The Politicus — Plato
=====================
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ
Translation/edition: Thomas Taylor (1804)
Language: English
Read in Plato Scroll: https://plato-scroll.com/s/stm/
This file: https://plato-scroll.com/text/stm-g.txt
Other editions of this work:
  - David Horan: https://plato-scroll.com/text/stm.txt
  - Benjamin Jowett: https://plato-scroll.com/text/stm-b.txt
  - H.N. Fowler (Loeb, 1925): https://plato-scroll.com/text/stm-c.txt
  - Greek text: https://plato-scroll.com/text/stm-e.txt
  - Spanish: https://plato-scroll.com/text/stm-h.txt
Sources and licences: https://plato-scroll.com/attribution.html
Numbers in [brackets] are the edition's reference loci (Stephanus, Bekker, book.line, page...). Superscript numerals refer to the Notes at the end.


## The Politicus

[257a] Socrates: I am greatly indebted to you, Theodorus, for making me acquainted with Theætetus and this guest.
[257a] Theodorus: Perhaps, Socrates, you will be indebted to me the triple of this, after these men have made you a politician and a philosopher.
[257a] Socrates: Be it so. But shall we say we have heard this of you, who are most skilful in reasoning, and in things pertaining to geometry?
[257b] Theodorus: What is that, Socrates?
[257b] Socrates: That we should consider each of these men as of equal worth, though they are more remote from each other in honour than accords with the analogy of your art.
[257c] Theodorus: By our God Ammon, Socrates, you have properly, justly, and promptly reproved me for my error in computation! But I shall speak with you about this at some other time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be weary in gratifying us, but discuss for us, in order, either a politician first, or, if it is more agreeable to you, a philosopher.
[257c] Guest: We shall do so, Theodorus, as soon as we attempt this discussion, nor shall we desist till we arrive at the end of it. But what ought I to do respecting Theætetus here?
[257c] Theodorus: About what?
[257c] Guest: Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead Socrates here, as our associate in the discussion? Or how do you advise?
[257c] Theodorus: As you say, take Socrates in his stead: for, both being young men, they will easily by resting be able to endure every kind of labour.
[257d] Socrates: And indeed, O guest, both of them appear to be allied to me in a certain respect. [257e] For you say that one of them (Theætetus) appears to resemble me in the formation of his face; and the other possesses a certain alliance, through having the same name as myself. But it is requisite that we who are allied should always readily recognize this alliance by discourse. With Theætetus, therefore, I yesterday joined in discourse, and to-day I have heard him answering this guest: but neither of them has yet discoursed with Socrates here. It is, however, proper that he should be considered. Let him then answer me some other time, but at present let him answer you.
[258a] Guest: Let it be so, Socrates. Do you hear this, Socrates junior?
[258a] Socrates: jun. I do.
[258a] Guest: Do you, therefore, assent to what he says?
[258b] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[258b] Guest: It appears, therefore, that you will be no impediment to our discussion; and perhaps it is requisite that much less should I be an impediment. But after a sophist, it is necessary, as it appears to me, that we should investigate a politician. Tell me, therefore, whether this character should be placed among the number of those that possess a scientific knowledge. Or how shall we say?
[258b] Socrates: jun. That it ought.
[258b] Guest: We must, therefore, make a division of the sciences, just as we made a division in our investigation of the sophist.
[258b] Socrates: jun. Perhaps so.
[258b] Guest: But yet it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not divide in the same manner.
[258c] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly not.
[258c] Guest: But after another manner.
[258c] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[258c] Guest: Who then can find the political path? For it is requisite to find it, and, separating it from other things, to impress it with one idea, and, marking the other deflections, with another species, to make our soul conceive that all the sciences are comprehended in two species.
[258c] Socrates: jun. I think, O guest, that this is your business, and not mine.
[258c] Guest: But indeed, Socrates, it is also requisite that it should be yours when it becomes apparent to us.
[258d] Socrates: jun. You speak well.
[258d] Guest: Are not, therefore, the arithmetic, and certain other arts allied to this, divested of action, and do they not afford knowledge alone?
[258d] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[258e] Guest: But those arts which pertain to architecture, and the whole of manual operation, possess, as it were, science connate with actions, and at the same time give completion to bodies produced by them, which before this had not a being.
[258e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[258e] Guest: After this manner, therefore, divide all sciences, calling one practic, and the other gnostic alone.
[258e] Socrates: jun. Let there be, therefore, one whole science, and two species of it.
[258e] Guest: Whether, therefore, shall we consider and denominate a politician, a king, a despot, and the governor of a family, as one and the same thing? Or shall we say there are as many arts pertaining to these as there are names? Or rather follow me hither.
[258e] Socrates: jun. Whither?
[259a] Guest: To the consideration of this. If any private person is able to advise sufficiently a public physician, is it not necessary to call him by the name of that art which he who is advised professes?
[259a] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[259a] Guest: And if any private person is able to give advice to a king, shall we not say that such a one possesses that science which the king himself ought to possess?
[259a] Socrates: jun. We shall.
[259b] Guest: But is not the science of a true king royal?
[259b] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[259b] Guest: And may not he who possesses this science, whether he is a private man, or a ruler, be in every respect rightly called, according to this art, royal?
[259b] Socrates: jun. He may, justly.
[259b] Guest: And are not the governor of a family and a despot the same?
[259b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[259b] Guest: But what? Is it of any consequence, with respect to empire, whether the city is of a small or of an ample size?
[259c] Socrates: jun. It is of no consequence.
[259c] Guest: It is evident, therefore (which is the thing we were just now inquiring), that there is one science respecting all these. But we do not think it is of any consequence whether any one denominates this science royal, or political, or œconomic.
[259c] Socrates: jun. For of what consequence can it be?
[259c] Guest: This too is evident, that every king is able to do but a little with his hands, and the whole of his body, towards the possession of empire, but much by the wisdom and strength of his soul.
[259c] Socrates: jun. It is evident.
[259d] Guest: Are you willing, therefore, we should say that a king is more allied to the gnostic than to the manual, and, in short, to the practic science?
[259d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[259d] Guest: We must, therefore, combine into the same the political science and a politician, the royal science and a royal man, as all these are one thing.
[259d] Socrates: jun. It is evident.
[259d] Guest: Let us, therefore, proceed in an orderly manner, and after this divide the gnostic science.
[259d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[259d] Guest: Attend, then, and inform me whether we can apprehend any way of escape in this.
[259e] Socrates: jun. Tell me of what kind.
[259e] Guest: Of this kind. There is a certain logistic art.
[259e] Socrates: jun. There is.
[259e] Guest: And this I think entirely belongs to the gnostic arts.
[259e] Socrates: Undoubtedly.
[259e] Guest: But the logistic art knows the difference in numbers. Shall we, therefore, attribute to it any further employment than that of distinguishing and judging about things known?
[259e] Socrates: jun. Why?
[259e] Guest: For no architect works himself, but rules over workmen.
[259e] Socrates: jun. It is so.
[259e] Guest: And he imparts indeed knowledge, but not manual operation.
[259e] Socrates: jun. He does.
[260a] Guest: He may justly, therefore, be said to participate of the gnostic science.
[260a] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[260a] Guest: But I think this belongs to the office of a judge, not to possess the end, nor to be liberated, in the same manner as the reckoner is liberated, but to order every manual operator that portion of work which is adapted to him, till that which they are commanded to do receives its completion.
[260b] Socrates: jun. Right.
[260b] Guest: Are not, therefore, all such things as these gnostic, and likewise such as are consequent to the logistic art? And do not these two genera differ from each other in judgment and mandate?
[260b] Socrates: jun. They appear to do so.
[260b] Guest: If, therefore, we should divide the whole of the gnostic science into two parts, denominating the one mandatory, and the other judicial, may we not say that we have made an elegant division?
[260b] Socrates: jun. Yes, according to my opinion.
[260b] Guest: But those that do any thing in common are delighted when they accord with each other.
[260b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[260b] Guest: As far, therefore, as we accord in this particular we shall bid farewell to the opinions of others.
[260b] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[260c] Guest: Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we must place a royal character. Must we place him in the judicial art, as a certain spectator? Or rather, shall we place him in the commanding art, acting as a despot?
[260c] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly, rather in this.
[260c] Guest: Let us again consider whether the commanding art admits of distinction. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckster differs from his art who sells his own goods, so the royal genus from the genus of public criers.
[260d] Socrates: jun. How so?
[260d] Guest: Hucksters, first receiving the saleable works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves.
[260d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[260d] Guest: In like manner, the tribe of criers, receiving the mandates of others, again imparts them to others.
[260d] Socrates: jun. Most true.
[260d] Guest: What then? Shall we mingle the royal into the same with the interpretative, commanding, prophetic, and præconic¹ genus, and with many other arts allied to these, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we just now assimilated, we should at present assimilate a name? since this genus of those who command their own concerns is nearly without a name. And thus we shall so divide these as to place the royal genus among the number of those that command their own concerns, neglecting every other particular, which any one may denominate as he pleases. For our method was adopted for the sake of a ruler, and not for the sake of the contrary.
[260e] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[260e] Guest: Since, therefore, this is sufficiently separated from those, and is brought by division from that which is foreign to that which is domestic, it is necessary that this again should be divided, if we have yet any compliant section in this.
[261a] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[261a] Guest: And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me in dividing.
[261b] Socrates: jun. Whither?
[261b] Guest: Do we not find that all such as rule by command issue out their commands for the sake of the generation of something?
[261b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[261b] Guest: And, indeed, it is not in every respect difficult to give a twofold division to all generated natures.
[261b] Socrates: After what manner?
[261b] Guest: Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.
[261b] Socrates: jun. They are so.
[261b] Guest: If we wish to cut the commanding division into these parts of the gnostic science, we should accordingly cut them.
[261c] Socrates: jun. According to what?
[261c] Guest: One part of it should be assigned to the genera of inanimate natures, and the other to the genera of such as are animated. And thus the whole will receive a twofold division.
[261c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[261c] Guest: One part, therefore, we must omit, and resume the other; the whole of which we must again divide into two parts.
[261c] Socrates: jun. But inform me which of these is to be resumed.
[261d] Guest: By all means, that which rules over animals. For it is not the province of the royal science to command things inanimate, like the architectonic science; but, being of a more generous nature, it always possesses its power in animals, and about things pertaining to them.
[261d] Socrates: jun. Right.
[261d] Guest: With respect to the generation and nurture of animals, attention to the latter is confined to one animal, but the care belonging to the former extends in common to the whole herd.
[261d] Socrates: jun. Right.
[261d] Guest: But we do not find that the attention of the politic science is of a private nature, like that of an ox-driver, or an equerry; but it is rather similar to the attention paid by him who feeds horses and oxen.
[261d] Socrates: jun. This appears to be the case.
[261d] Guest: Whether, therefore, with respect to the nurture of animals, shall we denominate the nurture of a flock the common nurture of many, or a certain common nutrition?
[261e] Socrates: jun. Both may be adopted in discourse.
[261e] Guest: You have answered well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying serious attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in intellectual prudence. Let us, therefore, now do as you advise. But do you understand how some one, by showing that the nurture of a herd is twofold, will render that which is now investigated in things double, to be sought after in halves?
[262a] Socrates: jun. I endeavour to do so: and it appears to me that there is one kind of nurture of men, and another of brutes.
[262a] Guest: You have divided in every respect promptly and valiantly. We must however to the utmost of our power be careful that we may not suffer this again.
