On the Existence of Evils — Proclus
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Translation/edition: Thomas Taylor
Language: English
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Translated by Thomas Taylor, 1833
WHAT the nature of evil is, and whence it derives its generation, some of those who preceded us have investigated, and engaged in the theory of it not superfluously, nor for the sake of something else; but have considered whether evil itself, surveyed by itself, is, or is not; and if it is, what kind of a thing it is, and whence it proceeds into existence and hypostasis. But it will not be amiss that we also, since we have leisure, should briefly narrate what each of these has said rightly, and prior to these, what have been the speculations of the divine Plato concerning the essence of evil. For by understanding what has been asserted by these men, we shall always more easily and more nearly comprehend the subjects of investigation, and shall, as it were, enkindle a light in ourselves from these inquiries.
1. In the first place, therefore, it must be considered whether evil is, or is not. And if it is, whether it is in intellectual natures or not? And if it is in sensibles, whether it subsists according to a principal cause, or not? And if not, whether some kind of essence must be given to it, or its existence must be considered to be wholly unsubstantial? And if it be admitted that it has some kind of essence, how does it subsist, there being another principle [contrary to it]? And, further still, how Providence existing, evil exists, and whence it is derived? In short, all such particulars must be considered as we are accustomed in our Commentaries to investigate.
The beginning, therefore, according to nature, of the speculation of these things will be, whether evil ranks among beings or not? But after what manner is it possible for that to exist, which is entirely destitute of the principle of beings? For neither is it possible for darkness [so far as it is darkness] to participate of light, nor vice of virtue, nor evil of good. As, therefore, if light was the first cause, there would be no darkness in secondary natures, as the generation of it would not be from chance, nor from anything else than the principle of things; so, because good is the cause of all things, it is requisite that evil should have no subsistence among beings. For if it is from goodness itself, how can the good be any longer the cause of all good, when it also produces the nature of evil? But if it does not derive its subsistence from the good, the good will not extend itself to all things, and will not be the principle of all beings, since evil having an arrangement among beings, will escape the progression which is from the good.
In short, if everything which has an essential subsistence, of whatever kind it may be, derives this subsistence from being; but that which participates of being, necessarily likewise participates of the one; since at the same time that a thing has being, it is one; for the one is prior to being: and if it neither was nor will be lawful for eternal natures to produce what they produce in any other way than in conjunction with the principles superior to themselves, — intellect indeed with life, but life with being, and all things with the one, — if this be the case, it is again requisite that evil should suffer one of two things. For it is necessary either that it should not at all participate of being, or that, deriving its existence in some way or other from being, it should at the same time participate of that cause which is beyond being.
And again, as consequent, and, as it were, successive to these things, it is necessary, either that there should be no principle of things, or that evil should have no existence, or that it should not have been generated as evil. For that which is deprived of being is non-being, and that which proceeds from the first cause is not evil. But in either way it is necessary to assert that evil has not anywhere an existence. And if, as we have said, the good is above being, and is the fountain of beings, because all beings and generated natures, of whatever kind they may be, desire good, how can evil rank among beings? For it will be excluded from such an appetition of good. If, however, it should be said that it is requisite evil should exist, because it is necessary there should be something subcontrary to good, yet being subcontrary, how can it desire a nature contrary to its own?
But it is impossible for that which does not desire good to rank among beings. For on account of this desire all beings are produced and exist, and from this derive their salvation. If, therefore, evil is contrary to good, evil is not one among the number of beings. And what occasion is there to be prolix. For if the one, which we also denominate the nature of the good, is beyond being, evil is beyond non-existence. But I mean non-existence or non-being simply considered; for the good is better than that which is simply being.
One of two things, therefore, must follow, if nonbeing is that which is in no respect being, much more is evil without existence, which is more debile and less permanent than perfect non-entity. For evil is much more distant from good than nonbeing. Hence that which is in no respect being, has a subsistence rather than that which is called evil. And consequently evil is much more deprived of existence, than that which is in every respect non-entity. But if the Demiurgus, as Plato says [in the Timæus], not only produced the nature of good, but was also willing that there should be nowhere anything evil, by what contrivance is it possible evil can subsist contrary to the will of the fabricator of all things? For it is not lawful for him to will some things, and produce others [contrary to his will]; since will and productive energy are simultaneous in divine essences. Hence, evil is not only contrary to the will of the Demiurgus, but is likewise unhypostatic; not because he did not produce it, (for it is not lawful to conceive that he did,) but because he was willing, in short, that it should not exist. What, therefore, can cause evil to have an existence, after the father of all things has brought it to a perfectly non-existent state? For what is there contrary to him, and whence does it derive its being? For that which is malefic is not from divinity, (since it is not lawful to admit that it is,) and it would be absurd to suppose that it is derived from anything else. For everything which the world contains proceeds from the father of it, either immediately — and these are self-subsistent natures — or mediately, through the energies of other superior powers.
And such is the reasoning which exterminates evil from existence; and such are the arguments which may with probability be adduced. But he who asserts the contrary to this will require us to look to the hypostasis of things, and to direct our attention to intemperance and injustice, and whatever else we are accustomed to call the evil of the soul. He will also ask us whether we call each of these good, or each of them evil. For if we admit that each of these is good, we must necessarily say one of two things, either that virtue is not contrary to vice, the whole to the whole, and the parts likewise analogously, or that what opposes good is not always evil. But what can be more contrary to common sense than each of these, or less congruous to the nature of things? For the virtues oppose the vices, and the manner in which this opposition subsists is evident from the hostile conduct of men towards each other, viz. of the unjust towards the just, and of the intemperate towards the temperate; and also from the dissension which is in souls themselves; as when in the incontinent man reason draws one way, but passion compels another way, and both acting in contrary directions, the better is vanquished by the worse. For what else is this, than the dissension of the temperate with the intemperate manners of the soul? And does not something else of the like kind take place in the opposition between reason and the irascible part? And is it not so in other evils, in which we perceive discord in the soul? For, in short, the apparent contrarieties of evil to good, by a much greater priority occultly subsist in souls themselves; and this disease of the soul then takes place, when our more excellent part, and its inherent forms which participate of good, are subdued by passions which are terrene and vile. The recalling these things, therefore, to our memory through many arguments cannot be considered as very foreign to the purpose.
If, however, as we have said, the vices are contrary to the virtues, but evil is entirely contrary to good, — for the nature of good is not adapted to be discordant with itself, but as being the offspring of one cause and one unity, through similitude and friendship and unity, it adheres to it, — and if beings which possess a greater portion of good are the saviours of such as possess a less degree of it, and the latter are adorned by the former as being more perfect, — if this be the case, it is necessary that the vices should not only be evil in definition, but that each of them should be really evil, and not a less good. For nowhere is a less contrary to a greater good, as neither is what is less to what is more hot, nor what is less to what is more cold. But if the vices of the soul must be confessed to be of the nature of evil, it will be shown that evil effects something among beings; and the effective power of evil is likewise evident from this, that it is corruptive of everything.
For that evil is this, is demonstrated by Socrates in the Republic, who very properly says, that the good of everything is that which is preservative of everything, on which account all things desire good; for existence and salvation to all things are thence derived; just as non-existence and corruption are on account of the nature of evil. Is it necessary, therefore, that nothing should be corruptive of anything? But thus the progress of generation would be stopped. For things of a corruptive nature not existing, neither is it possible that there should be corruption; and corruption not existing, neither will there be generation, because all generation is effected through the corruption of another thing. Generation likewise not existing, the whole world will at the same time be imperfect; for it will not contain in itself the mortal genera of animals.
It is, however, requisite that it should, in order (says Timæus) that it may be sufficiently perfect. If, therefore, it is requisite, [as Plato says in the Timaeus,] that the world should be a blessed God, it is also requisite that its similitude to all-perfect animal should be perfectly preserved. And if this is necessary, it is requisite that mortal genera should give completion to the universe; but if this, then there must be generation and corruption; and if this also be admitted, different things must be generative and corruptive of different things. For generation and corruption are not from the same things to all things. But the natures which are allotted generation being corruptive, are so from an innate power, and this is their evil. For the evil of that which is generated, is a corruptive principle, primarily and essentially inherent in it For, indeed, one thing is corruptive of the soul, but another of the body.
That also which is corrupted is different from that which corrupts; and there is not the same mode of corruption; but in one thing it is essential, and in another vital; and in this thing essentially leading to corruption; but in that vitally, in consequence of the life of it flying from being to non-entity. The same reasoning, therefore, will preserve for us the whole world perfect, and will give a place to evil among beings. Hence, not only will evil exist on account of good, but it will also be good for it to exist. This, therefore, which is most paradoxical, will again become more known.
If, however, it be requisite not only to acquiesce in the above reasonings, but to pursue the object of inquiry in another way, let us unfold it in the following manner. Every good which receives the difference of the more and the less, according to the more has a greater degree of perfection, and is constituted nearer to the fountain of its existence.
Again, according to the less becoming debilitated and more imperfect, it recedes to the less excellent part of its unity. For with respect to the equal, also, that which approximates to it in a superlative degree, will be most allied, and, as it were, consequent to it; but that which is equal in a comparative degree, will have the second order after this; and that which is equal in a positive degree only, will possess the ultimate order [in the approximations to equality]. And the same reasoning will take place with respect to the hot and the cold, the beautiful, the great and the small. Must we not, therefore, also admit that injustice and intemperance have the more and the less; or must we assert that all men are equally intemperate and unjust? By no means must we admit the latter. But with respect to the more and the less, must we not say, that what is less unjust is less distant from the nature of good? And again, with respect to that which is more unjust, must we not say, that by how much the greater its possession is of injustice, by so much the more it is destitute of good? This, indeed, must be necessarily admitted. Of every good, however, whether it be less or whether it be greater, it must be granted, that when augmented it becomes nearer to the first good, and that what is perfectly good, is the same with that which is good in the most transcendent degree. Hence it is not proper to call either a greater or a less injustice good, but each of these must be denominated entirely evil. For that, indeed, which is a less good, becomes by increase good in a greater degree; but that which is unjust, when it increases does not become a greater good. Subsisting, therefore, in a way contrary to good, how is it possible it should not rank among evils? Hence reason confidently asserts these things of the hypostasis of evil, which is also corroborated by the testimony of Plato, who not only enunciatively, but also demonstratively, appears to have introduced the nature of evil into beings. For Socrates, in the Theaetetus, strenuously asserts that it is not possible for evils to perish; and again says, that the existence of them is not superfluous, and, as it were, casual; for they are necessary, and are good. But if it is good for evil to be, evil exists as Socrates says; and thus indeed by its transition into existence, it has good for its principle.
What cause, therefore, shall we assign of the necessary existence of evil, and that contrariety of it to good, according to Socrates? For there are, as we have elsewhere observed, both all forms, and that which is beyond forms. But divine forms are not adapted to generate immediately after themselves that which participates of essence casually; nor. do they extend their energy as far only as to those beings which, without transition, are always able to enjoy them with invariable sameness; but on account of exuberant power, and transcendent goodness, they produce orders which proximately participate of themselves, and subsist uniformly, without being mingled with privation. They likewise produce by their energies the last hypostases, which are incapable of remaining immaculate and in transmutable. For these cannot participate of those beings which are inseparable from wholes, and exempt from all the natures which subsist in others; and they rank among participants alone.
Nor is it proper that those beings alone should exist, which always receive the impressions of divine forms, and that the last of things should not be produced, which sometimes only participate of these forms. For in this case, all excellent beings would have an ultimate rank, and things which have an eternal subsistence would have a material order. Hence they would be sterile and debile, and would have all the properties which we are accustomed to ascribe to generable and corruptible natures, in the same manner as if such natures did not exist. If these things, therefore, are necessary from the omnipotent and all-beneficent energy of first causes, neither will good always subsist with invariable sameness in all beings, nor will the generation of evil be expelled from beings. For if there is that which is sometimes able to participate of good, but again sometimes neglects a co-existence with it, there will indeed, from necessity, be a privation of participation; but as the privation of good is not able to subsist by itself, nor can be entirely liberated from the nature of which it is the privation, it is after a certain manner rendered powerful by this nature, on account of its complication with the order of things contrary to good.
