act worthy of a king to retain, even in the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty. For he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the possession of the Romans, they would give many handles to the enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps, been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use power with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in disaster they displayed caution and good sense; but certainly this was the case with Philip. And this will be made manifest by what I shall subsequently relate. For as I showed without reserve the justice of his measures at the beginning of his reign, and the change for the worse which they subsequently underwent; and showed when and why and how this took place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of his career;¹⁹ in the same way am I bound to set forth his repentance, and the dexterity with which he changed with his change of fortune, and may be said to have shown the highest prudence in meeting this crisis in his affairs. [18.33] As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the necessary measures as to the captives and the rest of the spoils, he proceeded to Larisa. . . . [18.34] Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness displayed by the Aetolians in regard to the spoils; and had no idea of leaving them to be masters of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his supremacy there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio, when he saw that they claimed all the credit of the victory, and were filling Greece with the report of their valour. Wherefore, wherever he met them he behaved with hauteur, and never said a word on public business, but carried out all his measures independently or by the agency of his own friends. While the relations between these two were in this strained state, some few days after the battle Demosthenes, Cycliadas, and Limnaeus came on a mission from Philip; and, after considerable discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate armistice of fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal interview also with Philip in the course of them to discuss the state of affairs. And this interview being conducted in a courteous and friendly manner, the suspicions entertained of Flamininus by the Aetolians blazed forth with double fury. For as corruption, and the habit of never doing anything without a bribe, had long been a common feature in Greek politics, and as this was the acknowledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus could so change in his relations with Philip without a bribe. They did not know the habits and principles of the Romans on this subject; but judging from themselves they concluded that there was every probability of Philip in his present position offering a large sum of money, and of Flamininus being unable to resist the temptation. [18.35] If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expressing what was generally true, I should have had no hesitation in asserting of the Romans as a nation that they would not be likely to do such a thing,—I mean in the period before they engaged in wars beyond the sea, and while they retained their own habits and principles uncontaminated.²⁰ But in the present times I should not venture to say this of them all; still, as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty in this particular: and as evidence that I am making no impossible assertion, I would quote two names which will command general assent,—I mean first, Lucius Aemilius who conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom of Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the other splendour and wealth, there was found in the treasury more than six thousand talents of gold and silver: yet he was so far from coveting any of this, that he even refused to see it, and administered it by the hands of others; though he was far from being superfluously wealthy himself, but, on the contrary, was very badly off. At least, I know that on his death, which occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons Publius Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry, amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such straits that they would have been quite unable to do so if they had not sold the household furniture and slaves, and some of the landed property besides. And if what I say shall appear incredible to any one, he may easily convince himself on the subject: for though there are many controversies at Rome, and especially on this particular point, arising from the antagonistic parties among them, yet he will find that what I have just said about Aemilius is acknowledged by every one. Again, Publius Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption of Publius called the Great, when he got possession of Carthage, reckoned the wealthiest city in the world, took absolutely nothing from it for his own private use, either by purchase or by any other manner of acquisition whatever, although he was by no means a very rich man, but very moderately so for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the wealth of Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Africa at all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in regard to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire will find that his reputation in this particular is absolutely undisputed at Rome. I shall, however, take a more suitable opportunity of treating this subject at greater length. [18.36] Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the congress, immediately wrote to the allies announcing when they were to appear; and a few days afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the appointed time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met, the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms they ought to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros then delivered a short and moderate speech, merely asking that “they would all have some consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon as the Romans left Greece, from turning the whole weight of his anger upon him; for the Athamanes were always an easy prey to the Macedonians, because of their weakness and the close contiguity of their territory.” When he had finished, Alexander the Aetolian rose and complimented Flamininus for “having assembled the allies in that congress to discuss the terms of peace; and, above all, for having on the present occasion called on each to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken,” he added, “if he believed that by making terms with Philip he would secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For neither of these was possible. But if he desired to accomplish both the design of his own government and his own promises, which he had given to all the Greeks, there was one way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and that was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be done if he did not let slip the present opportunity.” [18.36] After some further arguments in support of this view he sat down. [18.37] Flamininus here took up the argument, and said that “Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but also as to the object which he proposed to himself, and above all as to the true interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly destroy those with whom they had been at open war. A proof of his assertion might be found in the war with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; for though the Romans had received the severest provocation at their hands, and afterwards had it in their power to do absolutely what they pleased to them, yet they had adopted no extreme measures against the Carthaginians. For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the idea that it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip; but on the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman demands. He was surprised, therefore, that those who had taken part in the former peace conference should now adopt a tone of such irreconcilable hostility. Have we not conquered? (say they). Yes, but this is the most senseless of arguments. For brave men, when actually at war, should be terrible and full of fire; when beaten, undaunted and courageous; when victorious, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But your present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to the Greeks themselves it is greatly to their interest that Macedonia should be humbled, but not at all so that she should be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as has been the case more than once already.” He then added that “the final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly enjoined by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of course, to the approval of the Senate: and that the Aetolians were free to take what measures they chose for themselves.” Upon Phaeneas attempting to reply that “Everything done hitherto went for nothing; for if Philip managed to extricate himself from his present difficulties, he would at once find some other occasion for hostilities,”—Flamininus sprang at once from his seat, and said, with some heat, “Cease this trifling, Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks.” [18.38] After this they separated for that day. On the next the king arrived: and on the third, when all the delegates were met for discussion, Philip entered, and with great skill and tact diverted the anger which they all entertained against him. For he said that “He conceded the demands made on the former occasion by the Romans and the allies, and remitted the decision on the remaining points to the Senate.” But Phaeneas, one of the Aetolians present, said: “Why then, Philip, do not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotid Thebes, and Echinus?” Whereupon Philip bade them take them over. But Flamininus here interposed, and forbade the Aetolians to take over any of the towns except Phthiotid Thebes; “for upon his approaching this town with his army, and summoning it to submit to the Roman protection, the Thebans had refused; and, as it had now come into his hands in the course of war, he had the right of taking any measures he chose regarding it.” Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at this, and asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns previously members of their league, “first on the ground that they had taken part in the recent war; and secondly in virtue of their original treaty of alliance, according to which the movable property of the conquered belonged to the Romans, the towns to the Aetolians.” To which Flamininus answered that “they were mistaken in both points; for their treaty with Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans, and made terms with Philip: and, even supposing that treaty to be still in force, they had no right to recover or take over such cities as had voluntarily put themselves under the protection of Rome, as the whole of the cities in Thessaly had done, but only such as were taken by force.²¹” [18.39] The other members of the congress were delighted at this speech of Flamininus. But the Aetolians listened with indignation; and what proved to be the beginning of serious evils was engendered. For this quarrel was the spark from which, not long afterwards, both the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus flamed out. The principal motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in coming to terms was the information he had received that Antiochus had started from Syria with an army, with the intention of crossing over into Europe. Therefore he was anxious lest Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to defend the towns and protract the war; and lest meanwhile he should himself be superseded by another commander from home, on whom the honour of all that he had achieved would be diverted. Therefore the terms which the king asked were granted: namely, that he should have four months’ suspension of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the two hundred talents; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of his friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus and Philip then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges of fidelity, on the understanding that, if the treaty were not confirmed, Flamininus was to restore to Philip the two hundred talents and the hostages. All the parties then sent ambassadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose the settlement. . . . [18.40] Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the same things and persons, we are unable to abandon our blind folly? For this particular kind of fraud has often been committed before now, and by many. That other men should allow themselves to be taken in is perhaps not astonishing; but it is wonderful that those should do so who are the authors and origin of the same kind of malpractice. But I suppose the cause is the absence of that rule so happily expressed by Epicharmus: “Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom’s sinews.” . . . ### Asia: King Attalus I [18.41] [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sailing along their coast, not from enmity to him, but from a suspicion that by giving support to Philip he would become an obstacle in the way of Greek liberty. . . . [18.41] King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus, owing to its extremely convenient position; for it appeared to occupy the position of an Acropolis for expeditions by land and sea against Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and to be always a most convenient base of operations for the kings of Asia against Europe. . . . [18.41] Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to speak a suitable word, as I have done in the case of others. Originally he had no other external qualification for royalty except money alone, which, indeed, if handled with good sense and boldness, is of very great assistance in every undertaking, but without these qualities is in its nature the origin of evil, and, in fact, of utter ruin to very many. For in the first place it engenders envy and malicious plots, and contributes largely to the destruction of body and soul. For few indeed are the souls that are able by the aid of wealth to repel dangers of this description. This king’s greatness of mind therefore deserves our admiration, because he never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the acquisition of royal power,—an object than which none greater can be mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this design, not only by doing services to his friends and gaining their affection, but also by achievements in war. For it was after conquering the Gauls, the most formidable and warlike nation at that time in Asia, that he assumed this rank and first puts himself forward as king. And though he obtained this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness towards his wife and children; kept faith with all allies and friends; and died in the midst of a most glorious campaign, fighting for the liberty of the Greeks; and what is more remarkable than all, though he left four grown-up sons, he so well settled the question of succession, that the crown was handed down to his children’s children without a single dispute. . . . ### Italy: Treaty with Philip Confirmed [18.42] After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consulship the ambassadors from Philip, and from Flamininus and the allies, arrived at Rome to discuss the treaty with Philip; and after a lengthened hearing the confirmation of the terms was decreed in the Senate. But on the matter being brought before the people, Marcus Claudius, who was ambitious of being himself sent to Greece, spoke against the treaty, and did his best to get it rejected. The people however ratified the terms, in accordance with the wish of Flamininus; and, upon this being settled, the Senate immediately despatched a commission of ten men of high rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks. Among others Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues, envoys from the Achaean league, made a proposal in the Senate for an alliance with Rome; but as some opposition was raised to this at the time, on account of a counter-claim of the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who were at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and Pylus, and of the Aetolians upon Heraea,—the decision was referred to the commission of ten. Such were the proceedings in the Senate. . . . ### Greece: Murder of Brachylles [18.43] After the battle of Cynoscephalae, as Flamininus was wintering at Elateia, the Boeotians, being anxious to recover their citizens who had served in Philip’s army, sent an embassy to Flamininus to try and secure their safety. Wishing to encourage the loyalty of the Boeotians to himself, because he was already anxious as to the action of Antiochus, he readily assented to their petition. These men were promptly restored from Macedonia, and one of them named Brachylles the Boeotians at once elected Boeotarch; and in a similar spirit honoured and promoted, as much as before, such of the others as were thought to be well disposed to the royal house of Macedonia. They also sent an embassy to Philip to thank him for the return of the young men, thus derogating from the favour done them by Flamininus,—a measure highly disquieting to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, and all who were regarded as partisans of Rome; because they foresaw what would happen to themselves and their families, knowing quite well that if the Romans quitted Greece, and Philip remained closely supporting the political party opposed to themselves, it would be unsafe for them to remain citizens of Boeotia. They therefore agreed among themselves to send an embassy to Flamininus in Elateia: and having obtained an interview with him, they made a lengthy and elaborate statement on this subject, describing the state of popular feeling which was now adverse to themselves, and discanting on the untrustworthiness of democratic assemblies. And finally, they ventured to say that “Unless they could overawe the common people by getting rid of Brachylles, there could be no security for the party in favour of Rome as soon as the legions departed.” After listening to these arguments Flamininus replied that “He would not personally take any part in such a measure, but he would not hinder those who wished to do so.” Finally, he bade them speak to Alexamenus the Strategus of the Aetolians. Zeuxippus and his colleagues accepted the suggestion, and communicated with Alexamenus, who at once consented; and agreeing to carry out their proposal sent three Aetolians and three Italians, all young men, to assassinate Brachylles. . . . [18.43] There is no more terrible witness, or more formidable accuser, than the conscience which resides in each man’s breast. . . . [18.44] About this same time the ten commissioners arrived from Rome who were to effect the settlement of Greece, bringing with them the decree of the Senate on the peace with Philip. The main points of the decree were these: “All other Greeks, whether in Asia or Europe, to be free and enjoy their own laws; but that Philip should hand over to the Romans those at present under his authority, and all towns in which he had a garrison, before the Isthmian games; and restore Eurōmus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus, Abydos, Thasus, Marinus, and Perinthus to freedom, and remove his garrisons from them. That Flamininus should write to Prusias commanding him to liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the Senate. That Philip should restore to the Romans within the same period all captives and deserters; and likewise all decked ships, except three and his one sixteen-banked vessel; and should pay a thousand talents, half at once, and half by instalments spread over ten years.” [18.45] Upon this decree being published in Greece, it created a feeling of confidence and gratification in all the communities except the Aetolians. These last were annoyed at not getting all they expected, and attempted to run down the decree by saying that it was mere words, without anything practical in it; and they based upon the clauses of the decree itself some such arguments as follow, by way of disquieting those who would listen to them. They said “That there were two distinct clauses in the decree relating to the cities garrisoned by Philip: one ordering him to remove those garrisons and to hand over the cities to the Romans; the other bidding him withdraw his garrisons and set the cities free. Those that were to be set free were definitely named, and they were towns in Asia; and it was plain, therefore, that those which were to be handed over to the Romans were those in Europe, namely, Oreus, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. Hence it was plain that the Romans were receiving the ‘fetters of Greece’ from the hands of Philip, and that the Greeks were getting, not freedom, but a change of masters.” [18.45] These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated ad nauseam. But, meanwhile, Flamininus left Elateia with the ten commissioners, and having crossed to Anticyra, sailed straight to Corinth, and there sat in council with the commissioners, and considered the whole settlement to be made. But as the adverse comments of the Aetolians obtained wide currency, and were accepted by some, Flamininus was forced to enter upon many elaborate arguments in the meetings of the commission, trying to convince the commissioners that if they wished to acquire unalloyed praise from the Greeks, and to establish firmly in the minds of all that they had originally come into the country not to gain any advantage for Rome, but simply to secure the freedom of Greece, they must abandon every district and free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. But this was just the point in dispute among the commissioners; for, as to all other cities, a decision had been definitely arrived at in Rome, and the ten commissioners had express instructions; but about Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they had been allowed a discretion on account of Antiochus, in order that they might take such measures as they thought best from a view of actual events. For it was notorious that this king had for some time past been meditating an interference in Europe. However, as far as Corinth was concerned, Flamininus prevailed on the commissioners to free it at once and restore it to the Achaean league, from respect to the terms of the original agreement; but he retained the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis. [18.46] When these decisions had been come to, the time for the celebration of the Isthmian games arrived. The expectation of what would happen there drew the men of highest rank from nearly every quarter of the world; and there was a great deal of talk on the subject from one end of the assembled multitude to the other, and expressed in varied language. Some said that from certain of the places and towns it was impossible that the Romans could withdraw; while others asserted that they would withdraw from those considered most important, but would retain others that were less prominent, though capable of being quite as serviceable. And such persons even took upon themselves in their ingenuity to designate the precise places which would be thus treated. While people were still in this state of uncertainty, all the world being assembled on the stadium to watch the games, the herald came forward, and having proclaimed silence by the sound of a trumpet, delivered the following proclamation: “The senate of Rome and Titus Quintius, proconsul and imperator, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians in war, declare the following peoples free, without garrison, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective countries: namely, Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians.” [18.46] Now as the first words of the proclamation were the signal for a tremendous outburst of clapping, some of the people could not hear it at all, and some wanted to hear it again; but the majority feeling incredulous, and thinking that they heard the words in a kind of dream, so utterly unexpected was it, another impulse induced every one to shout to the herald and trumpeter to come into the middle of the stadium and repeat the words: I suppose because the people wished not only to hear but to see the speaker, in their inability to credit the announcement. But when the herald, having advanced into the middle of the crowd, once more, by his trumpeter, hushed the clamour, and repeated exactly the same proclamation as before, there was such an outbreak of clapping as is difficult to convey to the imagination of my readers at this time. When at length the clapping ceased, no one paid any attention whatever to the athletes, but all were talking to themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of their senses. Nay, after the games were over, in the extravagance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in the face and call him their preserver; others were eager to touch his hand; most threw garlands and fillets upon him; until between them they nearly crushed him to death. But though this expression of popular gratitude was thought to have been extravagant, one might say with confidence that it fell short of the importance of the actual event. For that the Romans and their leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred unlimited expense and danger, for the sole purpose of freeing Greece, deserved their admiration; and it was also a great thing that their power was equal to their intention. But the greatest thing of all is that Fortune foiled their attempt by none of her usual caprices, but that every single thing came to a successful issue at the same time: so that all Greeks, Asiatic and European alike, were by a single proclamation become “free, without garrison or tribute, and enjoying their own laws.” [18.47] The Isthmian festival having come to an end, the first persons with whom the commissioners dealt were the ambassadors from Antiochus. They instructed them that “Their master must abstain from attacking those cities in Asia which were autonomous, and go to war with none of them; and must evacuate those that had been subject to Ptolemy or Philip. In addition to this they forbade him to cross over into Europe with an army; for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war or to be enslaved to any one. Finally, they said that some of their own number would go to visit Antiochus.” With this answer Hegesianax and Lysias returned to Antiochus. They next summoned the representatives of all the nations and cities, and declared to them the decisions of the commissioners. The Macedonian tribe of the Orestae, on the ground of their having joined Rome during the war, they declared autonomous; the Perrhaebians, Dolopes, and Magnesians they declared to be free. To the Thessalians, in addition to their freedom, they assigned the Phthiotid Achaeans, with the exception, however, of Phthiotid Thebes and Pharsalus: for the Aetolians made such a point of their claim to Pharsalus, as also to Leucas, on the ground of the rights secured them by the original treaty, that the commissioners referred the consideration of their demand in regard to these places back again to the Senate, but allowed them to retain Phocis and Locris as members of their league, as they had been before. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea they handed over to the Achaeans. Oreus and Eretria the majority wished to give to King Eumenes, but on the instance of Flamininus this design was not confirmed; and, accordingly, a short time afterwards these towns, with Carystus, were declared free by the Senate. To Pleuratus they assigned Lychnis and Parthus in Illyria, towns which had been subject to Philip; and Amynandros they allowed to retain all such strongholds as he had taken from Philip during the war. [18.48] This business completed, the commissioners separated in various directions: Publius Lentulus sailed to Bargylia and announced its freedom; Lucius Stertinius did the same to Hephaestia, Thasus, and the cities in Thrace; while Publius Villius and Lucius Terentius started to visit Antiochus; and Gnaeus Cornelius with his colleagues went to king Philip. They met him near Tempe, and after speaking with him on the other matters about which they had instructions, they advised him to send an embassy to Rome, to ask for an alliance, in order to obviate all suspicion of being on the watch for an opportunity in expectation of the arrival of Antiochus. The king agreeing to follow this advice, Cornelius left him and went to the league congress at Thermus; and coming into the public assembly urged the Aetolians in a lengthy speech to abide by the policy they had adopted, from the first, and maintain their good disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer: of whom some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in moderate and decorous language, for not having used their good fortune with sufficient regard to their joint interests, and for not observing the original compact; while others delivered violent invectives, asserting that the Romans would never have set foot on Greece or conquered Philip if it had not been for them. Cornelius disdained to answer these speeches in detail, but he advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, for they would get full justice in the Senate: which they accordingly did. Such was the conclusion of the war with Philip. . . . ### Asia: Roman Envoys To Antiochus [18.49] Whenever they are reduced to the last extremity, as the phrase goes, they will fly to the Romans for protection and commit themselves and their city to them.²². . . [18.50] Just when the designs of Antiochus in Thrace were succeeding to his heart’s desire, Lucius Cornelius and his party sailed into Selybria. These were the envoys sent by the Senate to conclude a peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. And at the same time there arrived Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius from Thasus, three of the ten commissioners for Greece. Their arrival having been promptly announced to Antiochus, they all assembled within the next few days at Lysimacheia; and it so happened that Hegesianax and Lysias, who had been on the mission to Flamininus, arrived about the same time. The private intercourse between the king and the Romans was informal and friendly; but when presently they met in conference to discuss public affairs, things took quite another aspect. Lucius Cornelius demanded that Antiochus should evacuate all the cities subject to Ptolemy which he had taken in Asia; while he warned him in solemn and emphatic language that he must do so also to the cities subject to Philip, “for it was ridiculous that Antiochus should come in and take the prizes of the war which Rome had waged with Philip.” He also admonished him to abstain from attacking autonomous cities, and added that “He was at a loss to conjecture with what view Antiochus had crossed over to Europe with such a powerful army and fleet; for if it were not with the intention of attacking the Romans, there was no explanation left that any reasonable person could accept.” With these words the Romans ceased speaking. [18.51] The king began his reply by saying that “He did not understand by what right the Romans raised a controversy with him in regard to the cities in Asia. They were the last people in the world who had any claim to do so.” Next he claimed that “They should refrain entirely from interfering in the affairs of Asia, seeing that he never in the least degree interposed in those of Italy. He had crossed into Europe with his army to recover his possessions in the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace; his right to the government of these places being superior to that of any one in the world. For this was originally the principality of Lysimachus; and as Seleucus waged war with and conquered that prince, the whole domain of Lysimachus passed to Seleucus:²³ then owing to the multifarious interests which distracted the attention of his predecessors, first Ptolemy and then Philip had managed to wrest this country from them and secure it for themselves. He had not then availed himself of Philip’s difficulties to take it, but had recovered possession of it in the exercise of his undoubted rights. It was no injury to the Romans that he should now be restoring to their homes, and settling again in their city, the people of Lysimacheia who had been expelled by an unexpected raid of the Thracians. He was doing this, not from any intention of attacking the Romans, but to prepare a place of residence for his son Seleucus. As for the autonomous cities of Asia, they must acquire their freedom by his free grace, not by an injunction from Rome. As for Ptolemy, he was about to settle matters amicably with him: for it was his intention to confirm their friendship by a matrimonial alliance.” [18.52] But upon Lucius expressing an opinion that they ought to call in the representatives of Lampsacus and Smyrna and give them a hearing, this was done. The envoys from Lampsacus were Parmenio and Pythodorus, and from Smyrna Coeranus. These men expressing themselves with much openness, Antiochus was irritated at the idea of defending himself against accusers before a tribunal of Romans, and interrupting Parmenio, said: “A truce to your long speeches: I do not choose to have my controversies with you decided before a Roman but before a Rhodian court.” Thereupon they broke up the conference very far from pleased with each other. . . . ### Egypt: Fall of Scopas [18.53] Many people have a yearning for bold and glorious undertakings, but few dare actually attempt them. Yet Scopas had much fairer opportunities for a hazardous and bold career than Cleomenes. For the latter, though circumvented by his enemies, and reduced to depend upon such forces as his servants and friends could supply, yet left no chance untried, and tested every one to the best of his ability, valuing an honourable death more highly than a life of disgrace. But Scopas, with all the advantages of a formidable body of soldiers and of the excellent opportunity afforded by the youth of the king, by his own delays and halting counsels allowed himself to be circumvented. For having ascertained that he was holding a meeting of his partisans at his own house, and was consulting with them, Aristomenes sent some of the royal bodyguards and summoned him to the king’s council. Whereupon Scopas was so infatuated that he was neither bold enough to carry out his designs, nor able to make up his mind to obey the king’s summons,—which is in itself the most extreme step,—until Aristomenes, understanding the blunder he had made, caused soldiers and elephants to surround his house, and sent Ptolemy son of Eumenes in with some young men, with orders to bring him quietly if he would come, but, if not, by force. When Ptolemy entered the house and informed Scopas that the king summoned him, he refused at first to obey, but remained looking fixedly at Ptolemy, and for a long while preserved a threatening attitude as though he wondered at his audacity; and when Ptolemy came boldly up to him and took hold of his chlamys, he called on the bystanders to help him. But seeing that the number of young men who had accompanied Ptolemy into the house was large, and being informed by some one of the military array surrounding it outside, he yielded to circumstances, and went, accompanied by his friends, in obedience to the summons. [18.54] On his entering the council chamber the king was the first to state the accusation against him, which he did briefly. He was followed by Polycrates lately arrived from Cyprus; and he again by Aristomenes. The charges made by them all were much to the same effect as what I have just stated; but there was now added to them the seditious meeting with his friends, and his refusal to obey the summons of the king. On these charges he was unanimously condemned, not only by the members of the council, but also by the envoys of foreign nations who were present. And when Aristomenes was about to commence his accusation he brought in a large number of other Greeks of rank also to support him, as well as the Aetolian ambassadors who had come to negotiate a peace, among whom was Dorimachus son of Nicostratus. When these speeches had been delivered, Scopas endeavoured to put forward certain pleas in his defence: but gaining no attention from any one, owing to the senseless nature of his proceedings, he was taken along with his friends to prison. There after nightfall Aristomenes caused Scopas and his family to be put to death by poison; but did not allow Dicaearchus to die until he had had him racked and scourged, thus inflicting on him a punishment which he thoroughly deserved in the name of all Greece. For this was the Dicaearchus whom Philip, when he resolved upon his treacherous attack on the Cyclades and the cities of the Hellespont, appointed leader of the whole fleet and the entire enterprise: who being thus sent out to perform an act of flagrant wickedness, not only thought that he was doing nothing wrong, but in the extravagance of his infatuation imagined that he would strike terror into the gods as well as man. For wherever he anchored he used to build two altars, to Impiety and Lawlessness, and, offering sacrifice upon these altars, worshipped them as his gods. Therefore in my opinion he met with a just retribution both from gods and men: for as his life had been spent in defiance to the laws of nature, his end was properly also one of unnatural horror. All the other Aetolians who wished to depart were allowed by the king to go in possession of their property. [18.55] As in the lifetime of Scopas his love of money had been notorious, for his avarice did in fact surpass that of any man in the world, so after his death was it made still more conspicuous by the enormous amount of gold and other property found in his house; for by the assistance of the coarse manners and drunken habits of Charimortus he had absolutely pillaged the kingdom. [18.55] Having thus settled the Aetolian business to their liking, the courtiers turned their attention to the ceremony of instituting the king into the management of his office, called the Anacleteria. His age was not indeed yet so far advanced as to make this necessary; but they thought that the kingdom would gain a certain degree of firmness and a fresh impulse towards prosperity, if it were known that the king had assumed the independent direction of the government. They then made the preparations for the ceremony with great splendour, and carried it out in a manner worthy of the greatness of the kingdom, Polycrates being considered to have contributed very largely to the accomplishment of their efforts. For this man had enjoyed even during his youth, in the reign of the late king, a reputation second to no one in the court for fidelity and practical ability; and this reputation he had maintained during the present reign also. For having been entrusted with the management of Cyprus and its revenues, when its affairs were in a critical and complicate state, he not only preserved the island for the young king, but collected a very considerable sum of money, with which he had just arrived and had paid to the king, after handing over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. But though he obtained great applause by this, and a large fortune immediately afterwards, yet, as he grew older, he drifted into extravagant debauchery and scandalous indulgence. Nor was the reputation of Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus very different in the later part of his life. But in regard to these men, when we come to the proper time, I shall not shrink from stating the circumstances which disgraced their official life. . . . ## Book XIX [19.1] The only fragment we possess of the nineteenth book of Polybius is a statement quoted by Plutarch as to M. Porcius Cato, to the effect that by his orders the walls of all the numerous Spanish cities north of the Baetis were dismantled on the same day. Cato was in Spain B. C. 195. The means taken by him to secure this simultaneous destruction of fortifications are told by Frontinus, Strateg. 