[262a] Socrates: jun. What?
[262a] Guest: That we do [262b] not take away one small part in opposition to many and great parts, nor yet take it away without species, but always in conjunction with species. For it is most beautiful to separate immediately the object of inquiry from other things, if the separation is rightly made; just as you a little before hastily thought respecting division, in consequence of perceiving the discourse tending to mankind. Though indeed, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtilty: but it is more safe to proceed dividing through media; for thus we shall more readily meet with ideas. But the whole of this confers to the objects of our investigation.
[262c] Socrates: jun. How do you mean, O guest?
[262c] Guest: I will endeavour to speak yet more clearly, on account of the benevolence of your nature, Socrates. It is impossible, therefore, to evince the things now proposed in such a manner that nothing shall be wanting: but yet we must endeavour to rise a little higher in our speculation, for the sake of perspicuity.
[262c] Socrates: jun. In what respect then do you say we have not just now rightly divided?
[262d] Guest: In this respect, that if any one should attempt to give a twofold division to the human genus, he would divide just as many of the present day divide. For these separate the Grecian genus apart from all others, as one thing; and denominate all other kinds of men, which are innumerable, unmixt, and discordant with each other, by one appellation, that of Barbarians; and through this one appellation, the genus itself appears to them to be one. [262e] But this is just as if some one, thinking that number should be divided into two species, should cut off ten thousand from all numbers, as one species, and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that this genus will become separate and different from the other through the appellation. He however will divide in a more beautiful manner, and more according to species, and a two-fold division, who cuts number into the even and odd, and the human species into male and female; and who then separates the Lydians or Phrygians, or certain other nations, from all others, when he is incapable of finding the genus and at the same time part of each of the divided members.
[263a] Socrates: jun. Most right. But inform me, O guest, how any one may more clearly know that genus and part are not the same, but different from each other.
[263b] Guest: O Socrates, best of men, you enjoin me no trifling thing. And, indeed, we have now wandered further from our proposed discourse than is fit; and yet you order us to wander still more. Now, therefore, let us again return thither, whence we have digressed, as it is fit we should; and hereafter we will at leisure investigate the question proposed by you. However, do not by any means think that you have heard this clearly determined from me.
[263b] Socrates: jun. What?
[263b] Guest: That species and part are different from each other.
[263b] Socrates: jun. Why so?
[263b] Guest: When any thing is a species of something, it is also necessary that it should be a part of the thing of which it is said to be the species: but it is by no means necessary that a part should be a species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as asserting this rather than that.
[263b] Socrates: jun. Be it so.
[263b] Guest: But inform me after this.
[263c] Socrates: jun. What?
[263c] Guest: Respecting that whence we have digressed hither. For I think that we principally digressed in consequence of your being asked how the nurture of a herd should be divided, and very readily answering that there were two kinds of animals, the one human, and the other comprehending the whole of the brutal species.
[263c] Socrates: jun. True.
[263d] Guest: And you then appeared to me, having taken away a part, to have thought that the remainder should be left as one genus of all brutes, because you could call all of them by the same name, viz. brutes.
[263d] Socrates: jun. These things were so.
[263d] Guest: But this, O most valiant of men, is just as if some other prudent animal, as for instance a crane, should after your manner call cranes rational, thus exalting himself, and consider them as forming one genus among other animals, but, comprehending all the rest together with men, should perhaps denominate them nothing else than brutes. We should endeavour, therefore, to avoid every thing of this kind.
[263e] Socrates: jun. How?
[263e] Guest: By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may be less exposed to this mistake.
[263e] Socrates: jun. For there is no occasion.
[263e] Guest: We, therefore, then erred in this respect.
[263e] Socrates: jun. In what respect?
[263e] Guest: That part of the gnostic science which is commanding was determined by us to be of that kind which is employed in the nurture of animals, viz. of gregarious animals. Was it not?
[264a] Socrates: jun. It was.
[264a] Guest: The whole animal genus, therefore, was then divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that are naturally capable of being rendered gentle are called tame; but those that are not are denominated wild.
[264a] Socrates: jun. Well said.
[264a] Guest: But the science which we are in search of, was and is in tame animals, and is to be investigated among such of these as are gregarious. Is it not so?
[264b] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[264b] Guest: We must not, therefore, divide as then, looking to all animals, nor must we divide hastily, in order that we may rapidly comprehend the politic science. For this would cause us to suffer that which the proverb speaks of.
[264b] Socrates: jun. What is that?
[264b] Guest: By dividing too hastily, we shall finish more slowly.
[264b] Socrates: jun. And it would very properly cause us to suffer, O guest.
[264b] Guest: Be it so then. But let us again from the beginning endeavour to divide the common nurture of animals. For perhaps the discourse itself being brought to a conclusion will more clearly unfold that which you desire. But tell me this.
[264c] Socrates: jun. What?
[264c] Guest: What perhaps you have often heard from certain persons. For I do not think you have met with those who tame fish about the Nile, or the royal lakes. But perhaps you have been a spectator of the taming of these in fountains.
[264c] Socrates: jun. I have been a spectator of this, and I have heard of the former from many.
[264c] Guest: You have likewise heard and believe that geese and cranes are fed by certain persons, though you have never wandered about the Thessalian plains.
[264c] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[264c] Guest: I have asked you all these questions, because the nurture of herds of animals is partly aquatic and partly terrestrial.
[264d] Socrates: jun. It is so.
[264d] Guest: Does it not, therefore, appear to you, as well as to me, that the science respecting the common nurture of animals should receive a twofold division, and that one part should be denominated that which nourishes in moisture, and the other that which nourishes in dryness?
[264e] Socrates: jun. It does appear to me.
[264e] Guest: But we do not in the same manner inquire to which of these arts the royal science belongs. For it is evident to every one.
[264e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[264e] Guest: For every one can divide the nurture of herds in dryness.
[264e] Socrates: jun. How?
[264e] Guest: Into the volant and gradient.
[264e] Socrates: jun. Most true.
[264e] Guest: That the political science, however, is to be investigated among gradient animals, is, as I may say, obvious to the most stupid. Or do you not think it is?
[265a] Socrates: jun. I do.
[265a] Guest: But it is requisite that, dividing the art of feeding animals, like an even number, we should show that it is twofold.
[265a] Socrates: jun. This is evident.
[265a] Guest: Moreover, the part to which our discourse impels us appears to extend itself in two certain paths; the one being short, in consequence of separating a small from a large part; but the other long, from preserving that precept which we mentioned before, that we ought to divide through media, as this is the most ample division. It is permitted us, therefore, to proceed in either of these paths, as is most agreeable to us.
[265a] Socrates: jun. Is it then impossible to proceed in both?
[265a] Guest: Not in both at once, O wonderful youth! But it is evident that it is possible to proceed in them separately.
[265b] Socrates: jun. I will choose, therefore, to proceed in each apart from the other.
[265b] Guest: It is easy so to do, since what remains is but short. In the beginning, indeed, and middle of our journey we should have found it difficult to comply with this mandate. But now, since it appears to be best, let us first proceed in the longer road. For, as we have but recently engaged in this affair, we shall more easily journey through it. But look to the division.
[265b] Socrates: jun. Say what it is.
[265b] Guest: The pedestrian genus of such tame animals as are gregarious must be divided by us according to nature.
[265b] Socrates: jun. Why?
[265b] Guest: Because they must be divided into such as are without horns, and into such as are horned.
[265c] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[265c] Guest: Dividing then the art of feeding pedestrian animals, describe the condition of each part. For, if you should be willing to name them, you would be involved in difficulties more than is becoming.
[265c] Socrates: jun. How then is it proper to speak of them?
[265c] Guest: Thus. Since the science of feeding animals receives a twofold division, one member of it consists in the horned part of the flock, but the other in that part which is without horns.
[265c] Socrates: jun. Let these things be so said: for they are sufficiently shown to be so.
[265d] Guest: Again, therefore, it will appear to us, that a king feeds a certain herd of mutilated hornless animals.
[265d] Socrates: jun. For how is it possible this should not be evident?
[265d] Guest: Breaking this, therefore, in pieces, we will endeavour to exhibit that which is transacted by a king.
[265d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[265d] Guest: Whether, therefore, are you willing we should divide this herd into what is called the fissured and the solid hoof? Or shall we divide it into common and private generation? For you understand me.
[265d] Socrates: jun. What kind of generation do you mean?
[265e] Guest: That of horses and asses, which naturally generate from each other.
[265e] Socrates: jun. They do.
[265e] Guest: But the remaining species, belonging to the one herd of tame animals, do not promiscuously mingle with each other, but those only of the same kind copulate together.
[265e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[265e] Guest: But whether does the political science appear to take care of the common, or of the private generation of animals?
[265e] Socrates: jun. It is evident that it takes care of the unmingled generation of animals.
[265e] Guest: It is evident, then, as it seems, that we should give a twofold division to this, as we did to the preceding particulars.
[266a] Socrates: jun. It is indeed necessary.
[266a] Guest: But we have already nearly separated into minute parts every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs among gregarious cattle.
[266a] Socrates: jun. It is not. But how shall we divide these two?
[266a] Guest: After that manner, which it is just you and Theætetus should adopt in distributing, since you have touched on geometry.
[266a] Socrates: jun. What manner is that?
[266a] Guest: By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.
[266a] Socrates: jun. How do you say?
[266b] Guest: Is the condition of the human genus in any other way naturally adapted to progression than as a diameter, in power a biped?
[266b] Socrates: jun. In no other way.
[266b] Guest: But again, the condition of the remaining genus is, according to the power of our power, a diameter, since it naturally consists of twice two feet.
[266b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand what you wish to evince.
[266c] Guest: But besides these things, do we perceive, Socrates, a circumstance worthy of laughter, which happened to us in making the former division?
[266c] Socrates: jun. What is that?
[266c] Guest: The human genus, mingled and concurring with a genus the most generous and tractable of all others.
[266c] Socrates: jun. I perceive it, and likewise that it is a very absurd circumstance.
[266c] Guest: Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive last of all?
[266d] Socrates: jun. It is.
[266d] Guest: But we do not perceive this, that a king appears still more ridiculous when running together with the herd, and performing his course in conjunction with him who is exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.
[266d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[266d] Guest: For now, Socrates, that is more apparent which was said by us in our investigation of a sophist.
[266d] Socrates: jun. What is that?
[266d] Guest: That, in such a method of discourse as this, he neither pays more attention to what is venerable than what is not, nor does he prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes that which is most true.
[266d] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[266e] Guest: After this, that you may not accuse me, as you have inquired what is the shorter way to the definition of a king, I will, in the first place, consider this.
[266e] Socrates: jun. By all means, do so.
[267a] Guest: But I say that a gradient animal ought to have been divided by us above into the biped and quadruped genus; and perceiving that man then alone remained in conjunction with the volant genus, the biped herd should again have been divided into the winged and without wings. But this division being made, and being evinced by that art which is the nurse of men, a political and royal character should be placed over it, like a charioteer, and the reins of the city should be given to him, in consequence of this science being adapted to him.
[267b] Socrates: jun. You have answered me beautifully, and as if you had been discharging a debt; and you have added a digression, by way of interest, and as the completion of your discourse.
[267b] Guest: Come, then, let us connect, by recurring from the beginning to the end, the discourse concerning the name of the politic art.
[267b] Socrates: jun. By all means.