Other privations, indeed, are alone produced by the absence of habits, assuming nothing from themselves which contributes to existence; but good, on account of the transcendent excellence of its power, gives strength even to the privation of itself. For as in all beings the good implants the first power, so likewise every being which is perfectly good generates its own power. But, as we have said, the privation which is complicated with good, using as a remedy for the instability of its nature the power of good, becomes indeed contrary to good, yet is corroborated by its mixture with it, and thence is enabled to oppose that which is proximate to it. Nevertheless it is not affected in the same manner as other privations. For these have an existence when habit departs; but evil, when good departs, vanishes into non-entity. For there is no species of life so bad as to extinguish entirely the power of reason; since reason remains within, but speaks in a debile manner, in consequence of being surrounded by all-various passions. These things, however, will be considered by us again.
But if, as we have said, it is not only requisite that the above-mentioned arguments should have been adduced, but that the doctrine concerning the existence of evil should be unfolded from the writings of Plato, what has been already delivered by us is sufficient even for those who are only able in a moderate degree to comprehend discussions of this kind. It is fit, however, in the same manner as in a court of justice, that we should not only hear the arguments of the contending parties, but that we should offer some opinion of our own. Let the following, therefore, if you please, be our decision on the subject, — that evil is, as I may say, twofold; one, and that the first; being real evil, unmingled with good; but the other not being real, nor unmingled with the nature of good. For with respect to good also, one kind is primarily good, and, as it were, good itself, and nothing else than good, being neither intellect, nor intelligence, nor truly-existing being; but another kind is mingled with other things.
And good is sometimes found unmingled with privation, and sometimes is to be seen mingled with it. For that which sometimes participates of what is primarily good, is complicated with what is not good; because being itself, also, and the nature of being, is in its highest subsistence truly-existing being; and being alone, but in its last subsistence, is in a certain respect comingled with nonbeing; so that in consequence of being replete with non-entity, it possesses more of non-existence than of existence. And non-being itself, which is in no respect whatever another being, and is beyond the nature which subsists accidentally, is neither able to subsist according to itself, nor according to accident. For that which is true non-entity, has not existence in one way, but in another not. But the being which subsists simultaneously with non-being, whether it be lawful to call it a privation of being, or difference, is not the same with true non-entity.
For with respect to non-entity, one kind is entirely deprived of being, but another kind, which subsists in intelligibles, suffers, as the Eleatic stranger [or guest] says, no diminution of being. But in those things which are sometimes beings, and sometimes non-beings, non-entity is more debile than entity; but yet after a certain manner they are vanquished by being. As, therefore, with respect to non-being, if some one should ask us, whether it has an existence, or whether it has not, we should reply, that what is entirely non-being, and in no respect whatever participates of existence, is in no respect whatever being; but, nevertheless, that nonbeing is after a certain manner to be connumerated with beings. Thus also with respect to evil, because it has a twofold subsistence, one kind being evil alone, but another not unmingled with good; the former has no existence whatever, in consequence of falling below being, just as the good is beyond being; but the latter must be ranked among beings.
Hence it is not deserted by being, on account of the intervention of good, nor by good, since it is still capable of remaining, on account of being: for it is at one and the same time being and good. And that which is in every respect evil, since it is a perfect falling off from the first good, is deservedly likewise deprived of being. For what can have a progression into beings that is unable to participate of good? But that which is not in every respect evil, is sub-contrary indeed to a certain good, but not to all good. It is, however, arranged and benefited through the transcendency of the source of all good. And it is evil to those things to which it is contrary; but it is nevertheless suspended as good from total good. For it is not lawful to act in opposition to this; but it is requisite that all things should be disposed according to justice, or that they should have no existence whatever.
Plato, therefore, rightly says in the Timæus, that so far as pertains to the demiurgic will, all things are good, and nothing is evil. But in the Theætetus he asserts that evil cannot be destroyed, and that it has from necessity a place among beings. For all things partake of good through the will of the father; and nothing is evil with reference to his fabrication, either of real beings, or of things which are becoming to be. And darkness, indeed, which is entirely mingled with its contrary, is therefore not destitute of light; and things which are made in the light, are on all sides terminated by it. With the sun, indeed, nothing is dark, for it gives even to darkness a debile splendour; but in the air, darkness is a privation of the light which was in it. All things, therefore, are good with the father of all; and evil is in the natures which are not able to remain established in good. On what account, however, this is necessary, we have before shown. After what manner, therefore, evil subsists, and after what manner it does not, is from these things evident. For both those who assert that all things are good, and those who do not, speak in one respect rightly, and in another erroneously. For that all beings are good is true; but non-being also is complicated with being. All things, therefore, are good, because there is no evil which is not adorned and mingled with good. And evil is in those beings whose nature is not adapted to remain in good in an unmingled state.
2. In the next place it is requisite to consider, in what beings evil exists, after what manner it subsists, and whence it is derived; because the nature of it has appeared to us to be something belonging to beings. Let us begin, therefore, from on high, and survey as far as we are able, where evil subsists.
The Gods, then, the kingdoms of the Gods, their numbers and their orders, obtain the first portion of being, or rather they preside over all beings and an intellectual essence, on which being, as it were, seated, they generate and rule over all things, proceed to and are present with all things, without being mingled with them, and exemptly adorn everything which the universe contains. Nor is their intelligence debilitated by their providential energies, nor their paternally transcendent government dissolved by the purity of their intellections. For their intellectual energy is the same with their essence; and providential inspection is present with them on account of goodness, and likewise on account of their twofold power, [viz. providential and demiurgic,] not being willing to remain in itself, but, as it were, producing into light from themselves whatever it is lawful for them to produce, viz. all beings, the genera that are more excellent than souls, souls themselves, and whatever else has a being inferior to these.
For the Gods themselves, indeed, are beyond all beings, and are the measures of existence, because every being is contained in them, just as number is in monads. But beings proceed from them, some indeed [at the same time that they proceed from,] abiding in them, but others, through their manifold nature, falling off from the unity of the Gods, in consequence of a diminution of essence. And these latter, indeed, are placed in the order of participants, suspended from the goodness of the Gods; but the former are essentialized in good itself, and the measure of wholes, and are nothing else than the unities, and measures, and goodnesses of beings. They are likewise, if you are willing, summits, and as it were flowers, and superessential luminaries, and everything of this kind. And they are indeed participable according to true being and the first essence; but they produce from themselves everything good and beautiful, all media, and being of every kind.
As, therefore, if some one should interrogate us respecting this visible light, which the God who is the king of it, and who has an arrangement analogous to the good, scatters through the whole world, — whether it is of itself susceptive of darkness or not, our answer to him would be multifarious. For at one time we should adduce the simplicity of its nature; at another time, its continuity with the divine genera; and at another something else. Thus also in speaking of the Gods, we must assert that evil has no subsistence whatever in them; and it is requisite to recollect that the Gods adorn all things, that they are not indigent of anything, and that their life is perfectly blessed and divinely exuberant. For these are our unperverted conceptions respecting them, and from these we should assume what it is requisite to assert of the Gods themselves.
But souls of a fortunate destiny, giving themselves to intellect, expanding the winged part of themselves, and being assimilated to the Gods, are permanently established in good; and no evil is present with them, nor ever will be. Perfect hilarity, likewise, an innoxious life, and the choir of the virtues, lead such a soul to the supernal region, to the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicate food, and to a condition of being far removed from the evils which are here, not for the purpose of vanquishing these maladies, but that together with the Gods, adorning sublunary affairs according to justice, they themselves may remain established in the Gods. And though while they are filled with the contemplation of real being, they possess a latent tendency to these inferior realms, yet they do not experience that which is perfectly evil. If, therefore, there is no evil in souls which are divine, how is it possible it should exist in the Gods? For, as it is said, heat is not in snow, nor cold in fire: and hence, neither is evil in the Gods, nor is a divine nature situated in evil.
In addition, therefore, to what has been said, it must be remembered that the very essence of the Gods is established in good. For as souls are derived from that soul which ranks as a whole, and as partial intellects are derived from an all perfect intellect, thus also, from the first good, or rather, if it be lawful so to speak, from goodness itself, and from the unity of all good, the most primary number of things that are good is derived, the being and existence of which is nothing else than unity and goodness. For neither is the essence of partial intellects anything else than intellection, nor of souls anything else than vitality. For if to all the preceding natures there is a continued progression from their principle, through similitude, — if this be the case, the progressions from the first unity must be primary unities, and from the one [first] good a multitude of natures characterized by good. How, therefore, can evil, and the nature of evil, be inherent in things essentially good? For it is not lawful that it should; since good is measure and light; but evil is darkness and incommensurability. And the latter, indeed, is without location, and is debile; but the former is the cause of all location, and of all power. The former likewise is preservative of all things; but the latter leads everything with which it is present to destruction, according to the order which each thing is assigned: for, as we have said, there is not the same mode of termination in all things. Whether, therefore, shall we say, it is false that the Gods are good, or shall we admit that being good they are changed; which we assert to be the case with partial souls, these being transmuted into different forms of life? In thus speaking, however, we shall assert of the existence of the Gods what is both impious and absurd. For good is not congenial with non-good; and that which is not good is not God. Nor is that which is transmuted similar to the one, and to that which is better than all energy. For what similitude is there between that which subsists according to an eternal essence, and that which is prior to eternity; or between that which is established in an invariable sameness of energy, and that which is more excellent than the peculiarity of even the highest energy? Hence, there is no evil in the Gods, neither simply, nor according to time. For, in short, the eternal and time are posterior to the Gods; since both these are essences, and subsist about essence. But the Gods are prior to essence and being. For beings derive their subsistence from them, they having an hyparxis prior to being. And here, indeed, every one is good; but truly-existing being is suspended from the good [which is the characteristic of the Gods].
Again, therefore, after the Gods, if you are willing, let us direct our attention to the order of angels, and consider, whether we must assert this to be perfectly good, or that evil subsists in this order primarily. If, however, evil, of whatever kind it may be, is in them, how can we any longer call them the messengers of the Gods? For all evil, indeed, is far distant and foreign from the Gods, and is like darkness with respect to the light which is with them. It also is not only ignorant that it is itself evil, but it is ignorant of everything else, and especially of whatever is good. For it flies from and destroys itself, not being able to know either itself or the nature of good. But the genus which is the interpreter of the Gods, is continuous with the Gods, knows their intellect, and elucidates the divine will. This angelic genus, also, is itself a divine light, proceeding from that effulgence which is concealed in the adyta of deity, becoming externally manifest, and being nothing else than good primarily shining forth from the beings which eternally abide in the unfathomable depths of the one. For it is requisite that the progression of wholes should be continued; and, on account of similitude, one thing is naturally consequent to another. To the fountain, therefore, of all good, many natures characterized by good are consequent, and an occult number of unities abiding in the ineffable fountain of deity. But the first number of preceding and proceeding natures continuous with the divine unities is that of the angelic order, which is situated, as it were, in the vestibules of the Gods, and unfolds their truly mystic silence. How, therefore, can evil exist in those beings whose essence consists in the elucidation of good? For where there is evil, good is absent; so far is it from being elucidated; but it is rather concealed by the presence of a contrary nature. That, however, possesses a transcendency of union which is enunciative of the one; and this is also the case with whatever in a second order is enunciative prior to that energy which is in other things. Hence, the angelic tribe is in a transcendent degree assimilated to the Gods, from which it is suspended, so that it is able, by a most manifest similitude, to unfold its peculiarity to posterior natures.
If, also, you are not willing to survey the beneficent order of angels in this way only, but according to another mode, consider that in all the genera, and all the numbers of beings, of whatever kind they may be, that which is allotted a first and principal order possesses good genuinely, and unmingled with evil. For it is requisite that what is first in every series of things should hear the image of the first cause; since everywhere primary natures are analogous to this cause, and the salvation of all things is through the participation of it. For whether you divide all beings into intellectuals and sensibles; or, again, the sensible nature into heaven and generation; or, in like manner, the intellectual essence into soul and intellect, — you will everywhere find, that what ranks as first and most divine is unreceptive of evil. It is requisite, therefore, that not only in these, but also in the triple empire of the better genera, [viz. of angels, daemons, and heroes,] there should be the immaculate, the intellectual, and the unmingled with evil. And this is likewise the case with everything that has a first order essentialized in good, because the progression of it takes place on account of goodness; just, again, “as the progression of daemons is according to power, and to that which is generative in the Gods; and hence, also, they rank as media in the three genera. For power pertains to the middle, just as intellect, and a circular conversion to the principle, pertain to the third progression, which is that of heroes; but goodness energises in angels, and defines their existence by its own unity. How is it possible, therefore, for any one to admit that evil can enter into such natures as these? Hence, that alone which is boniform will obtain the order of angels, but will never partake of any evil. For angels are the elucidators of the Gods, are the summit of the better genera, and their very being is characterized by good.