1, 1, 1. [19.1] We thus lose the history of the years B. C. 195, 194, 193; as well as the greater part of that of B. C. 192, 191, contained in the early part of book 20, of which only a few fragments remain. Livy, however, has evidently translated from Polybius in his history of these years, and a brief abstract of events in Greece may help the reader in following the fragmentary book which follows with more interest. [19.1] B. C. 195. Lucius Valerius Flaccus, M. Porcius Cato, Coss. Flamininus’s imperium is extended for this year, because of the danger from Antiochus and Nabis. The Aetolians, still discontented, push their demand for Pharsalus and Leucas, and are referred by the Senate back to Flamininus. The latter summons a conference of Greek states at Corinth, and a war is decreed against Nabis, the Aetolians still expressing their dislike of Roman interference. The levies are collected; Argos is freed from Nabis; Sparta all but taken; and Nabis forced to submit to most humiliating terms: the Aetolians again objecting to his being allowed to remain at Sparta on any terms at all. In this year also legates from Antiochus visit Flamininus, but are referred to the Senate. [19.1] B. C. 194. Publius Cornelius Scipio II., Tiberius Sempronius Longus, Coss. Flamininus leaves Greece after a speech at Corinth to the assembled league advising internal peace and loyalty to Rome, and enters Rome in triumph. There is a time of comparative tranquillity in Greece. [19.1] B. C. 193. L. Cornelius Merula, Q. Minucius Thermus, Coss. The legates from Antiochus are sent back with the final answer that, unless the king abstains from entering Europe in arms, the Romans will free the Asiatic Greek cities from him. Roman legates, P. Sulpicius, P. Villius, P. Aelius, are sent to him. Hannibal arrives at the court of Antiochus, and urges him to resist; and the Aetolians urge the same course, trying also to stir up Nabis and Philip of Macedon. Antiochus accordingly will give the Roman envoys no satisfactory answer. [19.1] B. C. 192. L. Quintius Flamininus, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Coss. The Romans therefore prepare for war. A fleet under the praetor Atilius is sent against Nabis: commissioners are sent into Greece—T. Quintius Flamininus, C. Octavius, Cn. Servilius, P. Villius—early in the year: M. Baebius is ordered to hold his army in readiness at Brundisium. Then news is brought to Rome by Attalus of Pergamum (brother of king Eumenes) that Antiochus has crossed the Hellespont, and the Aetolians on the point of joining him. Therefore Baebius is ordered to transport his army to Apollonia. [19.1] Meanwhile Nabis takes advantage of the alarm caused by Antiochus to move. He besieges Gythium, and ravages the Achaean territory. The league, under Philopoemen, proclaim war against him, and, after losing an unimportant naval battle, decisively defeat him on land and shut him up in Sparta. The Aetolians now formally vote to call in Antiochus, “to liberate Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome.” They occupy Demetrias; and kill Nabis by a stratagem. Whereupon Philopoemen annexes Sparta to the Achaean league. Later in the year Antiochus meets the assembly of the Aetolians at Lamia in Thessaly, is proclaimed “Strategus”; and after a vain attempt to conciliate the Achaeans seizes Chalcis, where he winters, and marries a young wife. [19.1] B. C. 191. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, M. Acilius Glabrio, Coss. The Romans declare war with Antiochus. Manius Acilius is selected to go to Greece, where he takes over the army of Baebius, and after taking many towns in Thessaly meets and defeats Antiochus at Thermopylae; where the Aetolian league did after all little service to the king, who retires to Ephesus. See Livy, 34, 43—36, 21. See also Plutarch, Philopoemen, and Flamininus; Appian, Syriacae, 6—21. ## Book XX ### Greece: Antiochus and the Aetolians Meet [20.1] The Aetolians chose thirty of the Apocleti²⁴ to confer with King Antiochus. . . . [20.1] He accordingly summoned a meeting of the Apocleti and consulted them on the state of affairs. . . . [20.2] When Antiochus sent an embassy to the Boeotians, they answered that they would not consider his proposals until the king came in person. . . . [20.3] As Antiochus was staying at Chalcis, just as the winter was beginning, two ambassadors came to visit him, Charops from Epirus, and Callistratus from Elis. The prayer of the Epirotes was that “The king would not involve them in the war with Rome, for they dwelt on the side of Greece immediately opposite Italy; but that, if he could, he would secure their safety by defending the frontier of Epirus: in that case he should be admitted into all their towns and harbours: but if he decided not to do so at present, they asked his indulgence if they shrank from a war with Rome.” The Eleans, in their turn, begged him “To send a reinforcement to their town; for as the Achaeans had voted war against them, they were in terror of an attack from the troops of the league.” The king answered the Epirotes by saying that he would send envoys to confer with them on their mutual interests; but to Elis he despatched a thousand foot soldiers under the command of Euphanes of Crete. . . . [20.4] The Boeotians had long been in a very depressed state, which offered a strong contrast to the former prosperity and reputation of their country. They had acquired great glory as well as great material prosperity at the time of the battle of Leuctra; but by some means or another from that time forward they steadily diminished both the one and the other under the leadership of Amaeocritus; and subsequently not only diminished them, but underwent a complete change of character, and did all that was possible to wipe out their previous reputation. For having been incited by the Achaeans to go to war with the Aetolians, they adopted the policy of the former and made an alliance with them, and thenceforth maintained a steady war with the Aetolians. But on the Aetolians invading Boeotia, they marched out with their full available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the Achaeans, who had mustered their men and were on the point of marching to their assistance, they attacked the Aetolians; and being worsted in the battle were so completely demoralised, that, from the time of that campaign, they never plucked up spirit to claim any position of honour whatever, and never shared in any enterprise or contest undertaken by the common consent of the Greeks. They devoted themselves entirely to eating and drinking, and thus became effeminate in their souls as well as in their bodies. [20.5] Such were, briefly, the steps in the degeneracy of Boeotia. Immediately after the battle just mentioned they abandoned the Achaeans and joined the Aetolians.²⁵ But on the latter presently going to war with Philip’s father Demetrius, they once more abandoned the Aetolians; and upon Demetrius entering Boeotia with an army, without attempting resistance they submitted completely to the Macedonians. But as a spark of their ancestral glory still survived, there were found some who disliked the existing settlement and the complete subservience to Macedonia: and they accordingly maintained a violent opposition to the policy of Ascondas and Neon, the ancestors of Brachylles, who were the most prominent in the party which favoured Macedonia. However, the party of Ascondas eventually prevailed, owing to the following circumstance. Antigonus (Doson), who, after the death of Demetrius, was Philip’s guardian, happened to be sailing on some business along the coast of Boeotia; when off Larymna he was surprised by a sudden ebb of the tide, and his ships were left high and dry. Now just at that time a rumour had been spread that Antigonus meant to make a raid upon the country; and therefore Neon, who was Hipparch at the time, was patrolling the country at the head of all the Boeotian cavalry to protect it, and came upon Antigonus in this helpless and embarrassed position: and having it thus in his power to inflict a serious blow upon the Macedonians, much to their surprise he resolved to spare them. His conduct in so doing was approved by the other Boeotians, but was not at all pleasing to the Thebans. Antigonus, however, when the tide flowed again and his ships floated, proceeded to complete the voyage to Asia on which he was bound, with deep gratitude to Neon for having abstained from attacking him in his awkward position. Accordingly, when at a subsequent period he conquered the Spartan Cleomenes and became master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in charge of the town, by way of paying him for the kindness done him by his father Neon. This proved to be the beginning of a great rise in importance of the family of Brachylles. But this was not all that Antigonus did for him: from that time forward either he personally, or king Philip, continually supported him with money and influence; so that before long this family entirely overpowered the political party opposed to them in Thebes, and forced all the citizens, with very few exceptions, to join the party of Macedonia. Such was the origin of the political adherence to Macedonia of the family of Neon, and of its rise to prosperity. [20.6] But Boeotia as a nation had come to such a low pitch, that for nearly twenty-five years the administration of justice had been suspended in private and public suits alike. Their magistrates were engaged in despatching bodies of men to guard the country or in proclaiming national expeditions, and thus continually postponed their attendance at courts of law. Some of the Strategi also dispensed allowances to the needy from the public treasury; whereby the common people learnt to support and invest with office those who would help them to escape the penalties of their crimes and undischarged liabilities, and to be enriched from time to time with some portion of the public property obtained by official favour. No one contributed to this lamentable state of things more than Opheltas, who was always inventing some plan calculated to benefit the masses for the moment, while perfectly certain to ruin them in the future. To these evils was added another unfortunate fashion. It became the practice for those who died childless not to leave their property to the members of their family, as had been the custom of the country formerly, but to assign it for the maintenance of feasts and convivial entertainments to be shared in by the testator’s friends in common; and even many who did possess children left the larger part of their property to the members of their own club. The result was that there were many Boeotians who had more feasts to attend in the month than there were days in it. The people of Megara therefore, disliking this habit, and remembering their old connexion with the Achaean league, were inclined once more to renew their political alliance with it. For the Megarians had been members of the Achaean league since the time of Antigonus Gonatas; but upon Cleomenes blockading the Isthmus, finding themselves cut off from the Achaeans they joined the Boeotians, with the consent of the former. But a little before the time of which we are now speaking, becoming dissatisfied with the Boeotian constitution, they again joined the Achaeans. The Boeotians, incensed at what they considered acts of contempt, sallied out in full force to attack Megara; and on the Megarians declining to listen to them, they determined in their anger to besiege and assault their city. But being attacked by a panic, on a report spreading that Philopoemen was at hand at the head of a force of Achaeans, they left their scaling ladders against the walls and fled back precipitately to their own country. [20.7] Such being the state of Boeotian politics, it was only by extraordinary good fortune that they evaded destruction in the dangerous periods of the wars of Philip and Antiochus. But in the succeeding period they did not escape in the same way. Fortune, on the contrary, seemed determined to make them pay for their former good luck by a specially severe retribution, as I shall relate hereafter. . . . [20.7] Many of the Boeotians defended their alienation from the Romans by alleging the assassination of Brachylles,²⁶ and the expedition made by Flamininus upon Coronea owing to the murders of Romans on the roads.²⁷ But the real reason was their moral degeneracy, brought about by the causes I have mentioned. For as soon as the king approached, the Boeotian magistrates went out to meet him, and after holding a friendly conversation with him conducted him into Thebes. . . . [20.8] Antiochus the Great came to Chalcis in Euboea, and there completed his marriage, when he was fifty years old, and had already undertaken his two most important labours, the liberation of Greece—as he called it—and the war with Rome. However, having fallen in love with a young lady of Chalcis, he was bent on marrying her, though the war was still going on; for he was much addicted to wine and delighted in excesses. The lady was a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a man of rank, and was possessed of extraordinary beauty. He remained in Chalcis all the winter occupied in marriage festivities, utterly regardless of the pressing business of the time. He gave the girl the name of Euboea, and after his defeat²⁸ fled with his bride to Ephesus. . . . [20.9] When the Romans took Heracleia, Phaeneas the Aetolian Strategus, in view of the danger threatening Aetolia, and seeing what would happen to the other towns, determined to send an embassy to Manius Acilius to demand a truce and treaty of peace. With this purpose he despatched Archidamus, Pantaleon and Chalesus, who on meeting the Roman consul were intending to enter upon a long argument, but were interrupted in the middle of their speech and prevented from finishing it. For Acilius remarked that “For the present he had no leisure to attend to them, being much engaged with the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia: he would, however, grant a ten days’ truce and send Lucius Valerius Flaccus with them, with instructions as to what he was to say.” The truce being thus made, and Valerius having come to Hypata, a lengthened discussion took place on the state of affairs. The Aetolians sought to establish their case by referring to their previous services to Rome. But Valerius cut this line of argument short by saying that “Such justification did not apply to the present circumstances; for as these old friendly relations had been broken off by them, and the existing hostility was owing entirely to the Aetolians themselves, the services of the past could be of no assistance to them in the present. They must therefore abandon all idea of justification, and adopt a tone of supplication, and beseech the consul’s pardon for their transgressions.” After a long discussion on various details, the Aetolians eventually decided to leave the whole matter to Acilius, and commit themselves without reserve to the good faith of the Romans. They had no comprehension of what this really involved; but they were misled by the word “faith” into supposing that the Romans would thereby be more inclined to grant them terms. But with the Romans for a man “to commit himself to their good faith” is held to be equivalent to “surrendering unconditionally.” [20.10] Having come to this resolution, Phaeneas despatched legates with Valerius to announce the decision of the Aetolians to Acilius. On being admitted to the presence of the Consul, these legates, after once more entering upon a plea of self-justification, ended by announcing that the Aetolians had decided to commit themselves to the good faith of the Romans. Hereupon Acilius interrupted them by saying, “Is this really the case, men of Aetolia?” And upon their answering in the affirmative, he said: “Well then, the first condition is that none of you, individually or collectively, must cross to Asia; the second is that you must surrender Menestratus the Epirote” (who happened at that time to be at Naupactus, where he had come to the assistance of the Aetolians), “and also King Amynander, with such of the Athamanians as accompanied him in his desertion to your side.” Here Phaeneas interrupted him by saying: “But it is neither just nor consonant with Greek customs, O Consul, to do what you order.” To which Acilius replied,—not so much because he was angry, as because he wished to show him the dangerous position in which he stood, and to thoroughly frighten him,— “Do you still presume to talk to me about Greek customs, and about honour and duty, after having committed yourselves to my good faith? Why, I might if I chose put you all in chains and commit you to prison!” With these words he ordered his men to bring a chain and an iron collar and put it on the neck of each of them. Thereupon Phaeneas and his companions stood in speechless amazement, as though bereft of all power of thought or motion, at this unexpected turn of affairs. But Valerius and some others who were present besought Acilius not to inflict any severity upon the Aetolians then before him, as they were in the position of ambassadors. And on his yielding to these representations, Phaeneas broke silence by saying that “He and the Apocleti were ready to obey the injunctions, but they must consult the general assembly if they were to be confirmed.” Upon Acilius agreeing to this, he demanded a truce of ten days to be granted. This also having been conceded, they departed with these terms, and on arrival at Hypata told the Apocleti what had been done and the speeches that had been made. This report was the first thing which made their error, and the compulsion under which they were placed, clear to the Aetolians. It was therefore decided to write round to the various cities and call the Aetolians together, to consult on the injunctions imposed upon them. When the news of the reception Phaeneas had met with was noised abroad, the Aetolian people were so infuriated that no one would even attend the meeting to discuss the matter at all. It was thus impossible to hold the discussion. They were further encouraged by the arrival of Nicander, who just at that time sailed into Phalara, on the Malian gulf, from Asia, bringing news of the warm reception given him by Antiochus, and the promises for the future which the king had made; they therefore became quite indifferent as to the non-completion of the peace. Thus when the days of the truce had elapsed the Aetolians found themselves still at war with Rome. [20.11] But I ought not to omit to describe the subsequent career and fate of Nicander. He arrived back at Phalara on the twelfth day after leaving Ephesus, and found the Romans still engaged in Heracleia, and the Macedonians having already evacuated Lamia, but encamped at no great distance from the town: he thereupon conveyed his money unexpectedly into Lamia, and attempted himself to make his way between the two camps into Hypata. But, falling into the hands of the Macedonian pickets, he was taken to Philip, while his evening party was still at the midst of their entertainment, greatly alarmed lest he should meet with rough treatment from having incurred Philip’s resentment, or should be handed over to the Romans. But when the matter was reported to the king, he at once gave orders that the proper officers should offer Nicander refreshments, and show him every politeness and attention. After a time he got up from table and went personally to visit him; and after enlarging at great length on “the folly of the Aetolians, for having first brought the Romans into Greece, and afterwards Antiochus,” he still, even at this hour, urged that “they should forget their past, adhere to their loyalty to himself, and not show a disposition to take advantage of each other’s difficulties.” He bade Nicander convey this message to the leaders of the Aetolians, and exhorting him personally to remember the favours which he had received at his hands, he despatched him with a sufficient escort, which he ordered to see him safe into Hypata. This result was far beyond Nicander’s hopes or expectations. He was restored in due course to his friends, and from the moment of this adventure remained devoted to the royal family of Macedonia. Thus, in the subsequent period of the war with Perseus, the obligations which this favour had imposed upon him caused him to offer such an unwilling and lukewarm opposition to the designs of Perseus, that he exposed himself to suspicion and denunciation, and at last was summoned to Rome and died there. . . . [20.12] The Spartans could not find one of their own citizens willing to address Philopoemen on this subject. To men who for the most part undertake work for what they can get by it there are plenty of people to offer such rewards, and to regard them as the means of founding and consolidating friendship: but in the case of Philipoemen no one could be found willing to convey this offer to him at all. Finally, being completely at a loss, they elected Timolaus to do it, as being his ancestral guest-friend and very intimate with him. Timolaus twice journeyed to Megalopolis for this express purpose, without daring to say a word to Philopoemen about it. But having goaded himself to making a third attempt, he at length plucked up courage to mention the proposed gifts. Much to his surprise Philopoemen received the suggestion with courtesy; and Timolaus was overjoyed by the belief that he had attained his object. Philopoemen, however, remarked that he would come to Sparta himself in the course of the next few days; for he wished to offer all the magistrates his thanks for this favour. He accordingly came, and, being invited to attend the Senate, he said: “He had long been aware of the kindness with which the Lacedaemonians regarded him; but was more convinced than ever by the compliments and extraordinary mark of honour they now offered him. But while gratefully accepting their intention, he disliked the particular manner of its exhibition. They should not bestow such honour and rewards on their friends, the poison of which would indelibly infect the receiver, but rather upon their enemies; that the former might retain their freedom of speech and the confidence of the Achaeans when proposing to offer assistance to Sparta; while the latter, by swallowing the bait, might be compelled either to support their cause, or at any rate to keep silence and do them no harm. . . .” [20.12] The remaining events of the war against Antiochus in this year are related by Livy, 36, 41-45. Acilius was engaged for two months in the siege of Naupactus: while the Roman fleet under Gaius Livius defeated that of Antiochus, under his admiral Polyxenidas, off Phocaea. [20.12] To see an operation with one’s own eyes is not like merely hearing a description of it. It is, indeed, quite another thing; and the confidence which such vivid experience gives is always greatly advantageous. . . . ## Book XXI [21.1] At this time also it happened that the embassy, which the Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome, returned disappointed. The subject of their mission was the hostages and the villages. As to the villages the Senate answered that they would give instructions to envoys sent by themselves; and as to the hostages they desired to consider further. But as to the exiles of past times, they said that they wondered why they were not recalled, now that Sparta had been freed from her tyrants. . . . [21.2] At the same period the Senate dealt with the ambassadors from Philip. They had come to set forth the loyalty and zeal of the king, which he had shown to the Romans in the war against Antiochus. On hearing what the envoys had to say, the Senate released the king’s son Demetrius from his position as hostage at once, and promised that they would also remit part of the yearly indemnity, if he kept faith with Rome in future. The Senate likewise released the Lacedaemonian hostages, except Armenas, son of Nabis; who subsequently fell ill and died. . . . [21.3] Directly the news of the victory at sea reached Rome, the Senate first decreed a public supplicatio for nine days,—which means a public and universal holiday, accompanied by the sacrifice of thank-offerings to the gods for the happy success,—and next gave audience to the envoys from Aetolia and Manius Acilius. When both parties had pleaded their cause at some length, the Senate decreed to offer the Aetolians the alternative of committing their cause unconditionally to the arbitration of the Senate, or of paying a thousand talents down and making an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome. But on the Aetolians desiring the Senate to state definitely on what points they were to submit to such arbitration, the Senate refused to define them. Accordingly the war with the Aetolians went on. . . . [21.4] While Amphissa was still being besieged by Manius Acilius, the Athenians, hearing at that time both of the distress of the Amphissians and of the arrival of Publius Scipio, despatched Echedemus and others on an embassy to him, with instructions to pay their respects to both Lucius and Publius Scipio, and at the same time to try what could be done to get peace for the Aetolians. On their arrival, Publius welcomed them gladly and treated them with great courtesy; because he saw that they would be of assistance to him in carrying out his plans. For he was very desirous of effecting a settlement in Aetolia on good terms; but had resolved that, if the Aetolians refused to comply, he would at all hazards relinquish that business for the present, and cross to Asia: for he was well aware that the ultimate object of the war and of the entire expedition was not to reduce the Aetolian nation to obedience, but to conquer Antiochus and take possession of Asia. Therefore, directly the Athenians mentioned the pacification, he accepted their suggestion with eagerness, and bade them sound the Aetolians also. Accordingly, Echedemus and his colleagues, having sent a preliminary deputation to Hypata, presently followed in person, and entered into a discussion with the Aetolian magistrates on the subject of a pacification. They, too, readily acquiesced in the suggestion, and certain envoys were appointed to meet the Romans. They found Publius and the army encamped sixty stades from Amphissa, and there discoursed at great length on their previous services to Rome. Publius Scipio adopted in reply a still milder and more conciliatory style, quoting his own conduct in Iberia and Libya, and explaining how he had treated all who in those countries had confided to his honour: and finally expressing an opinion that they had better put themselves in his hands. At first, all who were present felt very sanguine that the pacification was about to be accomplished. But when, in answer to the Aetolian demand to know on what terms they were to make the peace, Lucius Scipio explained that they had two alternatives—to submit their entire case unconditionally to the arbitrament of Rome, or to pay a thousand talents down and to make an offensive and defensive alliance with her—the Aetolians present were thrown into the state of the most painful perplexity at the inconsistency of this announcement with the previous talk: but finally they said that they would consult the Aetolians on the terms imposed. [21.5] On the return of the Aetolian envoys for the purpose of consulting their countrymen, Echedemus and his colleagues joined the council of the apocleti in their deliberations on this subject. One of the alternatives was impossible owing to the amount of money demanded, and the other was rendered alarming in their eyes by the deception they had experienced before, when, after submitting to the surrender, they had narrowly escaped being thrown into chains. Being then much perplexed and quite unable to decide, they sent the same envoys back to beg the Scipios that they would either abate part of the money, so as to be within their power to pay, or except from the surrender the persons of citizens, men and women. But upon their arrival in the Roman camp and delivering their message, Lucius Scipio merely replied that “The only terms on which he was commissioned by the Senate to treat were those which he had recently stated.” They therefore returned once more, and were followed by Echedemus and his colleagues to Hypata, who advised the Aetolians that “Since there was at present a hitch in the negotiations for peace, they should ask for a truce; and, having thus at least delayed the evils threatening them, should send an embassy to the Senate. If they obtained their request, all would be well; but, if they did not, they must trust to the chapter of accidents: for their position could not be worse than it was now, but for many reasons might not impossibly be better.” The advice of Echedemus was thought sound, and the Aetolians accordingly voted to send envoys to obtain a truce; who, upon reaching Lucius Scipio, begged that for the present a truce of six months might be granted them, that they might send an embassy to the Senate. Publius Scipio, who had for some time past been anxious to begin the campaign in Asia, quickly persuaded his brother to grant their request. The agreement therefore was reduced to writing, and thereupon Manius Acilius handed over his army to Lucius Scipio, and returned with his military tribunes to Rome. . . . ### Asia: Factions at Phocaea [21.6] Factions became rife at Phocaea,²⁹ partly because they suffered from the Romans left with the ships being quartered on them, and partly because they were annoyed at the tribute imposed on them. . . . [21.6] Then the Phocaean magistrates, alarmed at the state of popular excitement caused by the dearth of corn, and the agitation kept up by the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys to Seleucus,³⁰ who was on their frontiers, ordering him not to approach the town, as they were resolved to remain neutral and await the final decision of the quarrel, and then obey orders. Of these ambassadors the partisans of Seleucus and his faction were Aristarchus, Cassander, and Rhodon; those, on the contrary, who inclined to Rome were Hegias and Gelias. On their arrival Seleucus at once showed every attention to Aristarchus and his partisans, but treated Hegias and Gelias with complete neglect. But when he was informed of the state of popular feeling, and the shortness of provisions in Phocaea, he threw aside all negotiation or discussion with the envoys, and marched towards the town. . . . [21.6] Two Galli, with sacred images and figures on their breasts, advanced from the town, and besought them not to adopt any extreme measures against the city.