[267b] Guest: One part, therefore, of the gnostic science was asserted by us in the beginning to be of a commanding nature; and we said that the part of this science which commands from itself was assimilated to this. Again, we asserted that the nurture of animals was a part of the self-commanding science, and that this was not the smallest part. Likewise, that the nurture of herds was a species of the nurture of animals; and that the art which is nutritive of animals without horns, especially belongs to the art of feeding pedestrian animals. Again, it is necessary to connect not less than the triple of this part, if any one is desirous of comprehending it in one name, viz. the science of an unmingled genus of feeding. But a section from this, which alone remains, and which feeds men, as ranking among bipeds, is the part which we are now exploring, and which we denominate royal, and at the same time political.
[267c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[267d] Guest: Do you therefore think, Socrates, that we have really done well, as you say?
[267d] Socrates: jun. In what?
[267d] Guest: I mean that the thing proposed by us has been in every respect and sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been particularly deficient in this, that it has given, indeed, a description of the thing, but such a one as is not perfectly finished?
[267d] Socrates: jun. How do you say?
[267d] Guest: I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly.
[267d] Socrates: jun. Do so.
[267d] Guest: Since, therefore, it has appeared that there are many pastoral arts, the politic science is one of these, and is the curator of one certain herd.
[267d] Socrates: jun. It is.
[267d] Guest: Our discourse defined this to be neither the nurse of horses, nor of any other brutes, but to be the common nutritive science of men.
[267e] Socrates: jun. It did so.
[267e] Guest: But let us contemplate the difference of all shepherds and kings.
[267e] Socrates: jun. What is the difference?
[267e] Guest: If any one possessing the name of another art should assert and vindicate to himself the nutrition in common of the human herd, what should we say?
[268a] Socrates: jun. How is this?
[268a] Guest: Just as if all merchants, husbandmen, and cooks, and besides these the professors of gymnastic, and the genus of physicians, should verbally oppose the shepherds of the human race, whom we have called politicians, and should assert that the care of nurturing men belonged to them, and that they were not only shepherds of the herds of men, but even of rulers themselves.
[268a] Socrates: jun. And would not their assertion be right?
[268b] Guest: Perhaps so. And let us also consider this. For we know that no one would contend with a herdsman about things of this kind; since he is, doubtless, the nurse, the physician, and as it were brideman of a herd, and is alone skilled in the obstetric art respecting parturition and offspring. No one, besides, is better calculated, by such sport and music as the nature of cattle is capable of receiving, of consoling, and by alluring arts mitigating, with instruments, or the mere mouth, the herd committed to his care. And the same may be said of other shepherds. Or may it not?
[268c] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[268c] Guest: How, then, will our discourse respecting a king appear to be right and entire, since we assert that he alone is the shepherd and nurse of the human herd, when at the same time ten thousand others contend for the same office?
[268c] Socrates: jun. By no means.
[268c] Guest: Did we not, therefore, a little before very properly fear, when we suspected lest we should only introduce a certain royal figure, and should not perfectly define a political character, unless we comprehended those that are connected with this character, and who profess themselves to be equally shepherds; and, separating a king from them, alone exhibited him pure?
[268c] Socrates: jun. Our fear, indeed, was most right.
[268d] Guest: This therefore, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we intend to disgrace our discourse at the end.
[268d] Socrates: jun. But this must by no means take place.
[268d] Guest: Again, therefore, we must proceed in another way from another beginning. soc. jun. In what way? guest. By nearly inserting a jest. For it is requisite to employ a copious part of a long fable², and to act in the same manner with what remains of our discussion, as we did above, viz. always to take away a part from a part, till we arrive at the summit of our inquiry. Is it not proper to act in this manner?
[268e] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[268e] Guest: Give me then, after the manner of boys, all your attention to the fable: for you are not very much removed from puerile years.
[268e] Socrates: jun. Only relate it.
[268e] Guest: There were then, and still will be, many memorials of antient affairs; and among others, there is one prodigious relation respecting the contention of Atreus and Thyestes. For you have heard and remember what is then said to have happened.
[268e] Socrates: jun. Perhaps you speak of the prodigy respecting the golden ram.
[269a] Guest: By no means: but respecting the mutation of the rising and setting of the sun, and the other stars. For whence they now rise they did then set: and their rising was from a contrary place. Divinity, therefore, then giving a testimony to Atreus, changed the heavens into the present figure.
[269a] Socrates: jun. This also is reported.
[269b] Guest: We have likewise heard from many respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.
[269b] Socrates: jun. We have from very many.
[269b] Guest: And were not those antient men born from the earth, and not generated from each other?
[269b] Socrates: jun. This also is one of the things which are said to have happened formerly.
[269c] Guest: All these things, therefore, proceed from the same circumstance, and ten thousand others besides these, and which are still more wonderful. But, through length of time, some of them have become extinct, and others are related in a dispersed manner, separate from each other. But that circumstance which is the cause of this taking place has not been mentioned by any one. It must, however, now be related: for the relation will contribute to the demonstration of the nature of a king.
[269c] Socrates: jun. You speak most beautifully. Speak, therefore, and do not omit any thing.
[269d] Guest: Hear, then. Divinity himself sometimes conducts this universe in its progression, and convolves it: but at another time he remits the reins of his government, when the periods of the universe have received a convenient measure of time. But the world is again spontaneously led round to things contrary, since it is an animal, and is allotted wisdom from him who cooperated with it from the first in harmonizing all its parts with the whole. This progression, however, to things contrary is naturally implanted in it through the following cause.
[269d] Socrates: jun. Through what cause?
[269d] Guest: To subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner, and to be the same, alone belongs to the most divine of all things: [269e] but the nature of body is not of this order. But that which we call heaven and the world, receives many and blessed gifts from its producing cause. However, as it participates of body, it cannot be entirely void of mutation: nevertheless, as far as it is able, it is moved in the same, and according to the same, with one lation. Hence it is allotted a circular motion, because there is the smallest mutation of its motion. But nearly nothing is able to revolve itself, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful that this should at one time move in one way, and at another time in a different way. [270a] From all this, therefore, it must be said, that the world neither always revolves itself, nor that the whole of it is always convolved by Divinity with twofold and contrary convolutions: nor, again, that two certain Gods convolve it, whose decisions are contrary to each other. But that must be asserted which we just now said, and which alone remains, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cause, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itself, and, being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions, because it is most great, and most equally balanced, and accomplishes its progressions with the smallest foot.
[270b] Socrates: jun. All that you have said appears to be very probable.
[270b] Guest: From what has been said, therefore, we may now, by a reasoning process, apprehend that circumstance which we said was the cause of all wonderful things. For it is this very thing.
[270b] Socrates: jun. What?
[270b] Guest: That the circular motion of the universe is at one time accomplished as at present, and at another time in a contrary manner.
[270b] Socrates: jun. But how is this the cause of all wonderful things?
[270c] Guest: It is requisite to think that this mutation is the greatest and most perfect of all the celestial conversions.
[270c] Socrates: jun. It is likely.
[270c] Guest: It is proper, therefore, to think that the greatest mutations then happen to us who are the inhabitants of the world.
[270c] Socrates: jun. And this also is likely,
[270c] Guest: But do we not know that the nature of animals sustains with difficulty great, numerous, and all-various mutations?
[270d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[270d] Guest: Hence, the greatest corruptions of other animals then necessarily take place, and very few of the human race remain. And to these many other wonderful and novel circumstances at the same time happen; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of the universe in which a conversion is effected contrary to the present.
[270d] Socrates: jun. What circumstance do you mean?
[270e] Guest: That which takes place the first of all, when, in whatever age a mortal animal is constituted, he is no longer seen advancing to old age, but is again changed to the contrary, and naturally becomes, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs, too, of those more advanced in years then became black³, and the cheeks of those that had beards became smooth; and thus each was restored to the past flower of his age. The bodies, likewise, of such as were in the bloom of youth, becoming smoother and smaller every day and night, again returned to the nature of a child recently born: and such were assimilated to this nature, both in soul and body. And at length their bodies, rapidly wasting away, perished. But the dead bodies of those who at that time died through violence were in like manner immanifestly, and in a few days, corrupted.
[271a] Socrates: jun. But what was then, O guest, the generation of animals, and after what manner were they produced from each other?
[271a] Guest: It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another. [271b] But, as it is said that there was once an earth-born race, this race was at that period restored back again from the earth. This information, too, was delivered to us by those our first progenitors, who lived immediately after the close of the last revolution. For they were public witnesses of the truth of our assertions, which at present are disbelieved, though improperly, by the multitude. For I think this particular ought to be attended to, as consequent to a part of the narration. For, if old men tended to the nature of boys, it follows, that such as were dead, but laid in the earth, must be again restored from thence, revive again, and follow that revolution of the universe, in which generation is convolved in a contrary order; and that the earth-born race, which according to this reason is necessarily produced, should thus be denominated and defined, viz. such of them as Divinity has transferred into another destiny.
[271c] Socrates: jun. This very much follows from what has been said above. But with respect to the life which you say was under the power of Saturn, did it subsist in those revolutions, or in these? For it is evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun happens in both these revolutions.
[271d] Guest: You follow the discourse well. But, in answer to your question respecting all things being produced spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in the present, but happened in the former revolution. For then Divinity was first the ruler and curator of the whole circulation; just as now the several parts of the world are locally distributed by ruling Gods. Divine dæmons, too, were allotted, after the manner of shepherds, animals according to genera and herds; each being sufficient for all things pertaining to the several particulars over which he presided, So that there was nothing rustic, no mutual rapine, no war, nor sedition of any kind; and ten thousand other things took place, which are the consequences of such a period. [271e] But what is said respecting the spontaneous life of these men is asserted because Divinity himself fed them, and was their curator; just as men who are of a more divine, are the shepherds of brutes, who are of a baser, nature. In consequence, too, of men being fed by Divinity, there were no polities, nor possessions of women and children. For all these were restored to life from the earth, and without having any recollection of former events. But all such things as these were absent. The inhabitants, too, had fruits in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, which did not grow through the assistance of agriculture, but were spontaneously given by the earth. [272a] And for the most part they were naked, slept without coverlids, and were fed in the open air. For the temperament of the seasons was innoxious to them. They had soft beds, too, from grass, which germinated in unenvying abundance from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you have heard what was the life of men under the reign of Saturn: but you yourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said to be under Jupiter. But are you able, and likewise willing, to judge which of these is the more happy?
[272b] Socrates: jun. By no means.
[272b] Guest: Are you willing, therefore, that I should after a manner judge for you?