Does evil, therefore, subsist primarily in daemons? For they exist in an order consequent to that of the angelic choir. There are, therefore, some who speak of the passions of daemons, and these, indeed, such as are according to nature, when they tragically narrate their different deaths and generations. But of other daemons, the passions are from choice alone, and these they denominate wicked and evil daemons, who defile souls through iniquity, lead them to matter, and draw them down from their celestial journey to the subterranean place. The authors of these assertions, likewise, think that they have Plato as the patron of this doctrine, who establishes twofold exemplars in the universe; the one divine, luminous and boniform, but the other without God, dark and malefic. Of souls, also, according to them, some tend to the former, but others to the latter, at which when they arrive, they suffer the punishment of their crimes.
As, again, of those that are in Hades, some fly from the mouth of the opening which is there; but others are dragged along by fiery and fierce phantasms, are torn on thorns, and hurled into Tartarus. What is asserted by these men, therefore, insinuates that every such genus of daemons which is seductive, malignant and destructive of souls, is susceptive of primary evil, and that the nature of daemons is distinguished by good and evil. It is requisite, however, to inquire of these, if we ask them nothing else, — for the fathers of these assertions are divine men, — whether are the daemons which you call evil, such to themselves; or are they not evil to themselves, but to others? For if, indeed, they are evil to themselves, one of two things must follow; either that they must remain in evil for ever, or that they are susceptive of transmutation.
And if, indeed, they are always evil, how can that which subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil? For it is better not to exist at all, than to exist always essentially evil. But if they are changed so as to pass into different forms, they do not rank among those that are essentially daemons, but among those who are such only through habitude [i.e. through proximity and alliance]. The like must be said of that which is better and worse, and has another form of life. All essential daemons, however, remain so perpetually, and continue in the order which they are severally allotted. But if they are good to themselves, and evil to others, in consequence of leading them to a worse condition of being, this is just as if some one should call certain preceptors and pedagogues wicked, who, from ranking as castigators of faults, do not permit those whom they superintend to pursue a better order in an unappropriate manner.
Or as if some one should denominate those evil, who, standing [as guardians] before sacred places, prevent the impure vulgar from entering within the curtains, because they prohibit them from a participation of the internal rites. It is not evil, therefore, for those to remain external to these sacred places, who are not worthy to enter into them; but it is evil to be of such an order, and to deserve such prohibitions. Hence, if of the mundane dæmons, some lead souls on high, but others keep the souls that are not yet able to ascend, in their own manners, we cannot justly say that either of these are evil, — either those by whom souls are separated from hence, or those by whom they are detained. For it is requisite there should be dæmons, who keep in custody about the terrestrial region souls that are defiled with Vice, and unworthy of a progression to the heavens. Neither, therefore, does it appear that evil, even in these dæmons can rationally be found; for they severally effect that which is conformable to their nature and always after the same manner. But this is not evil.
Again, with respect to the genus of heroes, does not, in the first place, the very being of these consist in an essential conversion to that which is more excellent? And, in the second place, heroes are always the causes to other things of a conversion to better natures. This providential employment, therefore, was assigned them by the father of the universe; and if their energy is invariably the same, it is not evil. For everything evil is naturally unstable and without locality; but the contrary is true of that which is always a whole. For perpetuity is power; but a subsistence in capacity pertains to those things to which evil pertains; In short, to be changed in the form of life in any way, causes those who suffer this change to be heroes according to habitude, and not yet to be such as essential heroes. For every angel, daemon and hero, who is such essentially, is naturally adapted always to preserve its own order, and does not subsist in one way at one time, and in a different way at another, but energises always according to the nature which it has received. Further still, if anger, violent efforts, and everything of this kind which is called evil, are employed by them through a perversion of what is according to nature, — in this case, evil in them is a disorderly use of their power, and is everywhere a departure from a perfection adapted to their essence; for evil is impotent and imperfect, and is of a nature too debile to effect the salvation of anything. But if each in thus acting preserves itself and its own nature, and the condition which it is perpetually allotted in the universe, how can it any longer be preternatural in them thus to act? For if it is according to nature, to them it will not be evil, if the evil to everything is that which is preternatural to it. For you would not say, that fury is an evil to lions or leopards; but it is an evil to men, to whom what is most excellent is reason. To other beings, however, whose essence is according to intellect, it is not good to energise according to reason. For it is requisite that evil, as we have frequently said, should not be that which is according to nature, and which in everything is the better part, — for a thing of this kind is good, — but that it should be the concomitant of a deteriorated nature. Hence a precipitate phantasy, fury, anger and pertinacity, are not unnatural to those beings to whom such things, and not reason, are essential.
What, therefore, is evil to them from these things? But the above-mentioned particulars are impediments to souls, and a bond; for to those, a tendency downward is a deviation from rectitude. For these powers do not lead to the place adapted Because reason is inferior to intellect. For the intellectual perception of a thing is intuitive, and not the result of ratiocination. to themselves, those souls which have not yet fallen into vice, because this would not be possible. But, in conformity to the laws of the universe, they punish souls that tend to a subordinate nature, and that require chastisement [as preparatory to their purification]. And these powers, indeed, in so doing act according to nature; but the universe uses them as instruments for the sanation of souls. For it also uses brutes for the devoration of men, and inanimate substances for some other natural purpose.
And a stone, indeed, in falling naturally strikes that with which it meets; for these actions are the percussions of bodies; and the universe opportunely uses the nature of these in order to give completion to the necessity of that which ought to suffer. Neither, therefore, is percussion evil to bodies; nor, in short, is there any evil in the operations of things which act conformably to their own nature. But everything acts according to nature, which has no energy better than its natural energy. Hence, it is not possible to assign any more excellent energy of these heroical powers than what has been before mentioned. For this is their order; and this species of energy was assigned to them by the fabricator of the universe, for the sake of guarding the perfections of things. Hence whatever is transacted in the boundaries of these powers, contrary to their life, becomes in destined periods of time subject to their guardian care.
But the period of the time of punishment corresponds to the power of the patients; and the purgation being perfect, the mouth of the opening ceases to bellow, and all the other impediments to ascending souls are withdrawn. While the punishment, however, is as yet imperfect, some souls, on account of an ignorance of themselves, desire a progression upwards, and the universe leads these to what is appropriate to their condition. The guardians of such, likewise, being subservient to the will of the universe, convert some to one, and others to a different kind of punishment; and employing coercion to these for a longer, but to those for a shorter time, they at length dismiss them conformably to the arrangements of the universe and its laws. We must say, therefore, with respect to the Gods, and the genera superior to our species, that their conduct towards us is through commiserating our condition, and that there neither is any evil in them, nor ever will be. For they energise in all things conformably to the order in which each of them is arranged, and, abiding in their accustomed manner, they preserve invariably that boundary which they possess from the fabrication of things.
3. In the next place, let us direct our attention to the natures consequent to the above, and investigate whether evil is anywhere to be found in these.
If, however, it must be said, that evil has nowhere an existence, it follows that it is neither there, nor in human souls. For all the above-mentioned genera are unreceptive of transmutation; I mean, of a transmutation according to their order. For each of them is always adapted to preserve the order which it received. But the natures consequent to these [viz. human souls] possess a power of sometimes ascending, and sometimes tending to generation and a mortal nature. Of these, likewise, some are better and more divine, and, in being connected with a mortal nature, do not abandon divine knowledge; but others sustain all-various fractures and distortions of their circles, and are replete with oblivion, habitude [to things subordinate], and evil. Let us, therefore, in the first place, consider the better kind of human souls. That these, then, in consequence of being better, do not admit in themselves any passion of human depravity, is indicated by Socrates in the Republic, where he accuses the poets of representing the offspring of the Gods [i.e. heroes] as equally avaricious with [other] men, and replete with such evils as we perceive to be accidental to human nature.
If, however, as it is said, a very great part of their period consists in contemplation, in an innoxious life, and in a secure providence of wholes in conjunction with the Gods; and if, when they descend into generation, their descent is for the benefit of terrestrial souls, — some, indeed, for the purpose of procuring a good offspring, others for the sake of purity, but others for the purpose of transmitting the illuminations of a divine intellect, — and if, also, they accomplish this in conjunction with the Gods, with renown, together with the inspiration of good daemons, and the consent of the universe, — what evil, in short, will there be in them, unless you are willing to call generation itself [or the whole of a visible nature] evil? For, as Socrates says in the [10th book of the] Republic, it is necessary that every soul should drink a certain measure of the cup of oblivion.
With respect to oblivion, however, it is different in different souls; in some, indeed, the habit of recollection being lost; but in others, remembrance in energy being alone buried [for a time, but not destroyed]. This rest of energy therefore, — habit remaining within, like a concealed light, incapable of proceeding externally on account of the adjacent darkness, — you may call oblivion, or, if you are willing, the evil of these souls. These souls, likewise, are impassive to the perturbations which subsist about the soul in generation, and on this account we are accustomed to call them immaculate; because the evils which are here cannot enter into them, though they are incapable of preserving in this terrene abode that invariable and immutable life which they led in the intellectual realms; but they permit that which is adapted to disturb them, and is unstable, to remain in the natures which are suspended from their essence.
These impassive souls, too, are internally silent, as long as they are situated in tranquillity; but when they are excited to vehement energy, then their beauty shines forth, so as to evince that they are truly the offspring of the Gods. Hence, whether in terrene animals, or in other parts of the universe, there are generations of souls, this is the mode of descent to all of them, and as far as to this, oblivion and evil are the result. For we say, that light is darkened, because the extraneous nature of that which surrounds it being gross and nebulous, it cannot illuminate that which is near to it. But that is perfectly involved in darkness, which cannot even be the saviour of itself. The descent, therefore, of these divine souls, not destroying their internal life, gives to them a debility of energy.
With respect, however, to the souls that are posterior to these, and which destroy their internal life, and fall into an oblivion of the contemplations arising from the energies of it, — in souls of this kind there is death, an insatiable tendency to mortal concerns, a defluxion of their wings, and whatever else of such souls, we are accustomed frequently to assert. For what other medium is it requisite to assign between that which is unsusceptible of evil, and that which is entirely malignant, than a slender, and, as I may say, apparent evil? These things, therefore, must be asserted of such souls. The habit, too, of these latter tribes of souls is truly all-various, and is transmuted by all-various impulses and elections. Their internal powers, likewise, suffer defalcation, and their energies are attended with great labour. Being also lame and debile, they suffer all the evils in which souls are said to be involved through falling from that place, the inhabitants of which are free from sorrow, and lead a blessed life.
For every soul when on high is conversant with sublime concerns, governs the whole world, and ascends, together with the presiding Gods, to the contemplation of the felicitous and most perfect energy of truly existing being, and surveying all the forms that it contains, is filled with the nectar which is there. For, as some one says, contemplation, prudence, and an intellectual life, are not the primary good of the beings that energise according to these; but the energy according to a divine intellect is that which is primarily good, comprehending intelligibles in the intellectual perception of itself, but encompassing sensibles by those powers which belong to the circle of difference, and exhibiting to these also a certain portion of the most exalted good. For that which is perfectly good, not only possesses plenitude in the salvation of itself, but likewise in what it imparts to other things, and through the unenvying abundance of its energy, desires to benefit all things, and causes them to be similar to itself.
But when the soul, according to both species of life, is incapable of imitating its presiding Gods, it then indeed becomes deprived of the contemplation of truly-existing being, and is attracted by other secondary powers, which revolve about the world. This, then, is to souls the principle of generation, and of a periodic revolution, and is the cause to them of impotency, and of a privation of the contemplative energy; and this is their evil. For there that which is sufficient to itself primarily exists, where there is that which is primarily good; and there power is transcendent, where that which is sufficient to itself subsists. This, therefore, is the debility of the soul, that, failing of the perfection pertaining to the first life, it tends downwards; but it there again acquires a power of ascending to the region from which it fell, before it sinks into the profundity of a material life.