³¹ . . . [21.7] The fire-carrier used by Pausistratus, the navarch of the Rhodians, was a scoop or basket. On either side of the prow two staples were fixed into the inner part of the two sides of the ship, into which poles were fitted with their extremities extending out to sea. To the end of these the scoop filled with fire was attached by an iron chain, in such a way that in charging the enemy’s ship, whether on the prow or the broadside, fire was thrown upon it, while it was kept a long way off from his own ship by the slope of the poles. . . . [21.7] The Rhodian admiral Pamphilidas was thought to be better capable than Pausistratus of adapting himself to all possible contingencies, because his character was more remarkable for its depth and solidity than for its boldness. For most men judge not from any fixed principle but by results. Thus, though they had recently elected Pausistratus to the command, on the ground of his possessing these very qualities of energy and boldness, their opinions at once underwent a complete revolution when he met with his disaster. . . . [21.8] At this time a letter arrived at Samos for Lucius Aemilius and Eumenes from the consul Lucius Scipio, announcing the agreement made with the Aetolians for the truce, and the approaching advance of the land forces to the Hellespont. Another to the same effect was sent to Antiochus and Seleucus from the Aetolians. . . . [21.9] An embassy from King Eumenes having arrived in Achaia proposing an alliance, the Achaeans met in public assembly and ratified it, and sent out some soldiers, a thousand foot and a hundred horse, under the command of Diophanes of Megalopolis. . . . [21.9] Diophanes was a man of great experience in war; for during the protracted hostilities with Nabis in the neighbourhood of Megalopolis, he had served throughout under Philopoemen, and accordingly had gained a real familiarity with the operations of actual warfare. And besides this advantage, his appearance and physical prowess were impressive; and, most important of all, he was a man of personal courage and exceedingly expert in the use of arms. . . . [21.10] King Antiochus had already penetrated into the territory of Pergamum; but when he heard that king Eumenes was close at hand, and saw that the land forces as well as the fleet were ready to attack him, he began to consider the propriety of proposing a pacification with the Romans, Eumenes, and the Rhodians at once. He therefore removed with his whole army to Elaea, and having seized a hill facing that town, he encamped his infantry upon it, while he entrenched his cavalry, amounting to over six thousand, close under the walls of the town. He took up his own position between these two, and proceeded to send messengers to Lucius Aemilius in the town, proposing a peace. The Roman imperator thereupon called Eumenes and the Rhodians to a meeting, and desired them to give their opinions on the proposal. Eudemus and Pamphilidas were not averse to making terms; but the king said that “To make peace at the present moment was neither honourable nor possible. How could it be an honourable conclusion of the war that they should make terms while confined within the walls of a town? And how was it possible to give validity to those terms without waiting for the Consul and obtaining his consent? Besides, even if they did give any indication of coming to an agreement with Antiochus, neither the naval nor military forces could of course return home until the Senate and people had ratified the terms of it. All that would be left for them to do would be to spend the winter where they were, waiting idly for the decision from home, doing nothing, and exhausting the wealth and resources of their allies. And then, if the Senate withheld its approval of the terms, they would have to begin the war all over again, having let the opportunity pass, which, with God’s help, would have enabled them to put a period to the whole war.” Such was the speech of king Eumenes. Lucius Aemilius accepted the advice, and answered the envoys of Antiochus that the peace could not possibly be made until the Proconsul arrived. On hearing this Antiochus immediately began devastating the territory of Elaea; and subsequently, while Seleucus remained in occupation of that district, Antiochus continued his march through the country as far as the plain of Thebe, and having there entered upon an exceedingly fertile and wealthy district, he gorged his army with spoil of every description. . . . [21.11] On his arrival at Sardis after this expedition, Antiochus at once sent to Prusias to urge him to an alliance. Now in former times Prusias had by no means been disinclined to join Antiochus, because he was much alarmed lest the Romans should cross over to Asia for the purpose of putting down all crowned heads. But the perusal of a letter received from Lucius and Publius Scipio had served to a great extent to relieve his anxiety, and give him a tolerably correct forecast of the result of the war. For the Scipios had put the case with great clearness in their letter, and had supported their assertions by numerous proofs. They entered not only upon a defence of the policy adopted by themselves, but of that also of the Roman people generally; by which they showed that, so far from depriving any of the existing kings of their sovereignties, they had themselves been the authors in some cases of their establishment, in others of the extension of their powers and the large increase of their dominions. To prove this they quoted the instances of Andobales and Colichas in Iberia, of Massanissa in Libya, and of Pleuratus in Illyria, all of whom they said they had raised from petty and insignificant princes to the position of undisputed royalty. They further mentioned the cases of Philip and Nabis in Greece. As to Philip, they had conquered him in war and reduced him to the necessity of giving hostages and paying tribute: yet, after receiving a slight proof of his good disposition, they had restored his son and the young men who were hostages with him, had remitted the tribute, and given him back several of the towns that had been taken in the course of war. While as for Nabis, though they might have utterly destroyed him, they had not done so, but had spared him, tyrant as he was, on receiving the usual security for his good faith. With these facts before his eyes they urged Prusias in their letter not to be in any fear for his kingdom, but to adopt the Roman alliance without misgiving, for he would never have reason to regret his choice. This letter worked an entire change in the feelings of Prusias; and when, besides, Caius Livius and the other legates arrived at his court, after conversation with them, he entirely relinquished all ideas of looking for support from Antiochus. Foiled, therefore, of hope in this quarter, Antiochus retired to Ephesus: and being convinced on reflection that the only way of preventing the transport of the enemy’s army, and in fact of repelling an invasion of Asia at all, was to keep a firm mastery of the sea, he determined to fight a naval battle and leave the issue of the struggle to be decided by his success in that. . . . [21.12] When the pirates saw that the Roman fleet was coming they turned and fled. . . . [21.12] The battle between the fleets of Rome and Antiochus took place between the promontories Myonnesus and Corycum, which form the bay of Teos. Antiochus was beaten with a loss of forty-two ships early in B.C. 190. Livy, 37, 30. [21.13] After sustaining this defeat at sea, Antiochus remained in Sardis, neglecting to avail himself of such opportunities as he had left, and taking no steps whatever to prosecute the war; and when he learnt that the enemy had crossed into Asia he lost all heart, and determined in despair to send an envoy to Lucius and Publius Scipio to treat of peace. He selected Heracleides of Byzantium for this purpose, and despatched him with instructions to offer to surrender the territories of Lampsacus and Smyrna as well as Alexandria (Troas), which were the original cause of the war, and any other cities in Aeolis and Ionia of which they might wish to deprive him, as having embraced their side in the war; and in addition to this to promise an indemnity of half the expenses they had incurred in their quarrel with him. Such were the offers which the envoy was instructed to make in his public audience; but, besides these, there were others to be committed to Publius Scipio’s private ear, of which I will speak in detail later on. On his arrival at the Hellespont the envoy found the Romans still occupying the camp which they had constructed immediately after crossing. At first he was much cheered by this fact, for he thought it would materially aid his negotiation that the enemy were exactly where they were at first, and had not as yet taken any further action. But when he learnt that Publius Scipio was still on the other side of the water he was much disturbed, because the turn which his negotiations were to take depended principally on Scipio’s view of the matter. The reason of the army being still in their first camp, and of Publius Scipio’s absence from the army, was that he was one of the Salii. These are, as I have before stated, one of the three colleges of priests by whom the most important sacrifices to the gods are offered at Rome. And it is the law that, at the time of these sacrifices, they must not quit the spot for thirty days in which it happens to find them.³² This was the case at the present time with Publius Scipio; for just as the army was on the point of crossing this season arrived, and prevented him from changing his place of abode. Thus it came about that he was separated from the legions and remained in Europe, while, though the army crossed, it remained encamped, and could take no further step, because they were waiting for him. [21.14] However, Publius arrived a few days afterwards, and Heracleides being summoned to attend the Council, delivered the message with which he was charged, announcing that Antiochus abandoned Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria; and also all such towns in Aeolis and Ionia as had sided with Rome; and that he offered, further, an indemnity of half their expenses in the present war. He added many arguments besides, urging the Romans “Not to tempt fortune too far, as they were but men; nor to extend their empire indefinitely, but rather to keep it within limits, if possible those of Europe,—for even then they would have an enormous and unprecedented dominion, such as no nation before them had attained;—but if they were determined at all hazards to grasp parts of Asia also, let them say definitely what parts those were, for the king would go to the utmost stretch of his power to meet their wishes.” After the delivery of this speech the council decided that the Consul should answer that “It was only fair that Antiochus should pay, not the half, but the whole expense of the war, seeing that he, and not they, had originally begun it; and as to the cities, he must not only liberate those in Aeolis and Ionia, but must surrender his whole dominion on this side of Mount Taurus.” On receiving this answer from the council, conveying demands which went far beyond his instructions, the envoy, without answering a word, abstained from a public audience thenceforth, but exerted himself to conciliate Publius Scipio. [21.15] Having at length got a suitable opportunity, he disclosed to him the offers with which he was charged. These were that the king would first restore his son without ransom, who had been taken prisoner in the early part of the war; and was prepared, secondly, to pay him any sum of money he might name, and thenceforth share with him the wealth of his kingdom, if he would only support the acceptance of the terms offered by the king. Publius replied that the promise as to his son he accepted, and would feel under an obligation to the king if he fulfilled it; but as to the rest he assured him that the king, among his other delusions, was under a complete mistake as to the course demanded by his own interests. “For if he had made these offers while still master of Lysimacheia and the entrance into the Chersonese, he would at once have got what he asked: and so too, even after evacuating these places, if he had appeared with his army at the Hellespont and shown that he meant to prevent our crossing, and then had sent his envoys, he might even thus have obtained his demands. But when he comes with his proposals of equitable terms, after allowing our troops to set foot in Asia, and having so not only submitted to the bridle, but allowed the rider to mount, he must expect to fail and be disappointed of his hopes. Therefore, I advise him to adopt wiser measures, and look at the facts in their true light. In return for his promise in regard to my son, I will give him a hint which is well worth the favour he offers me: make any concession, do anything, rather than fight with the Romans.” With this answer Heracleides returned and told the king everything. And Antiochus, considering that no severer terms could be imposed on him if he were beaten in the field, abandoned all idea of negotiation, and began making preparations of all sorts and in every direction for the battle. . . . [21.15] Antiochus sent Scipio’s son back. The decisive battle took place in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, and proved a decisive victory for the Romans. This was in the late autumn of B. C. 190. See Livy, 37, 38-44. [21.16] After the victory the Romans took Sardis and its Acropolis, and there they were visited by Musaeus bringing a message from Antiochus. Being politely received by the Scipios, he announced that Antiochus wished to send envoys to treat on the terms of peace, and therefore desired that a safe conduct should be given them. This was granted and the herald returned; and some days after, Zeuxis, formerly Satrap of Lydia, and Antipater, his nephew, came as ambassadors from king Antiochus. Their first anxiety was to meet king Eumenes, because they feared that his old quarrel would cause him to be only too ready to do them a bad turn. But when they found him, contrary to their expectation, disposed to moderate and gentle methods, they at once addressed themselves to meeting the council. Being summoned to attend it they made a lengthy speech, among other things exhorting the Romans to use their victory with mildness and generosity; and alleging that such a course was still more to the interest of the Romans than of Antiochus, since Fortune had committed to them the empire and lordship of the world. Finally, they asked “What they were to do to obtain peace and the friendship of Rome?” The members of the council had already in a previous sitting discussed and agreed upon this point, and now bade Publius Scipio deliver their decision. [21.17] Scipio began by saying that victory never made the Romans more severe than before, and accordingly the envoys would receive the same answer as they had previously received when they came to the Hellespont before the battle. “They must evacuate Europe and all Asia this side Taurus: must pay the Romans fifteen thousand Euboic talents as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, five hundred at once, two thousand five hundred on the ratification of the treaty by the people, and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of a thousand talents. Further, Antiochus must pay Eumenes the four hundred talents owing to him, and the balance of the corn due in accordance with the treaty made with his father Attalus. He must at the same time deliver Hannibal the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo and Eubulides the Chalcidians. As security for the fulfilment of these terms, Antiochus must at once give twenty hostages named in the treaty.” Such was the decision announced by Publius Scipio in the name of the whole Council. Antipater and Zeuxis having expressed their consent to them, it was agreed by all to send envoys to Rome to appeal to the Senate and people to confirm the treaty. The ambassadors of Antiochus departed with this understanding: and during the following days the Roman commanders divided their forces into their winter quarters; and when some few days later the hostages arrived, both Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus started on their voyage to Rome. Nor were they alone in their mission; for Rhodes also, and Smyrna, and nearly all the nations and states on this side Taurus sent ambassadors to Rome. . . . [21.18] The remaining chapters of this book are placed by Schweighaeuser and others in book 22, 1-27. [21.18] At the beginning of the summer following the victory of the Romans over Antiochus, the ambassadors of that king, and those from Rhodes, as well as from the other states arrived in Rome. For, as I said, nearly all the states in Asia began sending envoys to Rome immediately after the battle, because the hopes of all as to their future position rested at that time on the Senate. All who arrived were graciously received by the Senate; but the most imposing reception was that accorded to king Eumenes, both in the complimentary processions sent out to meet him and the arrangements made for his entertainment; and next in cordiality to his reception was that given to the Rhodians. When the time for the audiences came, they first called in the king and bade him say freely what he wished to obtain at the hands of the Senate. But Eumenes at first evaded the task by saying: “If I had been desirous of obtaining any favour from others, I should have looked to the Romans for advice, that I might neither desire anything that was wrong nor ask anything unfair; but seeing that I am here to prefer my request to the Romans themselves, I think it better to leave the interests of myself and my brothers unreservedly in their hands.” And though one of the Senators rose and begged him to have no apprehension, but to speak his mind, he still adhered to this view. And so after a certain time had elapsed the king withdrew; and the Senate, remaining in the curia, debated what was to be done. Eventually it was decreed to call upon Eumenes to declare with his own mouth the objects of his visit without reserve, on the ground that he knew best what his own kingdom required, and what was the state of things in Asia. He was then called in; and, one of the Senators having informed him of the vote, he was compelled to speak on the business. [21.19] He said therefore that “He would not say another word on his own concerns, but would adhere strictly to his resolution of leaving the decision as to them entirely in the hands of the Romans. But there was one subject on which he felt anxiety, namely, the policy of Rhodes; and it was this that induced him to address the Senate on the present occasion. These Rhodians had come to Rome to further the interests of their own country, and their own prosperity, quite as much as he had come to promote those of his own kingdom at that moment; but their professions were entirely at variance with their real purpose. And it was easy to satisfy one’s self of this: for, when they enter the Senate house, they will say that they come neither to ask anything for themselves nor to thwart Eumenes in any way whatever; but are ambassadors for the liberty of the Greek inhabitants of Asia. ‘To secure this,’ they will say, ‘is not so much a favour to themselves as an act incumbent on the Romans, and in consonance with their former achievements.’ Such will be their specious professions; but the real truth of the case will be wholly different. For if these cities are once set free, the result will be that their dominion will be many times increased, while his own would be in a manner entirely broken up. For the attractive name of liberty and autonomy would draw from his rule not only the cities to be freed at present, but those also which had been under his rule from of old, directly it is made apparent that the Senate has adopted that policy, and would add them to the dominion of Rhodes. That was the natural course for things to take. Imagining that they owed their freedom to Rhodes, those cities would become in name its allies, but in reality entirely subservient, owing to the heavy obligation under which they will find themselves. He begged the Senators, therefore, to be on their guard on that point: lest they should find that they had unwittingly aggrandised one friendly nation too much, and disproportionately weakened another; or even that they were benefiting men who had once been their foes, to the neglect and contempt of their genuine friends.” [21.20] “For myself,” he continued, “though in every other point I would yield, if it were necessary, to my neighbours, yet in the matter of your friendship and of my goodwill towards you I will never, if I can help it, yield to any one alive. And I think that my father, if he had been living, would have said the same: for as he was the first to become your friend and ally, so of all the inhabitants of Asia and Greece he was the most nobly loyal to you to the last day of his life, not only in heart but in deed. For he took his part in all your wars in Greece, and furnished the largest contingents of men and ships of all your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies; and faced the most serious dangers: and to sum up all, ended his life actually engaged in the war with Philip, while employed in urging the Boeotians to join your alliance. I, too, when I succeeded to his kingdom, while fully maintaining my father’s views, for it was impossible to do more, have yet gone even beyond him in actual achievements: for the state of the times brought me to a more fiery test than they did him. Antiochus offered me his daughter and a share in his whole kingdom: offered me immediate restoration of all the cities that had been before wrested from me: and finally promised me any price I chose if I would join him in his war with you. But so far from accepting any one of these offers, I joined you in your struggle against Antiochus with the largest military and naval contingents of any of your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies at the time of your utmost need; and exposed myself unreservedly to every danger along with your generals. Finally, I submitted to being invested in Pergamos itself, and risked my life as well as my crown in my loyalty to your people. [21.21] “Therefore, men of Rome, as many of you have been eye-witnesses of the truth of my words, and all of you know it, it is but just that you should have a corresponding regard for my interests. You have made Massanissa king of the greater part of Libya, though he had once been your enemy and at last deserted to your side accompanied only by a few horsemen, only because he kept faith with you in one war: you have raised Pleuratus to the first position among the princes of Illyria, though he had done absolutely nothing for you beyond keeping loyal; it would be the height of inconsistency if you should neglect me and my family, who from generation to generation have co-operated in your most important and glorious undertakings. What is it, then, that I am asking you to do, and what do I claim at your hands? I will tell you openly, since you have called upon me to speak my mind to you. If you decide, then, to continue holding certain parts of Asia which are on this side Taurus, and were formerly subject to Antiochus, that is what I should wish to see best of all: for I consider that the security of my realm would best be secured by having you for neighbours, and especially by my sharing in your prestige. But if you decide not to do this, but to evacuate Asia entirely, there is no one to whom you may with greater justice surrender the prizes you have won in the field than to me. But it may be said, it is a more honourable thing still to set the enslaved free. Yes! if they had not ventured to join Antiochus in the war against you. But since they had the hardihood to do so, it is a much more honourable course to make a proper return to your sincere friends, than to benefit those who have shown themselves your enemies.” [21.22] After the delivery of this effective speech Eumenes retired. The Senate received both the king himself and the speech with every mark of favour, and were enthusiastic for doing everything in their power to gratify him. They wished to call in the Rhodians next after him; but one of the Rhodian ambassadors not being there in time, they called in those from Smyrna, who delivered a long disquisition on the goodwill and zeal which they had displayed towards Rome during the late war. But as there are no two opinions about the fact of their having been, of all the autonomous states in Asia, the most strenuous in the cause, I do not think it necessary to set forth their speech in detail. [21.22] But next to them came in the Rhodians: who, after a short preamble as to their services to the Romans, quickly came to the discussion of the position of their own country. They said that “It was a very great embarrassment to them, in the discharge of their ambassadorial duties, to find themselves placed by the necessities of the case in opposition to a sovereign with whom their public and private relations were of the most friendly description. It was the opinion of their countrymen that the most honourable course, and the one which above all others would redound to the credit of Rome, was, that the Greeks in Asia should be set free, and should recover that possession dearest to all mankind—autonomy: but this was the last thing to suit Eumenes and his brothers. It was the nature of monarchy to hate equality, and to endeavour to have everybody, or at least as many as possible, subject and obedient. But though that was the case now, still they felt convinced that they should gain their object, not because they had greater influence with the Romans than Eumenes, but because they would be shown to be suggesting a course more just in itself and more indisputably advantageous to all concerned. If, indeed, the only way the Romans could requite Eumenes was by handing over to him the autonomous towns, they might reasonably be at a loss to determine what to do; for they would have had to decide between neglecting a sincere friend and disregarding their own honour and duty, and thus entirely obscuring and degrading the glory of their great achievements. But if, on the other hand, it were possible adequately to consult for both these objects at the same time, who could doubt about the matter any longer? Yet the fact was that, as in a costly banquet, there was enough and to spare for all. Lycaonia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Pisidia, the Chersonese also and the districts bordering on it, were at the disposal of the Romans to give to whom they chose; only a few of which added to the kingdom of Eumenes would double its present extent, while if all, or even the great part were assigned to him, it would become second to that of no other prince in Asia. [21.23] “It was therefore in the power of the Romans to strengthen their friends very materially without destroying the glory of their own policy. For the end which they proposed to themselves in their war was not the same as that of other nations, but widely different. The rest of the world all entered upon war with the view of conquering and seizing cities, wealth, or ships: but heaven had ordained that they should want none of these things, by having put everything in the whole world under their rule. What was it, then, that they had still occasion to wish for, and to take the securest means to obtain? Plainly praise and glory among mankind; which it was difficult indeed to gain, but most difficult of all to preserve when gained. Their war with Philip might show them their meaning. That war they had, as they professed, undertaken with the sole object of liberating Greece; and that was in fact the only prize they gained in it, and no other whatever: yet the glory they got by it was greater than that which the tribute of the Carthaginians had brought them. And justly so: for money is a possession common to all mankind, but honour and praise and glory are attributes of the gods and of those men who approach nearest to them. Therefore, the most glorious of all their achievements was the liberation of Greece; and if they now completed that work their fame would receive its consummation: but if they neglected to do so, even what they had already accomplished would lose its lustre.” They finally wound up by saying, “As for us, gentlemen, having once deliberately adopted this policy and joined with you in the severest battles and in genuine dangers, we do not now propose to abandon the part of friends; but have not hesitated to say openly what we believe to be for your honour and your interests alike, with no ulterior design whatever, and with a single eye to our duty as the highest earthly object.” [21.24] This speech of the Rhodians was universally regarded as temperate and fair. The Senate next caused Antipater and Zeuxis, the ambassadors of Antiochus, to be introduced: and on their speaking in a tone of entreaty and supplication, an approval of the agreement made by him with Scipio in Asia was voted. A few days later the people also ratified it, and oaths were accordingly interchanged with Antipater and his colleague. This done, the other ambassadors from Asia were introduced into the Senate: but a very brief hearing was given to each, and the same answer was returned to all; namely, that ten commissioners would be sent to decide on all points of dispute between the cities. The Senate then appointed ten commissioners, to whom they gave the entire settlement of particulars; while as a general principle they decided that of Asia this side Taurus such inhabitants as had been subject to Antiochus were to be assigned to Eumenes, except Lycia and Caria up to the Maeander, which were to belong to the Rhodians; while of the Greek cities, such of them as had been accustomed to pay tribute to Attalus were to pay the same to Eumenes; and only those who had done so to Antiochus were to be relieved of tribute altogether. Having given the ten commissioners these outlines of the general settlement, they sent them out to join the consul, Cnaeus Manlius Vulso, in Asia. [21.24] After these arrangements had been completed, the Rhodian envoys came to the Senate again with a request in regard to Soli in Cilicia, alleging that they were called upon by ties of kindred to think of the interests of that city; for the people of Soli were, like the Rhodians, colonists from Argos. Having listened to what they had to say, the Senate invited the attendance of the ambassadors from Antiochus, and at first were inclined to order Antiochus to evacuate the whole of Cilicia; but upon these ambassadors resisting this order, on the ground of its being contrary to the treaty, they once more discussed the case of Soli by itself. The king’s ambassadors still vehemently maintaining their rights, the Senate dismissed them and called in the Rhodians. Having informed them of the opposition raised by Antipater, they added that they were ready to go any length in the matter, if the Rhodians, on a review of the whole case, determined to push their claim. The Rhodian envoys, however, were much gratified by the spirit shown by the Senate, and said that they would ask nothing more. This question, therefore, was left as it was; and just as the ten commissioners and the other ambassadors were on the point of starting, the two Scipios, and Lucius Aemilius, the victor in the sea fight with Antiochus, arrived at Brundisium; and after certain days all three entered Rome in triumph. . . . [21.24] Amynandrus was restored to the kingdom of Athamania, which was occupied by a garrison of Philip’s, by the aid of the Aetolians, who then proceeded to invade Amphilochia and the Dolopes. Hence the Aetolian war, beginning with the siege of Ambracia by M. Fulvius Nobilior. Livy, 38, 1-11. ### The Aetolian War [21.25] Amynandrus, king of the Athamanes, thinking that he had now permanently recovered his kingdom, sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in Asia, for they were still in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, partly to excuse himself for having, as it appeared, secured his recall by the help of the Aetolians, but chiefly to entreat that he might be received again into the Roman alliance. But the Aetolians, imagining that they had now a good opportunity of once more annexing Amphilochia and Aperantia, determined on an expedition against those countries; and when Nicander their Strategus had mustered the league army, they invaded Amphilochia. Finding most of the people willing to join them, they advanced into Aperantia; and the Aperantians also willingly yielding to them, they continued their expedition into Dolopia. The Dolopians for a time made a show of resistance, and of keeping loyal to Philip; but on considering what had happened to the Athamanes, and the check which Philip had received there, they quickly changed their minds and gave in their adhesion to the Aetolians. After this successful issue of his expedition Nicander led his army home, believing that Aetolia was secured by the subjection of these tribes and places, against the possibility of any one injuring its territory. But immediately after these events, and when the Aetolians were still in the full elation of their successes, a report reached them of the battle in Asia, in which they learnt that Antiochus had been utterly defeated. This caused a great revulsion of feeling; and when presently Damoteles came from Rome and announced that a continuation of the war was decreed against them, and that Marcus Fulvius and an army had crossed to attack them, they were reduced to a state of complete despair; and not knowing how to meet the danger which was impending over them, they resolved to send to Rhodes and Athens, begging them to despatch envoys to Rome to intercede in their behalf, and, by softening the anger of the Romans, to find some means of averting the evils that threatened Aetolia. They also sent ambassadors of their own to Rome once more, Alexander Isius, and Phaeneas, accompanied by Callippus of Ambracia and Lycopus. . . . [21.26] Some envoys from Epirus having visited the Roman Consul, he consulted with them as to the best way of attacking the Aetolians. They advised that he should begin by attacking Ambracia, which was at that time a member of the Aetolian league. They gave as their reasons that, if the Aetolians ventured to give battle, the neighbourhood of Ambracia was very favourable for the legions to fight in; and that if, on the other hand, the Aetolians avoided an engagement, the town was an excellent one to besiege: for the district round it would supply abundant timber for the construction of siege artillery; and the river Arachthus, which flowed right under the walls, would be of great use in conveying supplies to the army in the summer season, and serve as a protection to their works. Fulvius thought the advice good, and accordingly marched through Epirus to attack Ambracia. On his arrival there, as the Aetolians did not venture to meet him, he reconnoitred the city, and set vigorously to work on the siege. Meanwhile the Aetolian envoys that had been sent to Rome were caught off Cephallenia by Sibyrtus, son of Petraeus, and brought into Charadrus. The Epirotes first resolved to place these men at Buchetus and keep them under strict guard. But a few days afterwards they demanded a ransom of them on the ground that they were at war with the Aetolians. It happened that one of them, Alexander, was the richest man in Greece, while the others were badly off, and far inferior to Alexander in the amount of their property. At first the Epirotes demanded five talents from each. The others did not absolutely refuse this, but were willing to pay if they could, because they cared above everything to secure their own safety. But Alexander refused to consent, for it seemed a large sum of money, and he lay awake at night bewailing himself at the idea of being obliged to pay five talents. The Epirotes, however, foresaw what would happen, and were extremely alarmed lest the Romans should hear that they had detained men who were on a mission to themselves, and should send a despatch ordering their release; they, therefore, lowered their demand to three talents a-piece. The others gladly accepted the offer, gave security, and departed: but Alexander said that he would not pay more than a talent, and that was too much; and at last, giving up all thought of saving himself, remained in custody, though he was an old man, and possessed property worth more than two hundred talents; and I think he would have died rather than pay the three talents. So extraordinarily strong in some men is the passion for accumulating money. But on this occasion Fortune so favoured his greed, that the result secured all men’s praise and approval for his infatuation. For, a few days afterwards, a despatch arrived from Rome ordering the release of the ambassadors; and, accordingly, he was the only one of them that was set free without ransom. When the Aetolians learnt what had happened to him, they elected Damoteles as their ambassador to Rome; who, however, when as far as Leucas on his voyage, was informed that Marcus Fulvius was marching through Epirus upon Ambracia, and, therefore, gave up the mission as useless, and returned back to Aetolia. . . . [21.27] The Aetolians being besieged by the consul Marcus Fulvius, offered a gallant resistance to the assault of the siege artillery and battering rams. Marcus having first strongly secured his camp began the siege on an extensive scale; he opened three separate parallel works across the plain against the Pyrrheium, and a fourth opposite the temple of Asclepius, and a fifth directed against the Acropolis. And the attack being pushed on energetically at all these points at once, the besieged became terribly alarmed at the prospect before them. Still, as the rams vigorously battered the walls, and the long poles with their iron sickles tore off the battlements, they tried to invent machines to baffle them, letting down huge masses of lead and stones and oak logs by means of levers upon the battering rams; and putting iron hooks upon the sickles and hauling them inside the walls, so that the poles to which they were fastened broke against the battlements, and the sickles fell into their hands. Moreover they made frequent sallies, in which they fought with great courage: sometimes making a descent by night upon the pickets quartered at the works, and at others attacking in broad daylight the day-parties of the besiegers: and by these means they managed to protract the siege. . . . [21.27] Nicander was outside the city, and sent five hundred horse into it. They carried the intervening entrenchment of the enemy and forced their way into the town. With these he had fixed on a day on which they were to sally out, and he was to be ready to support them. They accordingly made the sally with great courage and fought gallantly; but either from fear of the danger, or because he conceived that what he was engaged upon at the time could not be neglected, Nicander failed to come up to time, and accordingly the attempt failed. . . .