[272b] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[272b] Guest: If, therefore, those [272c] that were nurtured by Saturn in so much leisure, and with the power not only of conversing with men, but with brutes, used all the above-mentioned particulars for the purpose of philosophy, associating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from others as to the common possession of prudence; from all this it may be easily inferred, that the men of those times were incomparably more happy than those that exist at present. But if, being abundantly filled with meats and drinks, their discourses with each other, and with brutes, were such as at present they are related to have been, from this also, in my opinion, their superior felicity may be very easily inferred. At the same time, however, we shall dismiss these particulars till some sufficient judge of them shall arise, who will unfold to us whether the men of that period were inclined to sciences and discourse. [272d] But let us now relate on what account we introduced the fable, that we may after this bring to a conclusion what remains. For, after the time of all these was consummated, and it was requisite that a mutation should take place, and besides this, the whole terrestrial genus being consumed, as all the generations of every soul had received their completion, and as many seeds having fallen on the earth as were destined to each soul,—then the governor of the universe, laying aside as it were the handle of his rudder, departed to that place of survey whence he contemplates himself. But then fate and connate desire again convolved the world. [272e] All those Gods, therefore, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest dæmon, knowing what had now happened, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world becoming inverted, conflicting with itself, and being agitated by an impulse contrary to its beginning and end, and likewise making an abundant concussion in itself, produced again another corruption of all-various animals. [273a] After these things, however, and the expiration of a sufficient length of time, the tumult, confusion, and concussions ceased, and the world, becoming tranquil and adorned, again proceeded in its usual course, possessing a providential care and dominion, both over itself and the natures which it contains; remembering, to the utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and father⁴. At the beginning, therefore, it accomplished this more perfectly, but at the end more remissly. But the cause of this is the corporeal form of the temperature, and which was nursed together with an antient nature. For it was a participant of much disorder before it arrived at the present ornament. For, from its composing artificer, indeed, it possesses every good; but, from its former habit, all that atrocity and injustice which subsist within the heavens.
[273b] And these the world both possesses from that former habit, and inserts in animated natures. The world, therefore, when nourishing the animals which it contains, in conjunction with the governor, brings forth small evils, and mighty goods: [273c] but when it is separated from him, during the nearest time of its departure, it conducts all things beautifully. At a more distant period, however, and from oblivion being generated in it, the property of its former dissonance rules with greater force. And at the last period of time it becomes deflorescent; and producing small goods, but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both itself, and the natures which it contains, being dissolved. [273d] Hence that God who adorned the world, then perceiving the difficulties under which it labours, and anxious lest, being thus tempestuously agitated, it should be dissolved by the tumult, and be plunged into the infinite sea of dissimilitude, again resumes the helm, and adorns and corrects whatever is diseased and dissolved through the inordinate motion of the former period, and renders the world immortal and unconscious of age. [273e] This, therefore, is the end of the whole narration. But this is sufficient to show the nature of a king to such as attend to what has been already said. For, the world being again converted to the present path of generation, the progression of its age again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the very contraries to what it then imparted. For animals proximate to death, on account of their smallness, are increased. But bodies recently born from the earth, hoary, again dying, descend into the earth; and all other things are transmuted, imitating and following the condition of the universe. The imitation, likewise, of motion, generation, and nutriment, follows all things from necessity. For it is no longer possible for an animal to be produced in the earth, through other things mutually composing it; [274a] but, as the world was destined to be the absolute ruler of its own progression, after the same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guidance to spring forth, generate, and nourish, as far as they are able. [274b] But we have now arrived at that for the sake of which the whole of our discourse was undertaken. For, with respect to other animals, many particulars, and of a prolix nature, might be discussed; such as, from what things they are severally composed, and through what causes they were changed: but the particulars respecting men are shorter, and more to our purpose. For, mankind being destitute of the guardian care of the dæmon whose possession we are, and who is the shepherd of [274c] our race, and as many animals who are naturally cruel became transported with rage, hence men, now imbecil, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals. And besides this, men in those first times were unskilful, and had no knowledge of the arts, because the earth spontaneously afforded them nutriment: but they did not know how to procure it, because they were not compelled by any previous necessity. From all these causes they were involved in the greatest difficulties. Hence, those gifts which are said to have been formerly imparted to us by the Gods were imparted with necessary instruction and erudition: fire, indeed, from Prometheus⁵, but the arts from Vulcan and Minerva. Again, seeds and plants were imparted by other divinities; and, in short, all such things as are the support of human life. For men, as we have said, were not left destitute of the guardian care of the Gods; [274d] and it became requisite that they also should pay attention to the concerns of life, in the same manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born in a different manner at different periods. And let this be the end of the fable. [274e] But we shall make it useful to discover how far we have erred in the above definition of a royal and political character.
[275a] Socrates: jun. In what respect, and how far, do you say we have erred?
[275a] Guest: Partly less, and in a more generous manner, and partly in a greater degree, and more abundantly.
[275a] Socrates: jun. How?
[275a] Guest: Because, while we were asked respecting a king and politician belonging to the present circulation and generation, we adduced a shepherd of a herd of men belonging to the contrary period; and in consequence of this shepherd being a God, and not a man, we transgressed abundantly: but again, because we evinced that this shepherd was the governor of the whole city, but yet did not say after what manner, in this respect we asserted what is true, but were deficient as to the whole and the perspicuous; and on this account we erred less in this latter case than in the former.
[275a] Socrates: jun. True.
[275a] Guest: We ought, therefore, as it seems, to think that we shall then have perfectly described a political character when we have defined the mode of governing a city.
[275b] Socrates: jun. Beautifully said.
[275b] Guest: On this account we related that fable, not only that those might be pointed out who oppose the royal character we are now investigating with respect to the nurture of a herd, but that we might more clearly perceive him who alone ought to be called a pastor, since after the manner of a shepherd and herdsman he takes care of the nurture of the human race.
[275c] Socrates: jun. Right.
[275c] Guest: But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine shepherd is still greater than that which belongs to a king; and that the politicians of the present day are naturally much more similar to subjects than governors, and in a manner more allied to these participate of discipline and nurture.
[275d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[275d] Guest: But we must not inquire whether they have been more or less so, and whether they are naturally so or not.
[275d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly not.
[275d] Guest: Again, therefore, let us thus resume our inquiry. We said, then, that there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art we then directly called the herd-nourishing art. Do you recollect?
[275d] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[275d] Guest: In this, therefore, we erred. For we have not by any means comprehended in a definition the political character, nor given it a name; but its name as yet flies from us.
[275e] Socrates: jun. How so?
[275e] Guest: To nourish the several herds of animals belongs to all other shepherds; but we have not given a fit name to the political character, which requires the application of something common.
[275e] Socrates: jun. You speak the truth, if this common something can be obtained.
[275e] Guest: But is it not possible to apply healing, as that which is common to all things, without either defining nutriment, or any other thing? and to introduce another certain art, either pertaining to the nurture of herds, or therapeutic, or adapted to take care of something; and thus to comprehend the political character together with others, since reason signifies that this ought to be done?
[276a] Socrates: jun. Right. But after this, in what manner must the division be made?
[276a] Guest: As before we divided the herd-nourishing art into the gradient and winged tribes, and into the horned and without horns, in the same manner we should divide the art pertaining to the care of herds, which will thus be similarly comprehended in our discourse, together with the kingdom of Saturn.
[276a] Socrates: jun. It appears so. But go on with your inquiries.
[276a] Guest: If, then, the name of the art pertaining to the care of herds had been thus adopted, no one would have opposed us, as if there were no careful attention whatever; just as then it was justly contended, that there is no art in us which deserves the appellation of nutritive; and that, if there were any such art, it belongs to many things prior to, and preferable to, any thing pertaining to kings.
[276b] Socrates: jun. Right.
[276c] Guest: But no other art endeavours to accomplish this more, and in a milder manner, as if it paid a careful attention to the whole of human communion, than the royal art.
[276c] Socrates: jun. Right.
[276c] Guest: But after these things, Socrates, do you perceive how very much we have erred about the end?
[276c] Socrates: jun. What kind of error have we committed?
[276c] Guest: We have erred in this, that though we have conceived that there is a certain nutritive art of a biped herd, yet we ought not immediately to have called it royal and politic, as if entirely complete.
[276c] Socrates: jun. Why not?
[276c] Guest: In the first place, as we have said, the name ought to be accommodated more to attentive care than to nutriment: and in the next place, this attentive care ought to be divided. For it will receive no small sections.
[276d] Socrates: jun. Of what kind?
[276d] Guest: The sections will be a divine shepherd, and a human curator.
[276d] Socrates: jun. Right.
[276d] Guest: And again, it is necessary to give a twofold distribution to human care.
[276d] Socrates: jun. What are the two parts?
[276d] Guest: The violent and the voluntary.
[276e] Socrates: jun. What then?
[276e] Guest: And erring in this, with greater ineptitude than is becoming, we considered a king and a tyrant as the same, though they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in their mode of government.
[276e] Socrates: jun. True.
[276e] Guest: Now, therefore, again correcting ourselves (as I have already said), we shall divide human care into the violent and the voluntary.
[276e] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[276e] Guest: And the violent we shall call tyrannic: but the voluntary, and the attention paid to the herds of voluntary biped animals, we shall denominate politic. We shall therefore evince, that he who possesses this art and care is truly a king and a politician.
[277a] Socrates: jun. And thus the demonstration, O guest, respecting political affairs will, as it appears, be perfect.
[277b] Guest: It will be well for us, Socrates, if this is the case. But it is requisite that these things should not only be apparent to you, but likewise to me, in common with you. But at present a king appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure: but just as statuaries, who by hastening their work sometimes unseasonably, and adding more and larger things than are fit, finish it more slowly; so we at present have not only rapidly and magnificently evinced that we erred in the former part of our discussion, in consequence of thinking that great paradigms should be employed about a king, but we reviled the wonderful bulk of the fable, and were compelled to use a greater part of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a more prolix demonstration, and have not entirely finished the fable. But, indeed, our discourse, like an animal, appears to have its exterior delineation sufficiently perfect, but is not yet perspicuous, through paint, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by words and discourse, to such as are able to follow the disquisition, than by painting, and the whole of manual operation; but other things are to be exhibited through the operations of the hand.
[277c] Socrates: jun. This, indeed, is rightly said: but show me why you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.
[277d] Guest: It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things perspicuously, without examples. For each of us appears to know all things as in a dream⁶, and again to be ignorant of all things according to a wakeful perception.
[277d] Socrates: jun. How do you say this?
[277d] Guest: We appear at present to have moved very absurdly the passion respecting science which is in us.
[277d] Socrates: jun. In what respect?
[277d] Guest: The example, O blessed youth, which I have adduced will again require an example.
[277d] Socrates: jun. Why? Tell me, and do not in any respect be remiss on my account.
[277e] Guest: I will, since you are prepared to follow me. For we know what boys do as soon as they have acquired a knowledge of their letters.
[277e] Socrates: jun. What is that?
[277e] Guest: They sufficiently perceive each of the elements in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to speak the truth concerning them.
[277e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[277e] Guest: But, being again dubious about these in other syllables, they are deceived in opinion and discourse.
[278a] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[278a] Guest: May they not, therefore, thus be easily, and in the most beautiful manner, led to things which they do not yet know?
[278a] Socrates: jun. How?
[278b] Guest: By leading them first to those syllables in which they have had right opinions respecting these very same things; but, when we have thus led them, to place before them things which they do not yet know; and, by comparing them together, to show them that there is the same similitude and nature in both the complications, till the things conceived by true opinion are presented to the view compared with all the unknown particulars. But these being presented to the view, and examples of them produced, it will cause them to denominate that which is different in all the elements of every syllable as different from other things; but that which is the same, as always the same, according to things the same with itself.
[278b] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[278b] Guest: This, therefore, we sufficiently comprehend, viz. [278c] that the generation of a paradigm then takes place, when that which is the same in another divulsed particular being rightly conceived by opinion, and accommodated to each, produces one true opinion of both.
[278d] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[278d] Guest: Shall we therefore wonder, if our soul, suffering the same thing naturally about the elements of all things, at one time is established in certain particulars by truth itself about each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other particulars, about all things? And that when, in certain commixtions, it thinks rightly, it should again be ignorant of these very same things, when it is transferred to long and difficult syllables of things?