For there is not the same mode of debility to all things. For neither are all bodies placed in the same degree of deterioration through their distance from the power by which they are measured and preserved. But if, as Plato says, the soul through an unfortunate occurrence, by which it becomes connected with generation and mortality, is filled with oblivion, and, becoming heavy, falls to the earth, then the universe, indeed, leads it to an appropriate order; but it varies the form of its life, till, as it is said in the Timæus, following the revolution of that same and similar nature contained in its essence, it vanquishes those abundantly turbulent passions, tumultuous and irrational, which afterwards externally adhere to it, and is led back to being itself, and the most splendid of being.
The soul, therefore, descending from thence, arrives at the circumambient ether, and surveys the souls that are there. It likewise proceeds under the throne of Necessity to the plain of Oblivion, no longer contemplating such objects as it did, when it possessed a primordial nature. For the objects of contemplation to souls when on high, were the plain of Truth, and the divine forms which it contains. The nutriment, however, as Plato says, which is adapted to the soul in its best condition of subsistence, is derived from the meadow which is there; but the nutriment which is here, is procured through opinion. Hence, also, this terrene abode is near to the river of Oblivion, and the dire worldly through which the soul is filled with folly and darkness, and is surrounded with all the evils to which the mortal nature is subject. For the fractures and distortions of circles [mentioned in the Timæus], and whatever introduces death to souls, the periods of a thousand years, the punishments of the passions, and all that is tragically said respecting the law which the universe ordains, are the consequences of the soul’s lapse into this mortal abode. And we shall not be able to fly from these maladies, nor to rest from labours, till rising above things foreign to our nature we separate from mortal nugacity, our own good and the contemplation of real being. We must therefore strip ourselves of the garments with which in descending we became invested, we must proceed naked from hence thither, must entirely purify the eye of the soul by which we contemplate truly-existing being, and instead of sense must make intellect to be the principal ruler of our internal life. Our communication indeed, and life in conjunction with a nature subordinate to our own, exhibit to us the generation of evil; and our oblivion and ignorance arise from surveying that which is unintellectual and dark; but our good consists in a flight and similitude to that which is divine. For there total good exists, and the fountain of all good, and there the purity of [real] being, and a felicitous life are present with perfect souls. And thus with respect to the soul which is able to ascend to a divine nature, and also to descend hither, we have shown after what manner evil subsists in it, together with debility, misfortune, and everything else which we have before mentioned.
With respect, however, to those souls, which are not parts of [real] beings, but certain images and parts of a worse soul, which the Athenian stranger or guest calls malefic, it is requisite to consider whether they are unreceptive of evil, or whether evil also exists in them, but after a different manner. If, therefore, they are indeed worse than the souls of men, — I mean than the image of the rational soul which is in us, — evil in them consists in not acting conformably to nature. For in the natures which are always changed according to a good and a bad condition of being, the good and the evil have not a uniform subsistence; since the good as well as the evil varies. But if, like our souls, they pertain to another soul which is prior to them, again it is necessary that the soul, which is capable of being better and worse, and which is also connected with the image of the rational soul, must sometimes tend to supernal beings, and sometimes to generation and the abode of matter; and that in consequence of irrationality being suspended from reason, that which is worse in them must consist in a discord with reason, in not receiving light from thence, and in the incommensurability of its nature being deprived of the measure which is thence derived. For this is not the power of such souls, but debility, and a defect of power. Hence, to these souls, the ascent to that which is better takes place when some energy is resplendent in them conformable to reason, which, like a present daemon, inspires them with an energy leading to such a progression. But again, their tendency to that which is worse is effected, when, on account of the evil condition of the body, or unappropriate aliment, the natural energy being vanquished, the soul is filled with a depraved habit.
In the next place, let us consider nature, and everything to which this imparts the whole of its being and existence. Whether, therefore, is there evil in this, or not? And if there is, on account of what cause does it subsist? We neither assert, therefore, nor conceive, that the nature of the universe, nor the nature of any eternal body, departs at any time from its own habit. But we are of opinion that abiding such as it is, it leads conformably to nature the body with which it is connected: for what else is the employment of nature, than to. preserve and perpetually retain that in which it subsists? And the same thing is effected by all causes. This nature, also, when it exists in a part over which it entirely predominates, conducts it rightly and wisely; but when as being partial it is vanquished, then the whole of that which uses it thus perverted, acts in a way contrary to its native adaptation. For to nature, indeed, considered as a whole, nothing is preternatural; because all natural productive powers are derived from it. But to the nature which ranks as a part, one thing is according to, and another contrary to nature. Thus the form of a lion is preternatural to the nature of man, because neither the productive power of this, nor of any other species, is inherent in man, but that of man alone. And thus in every other class of beings, the productive powers of different species are different. Hence it pertains to a partial nature to be vanquished, and to act contrary to nature, but not to the nature which Tanks as a whole, nor to anything which is eternal. For matter, when it is the subject of beings that are not eternal, is frequently vanquished by the bonds proceeding from nature, and then it adorns and as it were illuminates its own darkness and deformity, and invests itself with a foreign ornament. And thus in the beings that rank as wholes, its turpitude is concealed. Hence though it subsists from a principle, it does not become known to every one, nor even to those who have elucidated many of the secrets of nature. But the nature which exists in a part is impotent through a defect of essential power. For it is as it were a ray, impression and reason [or form] of total nature, being divided from thence, flowing downward into body, and incapable of remaining unmingled and pure. This, again, likewise arises from the power of the contraries by which it is on all sides surrounded. For the things which are external to it are many, and foreign to the mortal nature.
Thus then, as we have said, this partial nature becoming debile, and superinducing the baseness of itself, defalcates indeed its own energy, and causes by its own deformity the light which proceeds from it to be darkened. For the turpitude of nature, in consequence of reason [or form] not having dominion, is passion, and is inordinate through the impotence of order; but then reason is vanquished by that which is subordinate to reason, and becomes itself irrational. If, therefore, there is also in the energy of a partial nature the unimpeded, we shall have all things according to nature, and there will nowhere in these essences be evil. But if in this, one thing is an end to it, and a path according to nature, but another thing is contrary to this, and an impediment to nature; and if, indeed, reason is one, but the things which are different from it are infinite, what else can we say than that this is the evil of nature?
For to the being to whom contemplation is good, the privation of it is evil. But to that to which it is good to effect something in another thing, and to energise according to reason, it is evil for reason not to vanquish, and for energy not to arrive at its destined end, through being vanquished by an inferior nature. And the evil of bodies consists in the form which is above them being vanquished by that which is worse than themselves. For corporeal turpitude arises from reason [or form] being subdued, and the disease of body, from its order being dissolved; because beauty then exists when form vanquishes matter, and falls like a [luminous] flower on things deprived of form. And with respect to health, this is produced, when the order which is conformable to nature is stably preserved. These things, therefore, as existing in nature, extend as far as to material bodies, and individual beings; but do not extend to beings which rank as wholes; nor must it. be admitted that they subsist in the natures which are beyond the reach of matter.
For deformity, wherever it exists, is from matter, which we are accustomed to call deformity itself, and the last of things, as being without measure, and without beauty, and as not possessing even the most debile portion of splendour. But where is inordination and the præternatural to be found in those beings which always subsist according to nature, and which, in consequence of this, possess an invariable sameness of well being? Individual or particular bodies, therefore, which in matter sustain all-various mutations, sometimes, indeed, possess order and good, but sometimes not, through contraries vanquishing their nature. But the bodies which do not rank as particulars, and which as wholes remain always the same, and complete the measure of their nature, perpetually possess order, vanquishing inordination. And of the bodies which are immaterial, some, indeed, are always numerically the same, and always possess similar energies, and are liberated from all mortal difficulty; but others are in their nature and essence the same, yet in their energies are led to the better and the worse.
And such are the organs of human souls, which have, indeed, the essential according to nature, but possess a variation according to life. And sometimes, indeed, they abide in their own beauty, and in an energy and order according to nature; but at other times they are dispersed into a foreign region, are brought into a condition contrary to nature, and introduce into themselves the baseness of matter. For each organ of the soul follows the impulses of it, and in so doing sustains all-various motions, and becomes assimilated to the appetitions of the soul. We have spoken, however, of a corporeal nature, and have shown what the evil of it is, and how in a different nature, there is a different evil.
Let us, therefore, in the next place direct our attention to matter, and consider whether it is evil or not. For it is by no means possible that evil can happen to it, because of itself it is without quality, and formless; is a subject, but is not in a subject; and is simple, but is not one thing in another. But if in short, as some say, it is evil, it is essentially evil. And hence, according to them, matter is primarily evil, and is that which is odious to the Gods. For what else is evil than the want of measure and bound, and whatever besides these, is a privation of good? For good is the measure, the bound, the end, and the perfection of all things. Evil, therefore, is incommensuration, — the infinite itself, the imperfect, and the indeterminate; for all these are primarily in matter, not being anything else than it; but they are matter itself, and the very essence of it. Hence matter is primarily evil, and is the nature of evil, and the last of all things. If also good is twofold, — one being the good itself, and nothing else than good; but another good subsists in something else, and is a certain good, and not primarily so, — evil likewise will be twofold, one being evil itself, and primarily, and nothing else than evil; but another evil subsisting in something else, and being a certain evil, by a participation of, or assimilation to, evil itself. And as good itself is the first, so evil itself is the last of things. For it is not possible for anything to be better than good, or for anything to be worse than evil; since we say that all other things are better or worse on account of these. But matter is the last of things. For everything else is naturally adapted either to act or suffer. But good itself and evil itself are not adapted to either of these, being deprived of the power of both. Hence matter is evil itself, and that which is primarily evil.
If, however, that which is preternatural in bodies arises, as we have said, from the predominance of matter, — and in souls evil and debility are produced by their lapse into, and inebriation from matter, becoming assimilated to it, through the indefiniteness which subsists about it, — why, dismissing this, should we investigate any other cause, principle and fountain of these evils? But if matter is evil, we must either make good to be the cause of evil, or we must admit that there are two principles of beings. For everything, of whatever kind the nature of it may be, is either the principle of wholes, or from the principle. Matter, however, since it is from the principle, has also its progression into being from good. But if there are two principles of beings, we must admit that there are two principles opposing each other, viz. that which is primarily good, and that which is primarily evil. This, however, is impossible; for there cannot be two firsts. For whence, in short, can there be two principles without a monad [from which they proceed]? If, indeed, each of these is a unity, it is necessary that prior to both, there should be the one, and one principle) through which each of these is one. Nor can evil be produced from good. For as the cause of all that is good, is good in a greater degree than the things of which it is the cause; so likewise that which is generative of evil) is evil in a greater degree than the things which it produces. And on this hypothesis, how will good possess its own nature, if it is the cause of the principle of evil? But if that which is generated, loves to be assimilated to its generator, evil itself also will be good, in consequence of possessing the form of good, through participating of its cause. Hence good, indeed, will be evil, as the cause of evil; but evil will be good, as being produced by good.
If, however, matter is necessary to the universe, and the world would not be in every respect a great and blessed God without matter, how can the nature of evil be any longer referred to matter? For evil is one thing, and that which is necessary another. And matter, indeed, is that without which it is impossible for the universe to exist; but evil is the privation of existence. If, therefore, matter exhibits the aptitude of itself as subservient to the fabrication of the whole world, and was from the first produced as the receptacle, and, as it were, nurse and mother of generation, [as Plato says in the Timæus,] how can it any longer be said to be evil, and to be that which is primarily evil? For we manifoldly speak of incommensurability, the infinite, and everything of this kind; since we say that it opposes measure, is the absence and ablation of it, and is the subject of it, and, as it were, is indigent of measure and bound.
But matter is not adapted to oppose, nor, in short, to produce anything, since neither is it naturally adapted to suffer, on account of its deficiency of passive power. It is not, however, an ablation of measure and bound. For it is not the same with privation, because privation does not exist when measure and bound are present; but matter both exists, and receives the representation of these. Hence the infinite of the nature of matter, and its privation of measure, are indigent of measure and bound. But being indigent of these, how can it be contrary to them? And how can it be still evil, if it is indigent of good? For evil, and in short every habit contrary to good, flies from the nature of good. But if, as Plato says [in the Timæus], matter is the nurse of generation, which it also desires and conceives, — in this case, matter being a mother, she will not be the cause of any evil to the natures which proceed from her, or rather, which are generated in her.