³³ [21.28] By assiduously working the battering rams the Romans were always breaking down this or that part of the wall. But yet they could not succeed in storming any of these breaches, because the besieged were energetic in raising counter walls, and the Aetolians fought with determined gallantry on the débris. They, therefore, in despair had recourse to mines and underground tunnels. Having safely secured the central one of their three works, and carefully concealed the shaft with wattle screens, they erected in front of it a covered walk or stoa about two hundred feet long, parallel with the wall; and beginning their digging from that, they carried it on unceasingly day and night, working in relays. For a considerable number of days the besieged did not discover them carrying the earth away through the shaft; but when the heap of earth thus brought out became too high to be concealed from those inside the city, the commanders of the besieged garrison set to work vigorously digging a trench inside, parallel to the wall and to the stoa which faced the towers. When the trench was made to the required depth, they next placed in a row along the side of the trench nearest the wall a number of brazen vessels made very thin; and, as they walked along the bottom of the trench past these, they listened for the noise of the digging outside. Having marked the spot indicated by any of these brazen vessels, which were extraordinarily sensitive and vibrated to the sound outside, they began digging from within, at right angles to the trench, another underground tunnel leading under the wall, so calculated as to exactly hit the enemy’s tunnel. This was soon accomplished, for the Romans had not only brought their mine up to the wall, but had underpinned a considerable length of it on either side of their mine; and thus the two parties found themselves face to face. At first they conducted this underground fighting with their spears: but as neither side could do much good, because both parties protected themselves with shields and wattles, some one suggested another plan to the defenders. Putting in front of them an earthenware jar, made to the width of the mine, they bored a hole in its bottom, and, inserting an iron funnel of the same length as the depth of the vessel, they filled the jar itself with fine feathers, and putting a little fire in it close to the mouth of the jar, they clapped on an iron lid pierced full of holes. They carried this without accident through the mine with its mouth towards the enemy. When they got near the besiegers they stopped up the space all round the rim of the jar, leaving only two holes on each side through which they thrust spears to prevent the enemy coming near the jar. They then took a pair of bellows such as blacksmiths use, and, having attached them to the orifice of the funnel, they vigorously blew up the fire placed on the feathers near the mouth of the jar, continually withdrawing the funnel in proportion as the feathers became ignited lower down. The plan was successfully executed; the volume of smoke created was very great, and, from the peculiar nature of feathers, exceedingly pungent, and was all carried into the faces of the enemy. The Romans, therefore, found themselves in a very distressing and embarrassing position, as they could neither stop nor endure the smoke in the mines.³⁴ The siege being thus still further protracted the Aetolian commander determined to send an envoy to the Consul. . . . [21.29] About this time the ambassadors from Athens and Rhodes came to the Roman camp for the purpose of furthering, if they could, the conclusion of a peace. The Athamanian king, Amynandrus, also arrived, very eager to relieve the Ambraciots from their miserable position, and having received a safe conduct from Marcus Fulvius in consideration of the urgent nature of the business: For he had a very friendly feeling towards the Ambraciots, from having passed most of the time of his exile in that town.³⁵ A few days afterwards also some Acarnanians arrived, bringing Damoteles and his fellow envoys. For Marcus Fulvius, having been informed of their misfortunes, had written to the people of Thyreum to bring the men to him. All these various persons, therefore, having assembled, the negotiations for peace were pushed on energetically. For his part, Amynandrus was urgent in his advice to the Ambraciots to save themselves from the destruction which would not be long in coming to them unless they adopted wiser counsels. On his coming again and again up to the wall and conversing with them on this subject, the Ambraciots decided to invite him inside the town. The consul having given the king leave to enter the walls, he went in and discussed the situation with the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys got hold of the consul and tried by ingenious arguments to mollify his anger. Some one also suggested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to apply to Caius Valerius and endeavour to win him over. He was the son of that Marcus Valerius Laevinus who made the first alliance with the Aetolians; and half brother, by the mother’s side, of the consul Marcus Fulvius, and being a young man of vigorous character enjoyed the greatest confidence of the consul. Being appealed to by Damoteles, and thinking that in a way he had a family interest in the matter, and was bound to undertake the patronage of the Aetolians, he exerted himself with the greatest zeal and enthusiasm to rescue that people from their perilous position. The matter then being vigorously pushed forward on all sides at once was at length accomplished. For the Ambraciots, by the persuasion of the king, surrendered to the consul unreservedly as far as they themselves were concerned, and gave up the town, on the one condition that the Aetolian garrison should march out under truce. This primary exception they made that they might keep faith with their allies. [21.30] So the consul agreed to grant the Aetolians peace on condition of receiving two hundred Euboic talents down, and three hundred in six yearly instalments of fifty: of the restoration to the Romans of all prisoners and deserters within six months without ransom: of their retaining no city in their league, nor thenceforth admitting any fresh one, of such as had been captured by the Romans, or had voluntarily embraced their friendship since Titus Quinctius crossed into Greece: the Cephallenians not to be included in these terms. [21.30] Such was the sketch in outline of the main points of the treaty. But it required first the consent of the Aetolians, and then to be referred to Rome: and meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys remained where they were, waiting for the decision of the Aetolians. On being informed by Damoteles and his colleagues on their return of the nature of the terms that had been granted them, the Aetolians consented to the general principle—for they were in fact much better than they had expected,—but in regard to the towns formerly included in their league they hesitated for some time; finally, however, they acquiesced. Marcus Fulvius accordingly took over Ambracia, and allowed the Aetolian garrison to depart under terms; but removed from the town the statues and pictures, of which there was a great number, owing to the fact of Ambracia having been a royal residence of Pyrrhus. He was also presented with a crown³⁶ weighing one hundred and fifty talents. After this settlement of affairs he directed his march into the interior of Aetolia, feeling surprised at meeting with no communication from the Aetolians. But on arriving at Amphilochian Argos, a hundred and eighty stades from Ambracia, he pitched his camp; and being there met by Damoteles and his colleagues with the information that the Aetolians had resolved to ratify the treaty which they had concluded, they went their several ways, the Aetolians back to their own country, and Marcus to Ambracia, where he busied himself about getting his army across to Cephallenia; while the Aetolians appointed Phaeneas and Nicander ambassadors to go to Rome about the peace: for not a single line of the above treaty held good until ratified by the Roman people. [21.31] While these envoys, accompanied by those from Rhodes and Athens, were on their voyage with this object, Marcus Fulvius sent Caius Valerius also, and some others of his friends to Rome to secure the ratification of the treaty. But when they arrived at Rome they found that a fresh cause of anger with the Aetolians had arisen by the instrumentality of king Philip; who, looking upon himself as wronged by the Aetolians having taken Athamania and Dolopia from him, had sent to some of his friends at Rome, urging them to share his displeasure and secure the rejection of the pacification. Accordingly, on the first arrival of the Aetolians, the Senate would not listen to them; but afterwards, at the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians, changed its mind and consented to their request: for Damis,³⁷ besides other excellences displayed in his speech, was thought to have introduced a very apt simile, extremely applicable to the case in hand. He said “The Romans had good cause for anger with the Aetolians; for, instead of being grateful for the many kindnesses received at their hands, they had brought the Roman Empire into great danger by causing the war with Antiochus to break out. But the Senate were wrong in one point, namely in directing their anger against the masses. For in states the common people were like the sea, which left to its own nature was ever calm and unmoved, and not in the least likely ever to trouble any of those who approached or used it; but directly violent winds blew upon and disturbed it, and forced it against its nature to become agitated, then indeed nothing could be more dreadful or formidable than the sea. This was just the case with the Aetolians. As long as they were left to themselves, no people in Greece were more loyal to you or more staunch in supporting your active measures. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus brought a storm from Asia, and Mnestas and Damocritus from Europe, and, disturbing the calm of the Aetolian masses, compelled them to become reckless of what they said or did,—then indeed their good disposition gave way to bad, and while intending to do mischief to you they really inflicted damage upon themselves. It is against these mischief-makers therefore that you should be implacable; while you should take pity on the masses and make peace with them: with the assurance that, if once more left to themselves, with the additional feeling of having owed their safety on the present occasion to you, their attachment to you will be the warmest in Greece.” [21.32] By these arguments the Athenian envoy persuaded the Senate to make peace with the Aetolians. The decree therefore having been passed and confirmed by a vote of the people, the treaty was formally ratified, of which the text was as follows: “The people of the Aetolians shall in good faith maintain the empire and majesty of the people of Rome. [21.32] “They shall not allow hostile forces to pass through their territory or cities against the Romans, their allies or friends; nor grant them any supplies from the public fund. “They shall have the same enemies as the people of Rome; and if the Roman people go to war with any, the Aetolian people shall do so also. [21.32] “The Aetolians shall surrender to the praefectus in Corcyra, within a hundred days from the completion of the treaty, runaway slaves, and prisoners of the Romans and their allies, except such as having been taken during the war have returned to their own land and been subsequently captured; and except such as were in arms against Rome during the time that the Aetolians were fighting on the side of the Romans. [21.32] “If there should be any not found within that time, they shall hand them over as soon as they are forthcoming, without deceit or fraud. And such persons, after the completion of the treaty, shall not be allowed to return to Aetolia. [21.32] “The Aetolians shall pay the consul in Greece at once two hundred Euboic talents of silver, of a standard not inferior to the Attic. In place of one third of this silver, they may, if they so choose, pay gold, at the rate of a mina of gold to ten minae of silver. They shall pay the money in the six years next following the completion of the treaty in yearly instalments of fifty talents; and shall deliver the money in Rome. [21.32] “The Aetolians shall give the Consul forty hostages, not less than ten or more than forty years old, to remain for the six years; they shall be selected by the Romans freely, excepting only the Strategus, Hipparch, public secretary, and such as have already been hostages at Rome. “The Aetolians shall deliver such hostages in Rome; and if any one of them die, they shall give another in his place. “Cephallenia shall not be included in this treaty. [21.32] “Of such territories, cities, and men as once belonged to the Aetolians, and, in the consulship of Titus Quinctius and Cnaeus Domitius, or subsequently, were either captured by the Roman or voluntarily embraced their friendship, the Aetolians shall not annex any, whether city or men therein. [21.32] “The city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to the Acarnanians.” The treaty having been solemnly sworn, peace was concluded, and the war in Aetolia, as is in the rest of Greece, thus came to an end. . . . ### The War with the Gauls of Asia [21.33] While the negotiations for peace with Antiochus, and for the settlement of Asia generally were going on at Rome, and the Aetolian war was being fought in Greece, it happened that another war in Asia, that, namely, against the Gauls, was brought to a conclusion, the account of which I am now about to give. . . . [21.34] Moagĕtes was Tyrant of Cibyra, a cruel and crafty man, whose career deserves somewhat more than a passing reference. . . . [21.34] When Cnaeus Manlius was approaching Cibyra and had sent Helvius to find out the intentions of Moagĕtes, the latter begged him by ambassadors not to damage the country, because he was a friend of Rome, and ready to do anything that was required of him; and, at the same time, he offered Helvius a compliment of fifteen talents. In answer to this, Helvius said that he would refrain from damaging the territory; but that as to the general question Moagĕtes must communicate with the Consul, for he was close behind with his army. Moagĕtes accordingly sent ambassadors to Cnaeus, his own brother being one of them. When the Consul met them in the road, he addressed them in threatening and reproachful terms, asserting that “Not only had Moagĕtes shown himself the most determined enemy of Rome, of all the princes in Asia, but had done his very best to overthrow their empire, and deserved punishment rather than friendship.”³⁸ Terrified by this display of anger, the ambassadors abstained from delivering the rest of the message with which they were charged, and merely begged him to have an interview with Moagĕtes: and when Cnaeus consented they returned to Cibyra. Next morning the Tyrant came out of the town accompanied by his friends, displaying his humility by a mean dress and absence of all pomp; and, in conducting his defence, descanted in melancholy terms on his own helplessness and the poverty of the towns under his rule (which consisted of Cibyra, Syleium, and the town in the Marsh), and entreated Cnaeus to accept the fifteen talents. Astonished at his assurance, Cnaeus made no answer, except that, “If he did not pay five hundred talents, and be thankful that he was allowed to do so, he would not loot the country, but he would storm and sack the city.” In abject terror Moagĕtes begged him not to do anything of the sort; and kept adding to his offer little by little, until at last he persuaded Cnaeus to take one hundred talents, and one thousand medimni of corn, and admit him to friendship.³⁹ . . . [21.35] When Cnaeus Manlius was crossing the River Colobatus, ambassadors came to him from the town of Sinda (in Pisidia) begging for help, because the people of Termessus had called in the aid of the people of Philomelus, and had depopulated their territory and sacked their town; and were at that very moment besieging its citadel, into which all the citizens, with wives and children, had retreated. On hearing this, Cnaeus immediately promised them aid with the greatest readiness; and thinking the affair was a stroke of luck for himself, directed his march towards Pamphylia. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of Termessus, he admitted the Termessians to friendship on the payment of fifty talents. He did the same with the Aspendians: and having received the ambassadors of the other towns in Pamphylia, he impressed on them in these interviews the conviction mentioned above,⁴⁰ and having relieved the Sindians from their siege, he once more directed his march against the Gauls. . . . [21.36] After taking the town of Cyrmasa (in Pisidia), and a very large booty, Cnaeus Manlius continued his advance. And as he was marching along the marsh, envoys came from Lysinoe, offering an unconditional surrender. After accepting this, Cnaeus entered the territory of Sagalassus, and having driven off a vast quantity of spoil waited to see what the Sagalassians were prepared to do. When their ambassadors arrived he received them; and accepting a compliment of fifty talents, twenty thousand medimni of barley, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted them to friendship with Rome. . . . [21.37] Cnaeus sent envoys to Eposognatus the Gaul, desiring him to send embassies to the kings of the Gauls. Eposognatus in his turn sent envoys to Cnaeus begging him not to move his quarters or attack the Tolistobogian Gauls; and assuring him that he would send embassies to the kings, and propose peace to them, and felt quite certain that he would be able to bring them to a proper view of affairs in all respects. . . . [21.37] In the course of his march through the country Cnaeus made a bridge over the River Sangorius, which was extremely deep and difficult to cross. And having encamped on the bank of the river, he was visited by some Galli⁴¹ sent by Attis and Battacus, the priests of the mother of the gods at Pesinus, wearing figures and images on their breasts, and announcing that the goddess promised him victory and power; to whom Cnaeus gave a courteous reception. . . . [21.37] When Cnaeus was at the small town of Gordieium, ambassadors came from Eposognatus, announcing that he had been round and talked with the kings of the Gauls, but that they would not consent to make any overtures of friendship whatever; on the contrary, they had collected their children and women on Mount Olympus, and were prepared to give battle. . . . [21.37] The victory of the Romans over the Tolistoboii at Mount Olympus is described by Livy, 38, 19-23; that over the Tectosages, a few miles from Ancyra, in 38, 24-27. The second battle took place in mid-autumn, B. C. 189; and the result was that the Gauls gave in their submission at Ephesus, and were forced to engage to leave off predatory excursions, and to confine themselves to their own frontiers. Livy, 38, 27 and 40. [21.38] It chanced that among the prisoners made when the Romans won the victory at Olympus over the Gauls of Asia, was Chiomara, wife of Ortiago. The centurion who had charge of her availed himself of his chance in soldierly fashion, and violated her. [21.38] He was a slave indeed both to lust and money: but eventually his love of money got the upper hand; and, on a large sum of gold being agreed to be paid for the woman, he led her off to put her to ransom. There being a river between the two camps, when the Gauls had crossed it, paid the man the money, and received the woman, she ordered one of them by a nod to strike the Roman as he was in the act of taking a polite and affectionate farewell of her. The man obeyed, and cut off the centurion’s head, which she picked up and drove off with, wrapped in the folds of her dress. On reaching her husband she threw the head at his feet; and when he expressed astonishment and said: “Wife to keep faith is a good thing,” she replied: “Yes; but it is a better thing that there should be only one man alive who has lain with me!” [Polybius says that he conversed with the woman at Sardis, and was struck with her dignified demeanour and intelligence.]⁴² . . . [21.39] After the victory over the Gauls at Olympus, when the Romans were encamped at Ancyra, and Cnaeus was on the point of continuing his advance, ambassadors came from the Tectosages asking that Cnaeus would leave his troops in their quarters, and advance himself in the course of the next day into the space between the two camps; and promising that their kings would come to meet him, and discuss the terms of a peace. But when Cnaeus consented, and duly arrived at the appointed place with five hundred horse, the kings did not appear. After his return to the camp, however, the ambassadors came again, and, offering some excuses for the kings, begged him to come once more, as they would send some of their chief men to discuss the whole question. Cnaeus consented; but, without leaving the camp himself, sent Attalus and some tribunes with three hundred horse. The envoys of the Gauls duly appeared and discussed the business: but finally said that it was impossible for them to conclude the matter or ratify anything they agreed upon; but they engaged that the kings would come next day to agree on the terms, and finally settle the treaty, if the Consul would also come to them. Attalus promised that Cnaeus would come, and they separated for that day. But the Gauls were deliberately contriving these postponements, and amusing the Romans, because they wanted to get some part of their families and property beyond the river Halys; and, first of all, to get the Roman Consul into their hands if they could, but if not, at any rate to kill him. With this purpose they watched next day for the coming of the Romans, with a thousand horse ready to fall upon him. When Cnaeus heard the result of Attalus’s interview, believing that the kings would come, he left the camp, attended as usual by five hundred horse. Now it happened that, on the days of the previous interviews, the foraging parties which went out from the Roman camp to fetch wood and hay had gone in the same direction, in order to have the protection of the squadron which went to the parley. A numerous foraging party acted in the same way on this third occasion, and the tribunes ordered them to proceed in the same direction, with the usual number of horsemen to protect them as they advanced. And their being out on this duty proved accidentally to be the salvation of their comrades in the danger which threatened them. . . . ### Cephallenia [21.40] M. Fulvius took the quarter of the town in which was the citadel by a night surprise, and introduced the Romans into the town.⁴³ [21.41] The good and the expedient are seldom compatible, and rare indeed are those who can combine and reconcile them. For as a general rule we all know that the good shuns the principles of immediate profit, and profit those of the good. However, Philopoemen attempted this task, and succeeded in his aim. For it was a good thing to restore the captive exiles to Sparta; and it was an expedient thing to humble the Lacedaemonian state, and to punish those who had served as bodyguards to a tyrant. But seeing clearly that money is ever the support on which every dynasty rests, and having a clear head and the instincts of a ruler, he took measures to prevent the introduction into the town of money from outside. . . . [21.42] A fragment, arranged in Hultsch’s text as ch. 42, is too much mutilated to be translated with any approach to correctness. ### Settlement of Asia [21.43] Meanwhile in Asia the Roman consul Cnaeus Manlius wintered at Ephesus, in the last year of this Olympiad, and was there visited by embassies from the Greek cities in Asia and many others, bringing complimentary crowns to him for his victories over the Gauls. For the entire inhabitants of Asia this side Taurus were not so much rejoiced at the prospect given them by Antiochus’s defeat of being relieved from tribute, garrisons, or other royal exactions, as at the removal of all fear of the barbarians, and at their escape from their insolence and lawlessness. Among the rest Musaeus came from Antiochus, and some envoys from the Gauls, desiring to ascertain the terms upon which friendship would be granted them; and also from Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia. For this latter prince, having attached himself to the fortunes of Antiochus, and having taken part in his battle with the Romans, had become alarmed and dismayed for his own fate, and therefore was endeavouring by frequent embassies to ascertain what he would have to pay or do to get pardon for his error. The Consul complimented the ambassadors from the cities, and dismissed them after a very favourable reception; but he replied to the Gauls that he would not make a treaty with them until king Eumenes, whom he expected, had arrived. To the envoys from Ariarathes he said that they might have peace on the payment of six hundred talents. With the ambassador of Antiochus he arranged that he would come with his army to the frontier of Pamphylia, to receive the two thousand five hundred talents, and the corn with which the king had undertaken to furnish the Roman soldiers before his treaty with Lucius Scipio. This business being thus settled, he solemnly purified his army; and, as the season for military operations was now beginning, he broke up his quarters, and, taking Attalus with him, arrived at Apameia in eight days’ march, and remained there three days. On the fourth he continued his advance; and, pushing on at great speed, arrived on the third day at the rendezvous with Antiochus, and there pitched his camp. Here he was visited by Musaeus, who begged him to wait, as the carts and cattle that were bringing the corn and money were late. He consented to wait: and, when the supply arrived, he distributed the corn among the soldiers, and handed over the money to one of his tribunes, with orders to convey it to Apameia. [21.44] He himself started in full force for Perga, where he heard that a commander of a garrison placed in that town by Antiochus had neither left it himself nor withdrawn his garrison. When he came within a short distance of the place he was met by the captain of the garrison, who begged Cnaeus not to condemn him unheard. “He had received the city from Antiochus in trust, and was holding it until he should be instructed what to do by the sovereign who had entrusted it to him.” And he therefore begged for thirty days’ respite, to enable him to send and ask the king for instructions. Observing that Antiochus was behaving straightforwardly in other particulars, Cnaeus consented to allow him to send and ask the king the question. After some days the officer accordingly received an answer, and surrendered the city. [21.44] About this time, just at the beginning of summer, the ten commissioners and king Eumenes arrived by sea at Ephesus; and, after giving themselves two days to recover from the voyage, proceeded up the country to Apameia. When their arrival was known to Cnaeus Manlius, he sent his brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda (in Pisidia), as a forcible hint that they must pay the money owing, in accordance with the terms agreed on; while he himself marched his army at full speed to meet Eumenes and the commissioners. On his arrival he found the king and the ten commissioners, and immediately held a consultation with them on the measures to be taken. The first resolution come to was to confirm the sworn agreement and treaty with Antiochus, about which I need say no more, beyond giving the actual text of the treaty, which was as follows:— [21.45] “There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus and the Romans if he fulfils the provisions of the treaty. “Neither Antiochus nor any subject to him shall allow any to pass through their territories to attack the Romans or their allies, nor supply them with aught. Neither shall the Romans or their allies do the like for those attacking Antiochus or those subject to him.” [21.45] “Antiochus shall not wage war upon the Islanders or the dwellers in Europe. “He shall evacuate all cities and territory (this side Taurus⁴⁴). His soldiers shall take nothing out with them except the arms they are carrying. If they chance to have taken anything away they shall restore it to the same cities. “He shall receive neither soldiers nor other men from the territory of king Eumenes. “If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from any of the cities taken over by the Romans, he shall deliver them up at Apameia. “If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus with the Romans or their allies, they may remain or depart as they choose. [21.45] “Antiochus and those subject to him shall give back the slaves, captives, and deserters of the Romans or their allies and any captive received from any quarter. Antiochus shall give up, if it be within his power so to do, Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnesilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, Euboulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and such of the Aetolians as have held national offices. [21.45] “Antiochus shall give up all his elephants, and shall have none henceforth. “Antiochus shall surrender his ships of war, their tackle, and fittings, and henceforth have only ten decked ships. He shall not have a vessel rowed by thirty oars, [or by less]⁴⁵ for purposes of war begun by himself. [21.45] “He shall not sail west of the river Calycadnus and the promontory of Sarpedon, except to convey tribute or ambassadors or hostages. “It shall not be lawful for Antiochus to enlist soldiers or receive exiles from the territory subject to Rome. “Such houses as belonged to the Rhodians or their allies, in the territory subject to Antiochus, shall continue to belong to the Rhodians as before the war: any money owed to them shall still be recoverable: and any property left behind by them, if sought for, shall be restored. [21.45] “The Rhodians shall, as before the war, be free from tribute. “If Antiochus has given any of the towns to others which he is bound to restore, he shall remove from them also his garrisons and men. And if any shall wish hereafter to desert to him, he shall not receive them. “Antiochus shall pay to the Romans ten thousand talents, in ten yearly instalments, of the best Attic silver, each talent to weigh not less than eighty Roman pounds, and ninety thousand medimni of corn. [21.45] “Antiochus shall pay to king Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the five years next following, in yearly instalments of seventy talents; and in lieu of the corn, according to the valuation of Antiochus himself, one hundred and twenty-seven talents, two hundred and eight drachmae, which sum Eumenes has consented to accept ‘as satisfying his claims.’ “Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, not less than eighteen nor more than forty-five years old, and change them every three years. “If there be in any year a deficit in the instalment paid, Antiochus shall make it good in the next year. [21.45] “If any of the cities or nations, against whom it has been hereby provided that Antiochus should not make war, should commence war against him, it shall be lawful for Antiochus to war with them; but of such nations and cities he shall not have sovereignty nor attach them as friends to himself. “Such complaints as arise between the parties to this treaty shall be referred to arbitration. “If both parties agree in wishing anything to be added to or taken from this treaty, it shall be lawful so to do.” [21.46] Immediately after this treaty had been solemnly sworn to, the proconsul Cnaeus sent Quintus Minucius Thermus and his brother Lucius, who had just brought the money from Oroanda to Syria, with orders to receive the oath from the king, and confirm the several clauses of the treaty. And to Quintus Fabius Labeo, who was in command of the fleet, he sent a despatch ordering him to sail back to Patara, and take over and burn the ships there. . . . [21.47] The proconsul Cnaeus Manlius made Ariarathes a friend of Rome on receipt of three hundred talents. . . . [21.48] At Apameia the Proconsul and the ten commissioners, after listening to all who appealed to them, assigned in the case of disputed claims to territory, money, or anything else, certain cities in which the parties might have their claims settled by arbitration. The general scheme which they drew out was as follows: Those of the autonomous cities which, having formerly paid tribute to Antiochus, had remained faithful to Rome, they relieved from tribute altogether. Those that had been tributary to Attalus they ordered to pay the same tribute to his successor Eumenes. Such as had abandoned the Roman friendship and joined Antiochus in the war, they ordered to pay Eumenes the amount of tribute imposed on them by Antiochus. The people of Colophon, Notium, Cymae, and Mylae, they freed from tribute. To the Clazomenians, besides this relief, they gave the Island Drymussa. To the Ephesians they restored the sacred district which they had been obliged by the enemy to evacuate. . . .⁴⁶ To the people of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, besides other marks of honour, they assigned the territory which they severally expressed a wish to have at the time, and alleged was their right, from regard for their loyalty and zeal which they had shown to Rome during the war. To the Phocaeans they restored their ancestral city and the territory which they possessed of old. They next transacted business with the Rhodians, giving them Lycia and Caria up to the river Maeander, except Telmissus. As to king Eumenes and his brothers, not content with the liberal provision made for them in their treaty with Antiochus, they now assigned him in addition the Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the castles on the borders of these districts, and such country as had been subject to Antiochus in Europe; and in Asia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, Great Phrygia, so much of Mysia as he had before subjugated, Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and Telmissus: all these they gave to Eumenes. As to Pamphylia, Eumenes alleged that it was on this side Taurus, the ambassadors of Antiochus on the other; and the commissioners feeling unable to decide, referred the question to the Senate. Having thus decided the largest number and most important of the matters brought before them, they started on the road towards the Hellespont, intending on their journey to still further secure the settlement arrived at with the Gauls. . . . ## Book XXII [22.1] In the 148th Olympiad (B. C. 188-184) embassies came from Philip and the tribes bordering on Macedonia to Rome. The decrees of the Senate concerning them. In Greece the quarrel of Philip with the Thessalians and Perrhaebians about the cities held by Philip in their countries from the time of the war with Antiochus. The decision concerning them before Q. Caecilius at Tempe. Decisions of Caecilius. A difference of Philip with the ambassadors of Eumenes and the exiles from Maroneia; the pleadings on these points at Thessalonica and the decision of Caecilius. The massacre at Maroneia instigated by king Philip. The arrival of the Roman legates, and their decisions. The causes of the war between the Romans and Perseus. Arrival of ambassadors from kings Ptolemy and Eumenes and Seleucus in the Peloponnese. The decision of the Achaeans on the alliance with Ptolemy, and on the gifts offered them by these kings. Arrival of Q. Caecilius and his disapprobation of the measures taken in regard to Sparta. Embassy of Areus and Alcibiades, two of the earlier exiles from Sparta, to Rome, and their accusations against Philopoemen and the Achaeans. The Roman envoys come to Cleitor, where there is an Achaean assembly. The speeches delivered for both parties, and the Achaean decrees in the affair of Sparta.