[278d] Socrates: jun. There is nothing wonderful in this.
[278e] Guest: For how, my friend, can any one, beginning from false opinion, arrive at any, even the smallest part of truth, and thus acquire wisdom?
[278e] Socrates: jun. Nearly no one.
[278e] Guest: If, therefore, these things naturally subsist in this manner, you and I shall not in any respect err, if we first of all endeavour to perceive the nature of the whole paradigm in another small and partial paradigm; and after this, betaking ourselves to the paradigm of a king, which is the greatest of all paradigms, and deriving it from lesser things, endeavour again, through a paradigm, to know by art the remedy of political affairs, that we may be partakers of wakeful perceptions instead of a dream.
[278e] Socrates: jun. Perfectly right.
[278e] Guest: Again, therefore, let us resume the former part of our discourse, viz. [279a] that since an innumerable multitude, together with the royal genus, doubt respecting the government of a city, it is requisite to separate all these from the royal genus, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose we said it was requisite that we should have a certain paradigm.
[279b] Socrates: jun. And very much so.
[279b] Guest: But what paradigm can any one adduce which both contains political concerns, and is the smallest possible, so that he may sufficiently find the object of his investigation? Are you willing, by Jupiter, unless we have something else at hand, that we choose the weaving art? Not the whole, indeed, if it is agreeable to you: for, perhaps, the weaving of wool will be sufficient. For it may happen that this part being chosen may testify that which we wish to evince.
[279b] Socrates: jun. For why should it not?
[279c] Guest: Shall we therefore now, with respect to this part of the weaving art, act in the same manner as we did above, viz. divide every particular by cutting the parts of parts? and, passing over all things in the shortest manner possible, return to that which is useful to our present purpose?
[279c] Socrates: jun. How do you say?
[279c] Guest: My answer to you shall be an explanation of the thing.
[279d] Socrates: jun. You speak most excellently.
[279d] Guest: Of all the things which we fabricate and possess, some are for the sake of doing something, and others are auxiliaries against any inconvenience we may suffer. And of auxiliaries, some are alexipharmic⁷, as well divine as human; but others are subservient to defence. And of things subservient to defence, some consist of warlike apparatus, and others are inclosures. And of inclosures, some are veils, and others are defences against heat and cold. But of defences, some are coverings, and others are apparel. And of apparel, one part is an under veil, and another a surrounding covering. And of surrounding coverings, some are simple, and others composite. But of the composite, some are perforated, but others are connected together without perforation. [279e] And of those that are without perforation, some are composed from the nerves of things growing out of the earth, but others are hairy. And of the hairy, some are conglutinated by water and earth, but others are themselves connected together with themselves. To these auxiliaries and coverings, which are wrought from the same things being bound together, we give the name of garments. But we call that art which is especially conversant with garments, vestific, from the thing itself, in the same manner as above we called the art respecting a city politic. We likewise say that the weaving art, so far as for the most part it weaves garments, differs in nothing but the name from the vestific art; just in the same manner as we formerly observed that a royal differed only nominally from a political character.
[280a] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[280b] Guest: But after this we should thus reason: that some one may, perhaps, think it has been sufficiently shown that the weaving art is conversant with garments, but may not be able to perceive, that though it is not yet distinguished from things which cooperate near together, it is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.
[280b] Socrates: jun. Tell me what things of a kindred nature.
[280b] Guest: You do not understand what has been said, as it seems. It appears, therefore, that we should return from the end to the beginning. For, if you understand propinquity, we have now separated this from the weaving art, by distributing the composition of coverings into things put under, and things surrounding us.
[280b] Socrates: jun. I understand you.
[280c] Guest: We have likewise separated every kind of fabrication from thread and broom, and all such plantal productions as we just now called nerves. We also defined the compressive art, and the composition which employs perforation and sewing, which for the most part pertains to the currier’s art.
[280d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[280d] Guest: We also separated the fabrication of simple coverings from skins, and of such coverings as are employed in building, and in the whole of the tectonic, and in all other arts which are employed in stopping the effluxions of water. Also such arts as procure restraints in joining, and violent actions, and which are employed about the construction of doors, and distribute the parts of the cementing art. We have likewise divided the armour-making art, which is a section of the great and all-various power effective of defence. We also defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of cooking, which is conversant with alexipharmics; and we left a certain art, which appears to be that we are in pursuit of, viz. which defends against cold, produces woollen vestments, and is called the art of weaving.
[280e] Socrates: jun. It seems so.
[280e] Guest: But we have not yet, O boy, perfectly discussed this matter. For he who is first engaged in the making of garments appears to act in a manner directly contrary to the weaver.
[281a] Socrates: jun. How so?
[281a] Guest: For the work of the weaver is a certain knitting together.
[281a] Socrates: jun. It is.
[281a] Guest: But the work of him who first engages in the making of garments consists in dissolving things joined together.
[281a] Socrates: jun. What kind of work is this?
[281a] Guest: The work of the art of carding wool. Or shall we dare to call the art of carding wool the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?
[281a] Socrates: jun. By no means.
[281a] Guest: But if any one should call the art effective of the thread and woof in a loom the weaving art, he would assert a paradox, and give it a false name.
[281b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[281b] Guest: But whether shall we say that the whole attention and care of the fuller and the mender contribute nothing to the making of garments? Or shall we also call these weaving arts?
[281b] Socrates: jun. By no means.
[281b] Guest: But all these contend with the power of the weaving art, respecting the care and the making of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but likewise assigning to themselves great portions of the same art.
[281c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[281c] Guest: Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the arts effective of the instruments through which the weaver accomplishes his work, should be considered as concauses of every work accomplished by weaving.
[281c] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[281d] Guest: Whether, therefore, will our discourse about the weaving art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, if we assert that it is the most beautiful and the greatest of all the arts which are employed about woollen garments? Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but yet neither clearly nor perfectly till we have separated all these arts from it?
[281d] Socrates: jun. This will be the case.
[281d] Guest: Must we not, therefore, in the next place act in this manner, that our discourse may proceed in an orderly series?
[281d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[281d] Guest: In the first place, therefore, let us consider two arts which subsist about all things.
[281d] Socrates: jun. What are they?
[281d] Guest: One is the concause of generation, and the other is the cause itself.
[281d] Socrates: jun. How?
[281e] Guest: Such arts as do not fabricate the thing itself, but prepare instruments for the fabricators, without which instruments the proposed work cannot be effected,—these are concauses: but those which fabricate the thing itself are causes.
[281e] Socrates: jun. This distinction is reasonable.
[281e] Guest: In the next place, those arts which produce the distaff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute to the making of garments,—all these I call concauses: but those which pay attention to and fabricate garments I call causes.
[281e] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[282a] Guest: But, of causes, it will be proper especially to collect that which pertains to the washing of garments, and that which is skilled in mending, and all the therapeutic care about these, since the cosmetic art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller’s art.
[282a] Socrates: jun. It will so.
[282a] Guest: But there is one art comprehending that part which cards wool and spins, and likewise every thing pertaining to the making of garments, and which is called by all men the wool-working art.
[282b] Socrates: jun. How so?
[282b] Guest: The art of carding wool, and the half of that art which uses the shuttle, and that art which separates from each other things joined together, —all these, in short, form a part of the wool-working art, of which there are two great parts, one collective, and the other separative.
[282b] Socrates: jun. There are so.
[282c] Guest: The art of carding wool, therefore, and all those other arts which we just now mentioned, belong to the separative part. For that art which divides in wool and thread, after one manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has all the names which we have just now mentioned.
[282c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[282c] Guest: Again, we must take a part of the collective part, and of the wool-working art contained in it; but we must pass by all such things of a separating nature as we happen to find there, and bisect the wool-working art, together with the collective and separative section.
[282d] Socrates: jun. Let us divide them.
[282d] Guest: It will be proper for you, therefore, Socrates, to divide the collective, together with the wool-working part, if we wish to apprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.
[282d] Socrates: jun. It will be requisite.
[282d] Guest: It will indeed: and we say, therefore, that one part of it is streptic, or conversant with rolling, and the other symplectic, or complicative.
[282d] Socrates: jun. Do I then understand you? For you appear to me to say that the elaboration of the thread is streptic.
[282d] Guest: Not the elaboration of this only, but likewise of the woof. Or can we find any generation of it which is not streptic?
[282e] Socrates: jun. By no means.
[282e] Guest: Define also each of these: for perhaps you will find the definition seasonable.
[282e] Socrates: jun. In what respect?
[282e] Guest: In this. We say that the work of the wool-carder, when it is drawn out into length and breadth, is a certain fracture.
[282e] Socrates: jun. We do.
[282e] Guest: This, when it is turned by the distaff, and becomes a solid thread, is called stamen: but they say that the art which directs this is stemonic, or conversant with stuff to be woven.
[282e] Socrates: jun. Right.
[282e] Guest: But such things as receive a loose contortion, and by the implication of the thread with the attraction of the polish acquire a measured softness,—of these we call what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over these, woof-spinning.
[283a] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[283a] Guest: And now that part of the weaving art which we proposed is obvious to every one. For, with respect to a part of the collective art in the working of wool, when it accomplishes that which is woven by a fit knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven is called a woollen garment, but the art presiding over this, textorian.
[283a] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[283a] Guest: Be it so. But why then did we not immediately answer, that the plectic art is that which weaves together the woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a circle, and defining many things in vain?
[283b] Socrates: jun. It does not appear to me, O guest, that we have said any thing in vain.
[283b] Guest: This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O blessed youth, it will be seen that you will often hereafter fall into this disease. Nor is it wonderful. But hear a certain discourse, which is proper to be delivered respecting all such particulars as these.
[283c] Socrates: jun. Only relate it.
[283c] Guest: Let us, therefore, in the first place, behold the whole of excess and deficiency, that we may praise and blame according to reason whatever is said with more prolixity or brevity than is becoming in disputations of this kind.
[283c] Socrates: jun. It will be proper so to do.
[283d] Guest: But I think we shall do right by discoursing about these things.
[283d] Socrates: jun. About what things?
[283d] Guest: About prolixity and brevity, and the whole of excess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant with all these.
[283d] Socrates: jun. It is.
[283d] Guest: We will divide it, therefore, into two parts. For it is requisite to that after which we are hastening.
[283d] Socrates: jun. Inform me how this division is to be made.
[283d] Guest: Thus. One part according to the communion of magnitude and parvitude with each other; but the other part according to the necessary essence of generation.
[283d] Socrates: jun. How do you say?
[283d] Guest: Does it not appear to you to be natural, that the greater ought to be called greater than nothing else than the lesser? and again, that the lesser should not be lesser than any thing than the greater?
[283e] Socrates: jun. To me it does.
[283e] Guest: But what? Must we not say that what surpasses the nature of mediocrity, and is surpassed by it, whether in words or actions, is that by which especially good and bad men differ from each other?
[283e] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[283e] Guest: These twofold essences, therefore, and judgments of the great and the small must be established; but not, as we just now said, with reference to each other only. But, as we now say, they are rather partly to be referred to each other, and partly to mediocrity. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requisite?
[284a] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[284b] Guest: If some one refers the nature of the greater to nothing else than the nature of the lesser, he will not refer it to mediocrity. Or will he?
[284b] Socrates: jun. He will not.