But if debility and misfortune happen to souls, it is not on account of matter, because they were subject to these prior to bodies and matter. And these in a certain respect preexisted in souls, as the causes of evils, antecedent to matter. Of whence of the souls that follow Jupiter [to the vision of the supercelestial place] is the head of the charioteer in some of them, incapable of raising itself to this place, and of beholding, through dimness of sight, the blessed spectacles which that place contains? How, likewise, does it happen that there is an oblivion of truly-existing being in these souls, an unfortunate occurrence, and a tendency downward, before they are connected with matter? For the horse which participates of depravity, becomes heavy and verges to the earth. For when the soul has fallen to the earth, she then is connected with matter, and is involved in the darkness of the terrestrial realms. But prior to her lapse, she experienced debility, oblivion and evil. For we should not have departed [from the vision of perfect realities] unless we had been debilitated, because, though we are distant from true being, we still aspire after the contemplation of it.
If, therefore, the soul becomes debile prior to her drinking of the cup [of oblivion], but proceeds into matter, after her flight from the intelligible world, debility and, in short, evil do not accede to souls on account of matter. For what can matter effect in other things, since it has no effective power? Or how, again, can that which is void of quality, so far as it is void of quality, be able to act? Moreover, either matter draws souls to itself or souls are by themselves drawn and become separate from themselves, and impotent. Hence, if they were indeed drawn from themselves, their impulse towards and appetition of that which is subordinate, became evil to them; but of this, matter was not the cause. For all flight from a more excellent condition of being is evil, and much more descent to that which is worse. And souls choosing badly through debility, suffer what such souls ought to suffer. But if they are drawn to this by matter, where is the self-motive nature and elections of the soul, if we ascribe the cause of its descent into the realms of generation to the attractions of matter, as to a certain compulsive power? Or after what manner, with respect to those souls which subsist in matter, do these look to intellect and the good, but those to generation and matter, if matter draws all of them to herself, and molests, and offers violence to souls while they are still in the intelligible world? Reason, indeed, will say this, and will compel us to confess, not merely that matter is not evil, but that it is good, giving a testimony contrary to the assertion that matter is evil itself.
It may seem, however, that Plato is drawn to both opinions. For in the Timaeus, indeed, when he calls matter the mother and nurse of generation, and a concause of the fabrication of the world, it is manifest to every one that he admits matter to be good. He likewise denominates the whole world a blessed God, and considers matter to be a portion of the world. But in the discourses of the Elean stranger or guest, [in the Politicus, he refers the cause of the inordination of the universe to its subject nature. He likewise says, that the world, through its producing cause, possesses every good, but through a former habit, the contraries of these are ingenerated in it. In the Philebus, however, producing matter itself, and every nature of the infinite from the one, and in short assigning a divine cause of the difference between bound and infinity, and asserting that good, and the generation which is from deity, are effected by the participation of deity, he grants, that evil has nowhere a divine origin, but that it is requisite to investigate other causes of it, as it is elsewhere said. Perhaps, therefore, inordination and evil are not on account of matter, but on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For this is a corporeal nature, which, as the Elean guest says, is the cause of inordination to the last parts of the universe. For motion subsists about a corporeal nature, matter being of itself immoveable. Nor is the body which is void of quality the first composite. For the first composite body, as Timæus says, is visible; but that which is without quality is not visible. The first composite, however, with a representation of all forms in itself, — and these, as it were, in a confused state, — in being moved, produces that which is inordinate. For the vestiges of different forms, leading to different local motions, manifest the whole motion to be fluctuating and turbulent. This, therefore, is the former habit of the world. For body of itself, not being able to retain forms, shows itself to be in its own nature unadorned, and destitute of beauty. And in wholes, indeed, reason [i.e. form] has dominion; but in things which have the relation of parts, reason, on account of its debility, being vanquished by a nature contrary to itself, is led to evil, and becomes as it were irrational, in consequence of being subdued by its inferior.
After what manner, therefore, that which is præternatural enters into bodies, will be shortly after manifest. That evil, however, is not from matter, nor from bodies, is evident from what has been said. For matter is not the same with that which is moved in a disorderly manner. But that matter must not be considered to be primarily evil, Socrates, I think, sufficiently shows in the Philebus, in which Dialogue he generates infinity from God. If, however, it must be said that matter is the infinite itself, matter, or that which is primarily infinite, is from God. For it must be admitted that essential infinity, depending on one cause, has a divine origin, and especially that infinity which, in conjunction with bound, is not able to produce a mixture; since God is the cause of the subsistence and mixture of these. These, therefore, and the nature of body, so far as body, are to be referred to one leading cause, which is God; for it is he who produced the mixture. Hence neither is body nor matter evil; for they are the progeny of deity, the former as a mixture, but the latter as infinite. In body, indeed, one thing has the relation of a fountain and of reason or form, but another thing is analogous to the infinite. For what else is the infinite in body, than matter? And what else is bound in it, than form? What, likewise, is that which consists of both these, than the material world? If, therefore, all the natures that are generated, and the things of which they consist, are from bound and infinity, — but that which produced all these ranks as the fourth, as Plato says, — if this be the case, we must say that neither matter nor form, nor that which is mixed from both, originated from any other cause than God. But what that is generated from thence can be evil? For [as Plato says in the Laws,] it is not the province of heat to refrigerate, nor of good to produce evil. And hence, neither matter nor body must be said to be evil.
Perhaps, therefore, some one may ask us what our opinion is concerning matter, and whether we admit it to be good or to be evil, or in a certain respect each of these? Let this, then, be our decision, that matter is neither good nor evil. For if it is good, it will be an end [to which something else will be moved], and not the last of things, and will be that for the sake of which something else exists, and will be an object of desire. For all good is a thing of this kind, because that which is primarily good is an end, is that for the sake of which all things subsist, and is desirable to all beings. But again, if matter is evil, there will be another principle of beings discordant with the cause of all good, and there will be two fabled fountains flowing contrary to each other, one being the fountain of good, but the other of evil. And neither will the life of the Gods themselves be innoxious, nor free from mortal difficulty, or from anything else which it is not easy to bear, and which is foreign, and, as it were, attended with molestation. If, however, evil is not, what will that be which will have an existence according. to it? Or is it not sufficient to repeat what has been often said, that we must assert of it an existence which is. necessary? For the nature of good is one thing, but the nature of evil another; and the one is contrary to the other. And there is another third things which is neither simply good nor evil, but necessary. For evil, indeed, leads from good, and flies from its nature; but that which is necessary is all that it is for the sake of good, has a reference to it, and whatever has a generation subsists on account of it If, therefore, generation is for the sake of good, but another thing which is evil, is for the sake of generation, — in this case we must say, that so far as it is necessary to generation, it is an end, and is good, and must not be called [real] evil, but was produced by divinity as necessary to forms, which are incapable of being established in themselves. For it is not fit that the cause of all good should alone produce beings that are good, and who are able to generate from themselves natures characterized by good, but it is requisite that it should likewise give existence to that nature which is not simply and from itself good. This nature, however, desires good, and through this desire it gives generation to other things, and contributes to the fabrication of a sensible essence.
For being [itself] not only gives subsistence to [real] beings, but also to things which desire a participation of essence, and whose existence consists in the desire of having a being. Hence, that which is primarily desirable is one thing, and that which desires this another, and which, through this desire, possesses an intermediate good. But it desires what has a prior subsistence to itself, and for the sake of which it exists.
If, therefore, we thus consider matter, we shall find that it is neither good nor evil, but necessary alone; and that so far as it was produced for the sake of good, it is good, but is not simply good. And so far, indeed, as it is the last of things, it is evil, because that is evil which is most distant from good; but simply considered, it is not evil, but, as we have said, is necessary. In short, it is not true to assert that evil can effect anything by itself; for that which can, is not unmingled evil, and primarily evil. For if evil is contrary to all good, it is requisite that it should be contrary to that which is good from itself and primarily good, prior to being contrary td the good which subsists in something else; and also that evil should be twofold, this being evil itself, but that existing in another thing. But if evil is contrary to that good which subsists in something else, much more will evil be in another thing, and will not have an existence from itself; for the good also to which evil is contrary, subsists in another thing, and has not a separate existence. For what that ranks among beings will be contrary to the first good? Since all beings exist on account of, and for the sake of it. But it is impossible that a contrary should derive its existence on account of a contrary nature. For contraries are corrupted by each other; and, in short, all contraries proceed from one summit and genus. What, however, will be contrary to that which is primarily the genus of the good? For what is beyond the nature of the good? And what among beings will become homogeneous to it? For it would be requisite that there should be something else about both these, of which they will participate; and the good will no longer be the principle of beings, but that will be the principle which is common to both these. Hence, nothing is contrary to the first good, nor to all the participants of it, but to those only which participate of it in a variable manner. Of these, however, we have before spoken, and therefore here we dismiss the discussion of matter.
Again, then, let us pass to privation, because. certain persons assert this to be evil and entirely contrary to good. For, say they, it is sufficient to matter for form to be present with it; but privation is never good, since it is always malefic and contrary to forms. And matter, indeed, aspires after good, and partakes of it; but privation flies from good, is the cause of corruption, and, in short, is evil. If, indeed, the first good was the same with being, and good and being were at the same time one nature, it would be requisite that privation should be primarily evil, in consequence of being of itself non-entity and contrary to being. But if good is different from being, and each is not the same thing, evil also will be different from privation. In short, with respect to inordination and incommensuration, these, as we have said, must be assumed in one way, as the absence of measure and order; but in another way, as naturally contrary to them. For the latter are adverse to order and measure; but the former are only an ablation of them, and are nothing except a negation of these. For when present, they are what they are; but when absent, they leave the privations of themselves. If, therefore, evil is indeed contrary to good, and discordant with it, — but privation neither opposes the habit of which it is the privation, nor is adapted to effect anything, the essence of it, as our opponents say, being so debile and fleeting, — how can we any longer ascribe to that a malefic nature which is destitute of all effective power? For that which is effective is form and power; but privation is formless and debile, and is not power, but rather the absence of power. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident what the beings are in which evil exists, and what those are in which it has no existence.
Because, however, evil subsists in souls in one way, but in bodies in another, what order of them is to be assumed, and whence does it begin, and how far does its diminution extend? Shall we say, that the evil of souls is greater than that of bodies; or shall we admit that the latter is the last of evils, but that the evil of the former is of a more debile nature? With respect, however, to the evil in soul, one kind extends to energy alone, but another restrains this. And with respect to the powers of the soul, its evil introduces to some of them all various fractures; but to others, as Plato says, a cessation of energy. One evil, therefore, is alone an impediment of energy; but another extends as far as to power; and another is corruptive of essence itself. And the first, indeed, is the passion of divine souls, that become connected with the realms of generation; but the second debilitates the splendour of intellect, and the last is the passion of bodies themselves.
Hence, the first will be only an apparent evil; but the last will be real evil, — I mean that evil which destroys the nature of the thing in which it is inherent, — and that which subsists between these, and which is the evil of power, is not adapted to effect anything in essence. In short, that which can injure greater things, is a greater evil; but essence is beyond power, and power is beyond energy. And that, indeed, which is corruptive of essence, at the same time dissipates power and energy; but that which is corruptive of power, destroys also energy; (neither, therefore, is essence the same with power and energy, nor can energy exist after the cessation of power;) and that which is corruptive of first power, as far as to energy, is privation, and not the contrary; but that which is corruptive of power is contrary to essence, [because essence is productive of power].
A greater evil, however, is contrary to a greater good; and therefore the evil of souls is greater than that of bodies, not indeed of all bodies [for this is not true of such as are immaterial], but of those the power of which is naturally adapted to suffer. And the evil is less to those beings in whom there is alone a cessation of energy, since it is alone the absence and the diminution of total perfection. One evil, also, is contrary to virtue, but another to the good of the body; and one is contrary to what is conformable to intellect, but another to what is conformable to nature. By how much better, therefore, intellect is than nature, and that which is according to intellect than that which is according to nature, by so much greater is the evil which is a deviation from intellect, than that which is a deviation from nature. If, however, one evil is corruptive of essence, but another of power alone, it is not wonderful.