⁴⁷ [22.3] After the execution of the men at Compasium,⁴⁸ some of the Lacedaemonians, incensed at what had been done, and believing that the power and authority of the Romans had been set at naught by Philopoemen, went to Rome and accused Philopoemen and his proceedings; and finally obtained a letter addressed to the Achaeans from Marcus Lepidus, the consul of the year, and afterwards Pontifex Maximus, in which he told the Achaeans that they had not acted equitably in the matters of the Lacedaemonians. At the same time as this mission from Sparta, Philopoemen also appointed Nicodemus of Elis and others to go on an embassy to Rome. [22.3] Just at that time Demetrius of Athens came on a mission from Ptolemy, to renew the existing alliance between the king and the Achaean league. This was eagerly accepted, and my father, Lycortas, and Theodoridas, and Rhositeles of Sicyon were appointed ambassadors to take the oaths on behalf of the Achaeans, and receive those of the king. And on that occasion a circumstance occurred, which, though not important perhaps, is still worth recording. After the completion of this renewal of alliance on behalf of the Achaeans, Philopoemen entertained the ambassador; and in the course of the banquet the ambassador introduced the king’s name, and said a great deal in his praise, quoting anecdotes of his skill and boldness in hunting, as well as his excellence in riding and the use of arms; and ended by quoting, as a proof of what he said, that the king on horseback once transfixed a bull with a javelin. . . . [22.4] In Boeotia, after the formation of the treaty between Rome and Antiochus, the hopes of the whole revolutionary party were destroyed. Politics therefore began to assume a new aspect; and whereas the administration of justice among them had been postponed for nearly the last twenty years, voices began to make themselves heard in the cities to the effect that “there ought to be an end and settlement of their mutual disputes.” But after considerable controversy on this point, because the discontented were more numerous than the wealthy, the following circumstance occurred which helped accidently to support the party of order. Titus Flamininus had for some time past been zealously working in Rome to secure the restoration of Zeuxippus to Boeotia, because he had found him serviceable on many occasions during the wars with Antiochus and Philip. And just at this time he had induced the Senate to send a despatch to the Boeotians ordering them to recall Zeuxippus and his fellow exiles. When this despatch arrived, the Boeotians, fearing that, if these men were restored, they would become detached from their good understanding with Macedonia, determined that the legal sentence upon Zeuxippus and the rest should be publicly proclaimed,⁴⁹ which they had formerly drawn up against them. Thus they condemned them on two charges, first, of sacrilege for having stripped off the silver from the plated table of Zeus, and, secondly, of murder for having killed Brachylles. Having made this arrangement, they assumed that they need pay no further attention to the despatch of the Senate, but contented themselves with sending Callicritus and others to Rome with the message that they were unable to rescind what had been settled by their laws. Zeuxippus having sent an embassy to the Senate at the same time, the Romans wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans an account of the attitude assumed by the Boeotians, and ordered them to restore Zeuxippus to his country. The Achaeans refrained from invading the country with an army, but selected some ambassadors to go and persuade the Boeotians to obey the orders from Rome; and also to settle the legal disputes existing between them and the Achaeans, on the same principles as they conducted the administration of justice at home: for it happened that there were some controversies between the two nations that had been dragging on for a long time. On receiving this message the Boeotians, whose Strategus was then Hippias, promised at the moment that they would do what was demanded of them, but shortly afterwards neglected it at every point. Therefore, when Hippias had laid down his office and Alcetas had succeeded him, Philopoemen gave all who chose license to make reprisals on the territories of the Boeotians; which proved the beginning of a serious quarrel between the two nations. For on the cattle of Myrrhichus and Simon being driven off,⁵⁰ and a struggle arising over this transaction, the contest soon ceased to be political, and became the beginning and prelude of open war. If indeed the Senate had persisted in carrying out the restoration of Zeuxippus, war would quickly have been kindled; but as it maintained silence on the subject, the Megareans were induced by an embassy proposing terms to stop the reprisals. . . .⁵¹ [22.5] A quarrel arose between the Lycians and Rhodians from the following causes. When the ten commissioners were employed in the settlement of Asia, they were visited by Theaetetus and Philophron on a mission from Rhodes, demanding that Lycia and Caria should be given to them in return for the goodwill and zeal displayed by them in the war with Antiochus. At the same time Hipparchus and Satyrus came from Ilium begging, on the ground of their kindred with the Lycians, that the latter should receive pardon for their transgressions. The commissioners listened to these pleadings, and tried to do what they could to satisfy both. For the sake of the people of Ilium, they inflicted no severity on the Lycians, but gratified the Rhodians by presenting them with the sovereignty over that people. This decision was the origin of a serious division and controversy between the Lycians and Rhodians. For the envoys of Ilium visited the Lycian cities, giving out that they had succeeded in pacifying the Roman anger, and that they owed their liberty to them; while Theaetetus and his colleague took back word to their countrymen that Lycia and all Caria south of the Maeander had been given as a free gift by the Romans to Rhodes. Presently an embassy came from Lycia to Rhodes desiring an alliance; while the Rhodians on their part had elected certain of their citizens to go to Lycia and give orders to the several cities as to what they were to do. They were thus entirely at cross purposes, and for some time the cause of the misunderstanding was not generally intelligible. But when the Lycian ambassadors appeared in the assembly and began talking about an alliance, and Pothion the Prytanis rose after them and explained the different ideas which the two people entertained on the subject, and moreover, sternly rebuked the Lycian envoys,⁵² the latter declared that they would endure anything rather than be subject to the Rhodians. . . . ### Egypt Under Ptolemy Epiphanes After the Death of Aristomenes (18, 53, 54) [22.6] All men admire the magnanimity of Philip towards Athens; for though he had been injured as well as abused by them, yet when he conquered them at Chaeroneia, so far from using this opportunity for injuring his opponents, he caused the corpses of the Athenians to be buried with the proper ceremonies; while those of them who had been taken prisoners he actually presented with clothes, and restored to their friends without ransom. But though men praise they do not imitate such conduct. They rather try to outdo those with whom they are at war, in bitterness of passion and severity of vengeance. Ptolemy, for instance, had men tied naked to carts and dragged at their tail, and then put to death with torture. . . . [22.7] When this same Ptolemy was besieging Lycopolis, the Egyptian nobles surrendered to the king at discretion; and his cruel treatment of them involved him in manifold dangers. The same was the result at the time Polycrates suppressed the revolt. For Athinis, Pausiras, Chesuphus, and Irobastus, who still survived of the rebellious nobles, yielding to necessity, appeared at the city of Sais and surrendered at discretion to the king. But Ptolemy, regardless of all pledges, had them tied naked to the carts and dragged off, and then put to death with torture. He then went to Naucratis with his army, where he received the mercenaries enlisted for him by Aristonicus from Greece, and thence sailed to Alexandria, without having taken any part whatever in the actual operations of the war, thanks to the dishonest advice of Polycrates, though he was now twenty-five years old. . . . [22.8] At this time were sowed the seeds of fatal evils to the royal house of Macedonia. I am aware that some historians of the war between Rome and Perseus, when they wish to set forth the causes of the quarrel for our information, assign as the primary one the expulsion of Abrupolis from his principality, on the ground of having made a raid upon the mines at Pangaeum after the death of Philip, which Perseus repulsed, finally expelling him entirely out of his own dominions. Next they mention the invasion of Dolopia, and the visit of Perseus to Delphi, the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, and the murder of the ambassadors in Boeotia; and from these they say sprang the war between Perseus and the Romans. But my contention is that it is of most decisive advantage, both to historians and their readers, to know the causes from which the several events are born and spring. Most historians confound these, because they do not keep a firm hold upon the distinction between a pretext and a cause, or again between a pretext and a beginning of a war. And since events at the present time recall this distinction I feel compelled to renew my discussion of this subject. For instance, of the events just referred to, the first three are pretexts; the last two—the plot against Eumenes, the murder of the ambassadors, and other similar things that happened during the same period—are clear beginnings of the war between Rome and Perseus, and of the final overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom; but not one of them is a cause of these things. I will illustrate by examples. Just as we say that Philip son of Amyntas contemplated and determined upon accomplishing the war with Persia, while Alexander put into execution what he had projected, so in the present instance we say that Philip son of Demetrius first projected the last war against Rome, and had all his preparations ready for the execution of his design, but that after his death Perseus became the agent in carrying out the undertaking itself. If this be true, the following also is clear: it is impossible that the causes of the war should have been subsequent to the death of him who resolved upon and projected it; which would be the case if we accepted the account of these historians; for the events alleged by them as its causes were subsequent to the death of Philip. . . . [22.9] About the same time ambassadors came to Rome from king Eumenes, informing the Senate of the encroachment of Philip upon the cities in Thrace. There came also the exiles of the Maronitae denouncing Philip, and charging him with being the cause of their expulsion. These were followed by Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians, demanding the restoration of their cities which Philip had taken from them during the war with Antiochus. Ambassadors also came from Philip to make answer to all accusers. After repeated debates between all these envoys and the ambassadors of Philip, the Senate decided to appoint a commission at once, to investigate the actions of Philip, and to protect all who chose to state their views and their complaints of the king to his face. The legates thus appointed were Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius Claudius.⁵³ . . . [22.9] There was again a war of parties among the Aenii, one side inclining to Eumenes, the other to Macedonia. . . . [22.9] The result of these embassies was the Congress of Tempe, at which no definite settlement was made. Livy, 39, 25-28. [22.10] I have already stated that in the Peloponnese, while Philopoemen was still Strategus, the Achaean league sent an embassy to Rome on the subject of Sparta, and another to king Ptolemy to renew their ancient alliance. [22.10] Immediately after Philopoemen had been succeeded by Aristaenus as Strategus, the ambassadors of king Ptolemy arrived, while the league meeting was assembled at Megalopolis. King Eumenes also had despatched an embassy offering to give the Achaeans one hundred and twenty talents, on condition that it was invested and the interest used to pay the council of the league at the time of the federal assemblies. Ambassadors came also from king Seleucus, to renew his friendship with them, and offering a present of a fleet of ten ships of war. But when the assembly got to business, the first to come forward to speak was Nicodemus of Elis, who recounted to the Achaeans what he and his colleagues had said in the Roman Senate about Sparta, and read the answer of the Senate; which was to the effect that the Senate disapproved of the destruction of the walls, and of the execution of the men put to death at Compasium, but that it did not rescind any arrangement made. No one saying a word for or against this, the subject was allowed to pass. [22.10] Next came the ambassadors from Eumenes, who renewed the ancestral friendship of the king with the Achaeans, and stated to the assembly the offer made by him. They spoke at great length on these subjects, and retired after setting forth the greatness of the king’s kindness and affection to the nation. [22.11] After they had finished their speech, Apollonidas of Sicyon rose and said that: “As far as the amount of the money was concerned, it was a present worthy of the Achaeans. But if they looked to the intention of the donor, or the purpose to which the gift was to be applied, none could well be more insulting and more unconstitutional. The laws prohibited any one, whether a private individual or magistrate, from accepting presents from a king on any pretence whatever; but if they took this money they would every one of them be plainly accepting a present, which was at once the gravest possible breach of the law, and confessedly the deepest possible personal disgrace. For that the council should take a great wage from Eumenes, and meet to deliberate on the interests of the league after swallowing such a bait, was manifestly disgraceful and injurious. It was Eumenes that offered money now; presently it would be Prusias; and then Seleucus. But as the interests of democracies and of kings are quite opposite to each other, and as our most frequent and most important deliberations concern the points of controversy arising between us and the kings, one of two things must necessarily happen; either the interests of the king will have precedence over our own, or we must incur the reproach of ingratitude for opposing our paymasters.” He therefore urged the Achaeans not only to decline the offer, but to hold Eumenes in detestation for thinking of making it. [22.11] Next rose Cassander of Aegina and reminded the Achaeans of “The misfortunes which the Aeginetans had met with through being members of the Achaean league; when Publius Sulpicius sailed against them with the Roman fleet, and sold all the unhappy Aeginetans into slavery.” In regard to this subject I have already related how the Aetolians, having got possession of Aegina in virtue of their treaty with Rome, sold it to Attalus for thirty talents. Cassander therefore drew the attention of the Achaeans to these facts; and demanded that Eumenes should not seek to gain the affection of the Achaeans by offering them money, but that he should establish an incontestable claim to every sign of devotion by giving back Aegina. He urged the Achaeans not to accept presents which would place them in the position of being the destroyers of the hopes of Aeginetan restoration for all time. [22.11] After these speeches had been delivered, the people showed such signs of enthusiastic approval that no one ventured to speak on the side of the king; but the whole assembly rejected the offer by acclamation, though its amount certainly made it exceedingly tempting. [22.12] The next subject introduced for debate was that of king Ptolemy. The ambassadors who had been on the mission to Ptolemy were called forward, and Lycortas, acting as spokesman, began by stating how they had interchanged oaths of alliance with the king; and next announced that they brought a present from the king to the Achaean league of six thousand stands of arms for peltasts, and two thousand talents in bronze coinage. He added a panegyric on the king, and finished his speech by a brief reference to the goodwill and active benevolence of the king towards the Achaeans. Upon this the Strategus of the Achaeans, Aristaenus, stood up and asked Lycortas and his colleagues in the embassy to Ptolemy “which alliance it was that he had thus renewed?” [22.12] No one answering the question, but all the assembly beginning to converse with each other, the Council chamber was filled with confusion. The cause of this absurd state of things was this. There had been several treaties of alliance formed between the Achaeans and Ptolemy’s kingdom, as widely different in their provision as in the circumstances which gave rise to them: but neither had Ptolemy’s envoy made any distinction when arranging for the renewal, merely speaking in general terms on the matter, nor had the ambassadors sent from Achaia; but they had interchanged the oaths on the assumption of there being but one treaty. The result was, that, on the Strategus quoting all the treaties, and pointing out in detail the differences between them, which turned out to be important, the assembly demanded to know which it was that it was renewing. And when no one was able to explain, not even Philopoemen himself, who had been in office when the renewal was made, nor Lycortas and his colleagues who had been on the mission to Alexandria, these men all began to be regarded as careless in conducting the business of the league; while Aristaenus acquired great reputation as being the only man who knew what he was talking about; and finally, the assembly refused to allow the ratification, voting on account of this blunder that the business should be postponed. [22.12] Then the ambassadors from Seleucus entered with their proposal. The Achaeans, however, voted to renew the friendship with Seleucus, but to decline for the present the gift of the ships. [22.13] Having thus finished their deliberations, the assembly broke up and the people separated to their several cities. But subsequently, while the (Nemean) games were in course of celebration, Quintus Caecilius arrived from Macedonia, on his way back from the embassy which he had been conducting to Philip. Aristaenus having called a meeting of the league magistrates in Argos, Quintus attended and upbraided them for having exceeded justice in the harshness and severity with which they had treated the Lacedaemonians, and urged them strongly to repair the error. Aristaenus said not a word, showing clearly by his silence that he disapproved of what had been done and agreed with the words of Caecilius. But Diophanes of Megalopolis, who was more of a soldier than a statesman, stood up to speak, and so far from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested to Caecilius, from hostility to Philopoemen, another charge that might be brought against them. For he said that “the Lacedaemonians were not the only people who had been badly treated; the Messenians had been so also.” There were as a fact some controversies going on among the Messenians, in regard to the decree of Flamininus concerning the exiles, and the execution of it by Philopoemen: and Caecilius, thinking that he now had a party among the Achaeans themselves of the same opinion as himself, expressed still greater anger at the hesitation on the part of the assembled magistrates in obeying his orders. However, when Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon argued long and elaborately to prove that what had been done at Sparta was right, and advantageous to the Lacedaemonians themselves more than to any one else, and that it was impossible to disturb any existing arrangements without violating justice to man and piety to the gods, they came to the decision that they would maintain them, and give an answer to that effect to the Roman legate. Seeing what the disposition of the magistrates was, Caecilius demanded that the public assembly should be summoned, to which the Achaean magistrates demanded to see the instructions which he had from the Senate on these points: and when he gave no answer to this demand, they said that they would not summon the assembly for him, as their laws forbade them to do so unless a man brought written instructions from the Senate, stating the subject on which they were to summon it. Caecilius was so angry at this uncompromising opposition to his orders, that he refused to receive his answer from the magistrates, and so departed without any answer at all. The Achaeans laid the blame both of the former visit of Marcus Fulvius and the present one of Caecilius on Aristaenus and Diophanes, on the ground that they had invited them on account of their political opposition to Philopoemen; and accordingly the general public felt a certain suspicion of these two men. Such was the state of the Peloponnese. . . . [22.14] Philopoemen had a sharp difference in debate with Archon the Strategus. In course of time, however, Philopoemen was convinced by Archon’s arguments, and, changing his mind, spoke in warm commendation of Archon as having managed his business with skill and address. But when I heard the speech at the time it did not seem to me right to praise a man and yet do him an injury, nor do I think so now in my maturer years. For I think that there is as wide a distinction in point of morality between practical ability and success secured by absence of scruples, as there is between skill and mere cunning. The former are in a manner the highest attainments possible, the latter the reverse. But owing to the lack of discernment so general in our day, these qualities, which have little in common, excite the same amount of commendation and emulation in the world. . . . [22.15] When Caecilius returned from Greece and made his report to the Senate concerning Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the ambassadors who had come to Rome on these matters were introduced into the Senate. First came those from Philip and Eumenes, as well as the exiles from Aenus and Maroneia; and on their saying much the same as they had said before Caecilius and his colleagues at Thessalonica, the Senate voted to send another deputation to Philip, to see first of all whether he had evacuated the cities in Perrhaebia in conformity with the answer he gave to Caecilius: and secondly, to order him to remove his garrison from Aenus and Maroneia; and in a word, to abandon all fortresses, positions, and towns on the seaboard of Thrace. [22.15] After these the ambassadors from the Peloponnese were introduced. For the Achaeans on their part had sent Apollonidas of Sicyon, and others, to justify themselves to Caecilius for his having received no answer, and generally to inform the Senate on the question of Sparta; and at the same time Areus and Alcibiades had come from Sparta as ambassadors,—two of the old exiles recently restored by Philopoemen and the Achaeans. And this was a circumstance that particularly roused the anger of the Achaeans; because they thought it the height of ingratitude on the part of the exiles, after receiving so important and recent a service at their hands, to be now sending a hostile embassy, and accusing to the sovereign people those who had been the authors of their unlooked-for preservation and restoration to their country. [22.16] Both parties were heard in their defence in each other’s presence. Apollonidas of Sicyon and his colleagues tried to convince the Senate that the affairs of Sparta could not have been better managed than they were managed by Philopoemen. Areus and his colleagues attempted to establish the reverse: alleging, first of all, that the power of the city was entirely destroyed by the violent withdrawal of so large a number; and, in the second place, that even those that were left were so few that their position was insecure, now that the walls were pulled down; and that their freedom of speech was entirely destroyed by the fact that they were not only amenable to the general decrees of the Achaean league, but were also made specially subject to the magistrates set over them from time to time. After hearing these envoys also, the Senate decided to give the same legates instructions regarding them as well as the others, and appointed Appius Claudius and his colleagues commissioners for Greece. [22.16] But the ambassadors from the Achaeans offered an explanation also to Caecilius in the Senate, on behalf of the magistrates, asserting that “They did not act wrongly or deserve blame for refusing to summon the assembly, unless it were requisite to decide on an alliance or a war, or unless some one brought a letter from the Senate. The magistrates had therefore impartially considered the subject of summoning the assembly, but were prevented from doing so by the laws, because he neither brought a despatch from the Senate nor would show them any written instructions.” At the conclusion of this speech Caecilius rose and made an attack on Philopoemen and Lycortas, and the Achaeans generally, and on the policy they had pursued towards the city of Sparta. After listening to the arguments, the Senate answered the Achaeans by saying that they would send commissioners to investigate the matter of Sparta; and they accompanied this answer by an admonition to them to pay attention to the ambassadors sent by them from time to time, and show them proper respect, as the Romans did to ambassadors who came to them. . . . [22.17] When Philip learnt, by a message from his own ambassadors at Rome, that he would be obliged to evacuate the cities in Thrace, he was extremely annoyed, because he regarded his kingdom as being now curtailed on every side; and he vented his wrath upon the unhappy people of Maroneia. He sent for Onomastus, his governor in Thrace, and communicated with him on the subject. And Onomastus on his return sent Cassander to Maroneia, who, from long residence there, was familiar with the inhabitants,—for Philip’s practice had long been to place members of his court in these cities, and accustom the people to their residence among them. Some few days after his arrival, the Thracians having been prepared for what they had to do, and having obtained entrance to the city by night through the instrumentality of Cassander, a great massacre took place, and many of the Maronites were killed. Having wreaked this vengeance on those who opposed him, and satisfied his own anger, Philip waited for the arrival of the Roman legates, persuaded that no one would venture for fear of him to denounce his crime. But when Appius and his colleagues presently arrived, they were promptly informed of what had happened at Maroneia, and expostulated in severe terms with Philip for it. The king attempted to defend himself by asserting that he had nothing to do with this act of violence; but that the Maronites, being divided into two hostile parties, one inclined to Eumenes and the other to himself, inflicted this misfortune upon themselves. He moreover bade them confront him with any one who wished to accuse him. He said this from a conviction that no one would venture to do so; because they would consider that Philip’s vengeance upon those who opposed him would be near at hand, while assistance from Rome would have a long way to come. But when Appius and his colleagues said that “they required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of what had happened, and who was the cause of it,” Philip became much confused. [22.18] They went no further than this in the first interview: but during the next day Appius ordered Philip to send Onomastus and Cassander at once to Rome, that the Senate might inform itself on what had happened. The king was disturbed at this to the greatest possible degree, and for some time did not know what to say; but at last he said that he would send Cassander, who was the actual author of the business, that the Senate might learn the truth from him; but he tried to get Onomastus excused, both in this and subsequent interviews with the legates, alleging as a reason that not only had Onomastus not been in Maroneia at the time of the massacre, but not even in any part of the country in its neighbourhood. His real motive, however, was fear lest, if he got to Rome, having been engaged with him in many similar transactions, he would not only tell the Romans the story of Maroneia, but all the others also. Eventually he did get Onomastus excused; and having, after the departure of the legates, sent off Cassander, he sent some agents with him as far as Epirus, and there had him poisoned.⁵⁴ But Appius and his colleagues left Philip with their minds fully made up both as to his guilt in the matter of Maroneia and his alienation from Rome. [22.18] The king, thus relieved of the presence of the legates, after consulting with his friends Apelles and Philocles became clearly conscious that his quarrel with Rome had now become serious, and that it could no longer be concealed, but was become notorious to most people in the world. He was therefore now wholly bent on measures of self-defence and retaliation. But as he was as yet unprepared for some of the plans which he had in his mind, he cast about to find some means of putting matters off, and gaining time for making his preparations for war. He accordingly resolved to send his youngest son Demetrius to Rome: partly to make his defence on the charges brought against him, and partly also to beg pardon for any error which he might have committed. He felt certain that everything he wished would be obtained from the Senate by means of this young prince, because of the extraordinary attentions which had been shown him when he was acting as a hostage. He no sooner conceived this idea than he set about making preparations for sending the prince and those of his own friends destined to accompany him on his mission. At the same time he promised the Byzantines to give them help: not so much because he cared for them, as from a wish under cover of their name to strike terror into the princes of the Thracians living beyond the Propontis, as a step towards the fulfilment of his main purpose. . . [22.19] In Crete, while Cydas son of Antalces was Cosmus,⁵⁵ the Gortynians, who sought in every way to depress the Gnossians, deprived them of a portion of their territory called Lycastium, and assigned it to the Rhaucii, and another portion called Diatonium to the Lyctii. But when about this time Appius and his colleagues arrived in the island from Rome, with the view of settling the controversies which existed among them, and addressed remonstrances to the cities of Gnossus and Gortyn on these points, the Cretans gave in, and submitted the settlement of their disputes to Appius. He accordingly ordered the restoration of their territory to the Gnossians; and that the Cydoniates should receive back the hostages which they had formerly left in the hands of Charmion, and should surrender Phalasarna, without taking anything out of it. As to sharing in the legal jurisdiction of the whole island, he left it free to the several cities to do so or not as they pleased, on condition that in the latter case they abstained from entering the rest of Crete, they and the exiles from Phalasarna who murdered Menochius and his friends, their most illustrious citizens. . . . [22.20] Apollonias, the wife of Attalus, father of king Eumenes, was a native of Cyzicus, and a woman who for many reasons deserves to be remembered, and with honour. Her claims upon a favourable recollection are that, though born of a private family, she became a queen, and retained that exalted rank to the end of her life, not by the use of meretricious fascinations, but by the virtue and integrity of her conduct in private and public life alike. Above all, she was the mother of four sons with whom she kept on terms of the most perfect affection and motherly love to the last day of her life. And so Attalus and his brother gained a high character, while staying at Cyzicus, by showing their mother proper respect and honour. For they took each of them one of her hands and led her between them on a visit to the temples and on a tour of the town, accompanied by their suite. At this sight all who saw it received the young princes with very warm marks of approval, and, recalling the story of Cleobis and Biton, compared their conduct with theirs; and remarked that the affectionate zeal shown by the young princes, though perhaps not going so far as theirs, was rendered quite as illustrious by the fact of their more exalted position. This took place in Cyzicus, after the peace made with king Prusias. . . . [22.21] Ostiagon the Gaul, king of the Gauls of Asia, endeavoured to transfer to himself the sovereignty of all the Gauls; and he had many qualifications for such a post, both natural and acquired. For he was open-handed and generous, a man of popular manners and ready tact; and, what was most important in the eyes of the Gauls, he was a man of courage and skill in war. . . . [22.22] Aristonicus was one of the eunuchs of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and had been brought up from childhood with the king. As he grew up he displayed more manly courage and tastes than are generally found in an eunuch. For he had a natural predilection for a military life, and devoted himself almost exclusively to that and all that it involved. He was also skilful in dealing with men, and, what is very rare, took large and liberal views, and was naturally inclined to bestow favours and kindnesses. . . . ## Book XXIII [23.1] In the 149th Olympiad a greater number of embassies came to Rome from Greece than were almost ever seen before. For as Philip was compelled by treaty to submit disputes with his neighbours to arbitration, and as it was known that the Romans were willing to receive accusations against Philip, and would secure the safety of those who had controversies with him, all who lived near the frontier of Macedonia came to Rome, some in their private capacity, some from cities, others from whole tribes, with complaints against Philip. At the same time also came ambassadors from Eumenes, accompanied by his brother Athenaeus, to accuse Philip in regard to the Thracian cities and the aid sent to Prusias. Philip’s son, Demetrius, also came to make answer to all these various envoys, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles, who were at that time considered the king’s first friends. Ambassadors also came from Sparta, representatives of each faction of the citizens. [23.1] The first summoned to the Senate was Athenaeus, from whom the Senate accepted the compliments of fifteen thousand gold pieces, and passed a decree highly extolling Eumenes and his brothers for their answer, and exhorting them to continue in the same mind. Next the praetors called upon all the accusers of Philip, and brought them forward by one embassy at a time. But as they were numerous, and their entry occupied three days, the Senate became embarrassed as to the settlement to be made in each case. For from Thessaly there were ambassadors from the whole nation, and also from each city separately; so also from the Perrhaebians, Athamanians, Epirotes, and Illyrians. And of these some brought cases of dispute as to territory, slaves, or cattle; and some about contracts or injuries sustained by themselves. Some alleged that they could not get their rights in accordance with the treaty, because Philip prevented the administration of justice; while others impeached the justice of the decisions given, on the ground that Philip had corrupted the arbitrators. And, in fact, there was an inextricable confusion and multiplicity of charges. [23.2] In such a state of things the Senate felt unable to come to a clear decision itself, and did not think it fair that Demetrius should have to answer each of the several indictments; for it regarded him with great favour, and saw at the same time that his extreme youth unfitted him to cope with business of such intricacy and complexity. Besides, what it desired most was not to hear speeches of Demetrius, but to ascertain with certainty the disposition of Philip. Excusing him therefore from pleading his cause, the Senate asked the young man and his friends whether they were the bearers of any written memoir from the king; and upon Demetrius answering that he was, and holding out a paper of no great size, the Senate bade him give a summary of what the paper contained in answer to the accusations alleged. It amounted to this, that on each point Philip asserted that he had carried out the injunctions of the Senate, or, if he had not done so, laid the blame upon his accusers; while to the greater number of his declarations he had added the words, “though the commissioners with Caecilius were unfair to me in this point,” or again, “though I am unjustly treated in this respect.” Such being Philip’s mind, as expressed in the several clauses of the paper, the Senate, after hearing the ambassadors who were come to Rome, comprehended them all under one measure. By the mouth of the praetor it offered an honourable and cordial reception to Demetrius, expressed in ample and emphatic language, and answered his speech by saying that “The Senate fully believe that on all the points mentioned by Demetrius, or read by him from his paper of instructions, full justice was already done or would be done. But, in order that Philip might be made aware that the Senate paid this honour to Demetrius, ambassadors would be sent to see that everything was being done in accordance with the will of the Senate, and at the same time to inform the king that he owed this grace to his son Demetrius.” Such was the arrangement come to on this part of the business. [23.3] The next to enter the Senate were the ambassadors of king Eumenes, who denounced Philip on account of the assistance sent to Prusias, and concerning his actions in Thrace, alleging that even at that moment he had not withdrawn his garrisons from the cities. But upon Philocles showing his wish to offer a defence on these points, as having been formerly charged with a mission to Prusias, and being now sent to the Senate to represent Philip on this business, the Senate, without listening very long to his speech, answered that “With regard to Thrace, unless the legates found everything there settled in accordance with its will, and all the cities restored to the entire control of Eumenes, the Senate would be unable any longer to allow it to pass, or to submit to being continually disobeyed.” [23.3] Though the ill-feeling between the Romans and Philip was becoming serious, a check was put to it for the time by the presence of Demetrius. And yet this young prince’s mission to Rome proved eventually no slight link in the chain of events which led to the final ruin of his house. For the Senate, by thus making much of Demetrius, somewhat turned the young man’s head, and at the same time gravely annoyed Perseus and the king, by making them feel that the kindness they received from the Romans was not for their own sakes, but for that of Demetrius. And T. Quintius Flamininus contributed not a little to the same result by taking the young prince aside and communicating with him in confidence. For he flattered him by suggesting that the Romans meant before long to invest him with the kingdom; while he irritated Philip and Perseus by sending a letter ordering the king to send Demetrius to Rome again, with as many friends of the highest character as possible. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of these circumstances that Perseus shortly afterwards induced his father to consent to the death of Demetrius. But I shall relate that event in detail later on. [23.4] The next ambassadors called in were the Lacedaemonians. Of these there were four distinct factions. Lysis and his colleagues represented the old exiles, and their contention was that they ought to have back the possessions from which they had originally been driven. Areus and Alcibiades, on the contrary, contended that they should receive the value of a talent from their original property, and divide the rest among deserving citizens. Serippus pleaded that things should be left in exactly the state in which they were when they formerly belonged to the Achaean league. Lastly, Chaeron and his colleagues represented those who had been condemned to death or exile by the votes of the Achaean league, and demanded their own recall and the restoration of the constitution. These all delivered speeches against the Achaeans in conformity with their several objects. The Senate, finding itself unable to come to a clear decision on these particular controversies, appointed a committee of investigation, consisting of the three who had already been on a mission to the Peloponnese on these matters, namely Titus Flamininus, Q. Caecilius, and Appius Claudius Pulcher.⁵⁶ After long discussions before this committee it was unanimously decided that the exiles and the condemned were to be recalled, and that the city should remain a member of the Achaean league. But as to the property, whether the exiles were each to select a talent’s worth from what had been theirs [or to receive it all back], on this point they continued to dispute. That they might not, however, have to begin the whole controversy afresh [the committee] caused the points agreed upon to be reduced to writing, to which all affixed their seals. But the committee, also wishing to include the Achaeans in the agreement, called in Xenarchus and his colleagues, who were at that time on a mission from the Achaeans, to renew their alliance with Rome, and at the same time to give an eye to their controversy with the Lacedaemonians. These men, being unexpectedly asked whether they consented to the terms contained in the written document, were somewhat at a loss what to answer. For they did not approve of the restoration of the exiles and the condemned persons, as being contrary to the decree of the league, and the contents of the tablet on which that decree was engraved; and yet they approved of the document as a whole, because it contained the clause providing that Sparta should remain a member of the league. Finally, however, partly from this difficulty, and partly from awe of the Roman commissioners, they affixed their seal. The Senate, therefore, selected Quintus Marcius to go as legate to settle the affairs of Macedonia and the Peloponnese. . . . [23.5] When Deinocrates of Messene arrived on a mission at Rome, he was delighted to find that Titus Flamininus had been appointed by the Senate to go as ambassador to Prusias and Seleucus. For having been very intimate with Titus during the Lacedaemonian war, he thought that this friendship, combined with his disagreements with Philopoemen, would induce him on his arrival in Greece to settle the affairs of Messene in accordance with his own views. He therefore gave up everything else to attach himself exclusively to Titus, on whom he rested all his hopes. . . . [23.5] This same Deinocrates was a courtier and a soldier by nature as well as habit, but he assumed the air of consummate statesmanship. His parts, however, were showy rather than solid. In war his fertility of resource and boldness were beyond the common run; and he shone in feats of personal bravery. Nor were these his only accomplishments: he was attractive and ready in conversation, versatile and courteous in society. But at the same time he was devoted to licentious intrigue, and in public affairs and questions of policy was quite incapable of sustained attention or far-sighted views, of fortifying himself with well-considered arguments, or putting them before the public. On this occasion, for instance, though he had really given the initiative to grave misfortunes, he did not think that he was doing anything of importance; but followed his usual manner of life, quite regardless of the future, indulging day after day in amours, wine, and song. Flamininus, however, did once force him to catch a glimpse of the seriousness of his position. For seeing him on a certain occasion in a party of revellers dancing in long robes, he said nothing at the time; but next morning, being visited by him with some request in behalf of his country, he said: “I will do my best, Deinocrates; but it does astonish me that you can drink and dance after having given the start to such serious troubles for Greece.” He appears, indeed, at that to have a little recovered his soberer senses, and to have understood what an improper display he had been making of his tastes and habits. However, he arrived at this period in Greece in company with Flamininus, fully persuaded that the affairs of Messene would be settled at a blow in accordance with his views. But Philopoemen and his party were fully aware that Flamininus had no commission from the Senate in regard to affairs in Greece; they therefore awaited his arrival without taking any step of any sort. Having landed at Naupactus, Flamininus addressed a despatch to the Strategus and Demiurgi⁵⁷ bidding them summon the Achaeans to an assembly; to which they wrote back that “they would do so, if he would write them word what the subjects were on which he wished to confer with the Achaeans; for the laws enjoined that limitation on the magistrates.” As Flamininus did not venture to write this, the hopes of Deinocrates and the so-called “old exiles,” but who had at that time been recently banished from Sparta, came to nothing, as in fact did the visit of Flamininus and the plans which he had formed. . . . [23.6] About the same period some ambassadors were sent by the exiled citizens of Sparta to Rome, among whom was Arcesilaus and Agesipolis who, when quite a boy, had been made king in Sparta. These two men were fallen upon and killed by pirates on the high seas; but their colleagues arrived safely at Rome. . . . [23.7] On the return of Demetrius from Rome, bringing with him the formal reply, in which the Romans referred all the favour and confidence which they avowed to their regard for Demetrius, saying that all they had done or would do was for his sake,—the Macedonians gave Demetrius a cordial reception, believing that they were relieved from all fear and danger: for they had looked upon war with Rome as all but at their doors, owing to the provocations given by Philip. But Philip and Perseus were far from pleased, and were much offended at the idea of the Romans taking no account of them, and referring all their favour to Demetrius. Philip however concealed his displeasure; but Perseus, who was not only behind his brother in good feelings to Rome, but much his inferior in other respects, both in natural ability and acquired accomplishments, made no secret of his anger: and was beginning to be thoroughly alarmed as to his succession to the crown, and lest, in spite of being the elder, he should be excluded. Therefore he commenced by bribing the friends of Demetrius. . . . [23.7] The end of this fraternal jealousy is described in Livy, 40, 5-24. By a forged letter purporting to come from Flamininus, Philip is persuaded that his son played the traitor at Rome and gives an order or a permission for his being put to death; which is accordingly done, partly by poison and partly by violence, at Heracleia, B. C. 181. [23.8] Upon Quintus Marcius arriving on his mission in Macedonia, Philip evacuated the Greek cities in Thrace entirely and withdrew his garrisons, though in deep anger and heaviness of spirit; and he put on a right footing everything else to which the Roman injunctions referred, wishing to give them no indication of his estrangement, but to secure time for making his preparations for war. In pursuance of this design he led out an army against the barbarians, and marching through the centre of Thrace he invaded the Odrysae, Bessi, and Dentheleti. Coming to Philippopolis, the inhabitants flying for safety to the heights, he took it without a blow. And thence, after traversing the plain, and sacking some of the villages, and exacting a pledge of submission from others, he returned home, leaving a garrison in Philippopolis, which was after a time expelled by the Odrysae in defiance of their pledge of fidelity to Philip. . . . [23.9] In the second year of this Olympiad, on the arrival of ambassadors from Eumenes, Pharnaces, and the Achaean league, and also from the Lacedaemonians who had been banished from Sparta,⁵⁸ and from those who were in actual possession of it, the Senate despatched their business. But there came after them a mission from Rhodes in regard to the disaster at Sinope; to whom the Senate replied that it would send legates to investigate the case of the Sinopeans and their grievances against those kings. And Quintus Marcius having recently arrived from Greece and made his report on the state of affairs in Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the Senate did not require to hear much more; but having called in the envoys from the Peloponnese and Macedonia they listened indeed to what they had to say, but founded its reply, without any reference to their speeches, wholly on the report of Marcius, in which he had stated, in reference to king Philip, that he had indeed done all that was enjoined on him, but with great reluctance; and that, if he got an opportunity, he would go all lengths against the Romans. The Senate accordingly composed a reply to the king’s envoys in which, while praising Philip for what he had done, they warned him for the future to be careful not to be found acting in opposition to the Romans. As to the Peloponnese, Marcius had reported that, as the Achaeans were unwilling to refer any matter whatever to the Senate, but were haughtily inclined and desirous of managing all their affairs themselves, if the Senate would only reject their present application and give ever so slight an indication of displeasure, Sparta would promptly come to an understanding with Messene; and then the Achaeans would be glad enough to appeal to the protection of Rome. In consequence of this report they answered the Lacedaemonian Serippus and his colleagues, wishing to leave this city in a state of suspense, that they had done their best for them, but that for the present they did not think this matter concerned them. But when the Achaeans besought for help against the Messenians⁵⁹ in virtue of their alliance with Rome, or at least that they would take precautions to prevent any arms or corn from being brought from Italy into Messene, the Senate refused compliance with either request and answered that the Achaeans ought not to be surprised if Sparta or Corinth or Argos renounced their league, if they would not conduct their hegemony in accordance with the Senate’s views. This answer the Senate made public, as a kind of proclamation that any people who chose might break off from the Achaeans for all the Romans cared; and they further retained the ambassadors in Rome, waiting to see the issue of the quarrel between the Achaeans and Messenians. . . . [23.10] In this period a certain dreadful foreshadowing of misfortune fell upon king Philip and the whole of Macedonia, of a kind well worthy of close attention and record. As though Fortune had resolved to exact from him at once the penalties for all the impieties and crimes which he had committed in the whole course of his life, she now visited him with furies, those deities of retribution, those powers that had listened to the prayers of the victims of his cruelties, who, haunting him day and night, so plagued him to the last day of his life, that all the world was forced to acknowledge the truth of the proverb, that “Justice has an eye” which mere men should never despise. The first idea suggested to him by this evil power was that, as he was about to go to war with Rome, he had better remove from the most important cities, and those along the sea-coast, the leading citizens, with their wives and children, and place them in Emathia, formerly called Paeonia, and fill up the cities with Thracians and other barbarians, as likely to be more securely loyal to him in the coming hour of danger. The actual carrying out of this measure, and the uprooting of these men and their families, caused such an outburst of grief, and so violent an outcry, that one might have supposed the whole district to have been taken by the sword. Curses and appeals to heaven were rained upon the head of the king without any further attempt at concealment. His next step, prompted by the wish to leave no element of hostility or disaffection in the kingdom, was to write to the governors of the several cities ordering them to search out the sons and daughters of such Macedonians as had been put to death by him, and place them in ward; in which he referred especially to Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and Samus, and those who had perished with them: but he also included all others whosoever that had been put to death by order of the king, quoting this verse, we are told:—⁶⁰ “Oh fool! to slay the sire and leave the sons.” Most of these men being persons of distinguished families, their fate made a great noise and excited universal pity. But Fortune had a third act in this bloody drama in reserve for Philip, in which the young princes plotted against each other; and their quarrels being referred to him, he was forced to choose between becoming the murderer of his sons and living the rest of his life in dread of being murdered by them in his old age; and to decide which of the two he had the greater reason to fear. Tortured day and night by these anxieties, the miseries and perturbations of his spirit lead to the inevitable reflection that the wrath of heaven fell upon his old age for the sins of his previous life: which will be rendered still more evident by what remains to be told. . . . Just when his soul was stung to madness by these circumstances, the quarrel between his sons blazed out: Fortune, as it were of set purpose, bringing their misfortunes upon the scene all at one time. . . . [23.10] The Macedonians make offerings to Xanthus as a hero, and perform a purification of the army with horses fully equipped. . . . [23.11] “One should not merely read tragedies, tales, and histories, but should understand and ponder over them. In all of them one may learn that whenever brothers fall out and allow their quarrel to go any great length, they invariably end not only by destroying themselves but in the utter ruin of their property, children, and cities; while those who keep their self-love within reasonable bounds, and put up with each other’s weaknesses, are the preservers of these, and live in the fairest reputation and fame. I have often directed your attention to the kings in Sparta, telling you that they preserved the hegemony in Greece for their country just so long as they obeyed the ephors, as though they were their parents, and were content to reign jointly. But directly they in their folly tried to change the government to a monarchy, they caused Sparta to experience every misery possible. Finally, I have pointed out to you as an example the case of Eumenes and Attalus; showing you that, though they succeeded to but a small and insignificant realm, they have raised it to a level with the best, simply by the harmony and unity of sentiment, and mutual respect which they maintained towards each other. But so far from taking my words to heart, you are, as it seems to me, whetting your angry passions against each other. . . .” [23.12] Philopoemen rose⁶¹ and proceeded on his way, though he was oppressed at once by illness and the weight of years, being now in the seventieth year of his age. Conquering his weakness, however, by the force of his previous habits he reached Megalopolis, from Argos, in one day’s journey. . . . [23.12] He was captured, when Achaean Strategus, by the Messenians and poisoned. Thus, though second to none that ever lived before him in excellence, his fortune was less happy; yet in his previous life he seemed ever to have enjoyed her favour and assistance. But it was, I suppose, a case of the common proverb, “a man may have a stroke of luck, but no man can be lucky always.” We must, therefore, call our predecessors fortunate, without pretending that they were so invariably—for what need is there to flatter Fortune by a meaningless and false compliment? It is those who have enjoyed Fortune’s smiles in their life for the longest time, and who, when she changes her mind, meet with only moderate mishaps, that we must speak of as fortunate. . . . [23.12] Philopoemen was succeeded by Lycortas,⁶² . . . and though he had spent forty years of an active career in a state at once democratic and composed of many various elements, he had entirely avoided giving rise to the jealousy of the citizens in any direction: and yet he had not flattered their inclinations, but for the most part had used great freedom of speech, which is a case of very rare occurrence. . . . [23.13] An admirable feature in Hannibal’s character, and the strongest proof of his having been a born ruler of men, and having possessed statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is that, though he was for seventeen years engaged in actual warfare, and though he had to make his way through numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men of different nationalities in what appeared desperate and hazardous enterprises, he was never made the object of a conspiracy by any of them, nor deserted by any of those who had joined him and put themselves under his command. . . . [23.14] Publius Scipio, in the course of an active career in an aristocratic state, secured such popularity with the multitude and such credit with the Senate, that when some one took upon himself to bring him to trial before the people in the manner usual at Rome, and produced many bitter accusations against him, he came forward and said nothing but that “It ill-became the Roman people to listen to accusations against P. Cornelius Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they had the power of speech at all.” At this the populace dispersed, and quitting the assembly, left the accuser alone. . . . Once when there was a sum of money required in the Senate for some pressing business, and the quaestor, on the ground of a legal difficulty, refused to open the treasury on that particular day, Scipio said that “he would take the keys himself and open it; for he was the cause of the treasury being locked at all.” And again, when some one in the Senate demanded an account of the money which he had received from Antiochus before the treaty for the pay of his army, he said that he had the ledger, but that he ought not to be called to account by any one. But on his questioner persisting, and urging him to produce it, he bade his brother bring it. When the schedule was brought, he held it out in front of him, and tearing it to pieces in the sight of everybody bade the man who asked for it seek it out of these fragments, and he demanded of the rest “How they could ask for the items of the expenditure of these three thousand talents, and yet no longer ask for an account of how and by whose agency the fifteen thousand talents which they received from Antiochus came into the treasury, nor how it is that they have become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia?” This speech not only made a strong impression on the rest, but also reduced the man who demanded the account to silence. [23.14] These anecdotes have been related by me for the double purpose of enhancing the fame of the departed, and of encouraging future generations in the paths of honour. . . . [23.15] For my part, I never concur with those who indulge their anger against men of their own blood to the length of not only depriving them of the year’s harvest when at war with them, but even of cutting down their trees and destroying their buildings, and of leaving them no opportunity for repentance. Such proceedings seem to me to be rank folly. For, while they imagine that they are dismaying the enemy by the devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future as well as their present means of getting the necessaries of life, they are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an isolated ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred. . . . [23.16] Lycortas the Achaean Strategus crushed the spirits of the Messenians in the war. Up to this time the populace at Messene had been afraid of their magistrates; but now at length, relying on the protection of the enemy, some of them plucked up courage to break silence and to say that the time was come to send an embassy to negotiate a peace. Deinocrates and his colleagues, being no longer able to face the people under this storm of popular odium, yielded to circumstances and retired to their own houses. Thereupon the people, acting under the advice of the older men, and especially under that of Epaenetus and Apollodorus, the ambassadors from Boeotia,—who, having arrived some time before to negotiate a peace, happened fortunately to be at that time at Messene,—appointed and despatched envoys, begging forgiveness for their transgressions. The Achaean Strategus, having summoned his colleagues⁶³ to council, and given the envoys a hearing, answered that “There was but one way in which the Messenians could reconcile themselves to the league, and that was by at once surrendering to him the authors of the revolt and of the murder of Philopoemen, leave the rest to the authority of the league assembly, and at once receive a garrison into their citadel.” When this message was announced to the Messenian populace, those who had long been bitterly opposed to the authors of the war were ready enough to surrender them and to arrest them; while the rest, being persuaded that they would not be severely dealt with by the Achaeans, readily consented to submit the general question to the decision of the assembly. But what chiefly induced them to unanimously accept the proposal was, that they in fact had no choice in the matter. The Strategus accordingly at once took over the citadel and marched his peltasts into it; and then, taking some picked troops with him, entered the city; and having summoned a meeting of the people, addressed them in terms befitting the occasion, promising that “they would never have reason to repent having committed themselves to the honour of the Achaeans.” The general question of what was to be done he thus referred to the league,—for it happened conveniently that the Achaeans were just then reassembling at Megalopolis for the second Congress,⁶⁴—but of those who were guilty of the disturbances, he ordered all such as were actually implicated in the summary execution of Philopoemen to put an end to their own lives. . . . [23.17] The Messenians were reduced by their own folly to the brink of ruin, but were restored to their former position in the league by the magnanimity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. But the towns of Abia, Thuria, and Pharae during these transactions abandoned their connection with Messene, and, setting up a pillar engraved with a treaty of alliance between themselves, formed a separate league. When the Romans were informed that the Messenian war had turned out successfully for the Achaeans, without taking any account of their previous declaration they gave a different answer to the same ambassadors, asserting that they had taken measures to prevent any one from conveying arms or corn from Italy into Messene. By this they showed clearly that, so far from avoiding or disregarding the affairs of foreign nations not directly concerning themselves, they were, on the contrary, annoyed at everything not being referred to them and carried out in accordance with their opinion. [23.17] When the ambassadors arrived in Sparta with their answer, the Achaean Strategus as soon as he had settled the Messenian business, summoned a congress at Sicyon, and on its assembling, proposed a resolution for the reception of Sparta into the league, alleging that “The Romans had declined the arbitration which had previously been offered to them in regard to this city,—for they had answered that they had now no concern with any of the affairs of Sparta. Those, however, at present in power at Sparta were desirous of being admitted to the privileges of the league. Therefore he advised that they should admit the town; for this would be advantageous in two ways: first, because they would be thus admitting men who had remained unshaken in their loyalty to the league; and secondly, because they would not be admitting those of the old exiles, who had behaved with ingratitude and impiety towards them, to any share of their privileges; but by confirming the measures of those who had excluded them, would at the same time be showing, with God’s help, due gratitude to the latter.” With these words Lycortas exhorted the Achaeans to receive the city of Sparta into the league. But Diophanes and some others attempted to put in a word for the exiles, and urged the Achaeans “Not to join in pressing heavily upon these banished men; and not to be influenced by a mere handful of men to strengthen the hands of those who had impiously and lawlessly expelled them from their country.” [23.18] Such were the arguments employed on either side. The Achaeans, after listening to both, decided to admit the city, and accordingly the agreement was engraved on a tablet, and Sparta became a member of the Achaean league: the existing citizens having agreed to admit such of the old exiles as were not considered to have acted in a hostile spirit against the Achaeans. After confirming this arrangement the Achaeans sent Bippus of Argos and others as ambassadors to Rome, to explain to the Senate what had been done in the matter. The Lacedaemonians also sent Chaeron and others; while the exiles too sent a mission led by Cletis Diactorius⁶⁵ to oppose the Achaean ambassadors in the Senate. ## Book XXIV [24.1] The ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the Achaeans arrived in Rome simultaneously with those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes, and Pharnaces; and the Senate attended to these latter first. A short time previously a report had been made to the Senate by Marcus,⁶⁶ who had been despatched on a mission respecting the war that had broken out between Eumenes and Pharnaces, speaking highly of the moderation of Eumenes in every particular, and the grasping temper and insolence of Pharnaces. The Senate accordingly did not require any lengthened arguments; but, after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they would once more send legates to examine more minutely into the points in dispute between the kings. Then came in the ambassadors from the Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the ambassadors from the citizens actually in the city; and after giving them a long hearing, the Senate expressed no disapproval of what had been done, but promised the exiles to write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to their country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his colleagues, sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a statement as to the restoration of order in Messene; and the Senate, without showing displeasure at any part of the arrangement, gave the ambassadors a cordial reception. . . . [24.2] When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived in the Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from the Senate to the Achaeans, desiring that measures should be taken for their recall and restoration to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the consideration of the question until their own ambassadors should return. After making this answer, they caused the agreement between themselves and the Messenians to be engraved on a tablet: granting them, among other favours, a three years’ remission of taxes, in order that the damage done to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with the Messenians. But when Bippus and his colleagues arrived from Rome, and reported that the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to any strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the importunity of the exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to make no change. . . . [24.3] Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive and loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it divides into two nearly equal parts, from which a view of both seas may be obtained. . . .⁶⁷ [24.4] In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set in motion, if one should speak of “a beginning of troubles” in Crete: for owing to the persistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery practised against each other, beginning and end are much the same in Crete; and what appears to some people to be an incredible story is a spectacle of everyday occurrence there. . . . [24.5] Having come to terms with each other, Pharnaces, Attalus, and the rest returned home. While this was going on, Eumenes had recovered from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus; and when his brother arrived to announce the arrangements that had been made, he approved of what had been done, and resolved to send his brothers to Rome: partly because he hoped to put an end to the war with Pharnaces by means of their mission, and partly because he wished to introduce his brothers to his own private friends at Rome, and officially to the Senate. Attalus and his brother were eager for this tour; and when they arrived in Rome the young men met with a cordial reception from everybody in private society, owing to the intimacies which they had formed during the Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome from the Senate, which made liberal provision for their entertainment and maintenance, and treated them with marked respect in such conferences as it had with them. Thus, when the young men came formally before the Senate, and, after speaking at considerable length of the renewal of their ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures to inflict on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave them a favourable hearing, and promised in reply to send legates to use every possible means of putting an end to the war. . . . [24.6] About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make friends with the Achaean league, sent an ambassador to them with an offer of a fleet of ten penteconters fully equipped; and the Achaeans, thinking the present worthy of their thanks, for the cost could not be much less than ten talents, gladly accepted the offer. Having come to this resolution, they selected Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon, to go on a mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to receive the ships and make arrangements for bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas, because, as Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he had worked energetically on the king’s side; and Polybius, though below the legal age for acting as ambassador,⁶⁸ because, as his father has been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance with Ptolemy, and had brought the present of arms and of money to the Achaeans; and Aratus, similarly, on account of his former intercourse with the king. However, this mission never went after all, as Ptolemy died just at this time. . . . [24.7] There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron, who in the previous year had been on an embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and great ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble position of life, and without the advantages of a liberal education. By flattering the mob, and starting questions which no one else had the assurance to move, he soon acquired a certain notoriety with the people. The first use he made of his power was to confiscate the land granted by the tyrants to the sisters, wives, mothers, and children of the exiles, and to distribute it on his own authority among the poor without any fixed rule or regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using the public money as though it were his own, without the authority of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these proceedings, certain men managed to get themselves appointed auditors of the treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing this, and conscious of his maladministration of the government, Chaeron sent some men to attack Apollonides, the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most able to expose his embezzlements, who stabbed him to death in broad daylight as he was coming from the bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans, and the people expressing great indignation at what had been done, the Strategus at once started for Sparta; and when he arrived there he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides, and having condemned him, threw him into prison. He then incited the remaining auditors to make a real investigation into the public funds, and to see that the relations of the exiles got back the property of which Chaeron had shortly before deprived them. . . . [24.8] In Asia king Pharnaces, once more treating the reference to Rome with contempt, sent Leocritus in the course of the winter with ten thousand men to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the beginning of spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia. When Eumenes heard of it, he was much enraged at Pharnaces thus breaking through the terms of the agreement to which he was pledged, but was compelled to retaliate by acting in the same way. When he had already collected his forces, Attalus and his brother landed from their voyage from Rome, and the three brothers, after meeting and interchanging views, marched out at once with the army. But on reaching Galatia they found Leocritus no longer there; and when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had before embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent them a message desiring that their lives might be spared, and promising that they would do anything that might be required of them, they refused the request on the ground of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and advanced with their full force against Pharnaces; and having performed the distance from Calpitus to the river Halys in five days, they reached Parnassus in six more, and being there joined by Ariarathes, the king of the Cappadocians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their camp, news came that the ambassadors from Rome had arrived to effect a pacification. When he heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to receive them; while he devoted himself to doubling the number of his troops, and improving them to the utmost: partly with a view to prepare them for actual service, and partly to impress the Romans with the belief that he was able to defend himself against Pharnaces, and beat him in war. [24.9] When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting an end to the war, Eumenes and Ariarathes professed to be ready to obey; but begged the Romans to bring them, if possible, to an interview with Pharnaces, that they might see fully from what was said in their own presence how faithless and cruel a man Pharnaces was; and, if this proved to be impossible, to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would do everything that was in their power and was consistent with honour; but they required the kings to remove their army from the country: for it was inconsistent that, when they were there with proposals for a peace, operations of war should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be committed. Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and immediately marched off in the direction of Galatia. The Roman legates then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he should meet Eumenes and Ariarathes in a conference, as that would be the surest way of settling the affair; but when he expressed repugnance to that measure, and absolutely refused to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he plainly thought himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause; but, being anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they continued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates might command. When these plenipotentiaries, the Roman legates, and Eumenes and Ariarathes met, the latter showed themselves ready to consent to any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace. But the envoys of Pharnaces disputed every point, and did not hold even to what they had once accepted, but continually brought forward some fresh demand, and altered their mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore, quickly came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour, as Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification. The conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the Roman legates having left Pergamum, and the envoys of Pharnaces having gone home, the war went on, Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their preparations for it. Meanwhile, however, the Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to help them; and he accordingly set out in great haste to carry on a war against the Lycians. . . . [24.10] This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbatus brought before the assembly the question of the letter from Rome as to the recall of the Lacedaemonian exiles. Lycortas and his party recommended that no change should be made, on the ground that “The Romans had only acted as they were bound to do in listening to the petition of men who, on the face of it, were deprived of their rights, so far as that petition seemed reasonable; but when they were convinced that of a petition some points were impossible, and others such as to inflict great disgrace and damage upon their friends, it had never been their custom to insist upon them peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also, if it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their letter would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the provisions engraved on the tablets, the very bonds of our league, they will retract their orders, and will admit that we are right to hesitate and to ask to be excused from carrying out its injunctions.” Such was the speech of Lycortas. But Hyperbatus and Callicrates advised submission to the letter, and that they should hold its authority superior to law or tablet or anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put before it the points contained in the speech of Lycortas. Callicrates of Leontium, Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon were forthwith nominated for this mission, and were despatched with instructions to this effect. But on their arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and, so far from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his political opponents; and, not contented with that, he undertook to rebuke the Senate itself. [24.11] For he said that “The Romans were themselves responsible for the Greeks neglecting their letters and orders instead of obeying them. For in all the democratic states of the day there were two parties,—one recommending obedience to the Roman rescripts, and holding neither law nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the will of Rome; the other always quoting oaths and tablets, and exhorting the people to be careful about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the multitude; consequently the Romanisers were discredited and denounced among the populace—their opponents glorified. If then the Senate would give some sign of their interest in the matter, the leaders, in the first place, would quickly change to the Romanising party, and, in the next place, would be followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two parties would be universal, as the more creditable and honourable in the eyes of the populace. Thus it came about that at that very time certain statesmen, without any other claims whatever, had obtained the highest offices in their own cities, merely from coming forward to speak against the rescripts of the Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity of the laws and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by all means let it go on as it is now doing. But if the Senate wished that its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts be despised by no one, it must give serious attention to that subject. If it did not do so, he knew only too well that the exact opposite of the Senate’s wishes would come about, as in fact had already been the case. For but lately, in the Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any measures with regard to the Messenians without the consent of the Romans, they had disobeyed that order; had voted the war on their own authority; had not only wasted the whole country in defiance of justice, but had in some cases driven its noblest citizens into exile, and in others put them to death with every extremity of torture, though they had surrendered, and were guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly written to order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles, the Achaeans were so far from obeying, that they had actually set up an engraved tablet, and made a sworn agreement with the men actually in possession of the city that these exiles should never return. With these instances before their eyes, the Romans should take measures of precaution for the future.” [24.12] After delivering a speech in these words, or to this effect, Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by the envoys of the exiles, who retired after delivering a short address, stating their case, and containing some of the ordinary appeals to pity. The Senate was persuaded that much of what Callicrates had said touched the interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent upon it to exalt those who supported its own decrees, and to humble those who resisted them. It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this time that it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in their several states took the patriotic and honourable side, and promoting those who were for appealing to its authority on every occasion, right or wrong. The result of which was that gradually, as time went on, the Senate had abundance of flatterers, but a great scarcity of genuine friends. However, on this occasion the Senate did not write about the restoration of the exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the Aetolians, Epirotes, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling them all as it were to witness, in order to break down the power of the Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without saying a word to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Callicrates himself, that “everybody in the various states should be as Callicrates.” This man accordingly arrived in Greece with his answer, in a great state of exultation, little thinking that he had become the initiator of great miseries to all the Greeks, but especially to the Achaeans. This nation had still at that time the privilege of dealing on something like equal terms with Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that it had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her greatest danger—I mean during the wars with Philip and Antiochus. . . . The league, too, had made progress in material strength and in every direction from the period from which my history commences; but the audacious proceeding of Callicrates proved the beginning of a change for the worse. . . . [24.12] The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble spirit and generous principles, commiserate all who have met with misfortunes, and show favour to all who fly to them for protection; but directly any one claims anything as of right, on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they at once draw in and correct their error to the best of their ability. Thus then Callicrates, who had been sent to Rome to plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the opposite spirit; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian war, on which the Romans themselves had made no complaint, returned to Achaia to overawe the people with the threat of the hostility of Rome. Having therefore by his official report frightened and dismayed the spirits of the populace, who were of course ignorant of what he had really said in the Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and, to make matters worse, proved to be open to bribery; and then, having got the office, carried out the restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian exiles.⁶⁹ . . . [24.13] Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and debater. In politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating it. Still he endeavoured to keep up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did, in fact, maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any one of them proved to plainly militate against the rescripts from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally performed, all Roman orders which were in harmony with the laws and the terms of their alliance; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first to demand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time; and if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so finally carry out the order. . . . [24.14] Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some such arguments as these: “It was impossible to maintain the Roman friendship by holding out the spear and the herald’s staff together. If we have the resolution to withstand them face to face, and can do so, well and good. But if Philopoemen himself does not venture to assert this,⁷⁰ . . . why should we lose what is possible in striving for the impossible? There are but two marks that every policy must aim at—honour and expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment should stick to that, if they have political wisdom; those to whom it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest proof of unwisdom: and the men to do that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we must give a ready submission to orders.” [24.15] Philopoemen, however, said that “People should not suppose him so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost of their tyranny? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power? . . . And if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us,⁷¹ . . . and if, by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once condemn the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notoriously slaves this long time past? Therefore it must either be admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is exceedingly strong and honourable. That the time will come when the Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible? Surely as late as possible! In this, then, my policy differs from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to come: I wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off.” [24.15] From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the one was honourable, of the other undignified, both were founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore while both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened with serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to the Romans undiminished; though a report found its way about that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen. . . . ## Book XXV [25.1] Tiberius Gracchus destroyed three hundred cities of the Celtiberes.⁷² . . . [25.2] The attack upon him being sudden and formidable, Pharnaces was reduced to submit to almost any terms; and on his sending an embassy, Eumenes and Ariarathes immediately accepted his proposals, and sent ambassadors to Pharnaces in return. When this had been repeated several times, the pacification was concluded on the following terms: “Eumenes, Prusias, and Ariarathes, shall maintain perpetual peace with Pharnaces and Mithridates. [25.2] “Pharnaces shall not enter Galatia on any pretence. “Such treaties as exist between Pharnaces and Gauls are hereby rescinded. [25.2] “Pharnaces shall likewise evacuate Paphlagonia, after restoring the inhabitants whom he had previously expelled, with their shields, javelins, and other equipment. “Pharnaces shall restore to Ariarathes all territory of which he has deprived him, with the property thereon and the hostages. [25.2] “He shall restore Tium by the Pontus, which some time before was given freely and liberally by Eumenes to Prusias. “Pharnaces shall restore, without ransom, all prisoners of war and all deserters.” [25.2] “He shall repay to Morzius and Ariarathes, in lieu of all money and treasure taken from them, the sum of nine hundred talents, and shall add thereto three hundred talents for Eumenes towards the expenses of the war. “Mithridates, the Satrap of Armenia, shall also pay three hundred talents, because he attacked Ariarathes in defiance of the treaty with Eumenes. [25.2] “The persons included under this treaty are, of the princes in Asia, Artaxias, lord of the greater part of Armenia, and Acusilochus: of those in Europe, Gatalus the Sarmatian: of the autonomous peoples, the Heracleotes, the Mesembrians in the Chersonese, and the Cyzicenes.” [25.2] The number and quality of hostages to be given by Pharnaces was also specified. The armies of the several parties then marched away, and thus was concluded the war of Eumenes and Ariarathes against Pharnaces. [25.2] Philip V. died at Amphipolis towards the end of B.C. 179. His last days were embittered by remorse for the death of his son Demetrius, whose innocence had been demonstrated to him. He wished to leave his crown to Antigonus, the son of Echecrates and nephew of Antigonus Doson, in order to punish his elder son Perseus for his treachery in securing his brother’s death. But Philip died suddenly before this could be secured, and Perseus succeeded him without opposition. See Livy, 40, 55-57. [25.3] Having renewed the alliance with Rome, Perseus immediately began intriguing in Greece. He invited back into Macedonia absconding debtors, condemned exiles, and those who had been compelled to leave their country on charges of treason. He caused notices to be put up to that effect at Delos, Delphi, and the temple of Athena at Iton,⁷³ offering not only indemnity to all who returned, but also the restoration of the property lost by their exile. Such also as still remained in Macedonia he released from their debts to the Royal exchequer, and set free those who had been confined in fortresses upon charges of treason. By these measures he raised expectations in the minds of many, and was considered to be holding out great hopes to all the Greeks. Nor were other parts of his life and habits wanting in a certain royal magnificence. His outward appearance was striking, and he was well endowed with all the physical advantages requisite for a statesman. His look and mien were alike dignified and such as became his age. He had moreover avoided his father’s weakness for wine and women, and not only drank moderately at dinner himself, but was imitated in this respect by his intimates and friends. Such was the commencement of the reign of Perseus. . . . [25.3] When king Philip had become powerful and had obtained supremacy over the Greeks, he showed the most utter disregard of faith and principle; but when the breeze of fortune again set against him, his moderation was as conspicuous in its turn. But after his final and complete defeat, he tried by every possible expedient to consolidate the strength of his kingdom. [25.4] After despatching the consuls Tiberius and Claudius against the Istri and Agrii,⁷⁴ the Senate towards the end of summer transacted business with the ambassadors that had come from the Lycians. They had not arrived at Rome until the Lycians had been completely conquered, but they had been despatched a considerable time before. For the people of Xanthus in Lycia, when about to embark upon the war, had sent Nicostratus and others to Achaia and Rome as ambassadors: who coming to Rome at that time moved many of the Senators to pity them, by laying before them the oppressiveness of the Rhodians and their own danger; and at length induced the Senate to send envoys to Rhodes to declare that “On inspecting the record of the arrangements made by the ten commissioners in Asia, when settling the dominions of Antiochus, it appeared that the Lycians had been given to the Rhodians, not as a gift, but rather as friends and allies.” But many were still dissatisfied with this solution of the matter. For the Romans seemed to wish, by thus pitting Rhodes against Lycia, to exhaust the accumulations and treasures of the Rhodians, because they had heard of the recent conveyance of the bride of Perseus by the Rhodians, and of their grand naval review. For shortly before this the Rhodians had been holding, with great splendour and elaboration of equipment, a review of all vessels belonging to them; the fact being that a vast quantity of timber for shipbuilding had been presented to them by Perseus. Moreover he had presented a gold tiara to each of the rowers on the upper bench in the ship that had brought him his bride Laodice.⁷⁵ . . . [25.5] When the envoys from Rome reached Rhodes and announced the decrees of the Senate, there was a great excitement in the island, and much confused discussion among the leading politicians. They were much annoyed at the allegation that the Lycians had not been given them as a gift but as allies; for having just satisfied themselves that the Lycian war was successfully concluded, they saw the commencement of fresh trouble for themselves growing up. For no sooner had the Romans arrived and made this announcement to the Rhodians, than the Lycians began a fresh revolt, and showed a determination of fighting to the last extremity for autonomy and freedom. However, after hearing the Roman envoys, the Rhodians made up their minds that the Romans had been deceived by the Lycians, and forthwith appointed Lycophron to lead an embassy to offer an explanation to the Senate. And the state of affairs was such that there was momentary expectation of a fresh rising of the Lycians. . . . [25.6] When the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome the Senate, after listening to their address, deferred its answer. Meanwhile the Dardanian envoys came with reports as to the number of the Bastarnae, the size of their men, and their courage in the field. They gave information also of the treacherous practices of Perseus and the Gauls, and said that they were more afraid of him than of the Bastarnae, and therefore begged the help of the Romans. The report of the Dardani being supported by that of the Thessalian envoys who arrived at that time, and who also begged for help, the Senators determined to send some commissioners to see with their own eyes the truth of these reports; and they accordingly at once appointed and despatched Aulus Postumius, accompanied by some young men. . . ## Book XXVI [26.1] Seleucus Philopator, whom we last heard of as king of Syria, was assassinated by one of his nobles—Heliodorus—in the twelfth year of his reign. Antiochus his younger brother had been a hostage at Rome, and being, according to agreement, exchanged in B. C. 175 for Philopator’s son Demetrius, he was returning to Syria. At Athens, on his journey home, he heard of the death of Seleucus, and the attempt of Heliodorus to usurp the kingdom. By the help of Eumenes Heliodorus was expelled and Antiochus installed, to the satisfaction of the people, who gave him at first the surname of Epiphanes. He is the Antiochus Epiphanes whose cruelties are recorded in the books of the Maccabees. He died mad at Tabae in Persia, B. C. 164. See 31, 11. For the following extract preserved by Athenaeus, see the translation of Livy, 41, 19. [26.1] Antiochus Epiphanes, nicknamed from his actions Epimanes (the Madman), would sometimes steal from the court, avoiding his attendants, and appear roaming wildly about in any chance part of the city with one or two companions. His favourite place to be found was the shops of the silversmiths or goldsmiths, chatting and discussing questions of art with the workers in relief and other artists; at another time he would join groups of the people of the town and converse with any one he came across, and would drink with foreign visitors of the humblest description. Whenever he found any young men carousing together he would come to the place without giving notice, with fife and band, like a rout of revellers, and often by his unexpected appearance cause the guests to rise and run away. He would often also lay aside his royal robes, and, putting on a tebenna,⁷⁶ go round the market-place as though a candidate for office, shaking hands and embracing various people whom he intreated to vote for him, sometime as aedile, and sometimes as tribune. And when he got the office and took his seat on an ivory curule chair, after the fashion of the Romans, he heard law cases which came on in the agora, and decided them with the utmost seriousness and attention. This conduct was very embarrassing to respectable people, some of whom regarded him as a good natured easy-going man, and others as a madman. In regard to making presents, too, his behaviour was on a par with this. Some he presented with dice made of gazelle horn, some with dates, others with gold. There were even instances of his making unexpected presents to men whom he met casually, and whom he had never seen before. In regard to public sacrifices and the honours paid to the gods, he surpassed all his predecessors on the throne; as witness the Olympieium at Athens and the statues placed round the altar at Delos. He used also to bathe in the public baths, when they were full of the townspeople, pots of the most expensive unguents being brought in for him; and on one occasion on some one saying, “Lucky fellows you kings, to use such things and smell so sweet!” without saying a word to the man, he waited till he was bathing the next day, and then coming into the bath caused a pot of the largest size and of the most costly kind of unguent called stactè to be poured over his head, so that there was a general rush of the bathers to roll themselves in it; and when they all tumbled down, the king himself among them, from its stickiness, there was loud laughter. . . . ## Book XXVII [27.1] The events of the years B.C. 174, 173, 172, which gradually led up to the war with Perseus, to be described in the twenty-seventh book, were briefly these:— [27.1] In B.C. 174 Perseus forced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him to Rome, to submit to his authority. After this successful expedition he marched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where he stayed three days, Phthiotid Achaia, and Thessaly. He carefully abstained from inflicting any damage in the districts through which he passed, and tried to gain the confidence of the various states. In the same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden any Lacedaemonian to enter their territory, by offering to restore their fugitive slaves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the Strategus, the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 22-24). [27.1] The same year saw also commotions in Aetolia, which were settled by five Roman commissioners: and in Crete, on the old score of the status of the Lycians. Q. Minucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 25). In B. C. 173 Perseus entered on still more active intrigues in Greece, and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to his tyranny, he gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia. The Senate accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and Achaia, and App. Claudius to Thessaly, to inquire into the facts; and a commission of five into Macedonia, with directions to proceed afterwards to Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6). [27.1] In B. C. 172 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to take measures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus; warning them that he had already obtained strong hold upon the Boeotians and Aetolians, and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That everywhere he had secured the death or exile of the partisans of Rome, and was overrunning in arms Thessaly and Perrhaebia (Livy, 42, 11-13). [27.1] The Senate, already inclined to listen to these representations, was still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Harpalus, the representative of king Perseus; by the attempted assassination of Eumenes by emissaries of Perseus at Delphi on his home journey; by receiving a report from Greece from C. Valerius confirming the speech of Eumenes; and lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of Brundisium, that he had been requested to poison certain Roman envoys who were accustomed to stay at his house on their journeys to and from Macedonia and Greece (Livy, 42, 15-17). [27.1] War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered to enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of the assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27). [27.1] In B. C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia, envoys appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would not allow them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple of Bellona: and after listening to a report from Sp. Cavilius that Perseus had, among other acts of hostility, taken cities in Thessaly and entered Perrhaebia in arms, the Senate answered the Macedonian envoys that any complaint they had to make must be made to the consul, P. Licinius, who would presently be in Macedonia, but that they must not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36). [27.1] A few days afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who distributed the districts to be visited among themselves: Servius and Publius Lentulus and Lucius Decimius were to go to Cephallenia, the Peloponnese, and the west coast generally; Q. Marcius and Aulus Atilius to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea, where they were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus, demanding the cause of their coming and of the presence of troops in Macedonia, was received and left unanswered. After visiting the districts assigned to them, in the course of doing which Marcius and Atilius had met Perseus on the river Peneus, and granted him a truce to enable him to send envoys to Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans were not yet fully prepared for war⁷⁷), the commissioners reached their destination at Chalcis, where the earlier events narrated in the following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43). ### Affairs In Boeotia: The War with Perseus [27.1] At this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of an embassy from the Thespians, and Ismenias⁷⁸ from Neon. Lases and his colleagues offered to put their city wholly into the hands of the Romans; Ismenias proposed to submit all the cities of Boeotia as one nation to the discretion of the commissioners. But this latter proposal was diametrically opposed to the policy of Marcius and his colleagues. What suited that policy best was to split up Boeotia into separate cities: and they therefore received Lases and his party, as well as the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, and all who came from single cities, with great favour and lavish courtesy; but treated Ismenias with ostentatious neglect and coldness. Some of the exiles⁷⁹ also attacked Ismenias and were very near stoning him to death, and would have done so if he had not saved himself by taking refuge through the door⁸⁰ of the chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the same period there were disturbances and party contests at Thebes. One party were for committing the town unconditionally to Rome; but the Coroneans and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained that they ought to maintain the alliance with Perseus. For a time neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give in to each other; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the example of changing sides and asserting that they ought to cleave to the Romans, a great change and revolution came over the feelings of the populace. First, they compelled Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other commissioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next, they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and bidding them go and make their own defence for the terms that they had made; for they were the men who had negotiated the alliance. When these men had left the town, the people immediately collected into the assembly and first voted honours and gifts to the Romans, and then ordered the magistrates to push on the alliance. Last of all they appointed ambassadors to hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their exiles. [27.2] Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes, the exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to state their grievances against Ismenias, Neon, and Dicetas. The bad policy of these men being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the exiles, Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that they were in danger of falling victims to the fury of the populace, until the Romans, by checking the assaults of the mob, secured them a certain degree of safety. [27.2] When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to the commissioners the decrees and honours I have mentioned, a rapid change passed over the face of things in each of the towns, for they were separated by a very narrow interval from each other. The commissioners with Marcius received the Theban envoys, complimented their town and counselled them to restore the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies to Rome submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the protection of the Romans. Their policy, therefore, of splitting up the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the popularity of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian populace having thus completely succeeded, the commissioners sent for Servius Lentulus from Argos, and leaving him in charge at Chalcis went themselves to the Peloponnese; while Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia; and Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison, shortly afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came about that the Boeotians, who had for a long period of years, and through many strange vicissitudes, maintained a national league, by now rashly and inconsiderately adopting the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an outburst of unreasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and split up into separate cities. [27.2] When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communication with the council of the Achaean league, they called upon Archon the Strategus to despatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison the town until the arrival of the Romans; an order which Archon readily obeyed. Having thus settled affairs in Greece during the winter, and met Publius Lentulus and his two colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to Rome. . . . [27.3] Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulus Postumius had been engaged on a visitation of the islands and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent the longest time in Rhodes; though the Rhodians at that time did not require any supervision, for the prytanis that year was Agesilochus, a man of high rank, who had once been on an embassy to Rome. Even before the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people to throw in their fortunes with those of Rome; and, among other things, had counselled them to repair forty ships, in order that, if any occasion for using them should arise, it should not find them still in the midst of preparations, but ready to answer to the call and to carry out their resolve at once. By stating these facts to the Roman envoys, and showing them the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return to Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes. . . . [27.4] After the conferences had been held between the Roman envoys and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a despatch containing a statement of his case, and the arguments employed on either side; partly from an idea that he would thus be shown to have the superiority of right on his side, and partly because he wished to test the feelings of the several states. Copies of this despatch he sent to the other states by his ordinary letter-carriers; but to Rhodes he sent also Antenor and Philip as ambassadors, who, on their arrival in the island, handed over the document to the magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered the Council chamber and urged the Rhodians “To remain neutral for the present and watch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked Perseus in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate. For this was the interest of all, and pre-eminently of the Rhodians, who more than most peoples desired equality and freedom of speech, and were ever the protectors, not only of their own liberty, but of that of the rest of Greece also; and therefore ought to be proportionally careful to provide and guard against a policy of an opposite tendency.” These and similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of friendship to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far prevailed that, though a friendly reception was given to the Macedonian envoys, they demanded in their formal answer that Perseus should not ask them to take any measure which would involve the appearance of hostility to Rome. Antenor and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with thanks for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to Macedonia. . . . [27.5] Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia remained faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander on a mission to them. On his arrival in Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from visiting any of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,⁸¹ and Haliartus, finding that they offered him no facilities for securing close relations. But he entered those three towns and exhorted their inhabitants to cling to their loyalty to the Macedonians. They received his words with enthusiasm, and voted to send ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander accordingly returned to the king and reported the state of things in Boeotia. A short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian cause; for the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because they would not agree with them and side with Rome. But Perseus replied that he was precluded by the truce from sending any aid to any one; but he begged them to resist the Thebans to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war with the Romans, but to remain neutral. . . . [27.6] When the report of the commissioners from Asia concerning Rhodes and the other states had been made at Rome, the Senate called in the ambassadors of Perseus, Solon and Hippias: who endeavoured to argue the whole case and to deprecate the anger of the Senate; and particularly to defend their master on the subject of the attempt upon the life of Eumenes. When they had finished all they had to urge, the Senate, which had all the while been resolved on war, bade them depart forthwith from Rome; and ordered all other Macedonians also that happened to be staying in the country to quit Italy within thirty days. The Senate then called upon the Consuls to act at once and see that they moved in good time. . . . [27.7] Caius Lucretius⁸² being at anchor off Cephallenia, wrote a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to despatch some ships, and entrusted the letter to a certain trainer named Socrates. This letter arrived at Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of Stratocles. When the question came on for discussion, Agathagetus, Rhodophon, Astymedes, and many others were for sending the ships and taking part in the war from the first, without any further pretence; but Deinon and Polyaratus, though really displeased at the favour already shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes as their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings of the populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling of suspicion and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against Eumenes, dating from the time of his war with Pharnaces; when, upon king Eumenes blockading the entrance of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into the Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with his design and thwarted him. This ill-feeling had again been recently exasperated during the Lycian war on the question of certain forts, and a strip of territory on the frontier of the Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of Eumenes’s subjects. These incidents taken together made the Rhodians ready to listen to anything against the king. Seizing on this pretext, the party of Deinon tried to discredit the despatch, asserting that it did not come from the Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve them on any possible pretext in a war, and bring expense and perfectly unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support of their contention they put forward the fact that the man who brought the letter was some obscure trainer or another; and asserted that the Romans were not accustomed to employ such messengers, but were rather inclined to act with unnecessary care and dignity in the despatch of such missives. When they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had really been written by Lucretius: their object was to persuade the Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but rather to perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions for offence and displeasure to crop up between the two nations. For their deliberate purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the Roman friendship, and to join it to that of Perseus, by every means in their power. Their motives for thus clinging to Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and vain, had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was avaricious and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on increasing his wealth by getting presents from princes and kings. These speeches having been delivered, the Prytanis Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some length against Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the despatch of the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were prepared, five of which were sent to Chalcis under the command of Timagoras, and the other under the command of another Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander fell in at Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by Perseus to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew. All such allies as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius thanked warmly, but excused from taking part in this service, observing that the Romans had no need of naval support. . . . [27.7] Perseus now collected a large army at Citium, thirty-nine thousand foot and four thousand horse, and advanced through the north of Thessaly taking many towns, and finally taking up his quarters at Sicyrium, at the foot of Mount Ossa. The Roman consul, P. Licinius, marched from the south-west through Gomphi, and thence to Larisa, where he crossed the river Peneus. After some cavalry skirmishes, which were generally favourable to the king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman camp, and a more important battle was fought, in which the king again scored a considerable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops. The Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners and two thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry and forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the victory sufficiently to inflict a crushing blow upon the Roman army; and though the Consul withdrew to the south of the Peneus, after some days’ reflection the king made proposals of peace. See Livy, 42, 51-62. B. C. 171 (summer). [27.8] After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned his Council, when some of his friends expressed an opinion that he ought to send an embassy to the Roman general, to signify his readiness even now to pay the Romans the same amount of tribute as his father had formerly undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to evacuate the same places. “For if,” they argued, “the Romans accept the terms the war will be ended in a manner honourable to the king after his victory in the field; and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will be much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or harsh burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other hand, in spite of the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to accept them, the anger of heaven will with justice fall on them; while the king by his moderation will gain the support of Gods and men alike.” The majority of his friends held this view, and Perseus expressing his assent to it, Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, and Midon of Beroea, were forthwith sent as ambassadors to Licinius. On their arrival, Licinius summoned his Council, and the ambassadors having stated their proposals in accordance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague were requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the proposition thus made to them. They decided unanimously to return as stern an answer as possible. For this is a peculiarity of the Romans, which they have inherited from their ancestors, and are continually displaying,—to show themselves most peremptory and imperious in the presence of defeat, and most moderate when successful: a very noble peculiarity, as every one will acknowledge; but whether it be feasible under certain circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the present occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit without reserve himself, and give the Senate full power to take whatever measures it might think good concerning Macedonia and all in it. On this being communicated to Pantauchus and Midon, they returned and informed Perseus and his friends; some of whom were roused to anger at this astonishing display of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more embassies or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however, was not the man to take such a line. He sent again and again to Licinius, with continually enhanced offers, and promising a larger and larger sum of money. But as nothing that he could do had any effect, and as his friends found fault with him, and told him that, though he had won a victory, he was acting like one who had been defeated and lost all, he was at length compelled to renounce the sending of embassies, and remove his camp back to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the campaign. . . . [27.9] When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of the cavalry engagement, and of the victory of the Macedonians, spread through Greece, the inclination of the populace to the cause of Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them having up to that time concealed their real feelings. Their conduct, to my mind, was like what one sees at gymnastic contests. When some obscure and far inferior combatant descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to be invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour upon the weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by applause, and eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm. And if he succeeds so far as even to touch the face of his opponent, and make a mark to prove the blow, the whole of the spectators again show themselves on his side. Sometimes they even jeer at his antagonist: not because they dislike or undervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by the unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they are quick to change and see their mistake. And this is what Cleitomachus is said to have done. He had the character of being an invincible athlete, and, as his reputation was spread all over the world, King Ptolemy is said to have been inspired with the ambition of putting an end to it. He therefore had Aristonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extraordinary care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the arena at Olympia a great number of the spectators, it seems, immediately showed their favour for him, and cheered him on, being rejoiced that some one should have had the courage to make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus. But when, as the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for his antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was a general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm showed itself loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to Aristonicus to keep up his spirits. Thereupon they say that Cleitomachus stepped aside, and after waiting a short time to recover his breath, turned to the crowd and asked them “Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him all they could? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat? Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment fighting for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king Ptolemy? Would they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the crown by beating Greeks, or that a Theban and Boeotian should be proclaimed victor in boxing over all comers?” Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a revulsion of feeling came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling than by Cleitomachus. [27.10] What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the feeling of the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one had pulled them up and asked them plainly, in so many words, whether they wished such great power to fall to one man, and were desirous of trying the effect of an utterly irresponsible despotism, I presume that they would have promptly bethought themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone to the other extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled to their recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of Macedonia from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at once and decisively changed their minds. However, for the present, at the first burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people showed unmistakable signs of joy at the news, being delighted at the unlooked-for appearance of a champion able to cope with Rome. I say this much to prevent any one, in ignorance of human nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude against the Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that time. . . . [27.11] The cestros was a novel invention, made during the war with Perseus. This weapon consisted of an iron bolt two palms long, half of which was spike, and half a tube for the reception of the wooden shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a span in length and a finger-breadth in diameter. At the middle point of the shaft three wooden “plumes” were morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal length, and on the leather between them the missile was loosely set. When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs taut, the missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one of the thongs, it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and was projected from the sling with such force as to inflict a very grievous wound upon any one whom it hit.⁸³ [27.12] Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of great ability in military affairs, and besides, quite unlike a Thracian in character. For he was of sober habits, and gave evidence of a gentleness of temper and a steadiness of disposition worthy of a man of gentle birth. . . . [27.13] Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no means like an Egyptian, but was a man of sense and administrative ability. He received the governorship of the island when the king of Egypt was quite a child, and devoted himself with great zeal to the collection of money, refusing payments of any kind to any one, though he was often asked for them by the king’s agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for refusing to part with any. But when the king came of age he made up a large sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king Ptolemy himself and his courtiers expressed their approval of his previous parsimony and determination not to part with any money. . . . [27.13] The battle on the Peneus was followed by other engagements of no great importance; and finally Perseus returned to Macedonia, and the Romans went into winter quarters in various towns in Thessaly, without a decisive blow having been struck on either side. Winter of B.C. 171-170. Livy, 42, 64-67. [27.14] Just about the time when Perseus retired for the winter from the Roman war, Antenor arrived at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the ransom of Diophanes and those who were on board with him. Thereupon there arose a great dispute among the statesmen as to what course they ought to take. Philophron, Theaetetus, and their party were against entering into such an arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus and their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an arrangement with Perseus for their redemption. . . . [27.15] Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epirus. He had long been connected by friendship with the royal house of Macedonia, but was now compelled by the force of circumstances to embrace the side of Perseus, the cause of which was as follows: There was a certain Epirote named Charops, a man of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of his being driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus conquering Epirus and Macedonia. Charops had a son named Machatus, who had a son also named Charops. Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth, the elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to Rome to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of time the young man returned home, having made many intimate friendships at Rome. The elder Charops then died, and the young man, being of a restless and designing character, began giving himself airs and attacking the distinguished men in the country. At first he was not much noticed, Antinous and Cephalus, his superiors in age and reputation, managing public affairs as they thought right. But when the war with Perseus broke out, the young man at once began laying information against these statesmen at Rome, grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said or did, and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing some facts and adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusations against them believed. Now Cephalus had always shown good sense and consistency, and at the present crisis had adhered to a course of the highest wisdom. He had begun by praying heaven that the war might not take place, or the question come to the arbitrament of arms; but when the war was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or showing any unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When Charops then vehemently accused Cephalus at Rome, and represented everything that happened contrary to the wishes of the Romans as malice prepense on his part, at first he and others like him thought little of the matter, being not conscious of entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they saw Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested without cause, and conveyed to Rome after the cavalry battle, and that the accusations made against them by Lyciscus were believed,—Lyciscus being a leader of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was in Epirus,—they at length began to be anxious about what would happen, and to consider their position. They resolved therefore to try every possible means to prevent themselves from being similarly arrested without trial and carried to Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their original policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus. . . . [27.16] Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of flagrant impiety and treachery. They learnt that the Roman consul Aulus Hostilius was on his way to Thessaly to join the army; and thinking that, if they could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would have given the latter the strongest possible proof of their devotion, and have done the greatest possible damage to the Romans at this crisis, they wrote urgently to Perseus to make haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and joining them; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians had seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give them battle first. Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at Phanota,⁸⁴ and put up at the house of Nestor the Cropian,⁸⁵ and thus gave his enemies an excellent opportunity; and had not fortune interfered on his behalf, I do not think that he would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor providentially suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour. Accordingly he gave up the idea of going by land through Epirus, and, having sailed to Anticyra,⁸⁶ thence made his way into Thessaly. . . . [27.17] Pharnaces was the worst of all his predecessors on the throne. . . . [27.18] While Attalus was spending the winter in Elateia (in Phocis), knowing that his brother Eumenes was annoyed in the highest possible degree at the splendid honours which had been awarded to him having been annulled by a public decree of the Peloponnesians, though he concealed his annoyance from every one,—he took upon himself to send messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not only the statues of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions also, which had been placed in his brother’s honour, should be restored. His motive in acting thus was the belief that he could give his brother no greater gratification, and at the same time would display to the Greeks by this act his own brotherly affection and generosity.⁸⁷ . . . [27.19] When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexandria was openly making preparations for a war of annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent Meleager at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to inform the Senate of the fact, and to protest that Ptolemy was attacking him without the least justification. . . . [27.20] In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate every undertaking by considerations of time; but this is especially true in war, in which a moment makes all the difference between success and failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors. . . . [27.20] Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who venture to attempt it; and of those who do so, it is rare to find any that have the resolution to persevere to the end. . . . ## Notes [1] That is the treaty between Philip and Antiochus. [2] The word βίαχα in the text is unknown, and certainly corrupt. The most obvious remedy is ὑπόβρυχα or ὑποβρύχια. But we cannot be sure. [3] An inscription found at Iassus [C. I. G. 2683] has confirmed this name which is found in one MS. instead of Hestias. Whether the meaning of the title is Artemis of the City, or some local designation, is uncertain. [4] Called Panion or Paneion. See Josephus B. Jud. 3, 10, 7, Ἰορδάνου πήγη τὸ Πάνειον. The town near it was called Paneas, and afterwards Paneas Caesarea, and later still Caesarea Philippi. Scopas, the Aetolian, was now serving Ptolemy Epiphanes; see 13, 2; 18, 53. [5] See on 4, 77; 13, 1. [6] See 15, 25. [7] Ptolemy Philopator had made Gaza his chief depôt of war material; see 5, 68. Antiochus destroyed it in B. C. 198 for its loyalty to the King of Egypt. [8] Syria was conquered by the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pilezer about B.C. 747, and was afterwards a part of the Babylonian and Persian empires. It does not seem certain to what invasion Polybius is here referring. [9] That is from the wars undertaken by them against Philip. Livy, 31, 14, 24. [10] For the Phocians see Pausan. 10.1.6. For the Acarnanians see supra. 9, 40. [11] The reading ἐναύσασθαι, which I attempt to represent, is doubtful. Schweig. suggests ἐγγεύσασθαι “to taste.” [12] Demosthenes, de Corona, §§ 43, 48, 295. [13] B. C. 338 after the battle of Chaeronea. See Thirlwall, 6, 77; Grote, 11, 315 (ch. 90); Kennedy’s translation of the de Corona, Appendix vi. The argument of Polybius is of course an ex post facto one. It is open still to maintain that, had the advice of Demosthenes been followed, these states might have been freed from the tyranny of Sparta without becoming subject to another master in the king of Macedonia. [14] Attalus spent the winter of B.C. 198-197 at Aegina, in the course of which he seems to have visited Sicyon. [15] That is of Cynoscephalae. Supergressi tumulos qui Cynoscephalae vocantur, relicta ibi statione firma peditum equitumque, posuerunt castra. Livy, 33, 7. [16] I have given the meaning which I conceive this sentence to have; but the editors generally suspect the loss of a word like ἄπρακτα or ἀπραγοῦντα after τὰ μὲν συνεχῆ τοῖς διαγωνιζομένοις. This is unnecessary if we regard συνεχῆ as predicative, and I think this way of taking it gives sufficient sense. Polybius is thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy, the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting. [17] See 3, 87. [18] Iliad, 13, 131. [19] See 4, 77; 7, 12; 10, 26. [20] See 6, 56; 32, 11. [21] Livy (33, 13) has mistaken the meaning of Polybius in this passage, representing the quarrel of the Aetolians and Flamininus as being for the possession of Thebes,—the only town, in fact, on which there was no dispute. [22] Referring apparently to the conduct of the Hellenic cities in Asia in presence of Antiochus, who, having wintered in Ephesus (B. C. 197-196), was endeavouring in 196 by force or stratagem to consolidate his power in Asia Minor. Livy, 33, 38. [23] Justin. 17, 1-2; Appian Syr. 62. The battle was in the plain of Corus in Phrygia. [24] The Apocleti, of the numbers of whom we have no information, acted as a consultative senate to prepare measures for the Aetolian Assembly. See Freeman, History of Federal Government, p. 335. Livy, 35, 34. [25] προσένειμαν Αἰτώλοις τὸ ἔθνος, cp. 2, 43. Some have thought that a regular political union with the Aetolian League is meant. But the spirit of the narrative seems to point rather to an alliance. [26] Brachylles, when a Boeotarch in B. C. 196, was assassinated by a band of six men, of whom three were Italians and three Aetolians, on his way home from a banquet. Livy, 33, 28. [27] Livy, 33, 29. [28] At Thermopylae, in which battle Livy (36, 19) states on the authority of Polybius that only 500 men out of 10,000 brought by Antiochus into Greece escaped, B. C. 191. [29] Livy, 37, 9. [30] Son of Antiochus the Great, afterwards King Seleucus IV. [31] This extract, preserved in Suidas, s. v. προστηθιδίων, has been restored by a brilliant emendation of Toupe, who reads ἐξελθόντες μὲν Γάλλοι for the meaningless ἐξελθόντες μεγάλοι. Livy calls them fanatici Galli. [32] Dies forte, quibus Ancilia moventur, religiosi ad iter inciderant. Livy. 37, 33. The festival of Mars, during which the ancilia were carried about, was on the 1st of March and following days. If this incident, therefore, took place in the late spring or summer of B. C. 190, the Roman Calendar must have been very far out. [33] The text of this fragment is much dislocated. [34] Smoking out an enemy in a mine was one of the regular manœuvres. See Aen. Tact. 37. It was perhaps suggested by the illegal means taken by workmen in the silver mines to annoy a rival; for we find an Athenian law directed against it. See Demosth. in Pantaen. § 36. [35] Nothing seems to be known of this exile of Fulvius, who had been granted an ovation in B. C. 191 for his victories in Spain. He was, however, in opposition to Cato, one of whose numerous prosecutions may have been against him. [36] Or “a compliment.” The Greek word στέφανος seems to be used for any present made to a victor. So also in ch. 34, and elsewhere. [37] Hultsch’s text, supported by the MSS., has *δάμις ὁ κιχησίων, from which no sense seems obtainable. According to Suidas, Damis was a philosopher from Nineveh who had settled in Athens. Livy (38, 10), has Leon Hicesiae filius. He must therefore have found the name Leon in his copy, which could hardly have been substituted for Δᾶμις by mistake, though ἹΚΕΣίου may have become κιχησίων. [38] The Greek text is corrupt. The sense is given from Livy, 38, 14. [39] The dynasty lasted until the time of the Mithridatic wars. The last Moagĕtes being deposed by Muraena, when Cibyra was joined to Lycia. Strabo, 13.4.71. [40] That is probably “of the necessity of submitting to Rome” but the passage referred to is lost. [41] See ch. 6. [42] This is really Plutarch’s version of a story he found in Polybius, and, to judge from Livy, 38, 24, not a very complete one. It took place near Ancyra. Plutarch de mulierum virtutibus. [43] See Livy, 38, 28, 29. The fragment here seems to be that translated by Livy in ch. 29, Romani nocte per arcem, quam Cyatidem vocant (nam urbs in mare devexa in Occidentem vergit) muro superato in forum pervenerunt. The people of Same suddenly threw off the terms under which the rest of Cephallania had submitted and stood a four months’ siege. [44] These words are wanting in the text. From Livy (38, 38) it appears that the territory was defined as between the Taurus and the R. Halys as far as the borders of Lycaonia. [45] Livy (l. c.) has neve monerem ex belli causa quod ipse illaturus erit. [46] See Livy, 38, 39. Some words are lost referring to grants to the people of Ilium. [47] This summary is arranged by Hultsch as chs. 1 and 2 of book 22. It appears as book 23, chs. 4, 5 in Schweighaeuser’s text. [48] In B. C. 191 Philopoemen secured the adhesion of Sparta to the Achaean league: but the Spartans were never united in their loyalty to it, and during his year as Strategus (B. C. 189) he punished a massacre of some Achaean sympathisers in Sparta by an execution of eighty Spartans at Compasium on the frontier of Laconia. This number Plutarch gives on the authority of Polybius, but another account stated it at three hundred and fifty. Plut. Phil. 16. [49] Some words are lost from the text describing their method of procedure. [50] Some words are lost in the text which would more fully explain the transaction. [51] Some words are lost in the text which would more fully explain the transaction. [52] Something is lost in the text. [53] Livy (39, 24) gives the names as Q. Caecilius Metellus, M. Baebius Tamphilus, Ti. Sempronius. [54] Livy (39, 34) more cautiously says: veneno creditur sublatus. Such accusations were easily made, and not easily proved or confuted. [55] For the ten Cosmi of Crete, see Aristot. Pol. 2, 10; and Muller’s Dorians, vol. ii. p. 133 sq. Cydas gives his name to the year as πρωτόκοσμος, see C. I. G. 2583. The same inscription contains the title κοσμόπολις, apparently like πολιοῦχος, as a name for a guardian hero of the city. We have already had this latter title as that of a chief magistrate at Locri. See bk. 12, ch. 16. [56] There is some loss in the text as to these names. The last is mentioned on a Greek embassy in 22, 16. See also the index. Livy, 39, 41, says nothing of this committee of three. [57] The ten federal magistrates of the league, who formed a council to act with the general. Their number probably arose from the number of the Achaean cantons or towns, after two of the twelve—Helice and Olenus—were destroyed. Polybius nowhere else gives them this title in any part of the history we possess, but its use by Livy, 32, 22, seems to point to his having used it in other places. It also occurs in a letter of Philip II. (perhaps genuine) quoted in Demosth. de Cor. 157. Polybius calls them also οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἀρχαί, προεστῶτες συνάρχοντες, συναρχίαι. See Freeman’s Federal Gov. p. 282. [58] That is, apparently, by some fresh disturbance towards the end of B. C. 183. See Strachan-Davidson, p. 495. [59] The Messenians revolted from the league B.C. 183, and in the course of the fighting which ensued Philopoemen fell into an ambush, was taken prisoner, and put to death by them. See ch. 12. [60] Stasinus fr. [61] He was ill with fever. Plutarch, Phil. 18. [62] Livy (39, 50) speaks of Lycortas at the time of Philopoemen’s death as alter imperator Achaeorum. If he had been the ὑποστρατηγός we know that he would not by law have succeeded on the death of the Strategus. Plutarch, Phil. 21, seems to assert that an election was held at once, but not the ordinary popular election. [63] That is the ten Demiurgi. [64] The second congress of the year seems to mean not that held for election of the Strategus for the next year, which met about 12th May, but the second regular meeting in August. [65] This looks like a local name, but no place is known corresponding to it. A Diactorides of Sparta is mentioned in Herodotus, 6, 127; and perhaps, as Hultsch suggests, we ought to read “Cletis and Diactorius.” [66] The mission to Eumenes and Pharnaces has been already mentioned in bk. 23, ch. 9, but the name of the ambassador was not given; nor is it mentioned by Livy (40, 20), who records the mission. It is uncertain who is meant by Marcus, some editors have altered it to Marcius, i.e. Q. Marcius Philippus, who had been sent to Macedonia, imagining him to have fulfilled both missions. [67] From Strabo (vii. 5, 13), who adds: “But this is not true, for the distance from the Adriatic is immense, and there are many obstacles in the way to obscure the view.” [68] Perhaps thirty, which seems to have been the legal age for admission to political functions. See 29, 24. [69] See Hicks’s Greek Inscriptions, p. 330. [70] Something is lost from the text. [71] Something is lost from the text. [72] From Strabo 3, ch. 4, who quotes Poseidonius as criticising this statement by remarking that Polybius must count every tower as a city. [73] The notices are put up at the three places visited yearly by great numbers, and by many separate pilgrims. It is interesting to notice the persistence in a custom common from the earliest times, at any rate as far as Delos and Delphi are concerned. Iton was in Thessaly, and the temple and oracle of Athena there was celebrated throughout Greece, and was the central place of worship for the Thessalians. The town stood in a rich plain on the river Cuarius, and hence its name—sometimes written Siton—was connected by some with σιτόφορος, “corn-bearing” (Steph. Byz.) Homer calls it μητέρα μήλων, “mother of sheep.” Pyrrhus hung up in this temple the spoils of Antigonus and his Gallic soldiers about B. C. 273. [Pausan. 1.13.2], “Itonian Athena” had temples in other parts of Greece also, e.g. in Boeotia [Paus. 9, 34, 1]. [74] The war in Istria, and the mutiny of the troops against the consul Manlius, are described in Livy, 41, 8-11. [75] Besides this connexion with Seleucus of Syria, sure to be offensive to Rome, Perseus gave a sister to Prusias, another enemy of Rome and Eumenes. Livy, 42, 12. [76] This word, of unknown origin, seems to be used here for the toga, or some dress equivalent to it. See 10, 4. [77] Marcius on his return to Rome gloried in having thus deceived the king and gained time for preparations at Rome, but his action was repudiated by the Senate. Livy, 42, 47. [78] Ismenias had just been elected Strategus of Boeotia; but the party who had supported a rival candidate had in revenge obtained a decree of the league banishing the Boeotarchs from all the Boeotian cities. They had, however been received at Thespiae, whence they were recalled to Thebes and reinstated by a reaction in popular feeling. Then they obtained another decree banishing the twelve men who, though not in office, had convened the league assembly; and Ismenias as Strategus sentenced them to the loss of all rights in their absence. These are the “exiles” here meant (Livy, 42, 43). Who Neon was is not certain; but we find in the next chapter that he had been a leader in the Macedonising party at Thebes, perhaps a son of Brachylles, whose father’s name was Neon (see 20, 5). He was captured in B.C. 167 and put to death by the Romans (Livy, 45, 31). [79] See note 2, page 356. [80] τὰ δίθυρα, Livy (42, 44) says in tribunal legatorum, and Casaubon contents himself with the same word. Schweighaeuser translates it podium, as if a “raised platform” on which the commissioners sat was meant. I think it is used in the natural sense of a “door” leading into the hall in which they were sitting, and into which Ismenias fled for refuge. Livy used tribunal from the ideas of his age as to the construction of such a building. [81] The text has Θήβας, which is inconsistent with what follows as to the Thebans. An inscription found on the site of Thisbae supplies the correction of an error as old as Livy (42, 46, 47). See Hicks’s G. I. p. 330. [82] Gaius Lucretius had seen naval service as duumvir navalis on the coast of Liguria in B. C. 181. Livy, 40, 26. He was now (B. C. 171) Praetor, his provincia being the fleet, and commanded 40 quinqueremes. Id. 42, 48. [83] Livy, who translates this passage, calls the missile a cestrosphendona (42, 65). [84] In Phocis. The name was variously given as Phanoteis, Phanote, Phanota (Steph. Byz.) [85] Schweighaeuser seems to regard this as a second name. But the Greeks seldom had such, and it is more likely the designation of some unknown locality. There was an Attic deme named Cropia, and therefore the name is a recognised one (Steph. Byz.) Gronovius conjectured Ὠρωπίῳ “of Oropus.” [86] Apparently the Anticyra on the Sperchius, on the borders of Achaia Phthiotis. [87] Hence Attalus obtained the name of Philadelphus. The origin of Eumenes’s loss of popularity in the Peloponnese is referred to in 28, 7, but no adequate cause is alleged. A reference to Achaia in his speech at Rome was not perhaps altogether friendly (Livy, 42, 12), and we shall see that he was afterwards suspected of intriguing with Perseus; but if this extract is rightly placed, it can hardly be on this latter ground that the Achaeans had renounced him.