[284b] Guest: May we not, therefore, divide the arts themselves, and all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we not entirely take away the political science which we are now investigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all such things as these guard against that which is more or less than mediocrity, not as if it had no subsistence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in actions. And after this manner preserving mediocrity, they effect every thing beautiful and good.
[284b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[284b] Guest: If, therefore, we take away the politic science, will not our investigation after this of the royal science be dubious?
[284c] Socrates: jun. Very much so.
[284c] Guest: Whether, therefore, as in our investigation of a sophist, we compelled non-being to be, after discourse about it fled from us, so now shall we compel the more and the less to become measured, not only with reference to each other, but likewise to the generation of mediocrity? For no one can indubitably become a politician, or knowing in any thing else pertaining to actions, unless he assents to this.
[284c] Socrates: jun. We ought, therefore, especially to do this now.
[284c] Guest: This, Socrates, is a still greater work than that; though, as we may remember, that was very prolix. But a thing of this kind may be supposed respecting them, and very justly.
[284c] Socrates: jun. Of what kind?
[284d] Guest: That there is occasion for what we are now speaking of, in order to evince what is accurate respecting this thing. Further still, with respect to the present particulars, it appears to me to have been shown sufficiently, that this discourse will afford us magnificent assistance, as leading us to think that all arts are to be similarly measured according to the more and the less, not only among themselves, but likewise with reference to the generation of mediocrity. For, this having a subsistence, they also are: and, these subsisting, this also is. And either of these being taken away, neither of them will subsist.
[284d] Socrates: jun. This indeed is right. But what follows?
[284e] Guest: We should evidently divide the art of measuring (as we have said) into two parts; placing as one of its parts all those arts which measure number, length, breadth, depth, and velocity, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit, and all such as fly from the extremes to the middle.
[284e] Socrates: jun. Each of these sections is great, and they differ much from each other.
[285a] Guest: That, Socrates, which is sometimes asserted by many of those elegant men, who think they assert something wise, when they say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated natures, is now asserted by us. For all artificial things after a certain manner participate of measure; but, in consequence of not being accustomed to divide according to species, these men immediately collect into the same these things which so widely differ from each other, and consider them as similar. [285b] And, again, they do the very contrary to this: for things which are different they do not divide according to parts, though it is requisite that, when any one first perceives the communion of many things, he should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it which are placed in species: and again, when he perceives all-various dissimilitudes in multitudes, he cannot desist from this difficult perception, till, having inclosed all such things as are allied in one similitude, he comprehends them in the essence of a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars, and concerning defect and excess. This only must be carefully observed, that two genera of measures about these particulars have been invented, and that we should remember what they are.
[285c] Socrates: jun. We will remember.
[285c] Guest: But, after this discussion, let us assume another respecting the objects of our investigation, and the whole purport of this discourse.
[285c] Socrates: jun. What is it?
[285d] Guest: If any one should ask us respecting the custom of those that learn their letters, when they are asked from what letters a word is composed, shall we say that the inquiry is then made for the sake of one word only, or that they may become more skilful in every thing pertaining to grammar?
[285d] Socrates: jun. Evidently that they may become more skilful in the whole of grammar.
[285d] Guest: But what again? Is our inquiry respecting a politician undertaken by us more for the sake of the politician, than that we may become more skilful in every discussion?
[285d] Socrates: jun. This also is evident, that it is undertaken on this latter account.
[285e] Guest: No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to investigate the art of weaving, for its own sake alone: but I think most men are ignorant, that there are certain sensible similitudes of things which are naturally capable of being easily learnt, and that there is no difficulty in making these manifest, when any one wishes to point them out to some one inquiring a reason respecting them, not in conjunction with things, but with facility, without assigning a reason. But of things the greatest and the most honourable, there is not any image clearly fabricated for men, which being exhibited by him who wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, can, by being harmonized to some one of the senses, sufficiently fill the soul. [286a] Hence it is requisite to meditate how we may be able to give and receive a reason for every thing. For incorporeal natures, as they are the most beautiful and the greatest of all things, can alone be clearly pointed out by reason, but by nothing else. And all we have said at present is asserted for the sake of these things. But the consideration of every particular is more easily effected in small things than in such as are great.
[286b] Socrates: jun. You speak most beautifully.
[286b] Guest: Do we, therefore, remember on what account all these things have been said by us?
[286c] Socrates: jun. On what account?
[286c] Guest: Principally on account of the difficulty in which we were involved, through the prolix discourse about the weaving art, and the revolution of the universe. We likewise considered the discourse of the sophist about the essence of non-being, as full of prolixity. And on all these accounts we terrified ourselves, fearing lest we should speak superfluously in conjunction with prolixity. Consider, therefore, all these things as said by us, in order that we may not suffer any thing of this kind again.
[286c] Socrates: jun. Be it so. Only discuss what remains.
[286c] Guest: I say, therefore, it is requisite that both you and I should be mindful of what we have now said, as often as brevity or prolixity of discourse is blamed, not judging the prolixities by one another, but according to that part of the measuring art, which we said above ought to be remembered with a view to the becoming.
[286d] Socrates: jun. Right.
[286d] Guest: But yet all things are not referred to this. [286e] For we do not require in order to obtain pleasure a prolixity which harmonizes with nothing, unless as a certain appendix. Nor is it proper to make the easy and rapid discovery of the object of our investigation our principal intention; but this ought to be considered by us as a secondary thing. But we should by far most especially, and in the first place, honour the method which is able to divide according to species. We should likewise by no means be indignant with a discourse, however extended, which renders the hearer more inventive; and the same must be said of a discourse however short. Further still, it becomes him who blames long discourses in disquisitions such as these, and who does not admit circular periods, not to condemn them altogether rapidly, and immediately, but to show first that we shall be more fit for discussion, and more capable of discovering things by reason, by shorter discourses: but we should neither pay any attention to, nor even seem to hear any other praise or blame. [287a] And thus much may suffice for these things, if it also seems so to you. Let us, therefore, again return to the political character, introducing the before-mentioned paradigm of the weaving art.
[287b] Socrates: jun. You speak well: and let us do as you say.
[287b] Guest: Is not, therefore, the office of a king to be separated from that of many shepherds, or rather from that of all those who have the charge of herds?
[287b] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[287b] Guest: But we say that the consideration of causes and concauses respecting a city remains, which are first to be divided from each other.
[287b] Socrates: jun. Right.
[287c] Guest: You know, therefore, that it is difficult to bisect these. But the cause of this will, I think, in the course of our inquiry be not less apparent.
[287c] Socrates: jun. It will be proper, therefore, so to do.
[287c] Guest: Let us, then, divide them into parts, like victims, since we cannot bisect them: for it is always requisite to cut into the nearest number possible.
[287c] Socrates: jun. How, therefore, shall we do at present?
[287c] Guest: Just as we did above: for we placed all such instruments as are subservient to weaving, as concauses.
[287c] Socrates: jun. We did.
[287d] Guest: The same thing, therefore, must be done by us now, and it is still more necessary than it was then. For such things as fabricate in a city either a small or a large instrument are all of them to be considered as concauses; since without these a city could never subsist, nor yet the politic science. But yet again we do not establish any one of these as the business of the royal science.
[287d] Socrates: jun. We do not.
[287e] Guest: We likewise attempt to accomplish a difficult thing, in separating this genus from others. For he who says that it is an instrument of some particular being, appears to speak probably: but at the same time we must say that this is different from the possessions belonging to a city.
[287e] Socrates: jun. In what respect?
[287e] Guest: Because it has not this power. For causes do not adhere to generation as an instrument, but on account of the safety of that which is fabricated.
[287e] Socrates: jun. What kind of thing do you mean?
[288a] Guest: An all-various species produced from things dry and moist, fiery and without fire, and which we call by one appellation, a vessel, though it is an abundant species: but I think this does not at all belong to the science we are investigating.
[288a] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly not.
[288a] Guest: But the third species, or that of possessions, appears to be multiform, consisting of the terrestrial and aqautic, the much-wandering and the nerratic, the honourable and the ignoble; and it has one name, because the whole of it subsists for the sake of a certain sitting, as it always becomes a seat to something.
[288a] Socrates: jun. What kind of thing is it?
[288a] Guest: It is that which is called a vehicle, a thing which is not entirely the work of the politic science, but rather of the tectonic, ceramic⁸, and calcotypic⁹.
[288a] Socrates: jun. I understand you.
[288a] Guest: Must we then [288b] mention a fourth species of these, in which most of the things formerly spoken of by us are contained? viz. every kind of garment, many arms, walls, all inclosures, consisting either of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all these are constructed for the sake of defence, the whole may most justly be called a fortification; and, for the most part, may more properly be considered as much more the work of the architect and weaver than of the politician.
[288c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[288c] Guest: Are we, therefore, willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning, painting, and music, together with such arts as use these; from which certain imitations are devised for the sake of procuring us pleasure, and which may be justly comprehended in one name?
[288c] Socrates: jun. In what name?
[288d] Guest: They may be denominated sportive.
[288d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[288d] Guest: This one name, therefore, accords with all these: for no one of them does any thing seriously, but all their operations are for the sake of sport.
[288d] Socrates: jun. This also I nearly understand.
[288d] Guest: But ought we not to place as a sixth all-various species, and, which is the offspring of many other arts, that art which prepares bodies for all the above-mentioned particulars?
[288d] Socrates: jun. Of what art are you speaking?
[288d] Guest: That art which digs gold and silver, and other metals, out of the bowels of the earth; likewise that which cuts down trees, that which constructs something by shaving off the hair, the knitting art, that which cuts off the barks of trees, and the skins of animals, and all such arts as are conversant with things of this kind. Also, such arts as procure cork, books, and bonds, fabricating composite species from genera which are not composite. The whole of this we call the first-born possession of mankind, simple, and by no means the work of the royal science.
[288e] Socrates: jun. Right.
[289a] Guest: The possession of nutriment, and such things as when mingled with the body can, by their parts, administer to its wants, must be ranked in the seventh place. And the whole of this must be denominated by us nutriment, unless we have any thing better to adopt instead of it. However, we may place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, gymnastic, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these more properly than to the politic science.
[289b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[289b] Guest: Nearly, therefore, all possessions, except those of tame animals, may I think be found in these seven genera. But consider: for it was most just that the species which we called first-born should be introduced first; and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, fortification, that which is sportive, and cattle. But if any thing of no great consequence is latent, which may be accommodated to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of coin, of seals, and of every thing impressed or carved. For these things are not very much allied to the genus; but some accord with it, for the purpose of ornament, others as subservient to instruments, violently, indeed, but at the same time they may be drawn to this end. But the nurture of herds which we before distributed, seems to comprehend the whole possession of tame animals, slaves being excepted.
[289c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[289d] Guest: The genus of slaves, and of all servants, remains, in which I prophesy, that those who contend with a king respecting the thing woven will become apparent, in the same manner as above, those that knit, and those that comb wool, and such others as were then mentioned by us, contended with the weavers. But all the others who were called by us concauses, together with the works just now mentioned, are set aside, and are separated from royal and political action.
[289d] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[289d] Guest: Let us then, approaching nearer, consider the rest, that we may more firmly perceive them.
[289d] Socrates: jun. It is, therefore, requisite to do so.
[289d] Guest: We shall find, then, that the greatest servants, so far as we can see in this affair, are engaged in a pursuit, and possess a property the very contrary to what we have expected.
[289e] Socrates: jun. What are these?
[289e] Guest: Men acquired by purchase; whom, beyond all controversy, we ought to call slaves, and of whom we should assert, that they by no means vindicate to themselves the royal art.