For when of the same thing, this corrupts the essence, but that the power of it, then that which is corruptive of essence is evil in a greater degree. But when this takes place in a different thing, and of a different nature, there is no absurdity in admitting, that what is corruptive of power, being more remote from the nature of good, exceeds in evil, as when the power of one thing is better than the essence of another. For thus the powers of the soul are said both to generate and preserve the corporeal essence [and are therefore superior to it]. Hence, Socrates in the [10th book of the] Republic says, that injustice is not deadly to the soul by which it is possessed, which it would be if the soul was mortal. For it would rapidly lead the souls that possessed it into non-existence. But it is better not to be, than to be in an evil condition; since the former is a privation of beings but the latter of good. Hence corporeal evil does not idly disclose to us the wickedness of souls. For one corporeal evil by its intensity terminates in non-existence [by destroying the life of the body]; but another terminates in a bad condition of being.
If, therefore, we assert these things rightly, matter will not be primarily evil, in consequence of the reason which we have assigned. For body, which is nearer to souls than matter, is replete with a less evil than that of souls. But neither is that which is more remote from good, more good, nor that which participates more of evil, a less evil; but in souls, indeed, the evil is greater, and in bodies less; because the order of souls is different from the order of bodies. For of souls, those that dwell on high are entirely pure; but in others, there is a privation of malefic energy; and in others, the reception of evil extends as far as to their powers [but not to their essence]. And of bodies, some indeed are always in order; in others, energy and power subsist differently at different times; and in others, their essence is the recipient of evil. And such is the order of these.
It follows, in the next place, that we should survey what evil itself is by itself, and what nature it possesses. Prior, however, to this, we should consider whether of evils there is some one and the same cause, or whether there is not For some say there is; but this is denied by others. And the former of these asserting that there is a fountain of evils, from this produce all evil, of whatever kind it may be; but the latter, contending that the principle of evil is a malefic soul, say that evils are generated from hence. Others, again, ascribing the species of evil to an intellectual nature, which is a medium, between the two above-mentioned principles, acknowledge that evils, as well as all other things, have from thence their progression. With respect to the authors, however, of these opinions, some form their conclusions from other hypotheses; but others make Plato the father of their dogmas. And the latter, indeed, establishing intellectual ideas of all things, adduce what is said by Socrates in the Theætetus in corroboration of their doctrine, viz. that there are twofold paradigms, the one divine, but the other without deity: but the former cite the Athenian guest, who introduces two kinds of souls, the one beneficent, but the other, on the contrary, malefic; and they say that the universe is governed by the former of these souls alone, but the mortal region by both.
For, in short, if it is admitted that there is one cause of evils, it is requisite to think that this cause is either divine, or intellectual, or psychical. The Gods, however, intellects and souls, receive the order of cause; but of other things, some are their instruments, and others are representations and images produced in matter. In answer to those, therefore, who contend that there is a fountain of evils, what has been said is sufficient. For all the Gods, and all the fountains [or principles of things], are the causes of good; but are not the causes, nor ever will be, of any evil. For if, as we have before said, and as Socrates in the Phaedrus asserts, everything divine is good, beautiful and wise, it will either produce evil contrary to its nature; or everything which subsists from thence will be boniform, and the progeny of the goodness which is established in divinity. But, as it is said, it is not the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of good to produce evil from itself. Hence, one of two things must follow; either that evil must not be said to be evil, if it is of divine origin, or that it exists, but has not deity for its cause. It has, however, been before shown, that there is another cause of evils, and that God is not the source of them; as Plato also somewhere teaches, admitting that the progression of all good is from one cause, but referring the generation of evils to other causes, and not to a divine original. For everything which thence subsists is good, and therefore the whole is good. And from that which is, as it were, a cardiack or invigorating light of goodness in the Gods, another light proceeds, being a splendour and power, and part of deific power. Those blessed, however, and felicitous beings, the progeny of the Gods, are said to adorn and give measure to evils, and to bound their infinity and darkness, in consequence of that portion of good which they receive, and the power of existence which they are allotted. This adorning and arranging cause, therefore, is called the fountain of evils, not as the fountain from which they are generated, — for it is not lawful that the first causes of beings should be the principle of evils, — but [it is rather a fountain of good] as imparting to evils end and bound, and illuminating their obscurity by its own beneficent light. For evil, indeed, is infinite from partial causes, but receives an end from wholes; and on this account it is evil to these causes, but to wholes is not evil. For the infinite in evils is not according to power, — since thus, by the infinitude of themselves, they would participate of the nature of good, — but it is in consequence of a defect of power. And evils are in a certain respect corroborated by good through the participation of bound.
The authors of these assertions, therefore, thus conceiving, and being persuaded that the generation of evils is not inordinate, make God to be the cause of the order of these. But it appears to me, that not the Barbarians only, but likewise the most eminent of the Greeks, ascribing to the Gods a knowledge of all things, — both of such as are evil, and such as are good, — ascribe the generation of things essentially good to the Gods, and also of such as are evil, so far as they receive a portion of good, and the power of existing, in order to accomplish a certain end. For, as toe have often said, evil is not evil without a mixture [of good]; but it is in one respect evil, and in another good. And so far, indeed, as it is good, it is from the Gods; but so far as evil, it derives its subsistence from another, and that an impotent cause. For all evil is generated on account of impotence and defect, because evil, so far as it is good, receives its hypostasis from power and [so far as it is evil from] impotence. For the power of evil is in good [i.e. exists so far as it partakes of good]. For if evil was evil without a mixture, and evil alone, it would be unknown to the Gods, since they are good, and are able to benefit all things, of whatever kind they may be, which derive from them their existence; or, in other words, they benefit everything of which they have a knowledge. For their cognitions are energetic powers, and are fabricative of all things, of which also they are said to be the cognitions. Because however evil, at the same time that it is evil, is likewise good, and is more good than evil, because it is good to the universe, neither must the knowledge of evil by the Gods be destroyed, nor the generation of it from thence; but it must be admitted, that the Gods both know and produce evil, so far as it is good. Hence, after the same manner that they know, they produce it; and the causes of evils are with them powers which impart good to the nature of evil; just as if some God should, according to forms, give a specific subsistence to intellectual powers in the forms of nature.
It is well, however, that our discussion has led us to speak of forms, and the order of forms, lest perhaps evils, and the generations of evils, should proceed from these; or whence to evils also is the never-failing derived? For everything which perpetually exists, proceeds from an immoveable and definite cause. If, therefore, evil perpetually surrounds the mortal nature, what is the perpetuity of it, and whence does it originate? For we cannot say that it proceeds from any other cause than that which eternally subsists after the same manner, and from an immoveable nature. But this is the nature of forms, and that which always exists is good. And what, indeed, will be produced by intellect which is not good? If, therefore, intellect is good, whatever is produced conformably to it is good; for that which is assimilated to good, is good; but evil, so far as evil is not adapted to be assimilated to good. We likewise say, that what is assimilated to intellectual forms, is perfect and happy; but, on the contrary, we denominate every being that is evil miserable and unhappy. Hence evil, so far as evil, is not assimilated to intellect; and this being the case, neither will there be in intellect paradigms of evils. For every image is the image of a paradigm. But if Plato, also, calls forms or ideas the most divine of beings, — for the Elean stranger or guest says, that a perpetually invariable sameness of subsistence alone pertains to the most divine of all things; — and if, as we have said, the paradigm of evils is destitute of divinity and dark, — if this be the case, how is it possible to suppose that such a nature as that which is most divine being innate in forms, evil can thence be produced? If, however, - the fabricator of the universe, who contains in himself all forms, and the number of forms, was willing that evil should not exist in the universe, and like wise wished to generate all things similar to himself, and therefore free from evil, how can there still be a paradigm of evils? For, containing all things, he will benefit them, and will not permit anything to be in vain. For he does not indeed give subsistence to, and generate some forms, but with respect to others is barren and inefficacious; but by his very being producing all things, his generative power operates with an impartible energy. One of two things, therefore is necessary, either that the divine intellect should wish evils to exist, and to be generated, if it contains essentially the forms of these; or that, not being willing, it should neither generate nor produce them, nor possess the forms of them in the same manner as it does of the mundane natures of which it is the cause.
This hypothesis, however, which introduces a paradigm of evils, is not of itself sufficient to persuade us that it is true, since it is often changed to what is contrary to truth. But it is not wonderful, if, while asserting that evil is eternal, and admitting that there are immoveable causes of eternal beings, we should at the same time refuse to grant that there is such a cause of evil. For that is [properly] eternal, which has perpetually a progression into existence according to nature, but not that which is produced [perpetually] in any way whatever; since it must be said, that evils revolve about a mortal nature, not in consequence of everything mortal being evil, but because these evils also are adorned by the order of the universe, and especially by the heavens. Hence these, after imparting essence to generated natures, cause them likewise to participate of eternity. But to the bodies which have a rectilinear motion, they give circular periods, and impart order to things inordinate bound to things indefinite, and goodness to everything that is evil. Everything, therefore, which is according to nature, and exists always, is generated from a definite cause. But evil is not according to nature. For neither is there a producing principle of lameness in nature nor of a deviation from art in art How, therefore, is it possible to investigate an immoveable principle, and a producing cause of evils in forms, since everything which derives its existence from them is a form and an end; but the nature of evils is of itself infinite and undefined?
In the third place, therefore, let us direct our attention to the soul which we denominate malefic, and consider whether or not we must ascribe to this the cause of all evils. Shall we say, then, that as it is essentially the province of fire to heat, but not to refrigerate anything, — and of other things, there is another employment, — so likewise it essentially pertains to this malefic soul to generate evils, and to infect with evil everything to which it is proximate? Or shall we admit that the nature of it is always good, but that its energies subsist differently according to the same order, a different energy producing a different life? If, therefore, it should be said that these indeed are malefic, it must be granted that it is malefic, not because it is an irrational soul, but because it is better than this, and through which it is good.
For to this soul there is a transmutation of habit to the better and the worse. But if, as some say, this soul is essentially and of itself evil, from whence does it derive its being? Is it from any other source than the demiurgic cause, and the mundane Gods? And how is it possible that it should not proceed from those causes, from which the species of the mortal life originates? But if it proceeds from these, how can it be essentially evil? For all the progeny of these are good, and in short, all evil is beyond essence, and is not essence; since nothing is contrary to essence. But good is contrary to evil. And a sensible essence, indeed, is the image of being; but being [i.e. real being,] is established in good, and generates all things according to good, and nothing which is thence derived is evil. It is not, however, wonderful, if the Athenian guest denominates such a soul malefic, on account of the evil which is in its powers and energies, this evil not always remaining, but as I have elsewhere observed, being made in a certain respect boniform, and adapting its own energies to those of a superior soul.
For this latter soul is adapted to save itself; but the former is incapable of being converted to itself. And to the latter, indeed, since it is of a boniform nature, measure and reason are derived from itself; but to the former, from an external cause: because to body, and to all alter-motive natures, both being and well-being are on account of another, and, as it were, externally acceding cause. In short, as I may say, it is absurd to make such a soul to be the cause of evils. For neither is it the cause to body of all the evils that are in it, nor to a more excellent soul. For evil and debility are to a better soul from itself, because when it descends, the form of the mortal life springs up together with it; but debility was allotted to it, prior to its descent into the realms of generation. For the causes of its descent were no other than debility, and an impotency of contemplating supernal natures; since neither while we were able and at the same time willing to be established in the intelligible world, did our flight from real being, and inordination with respect to the contemplation of it, exist; nor, in short, does the flight from the survey of it proceed from not wishing to see the spectacles in the superior [i.e. in the supercelestial] place.
For all those that are distant from, aspire after the vision of it; And its descent is owing to its debility. but, as Plato says [in the Phaedrus], being impotent, they are carried round in a submerged condition. Hence it remains, that this arises from debility alone. For the eyes of the soul are impotent with respect to a permanent vision of the truth and splendour which are there. By a much greater priority, therefore, is evil in souls, and does not originate from a second life. After what manner, however, evil subsists in the former soul, and why Plato denominates it malefic, has been shown by us sufficiently for the present. For its incommensurability and indefinite nature are contrary to measure, and to those boundaries which proceed from form; and it neither is alone deprived of, nor desires the participation of them. If any one, therefore, looking to these things, should denominate this latter soul malefic and contrary to form, he will not assert this of it as if it was allotted a nature of this kind, but as verging to that which is without measure and bound, though at the same time it is able to be drawn by itself to a more excellent nature.
4. But if these are not the causes of evils, why do we ourselves admit that there is a cause of the generation of them? To this we reply, it must by no means be admitted that there is one cause, which of itself is the source of evils. For if there is one cause of everything that is good, there are many causes, and not one cause alone, of evils; since all things that are good, are commensurate with, similar and friendly to each other; but, on the contrary, evils are neither commensurate with each other, nor with things that are good. If, therefore, one cause precedes the commensurability of similars with each other, but many that of dissimilars, — for all things which are from one cause, are friendly to, and co-passive with, each other, and assemble together, some in a greater, but others in. a less degree, — if this be the case, and if there be many causes, and not one cause only of evils, — some, indeed, to souls, but others to bodies, — from these, and in these, evil must be surveyed.
And it appears to me that Socrates, in the Republic, insinuating this, denies that a divine nature is the cause of evils; but says that other causes of them are to be investigated. For by this he signifies that these causes are many, indefinite and particular. For what monad or triad, or eternally producing principle can there be of evils, the very being of which is through dissimilitude and indefiniteness as far as to an individual nature? But that which ranks as a whole is everywhere without evil. The effective causes of evils, therefore, are these: and souls, likewise, and such forms as subsist about matter, are certain causes of this kind. For some of these lead to evil, but others being adverse to each other, afford a place to that which is preternatural in generation; since that which is according to nature to some things, is preternatural to others.
Let an instance of this, if you are willing, be that paradigm, destitute of Divinity and dark, which is mentioned by Socrates in the Theætetus, where he speaks of the evils which necessarily revolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our abode. For souls when assimilated to evil beings, change their life by an assimilation to a more excellent nature. For the soul, indeed, beholds the exemplars of good, when she is converted to herself, and to beings better than herself, with whom things primarily good subsist, and the summits of beings, separately established on a pure and holy foundation; but again, she looks to the paradigms of evils, when she directs her attention to things external to, and posterior to, herself, which are naturally inordinate, indefinite and flowing, and are destitute of that good by which the eye of the soul is nourished and watered, and lives her own proper life.
The forms and powers of evils, therefore, are not effective, but are impotence and debility, and an incommensurable communion with, and mixture of, similars. Nor, again, are there certain immoveable paradigms of evils, and which always subsist after the same manner, but such as are infinite and indeterminate, and borne along in other, and these innumerable, things. But that for the sake of which something else subsists, is the least of all things to be ranked among evils. For it is not fit that the end of evils should be good: but because souls search after good in every possible way, and for the sake of this undertake all that they effect, and act badly, — on this account, some one perhaps may think that the end of evils is good. All things, therefore, are for the sake of this good, both such as are really good and such as are contrary to it.
For we act badly through an ignorance of our own nature, at the same time desiring good. And perhaps it will be well, neither to establish evil as a principle, nor as a paradigm according to nature, nor as of itself subsisting for its own sake. For the form and nature of evils is defect, indetermination, privation, and a mode of hypostasis, which, as it is usually said, may be rather assimilated to a parhypostasis, or deviation from subsistence. And hence, as it has been frequently observed, evil is involuntary. For how, indeed, can it be voluntary, since that which is voluntary subsists for the sake of good? But evil of itself is neither desirable, nor an object of choice to any being. These things, however, we shall elsewhere discuss. But from what has been said, it is evident that evil in souls arises from debility, and the victory of a subordinate nature; for the horse which participates of depravity, says Plato [in the Phaedrus], gravitates and tends to the earth.
And in bodies, it arises from the mixture of dissimilars, viz. of form, and matter which is formless, and of contrary producing powers.
It follows, therefore, that we who admit that evil is to be called a parhypostasis, or deviation from subsistence, should show after what manner, from the above-mentioned causes and non-causes, it subsists; since it is not possible for it to exist otherwise than as a parhypostasis. For that which is produced by a principal cause, of whatever kind it may be, has itself a principal subsistence, neither having an indefinite end, nor the relation of that which alone subsists for the sake of something else, nor a progression from itself into being. And [in short,] whatever is generated from a cause, is according to nature. For without a cause, it is impossible for anything to have a generation, or to refer the order of its existence to any end. Shall we say, therefore, that evil is accidental to certain things, and that it subsists for the sake of something else, and is not derived from the first principle?
For we also energise in everything, for the sake of the participation of good, and in consequence of looking to it, and being as it were, parturient with, and always desiring it Hence, in some things we act rightly; but in others not. For because we esteem that which is not good, [as if it were good,] we act erroneously; but because in what we do, we desire to obtain good, we act rightly. And our conduct, so far as pertains to what is universal, is right; but so far as pertains to what is particular, is wrong. Hence that which is desirable to us is one thing, and that which we obtain is another. And the one is the nature of good; but the other is contrary to it. The generation, therefore, of what is contrary to good, of whatever kind it may be, arises from the debility of the efficient, and its incommensurability to that which is effected.
For we rightly assert that those things have a subsistence which proceed from a principle, and have a certain end to which their progression is directed; but we say that those things have a deviation from subsistence, which neither proceed from a principle according to nature, nor have a definite end. But evils neither have a principal cause of their generation, — for neither the nature of that which is præternatural, nor the reason of things præter-rational, is a cause, — nor do they reach to an end. For everything which is generated, is generated for the sake of something [different from itself]. Hence such a generation must be said to be a deviation from subsistence, imperfect and without a scope, and also in a certain respect uncaused and indefinite. For neither is there one cause of it, nor does that which is a cause of itself, and a principal cause, effect anything, looking to evil itself, and the nature of evil.
But the very contrary to this takes place. For everything which is produced, is produced for the sake of good; but evil is extrinsically derived, and is superadvenient. The attainment, indeed, of that which is appropriate, is to everything an end; but the unattainment of it proceeds from the debility of the efficient, so far as it receives a nature which is partly less and partly more excellent; and in consequence of this, one part of it is different from the other. For where the one is, there at the same time is the good; but evil is in its nature divided and not one. For the incommensurable, the unharmonious and contrariety are in multitude; but from these debility and indigence proceed; because in the Gods also [who are characterized by unity] there is the winged nature and at the same time each of the horses is good. There, however, all things are good, and from such things as are good, and not from their contraries; but in other beings, there is a mixture of evil and good, multitude, and a diversity of powers, through which they are drawn to things of a different nature.
And among divine beings, indeed, multitude looks to one thing, and is bounded by one species of life. But where multitude and difference shine forth, there, on account of a diminution of union, there is an indigence of power. For all power is one thing, and is that which it is from unity, and discord and discrepance arise from the appetition of one thing being different from that of another. And thus we have shown after what manner the generations of evils subsist, and what that is which is called a parhypostasis, or deviation from subsistence, and whence it is derived.
5. It must now, therefore, be shown what evil itself is. It appears, however, to be the most difficult of all things to know what is essentially the nature itself of evil; since all knowledge is a contact with form, and is itself a form. But evil is without form, and is as it were privation. This, perhaps, will become manifest, if, looking to good itself and the nature of what is good, we thus survey what evil itself is. For as that which is the first good, is beyond all things, so evil itself is destitute of all good; I mean so far as it is evil, and a defect and privation of good. With respect to good, therefore, how far it extends, after what manner it subsists, and what orders it possesses, we have elsewhere shown. But with respect to evil, if so far as evil it is entirely a privation of good, it follows that as evil it is destitute of the fountain of good; that as infinite it is deprived of the first bound; as debility, that it is without the power which is in the intelligible order; that as incommensurable, and false, and turpitude itself, it is destitute of the beauty, truth and symmetry through which that which is mixed, and in which the unities of beings subsist; that as being naturally without location and unstable, it is deprived of the nature and power of eternity which abides in one; but that as privation and without life it does not participate of the first monad of forms, and of the life which is there.
And if evil is corruptive, and the cause of division to the natures with which it is present, and is imperfect, it is deprived of the perfective goodness of wholes. For as corruptive, indeed, it leads from existence to non-existence; as dividing, it destroys the continuity and union of being; and as imperfect, it prevents particulars from obtaining their perfection and natural order. Further still, the indefiniteness of the nature of evil, causes it to be destitute of, and to deviate from, the summit which possesses transcendent union; its infecundity deprives it of generative, and its inertness of demiurgic, power. For it is the exclusion, debility and indefiniteness of every good of this kind, viz. it is a privation of the monadic cause, of generative power, and efficacious production. But if it is the cause of dissimilitude, partition and inordination, it is evident that it is thus deficient of assimilitative good, and of the impartible providential inspection of partible natures, and of the order which is necessary to impartible beings.
If, however, good does not only extend to these orders, but there is also the immaculate genus, which is efficacious and magnificent in its energies, evil will be inefficacious, dark and material. Or whence will it possess each of these, and other things of a like kind, if not from privations of the above-mentioned species of good? For there good subsists primarily, of which the good that is in us is a part and an image; and of which evil is the privation. And what occasion is there to say this, since the evil also which is in bodies, is not only a privation of the good which exists in the intelligible and intellectual orders, but also of that which prior to body is in souls. For the good which is in bodies, is a corrupt image of the good of souls. Hence, likewise, the privation of form will not be a frustration of anything else than of intellectual power; because form is the offspring of intellect; and that which is productive of essence, is essentially intellectual. And thus we have shown, that what is in every respect evil, is a privation and defect of good.
Such, therefore, being the nature of evil, let us in the next place show whence its contrariety to good proceeds. For evil, indeed, is a privation, but not perfect privation. Hence, being co-existent with the habit of which it is the privation, it causes it by its presence to be debile; but from the habit assumes itself power and form. In consequence of this, the privations of forms, being perfect privations, are alone the absence of habits, and are not adverse to them; but the privations of good, are adverse to, and in a certain respect contrary to, their habits. For they are not entirely impotent and inefficacious, being co-existent with their powers, and led as it were by them into form and energy. Pluto also knowing this, says that injustice itself is of itself debile and inactive, but through the presence of justice both possesses power and is led to energy, not abiding in its own nature, nor in a privation of vitality alone, because that which is vital subsisting prior to evil, imparts to evil a participation of life.
All life, however, is essentially power; but evil being produced through a power which is not its own, is contrary to good, employing its own power for the purpose of resisting good. And the greater, indeed, the inherent power is, the greater are the energies and the works of evil; but they are less when the power is less. In the powers of nature, likewise, in bodies, the preternatural then exists in a greater degree, when order is entirely dissolved. Hence, in souls also, greater effects are produced from a less evil, but less from a greater. For evil being destitute of its contrary [good,] is increased, indeed, according to its turpitude and privation of form; but being diminished according to power and energy, is debile, and at the same time inefficacious. For its strength is not from its own power, so that the power being increased, the transition would be to something greater; but it is from the presence of its contrary; just as if cold should use the power of heat for the purpose of effecting its own work, vanquishing its power, and causing it to be in subjection to itself.
Hence, there being a deficiency of the nature contrary to evil, and privation increasing in proportion to the deficiency; and the effective energy likewise becoming more debile, through a diminution of power, the evil, indeed, is greater, but the effect produced by it is less. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, it must not be said that evil [so far as evil,] either effects, or is capable of effecting anything; but both its efficiency and its power are derived from its contrary good. For good, on account of its mixture with evil, is debile and inefficacious; and evil participates of power and energy on account of the presence of good, since both subsist in one thing. Thus too, in material bodies, where one thing is contrary to another, that which is according to nature corroborates that which is præternatural. Or whence do bodies derive a periodic measure, and an order of periods, except from natural numbers, and from that disposition which is Conformable to nature?
That, however, which is præternatural debilitates that which is according to nature, the energy of nature being blunted, and the order being dissolved in which its well-being consists. Thus also in souls, evil vanquishing good, employs the power of it for its own purposes, viz. it uses the power of reason and its inventions for the gratification of inordinate desires. Each, likewise, imparts to the other what pertains to its own nature; this indeed power, but that debility; because evil of itself is not adapted to the possession of either energy or power. For all power is good, and all energy is an extension of power.