[289e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[289e] Guest: But what shall we say of those free-born men who voluntarily engage in the servile employments mentioned by us above, viz. who transmit the works of husbandry, and of the other arts, to each other, and who are engaged in mutual traffic, domestic or foreign, whether they change money for other things, or like for like, (whom we denominate moneychangers, pilots, and hucksters,) shall we say that these will contend for any part of the politic science?
[290a] Socrates: jun. Perhaps merchants will.
[290a] Guest: But yet we never find that those mercenaries who readily offer their services to every one vindicate to themselves the royal science.
[290a] Socrates: jun. For how can they?
[290a] Guest: What then shall we say of those that act in this servile capacity every where?
[290a] Socrates: jun. Of whom are you speaking? and of what kind of servile offices?
[290a] Guest: I speak of the tribe of criers, and of those who become wise respecting letters¹⁰, and often act in the capacity of servants, together with certain other persons who are very skilful in the labours pertaining to government. What again shall we say of these?
[290b] Socrates: jun. That which you just now said, that they are servants, but no rulers in cities.
[290b] Guest: I do not think, therefore, I was looking at a dream, when I said that many on this account would be seen strenuously contending for the royal science, though it may appear to be very absurd to seek after these in any servile portion.
[290c] Socrates: jun. Very much so, indeed.
[290c] Guest: Let us, besides, approach still nearer to those whom we have not yet examined. But these are such as possess a certain portion of ministrant science about divination. For they are considered as interpreting to men things proceeding from the Gods.
[290c] Socrates: jun. They are.
[290c] Guest: The genus too of priests, as established by law, knows in what manner we should offer gifts, through sacrifices, to the Gods, so as to render the divinities propitious to us; and likewise, after what manner we should request of them, by prayer, the possession of good things. But both these are parts of the ministrant art.
[290d] Socrates: jun. So it appears.
[290d] Guest: Now, therefore, we appear to me to touch, as it were, upon a certain vestige of the object of our search. [290e] For the figure of priests and prophets is very replete with prudence, and receives a venerable opinion through the magnitude of the undertakings. Hence, among the Egyptians, a king is not allowed to govern without the sacerdotal science; so that, if any one belonging to another genus of men usurps the kingdom, he is afterwards compelled to be initiated in their mysteries, that he may be skilled in the sacerdotal science. Further still, in many places belonging to the Greeks, we shall find that the greatest sacrifices of this kind are under the direction of the greatest magistrates; and the truth of what I assert is particularly evinced among you. For, when a king is elected, they say that the most venerable of all the antient sacrifices, and such as are most peculiar to the country, are to be consigned to the care of the new king.
[291a] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[291a] Guest: We should, therefore, consider these kings chosen by lot, together with the priests, their servants, and a certain other numerous crowd, which just now became manifest to us, apart from our former assertions.
[291a] Socrates: jun. Of whom are you speaking?
[291a] Guest: Of certain very wonderful persons.
[291b] Socrates: jun. Why so?
[291b] Guest: As I was just now speculating, the genus of them appeared to me to be all-various. For many men resemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are similar to satyrs, and to imbecil and multiform wild beasts. They likewise rapidly change their ideas and their power into each other. And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have just now perceived these men for the first time.
[291b] Socrates: jun. Speak: for you seem to behold something unusual.
[291c] Guest: I do: for the unusual or wonderful happens to all men from ignorance. And I myself just now suffered the very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on perceiving the choir of civil concerns.
[291c] Socrates: jun. What choir?
[291c] Guest: The greatest enchanter of all sophists, and the most skilled in this art, who must be separated from truly political and royal characters, though this is difficult in the extreme, if we intend to see clearly the object of our investigation.
[291c] Socrates: jun. We must by no means omit to do this.
[291c] Guest: We must not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.
[291d] Socrates: jun. What?
[291d] Guest: Is not a monarchy one of our political governments?
[291d] Socrates: jun. It is.
[291d] Guest: And after a monarchy I think an oligarchy may be placed.
[291d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[291d] Guest: But is not the third scheme of a polity the government of the multitude, and which is called a democracy?
[291d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[291d] Guest: May not these three become after a manner five, since they produce two other names from themselves?
[291d] Socrates: jun. What are these two?
[291e] Guest: Those who now look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and riches, law and the transgression of law, which take place in these governments, and who give a twofold division to each of the two, and call monarchy by two names, as affording two species, viz. tyrannic and royal.
[291e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[291e] Guest: But they denominate a city which is governed by a few an aristocracy and an oligarchy.
[291e] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[291e] Guest: But no one is ever accustomed to change the name of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they accurately defend the laws or not.
[292a] Socrates: jun. True.
[292a] Guest: What then? Shall we think that any one of these polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, viz. by one, and a few, and a many, by riches and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, by written laws, and the privation of laws?
[292b] Socrates: jun. What should hinder?
[292b] Guest: Consider more attentively, following me hither.
[292b] Socrates: jun. Whither?
[292b] Guest: Shall we abide by that which was asserted by us at first, or shall we dissent from it?
[292b] Socrates: jun. Of what assertion are you speaking?
[292b] Guest: I think we said that a royal government was one of the sciences.
[292b] Socrates: jun. We did.
[292b] Guest: Yet we did not consider it as any one science indiscriminately; but we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial and presiding.
[292c] Socrates: jun. We did.
[292c] Guest: And of the presiding science, dividing one part, as belonging to inanimate works, and the other as belonging to animals, we have proceeded thus far, not forgetting that we were scientifically employed; but we have not yet been able to determine with sufficient accuracy what this science is.
[292c] Socrates: jun. Right.
[292c] Guest: Do we, therefore, understand this, that the definition must not be made by the few, nor by the many, nor yet by the voluntary or involuntary, nor by poverty or riches, but according to a certain science, if we follow what has been formerly delivered?
[292d] Socrates: jun. But, indeed, it is impossible that this should not be done.
[292d] Guest: From necessity, therefore, we must now consider in which of these the science respecting the government of men happens to subsist; this government being nearly the greatest of all others, and the most difficult to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect it, that we may perceive what are the things which must be taken away from a prudent king, and who those are that pretend to be, and persuade the multitude that they are, politicians, but who are by no means so.
[292e] Socrates: jun. Our former reasoning evinces that it is requisite to act in this manner.
[292e] Guest: Does it then appear to you that the multitude in a city is able to acquire this science?
[292e] Socrates: jun. How can they?
[292e] Guest: In a city, therefore, consisting of a thousand men, is it possible that a hundred or five hundred of the inhabitants can sufficiently acquire this science?
[293a] Socrates: jun. If this were the case, it would be the most easy of all arts. For we know that among a thousand men there cannot be found so great a number of those that excel the other Greeks in the game of chess, much less can there be found as many kings. But, according to our former reasoning, it is requisite to call him royal who possesses the royal science, whether he governs or not.
[293a] Guest: You very properly remind me: but I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it subsists rightly, ought to be investigated about one person, or two, or altogether about a few.
[293a] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[293a] Guest: And, as we now think, those that govern according to a certain [293b] art are to be considered as political and regal characters, whether they gov- ern the willing or the refractory, whether according to or without written laws, and whether they are rich or poor. For we call those who heal the maladies of the body, no less physicians, whether they cure by cutting, or burning, or any other painful application, the voluntary or the refractory; and whether from writings or without writings; and whether they are poor or rich. In all these cases we say that they are no less physicians, so long as they proceed according to art, in purging or some other way attenuating the body, or in causing it to increase; and so long as, alone regarding the good of the body, they restore it from a worse to a better habit, and preserve it when thus restored. After this manner alone, as I think, we must say that the definition of the medicinal or any other government is rightly made.
[293b] Socrates: jun. And very much so.
[293d] Guest: It is necessary, therefore, as it seems, that that polity alone must in the highest degree be rightly established, in which the governors are found to be truly, and not in appearance only, scientific; whether they govern according to laws, or without laws; whether they rule over the obedient, or the refractory; and whether they are rich or poor. For no one of these is of any consequence with respect to rectitude of government.
[293d] Socrates: jun. Beautifully said.
[293d] Guest: Nor yet is it of any [293e] consequence, whether they purge the city with a view to its good, by putting to death or banishing certain persons; or whether they send out colonies, like a swarm of bees, and thus diminish the people; or whether, introducing certain foreigners, they make citizens of them, and thus increase the city. For, so long as, employing science and justice, they cause the city, to the utmost of their power, to pass from a worse to a better condition, and preserve it in this state,—so far, and according to such definitions, we say that a polity is alone rightly established; but that such others, as we have mentioned, are neither genuinely nor truly polities. We must likewise willingly say that such polities as imitate this are consonant to reason, and tend to things more beautiful, but that such as do not, tend to deformity by an imitation of things evil.
[293e] Socrates: jun. Other things indeed, O guest, appear to have been discussed sufficiently: but it is not easy to admit your assertion, that it is requisite to govern without laws.
[294a] Guest: You have got before me a little, Socrates, by your question. For I was going to ask you, whether you admit all these things, or whether you find any difficulty in any thing that has been said. It is however evident, that we now wish to inquire concerning the rectitude of those that govern without laws.
[294a] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[294a] Guest: After a certain manner it is evident that legislation pertains to the royal science: but it is best, not for the laws to prevail, but a man who is royal in conjunction with prudence. Do you know why?
[294a] Socrates: jun. Inform me.
[294b] Guest: Because law cannot, by comprehending that which is most excellent, and at the same time most accurately just, for all men, always enjoin that which is best. For the dissimilitudes of men and actions, and the unceasing restlessness, as I may say, of human affairs, do not permit any art whatever to be exhibited respecting all things, and through every time. Shall we admit these assertions?
[294b] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[294c] Guest: But we see that law nearly endeavours to accomplish this very thing, like a certain arrogant and ignorant man, who does not suffer any thing to be done contrary to his own orders, nor any one to ask whether it would not be better to make some new regulation, contrary to what he has ordained.
[294c] Socrates: jun. True. For the law does as you say.
[294c] Guest: But it is impossible that a thing which is simple should prevail in things which are never at any time simple.
[294d] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[294d] Guest: The cause, therefore, must be found out why it is necessary to establish laws, since law does not possess the greatest rectitude.
[294d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[294d] Guest: Are there not, therefore, among us, as also in other cities, certain exercises of men collected together, whether belonging to the course, or to any thing else which is undertaken for the sake of contention?
[294d] Socrates: jun. There are very many such exercises.
[294d] Guest: Come then, let us again recall to our memory the mandates of those who preside over gymnastic exercises according to art.
[294d] Socrates: jun. What are their mandates?
[294d] Guest: They do not think that a subtle division should be made, according to each individual, so as to enjoin that which is adapted to the body of each; but that attention should be paid to what is more common, and which is advantageous for the most part, and to a many.
[294e] Socrates: jun. Excellent.
[294e] Guest: Hence at present assigning equal labours to collected bodies of men, they at the same time impel them to begin the contest together, and to rest from the race, from wrestling, and from all the labours of the body, at one and the same time.
[295a] Socrates: jun. They do so.
[295a] Guest: We, therefore, think that the legislator who presides over the herds of men, and enjoins them what is just respecting their compacts with each other, cannot, while he gives laws to them collectively, accurately assign what is fit to each individual.
[295a] Socrates: jun. This is likely to be the case.