6. And how, indeed, is it possible to admit that evil possesses power, if it is the province of all power to preserve that in which it resides? But evil dissipates everything of which it is the evil. Hence, evil is of itself inefficacious and impotent; and if, also, as Plato says, it is involuntary, it will be without will, and thus is deprived of the most primary triad of good, viz. of will, power and energy. For good, indeed, in its own nature, is accompanied by will, and is powerful and efficacious; but evil is without will, and is debile and inefficacious. For neither is that wished for by anything which is corruptive of that thing; nor is it the province of power, so far as it is power, to corrupt; nor of energy, not to have its hypostasis according to power. But as things that are evil desire what appears to them to be good, and the evil which appears to them is the object of their will, on account of its mixture with good; so, likewise, power and effective energy have in evil an apparent subsistence, because evil has not these essentially, nor so far as it is evil, but derives them externally, in consequence of not having itself a real subsistence, but being a deviation from subsistence. It appears, therefore, to me, that this is shown by Socrates, in the Theætetus, to those who are capable of apprehending his meaning, viz. that evil is neither [absolutely] privation, nor contrary to good. For privation is not able to effect anything, nor, in short, is at all powerful; nor of itself is a contrary, nor has any power or energy. Hence, we denominate evil in a certain respect a subcontrary, because it is not of itself entirely a perfect privation, but, together with habit, deriving from it power and energy, is constituted in the part of contrariety, and is neither perfect privation, nor contrary, but subcontrary to good. But the term parhypostasis indicates the truth concerning it to those who do not negligently attend to its meaning. It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, what the nature of evil is, and whence it is derived.
7. In the next place, let us speak of the differences of evil, and show what they are. It has, therefore, been before observed by us, that of evil, one kind is in souls, but another in bodies; and, likewise, that evil in souls is twofold, this subsisting in the irrational form of life, but that in the rational part. And we now say, that in the three following things evil subsists, viz. in a partial soul, in the image of soul, and in the body which ranks among particulars. Hence, if the good of the rational soul is derived from its conversion to intellect, — for intellect is prior to it; — and the good of the irrational part is from reason, — for the good of everything is derived from that which is proximately better than itself; — and again, if the good of body is a subsistence conformable to nature, — for nature is the principle of motion and rest to it; — if this be the case, it is necessary that the evil of the rational part should be in a subsistence subcontrary to intellect, but of the irrational part, in a deviation from reason; since the good of it consists in acting conformably to reason; and the evil of body will be a præternatural subsistence.
And these three evils are inherent in the three natures, through their being subject to debility from a diminution in the partial nature of their essence. For wholes, as we have frequently said, possess their proper good perpetually; but evil exists in particulars and individuals, in which there is a deficiency of power, through a diminution of essence, together with division and an attenuated union. In short, there is one evil in souls, and another in bodies. And of these, that which is in souls is twofold; this, indeed, being a molestation of the soul arising from grief or some other passion; but that being turpitude, as it is somewhere said by the Elean guest. But the turpitude of the soul is indeed ignorance and a privation of intellect, and its molestation from passion arises from discord in the soul, and an abandonment of the life which is according to reason.
And thus, evil will have a threefold subsistence; but each of these likewise is twofold. For, with respect to turpitude, one kind subsists about the dianoetic, but another about the doxastic power; because the knowledge of each is different; and in the one, there is a want of science, but in the other, of art With respect, however, to turpitude and the molestations of the soul, one kind of these subsists in its cognitions, and another in its impulses; For appetite is not [in its own nature] conformable to reason, — and there are many senses and precipitate imaginations, — so that appetites oppose those whose life consists in action, and the phantasy intervening is hostile to those who give themselves to the contemplative energy by destroying the purity and immateriality of the contemplations. The præternatural, likewise, is twofold. For the turpitude which is in body is præternatural; since this is the debility, the defect and malady of form, the order and commensuration of it being dissolved.
In so many ways, therefore, is evil to be divided; because the measures also of beings are in those three principles, — nature, soul and intellect. The incommensurate, likewise, is either a privation of the productive powers which are in nature, or of those which are in soul, or of those which are in intellect, and are generated by intellect. For that which adorns anything primarily is better than the thing adorned. But I mean by this, every adorning nature which has a primary subsistence. And such in bodies, indeed, is nature; in the irrational forms of life, reason; but in the rational forms, that which is prior to them, and which is intellect; and [in intellectual forms], the good. In the images, likewise, of the rational soul, the good which they participate is either on account of the rational soul [from which they are suspended], or on account of the soul which dwells on high. But whatever the natures are which are suspended from such a soul, they either [subsist on account of such a soul, or] on account of that principle which is external to them, and from which good is imparted to the beings to which it providentially attends. But with respect to bodies, good to some of them is derived from a partial soul, and to others, from that soul which ranks as a whole.
Some one, however, may still doubt after what manner evils can subsist, and whence they are derived, Providence existing. For if evil exists, how will the energy of Providence be solely directed to good? Or, if the universe is replete with the energies of Providence, how can evil subsist among beings? Some, therefore, yield to one of the reasons, viz. that all things are not from Providence if evil exists, and that evil is not, if all things are from Providence and the good. For this, in the first place, perhaps, disturbs the mind, that evil is in souls. For evil considered by itself is unmingled with its contrary good, is most obscure, and nothing else than darkness; and if it subsisted by itself, it might perhaps be an impediment to the works of Providence. But, as we have frequently said, evil is not unmingled with good, and there is no such thing as evil itself; since it is in a certain respect, and not absolutely evil, through its participation of good. For, in short, it is not the same thing to say, that God is the cause of all things, and that he is alone the cause of all things [since other causes co-operate with him]. For the former assertion is true, but the latter not. For intellect is the cause of the natures posterior to itself; soul, of the beings which are consequent to it; and nature, of bodies, and whatever is inherent in bodies. Each of these, likewise, produces in a different way. For God produces primarily, and according to transcendent union; intellect, according to an eternal energy; soul, self-motively; and nature, through necessity. And neither is that which produces intellectually the same with that which is prior to it, nor with that which is secondary to it, so far as it is secondary. If, therefore, all things are from Providence, and no one of all things is evil, so far as it is from, and is produced by Providence, why is it wonderful that evil should have a place among beings, so far as it subsists from soul? And the same thing, indeed, will be evil to particulars, but good to wholes. It will, however, be in a greater degree evil to particulars, because evil is derived from them. For not energy alone, but also that which energises, possesses from Providence an excellent condition of being. Hence, in a certain respect good is in them, — I mean, in the evils which exist in the soul. And thus it will be credible that Providence does not suffer any one of these to be deprived of itself. Evil, therefore, must be admitted to be twofold; one being within the soul, and consisting either in improper imaginations, or vicious consent, or base choice; but the other subsisting externally, and becoming apparent in various actions, which are the effects either of anger or desire.
8. All such things, therefore, as these manifoldly possess good. For they are effected for the avengement of other natures. The action, also, is according to the desert of the agent; and that which acts badly, does not suffer the same punishment for every bad action, whatever it may be, nor does it require the same punishment for each. These deeds, therefore, are entirely good to that which suffers from them; and they are also good to that which is effective of them, so far as it follows or acts in conformity to wholes; but so far as it acts from itself the deeds are evil, and detrimental to itself and do not give completion to the great conceptions of the soul. This, however, is the beginning of salvation to the patient. For in many persons, the meditated evil remaining within the soul is concealed, but at length, as being base and improper, is benefited, and its nature then becomes evident when it exists in energy.
This is manifested by the penitence and remorse of the soul, reproaching itself, as it were, for the evil deed. For the arts of physicians, also, by opening ulcers, and thus making the passion and the inwardly concealed cause of the disease evident, exhibit an image of the operations of Providence, who admits both the base deeds and depraved passions, in order that the latter being changed from the conception which they had formed, and from the habit which was caused and inflated by evils, may assume the principle of a better period and life. But whatever passions are within the soul, are accompanied by the good of the evil, so far as they always lead the soul to what is proper. For it is not possible for that which chooses things of a worse nature to remain in such as are better, but it soon tends to that which is dark and base. And not actions only, but likewise without these, the elections of the soul contain in themselves [retributive] justice.
For every election leads the soul to that which is similar to its choice. If, therefore, there is anything depraved and base and atheistical in the soul, the transferring it to that which is congenial to itself is soon attended with good, with the desert which is from Providence, and with the law inherent in souls, which leads each of them to what is appropriate. For Providence foreknows the life of the soul, and through this conjoins it to things similar to itself; but this is the same as uniting it with that which it deserves, or with that which is conformable to its difference with respect to other souls; this, again, unites it to what is imparted by Providence, and this [finally] to good. If, indeed, it were fit that souls which act unjustly should abide on high, which it is not lawful to assert, their choice would in no respect possess what is good; but being alone evil, it would be entirely atheistical and unjust.
But if choice soon removes the elective soul from things of a better nature, it possesses good mingled with evil. For every soul naturally desires the supernal region. When souls, therefore, descend into the realms of mortality, their choice is directed to a degraded life; but it is necessary that everything should descend which does not [always] energise according to intellect, though the lapse is to some souls more, and to others less, because the choice in them varies.
But after what manner is the evil that is in bodies at the same time good? May we not say, that this to the whole is according to nature, but to the part is præternatural. Evil, however, is in a greater degree good to the whole than to the part, because it contributes naturally to the universe; but so far as it is distributed into parts, it has from thence the preternatural. But the evil which is in bodies is twofold, one kind existing as deformity, but another as disease I call, however, the deformity of body everything which is not a preternatural disease of it. For monsters are the turpitudes of nature. And in nature, considered as a whole, deformity subsists naturally, because in this it is reason [i.e. a producing principle] and form; but in a partial nature, deformity is one reason [or form], and that which is contrary to this, is to such a nature preternatural. But in nature as a whole, all producing principles and all forms subsist naturally. And sometimes, indeed, from one species or form, that which is generated is one thing; for the form of man in nature may be said to generate man in a more principal manner than anything else. But sometimes many things are generated from one form; for there is one productive principle of figure in nature, but many different kinds of figures proceed from it. And sometimes, from many forms one thing is produced; such as are the mixtures of species about matter, that appear to be monsters to an individual nature, which desires to obtain, and subsists according to one form. Lastly, sometimes many things [of the same species] proceed from many forms; for in many such things there is both equality and inequality. All species or forms, therefore, are according to nature, both such as are unmingled, and such as are mingled, and proceed from those producing powers which are in Nature herself, with all the variety of which she is replete. To some bodies, however, disease is according to nature; because each of these is generated that which it is said to be in a twofold respect, viz. both from a partial and a total nature. But that which is corruptible is so naturally with respect to nature considered as a whole, but is præternatural to a partial nature. For that into which the thing that is corrupted is transmuted, possesses a form and reason from total nature, contrary to the nature of the thing corrupted. For so far as that which is corrupted is a whole, so far the corruption of it is præternatural; but so far as it is a portion of the universe, the corruption of it is according to nature; since every whole subsists according to the form or productive principle which is in it. And thus corruption is produced from one thing, and the corruption is again the cause of the generation of another thing.
9. Hence, the evil which is in bodies is not unmingled evil; but the evil of these, so far as it is from Providence, is natural; and, in short, those things that have a generation, have it on account of good. Some one, however, may say, How is it possible for that which is perfectly good to suffer that which is deprived of the nature of good to remain? For neither is it possible for evil to exist, without having the appearance of its contrary, good; because all things, and even evil itself, are for the sake of good. To this we answer, that if all things are for the sake of good, Divinity is not the cause of evils. For evil, so far as evil, is not derived from thence, but from other causes, which, as we have before observed, generate not from power, but from debility. On which account, as it appears to me, Plato, arranging all things about the King of all, and asserting that all things are for his sake, and even such as are not good, — for they have the appearance of good, — calls this King the cause of all things, and the cause of every being. But he does not, indeed, call him the cause of evils, so far as they are evils, but so far as each of these is good, in consequence of ranking among beings. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, both all things will be derived from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence, also, the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good; and, as possessing a transcendency united knowledge, they know all things, impartibly such as are partible, boniformly such as are evil; and multitude is known by them according to profound union. For there is one knowledge pertaining to soul, another to an intellectual nature, and another to the Gods themselves. And the first of these, indeed, is a self-motive, the second an eternal, and the third an ineffable and transcendency united knowledge, both knowing and producing all things by the one itself.