[295a] Guest: But I think that in a less subtle way he will establish laws for the multitude, and for the most part, both written and unwritten, and such as are agreeable to the manners of the country.
[295b] Socrates: jun. Right.
[295b] Guest: Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one attend sufficiently to individuals through the whole of life, and accurately enjoin what is adapted to each? For, though he who possesses the royal science could, I think, do this, he would scarcely prescribe for himself those impediments which are called laws.
[295b] Socrates: jun. It appears so, O guest, from what has been now said.
[295b] Guest: Rather, O most excellent youth, from what will be said.
[295b] Socrates: jun. What is that?
[295c] Guest: This. For we thus say to ourselves: If a physician, or master of gymnastic, intending to travel, and to be absent from those under his care for a long time, should think that those who are exercised, or those who are sick, would not remember his precepts, he will wish to write commentaries for them. Or how shall we say?
[295c] Socrates: jun. That he will wish to do so.
[295d] Guest: But what? If the physician should return sooner than he thought, will he venture to order them certain other things besides those contained in his writings, if any thing better should occur for the sick, through winds, or any thing else, which is wont to take place through Jupiter, contrary to expectation? Will he think that he ought strenuously to persevere in his former injunctions, neither himself ordering any thing else, nor the sick man daring to do any thing different from his written prescriptions; these being medicinal and salubrious, but things of a different nature, noxious, and contrary to art? Or rather, every thing of this kind happening about all things according to science and true art, will not his edicts become the most ridiculous of all others?
[295d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[295d] Guest: But shall not he who writes things just and unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who establishes unwritten laws for the herds of mankind, who live in cities according to written laws,—shall not he, I say, who has written laws according to art, or any other who resembles him, be permitted on his return to enjoin things different from these? Or, rather, would not this interdiction appear in reality tobe no less ridiculous than the former?
[296a] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[296a] Guest: Do you know, therefore, what the multitude say respecting a thing of this kind?
[296a] Socrates: jun. I do not at present remember.
[296a] Guest: But it is very specious. For they say, if any one has found out laws better than those that are already established, and can persuade his citizens that they are better, he should establish them; otherwise not.
[296a] Socrates: jun. Do they not, therefore, say rightly?
[296a] Guest: Perhaps so. But if some one should introduce that which is best, not by persuasion, but by force, what name must be given to this violence? Or, rather, first answer me respecting the former particulars.
[296b] Socrates: jun. Of what particulars are you speaking?
[296b] Guest: If any one who is properly skilled in the medical art should not persuade but compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, to do that which is better, but at the same time contrary to written prescriptions, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather any thing than a transgression of art, or a noxious error? And should we not say that every thing will happen to the compelled person, rather than any thing noxious and contrary to art from the compelling physicians?
[296c] Socrates: jun. You speak most true.
[296c] Guest: But what is that error to be called which is contrary to the political art? Must it not be denominated base, evil, and unjust?
[296c] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[296c] Guest: But come, will not he be the most ridiculous of all men, who should blame the violence of those that force men to act more justly, better, and more beautifully than before, contrary to written precepts, and the laws of their country? And ought not every thing rather to be asserted of those that are thus compelled, than that they suffer things base, unjust, and evil?
[296d] Socrates: jun. Your assertion is most true.
[296d] Guest: But if he who compels is rich, will his compulsions be just,— but, if he is poor, unjust? [296e] Or shall we not rather say, that he who effects what is advantageous, whether he persuades or does not persuade, whether he is rich or poor, and whether he acts according or contrary to written injunctions, will act conformably to the most true definition of the right government of a city? For a wise and good man will always govern in this manner, always attending to the advantage of his subjects, in the same manner as a pilot is watchful for the safety of the ship and the sailors. [297a] And as the pilot preserves the sailors, not by written mandates but by exhibiting to them laws according to art, after the same manner an upright polity will be produced by those who are thus able to govern, by exhibiting a strength of art better than the laws. And, in short, prudent governors never err in any part of their conduct, as long as they observe this one thing, viz. by always distributing that which is most just to the citizens, in conjunction with intellect and art, to preserve them, and, from being worse, render them better to the utmost of their power.
[297b] Socrates: jun. These assertions cannot be contradicted.
[297b] Guest: Nor yet those.
[297b] Socrates: jun. What assertions do you mean?
[297b] Guest: That no multitude whatever can receive that science, by which a city is governed according to intellect, but that an upright polity must be investigated about a small number, and a few, and one person; and that other polities are to be considered as imitations, as we observed a little before, some resembling this in a more beautiful, and others in a more deformed manner.
[297c] Socrates: jun. How do you say this? For I do not understand what you just now said respecting imitations.
[297d] Guest: He would not act badly, who, after introducing a discourse of this kind, should desist before he had shown the error which is at present committed.
[297d] Socrates: jun. What error do you mean?
[297d] Guest: It is requisite to investigate a thing of that kind, which is not altogether usual, nor yet easy to perceive; but at the same time we must endeavour to apprehend it. For, since an upright polity is that alone of which we have spoken, do you not know that other polities ought to be preserved, while they use the institutions of this, and do that which we just now praised, though it is not most right?
[297d] Socrates: jun. What is that?
[297e] Guest: That no citizen shall dare to act in any respect contrary to the laws, and that he who dares to do so shall be punished with death, and shall suffer all extreme punishments. This is most right and beautiful in the second place; for that which was just now mentioned must be ranked in the first place. But we should unfold the manner in which that which we call secondary subsists. Or should we not?
[297e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[297e] Guest: But let us again return to images, to which it is always necessary to assimilate royal governors.
[297e] Socrates: jun. What kind of images?
[297e] Guest: The generous pilot, and, as Homer says, the physician, who is of equal worth with many others. Let us consider the affair by devising a certain figure in these things.
[297e] Socrates: jun. Of what kind?
[298a] Guest: Such a one, as if we all conceived that we suffered the most dire things from these persons. For such of us as they wish to save, they do save; and such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burning; at the same time ordering money to be given them as a reward for this, not spending any thing themselves on the sick, but they and their familiars making use of others. And lastly, receiving money either from the kindred or from certain enemies of the sick man, they cause him to die. Pilots too effect ten thousand other things of this kind. For they designedly leave men by themselves in certain recesses, and, committing an error in navigation, hurl them into the sea, and injure them in other respects. [298b] In consequence of considering these things, let us suppose that we consult how we may deprive these arts of their independent authority, so that they may no longer possess absolute power, either over slaves or the free-born. Hence, we assemble together for this purpose, and convene either all the people, or the rich only. In this assembly, obscure individuals and mechanics give their opinion respecting the ship and diseases; [298c] viz. after what manner medicines, and medical instruments, should be employed about the diseased; and likewise ships and nautical instruments in navigation, in the dangers to which ships are subject, through [298d] the winds, the sea, and pirates, and when there is occasion to fight with long ships against others of the like kind. Let us likewise suppose that the opinions, either of certain physicians and pilots, or of other private persons, given in this assembly, are inscribed in triangular tables and pillars, and that certain unwritten customs of the country are established, according to which in all future times navigation is to be conducted, and remedies for the sick administered.
[298e] Socrates: jun. You have spoken of very absurd things.
[299a] Guest: Let us likewise suppose that yearly governors of the multitude are established, whether chosen by lot from the rich, or from all the people; and let them govern both ships and the diseased, according to those written institutions.
[299a] Socrates: jun. These things appear still more difficult.
[299a] Guest: Let us likewise see what is consequent to these things. For when the year of each governor is expired, it will be necessary that courts of justice should be established, which are composed either of chosen rich men, or from all the people, for the purpose of calling the governors to account, and reproving them when requisite. Let every one likewise who is willing be permitted to accuse the governors, as neither governing the ships, during the year, according to the written injunctions; nor according to the antient manners of their ancestors. And let the same things be permitted to take place respecting those that cure the diseased. But let those that are convicted be punished in whatever manner the judges shall think fit.
[299b] Socrates: jun. He, therefore, who voluntarily governs these men will most justly suffer from them, and receive whatever punishment they please.
[299b] Guest: Further still, it will [299c] be requisite that a law should be established for all these, that if any one introduces a mode of piloting different from the written institutions, or shall be found investigating the salubrious, and the truth of the medicinal art, contrary to the writings, about winds, heat and cold, or devising any thing whatever, about affairs of this kind;—in the first place, he shall neither be called a pilot nor a physician, but a certain boastful and garrulous sophist; and, in the next place, he shall be brought before a court of justice, by any person who is willing, as one who corrupts other young men, and persuades them that every one should be permitted to pilot ships, and cure the diseased, not according to the laws, but according to his own will. And if any one shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written mandates, he shall be punished in the extreme. For nothing ought to be wiser than the laws. Besides, no one should be ignorant of the medicinal and the salubrious, nor of nautical affairs. For every one who is willing is permitted to learn the written mandates, and the customs of his country. [299d] If these particulars, Socrates, should take place about these sciences, viz. about military concerns, the whole of hunting, and painting, imitation, and architecture, the formation of instruments of every kind, agriculture, botany; or, again, about the care pertaining to horses, and herds of cattle of every kind, prophecy, the whole of servile offices, the game of chess, the whole of arithmetic in its simple state, whether it is conversant with planes or depths, or swiftness and slowness;—if these particulars, I say, should take place about these sciences, so as to cause them to be effected according to the written mandates, and not according to art, what shall we say?
[299e] Socrates: jun. It is evident that all arts must be entirely subverted, without ever being restored, in consequence of the law which forbids investigation. So that life, which is at present difficult, would then be perfectly intolerable.
[300a] Guest: But what will you say to this? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned particulars to take place according to written injunctions, and should appoint as the guardian of these writings a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who paying no attention to them, either for the sake of a certain gain, or private pleasure, should endeavour, though ignorant of every thing, to act contrary to these mandates; would not this be a greater evil than the former?
[300a] Socrates: jun. It most truly would.
[300a] Guest: For he who should dare to act contrary to those laws which have been established from long experience by those who, consulting how to gratify the people, have persuaded them to adopt them, will commit an error of a very extended nature, and subvert every action in a much greater degree than written mandates are capable of effecting.
[300b] Socrates: jun. How is it possible he should not?
[300b] Guest: Hence, as it is said, there is a second navigation for those that establish laws and written mandates respecting any thing whatever, viz. that neither one person, nor the multitude, should ever be suffered to do any thing at any time contrary to them.
[300c] Socrates: jun. Right.
[300c] Guest: Will not these writings, therefore, be certain imitations of truth, composed by intelligent men, in the greatest perfection of which they are capable?
[300d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[300d] Guest, But, if we remember, we have said, that a man truly knowing in political concerns will do many things from art, without paying any attention to written mandates, when any thing occurs to him better than what he has left behind him in writing.
[300d] Socrates: jun. We did say so.
[300d] Guest: And if any thing better than what is established by law should occur either to an individual, or to the people at large, will they not in this case, to the utmost of their power, act in the same manner as the true politician?
[300d] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[300d] Guest: If, therefore, they should act in this manner, without possessing science, they would attempt to imitate that which is true, but the whole of their imitation would be vicious; but if their conduct is the effect of art, this is no longer an imitation, but is a thing itself most true.
[300e] Socrates: jun. It is so in every respect.
[300e] Guest: It was likewise acknowledged by us above, that the multitude is incapable of receiving any art whatever.
[300e] Socrates: jun. It was.
[300e] Guest: If, therefore, there is a certain royal art, the multitude of the rich, and the whole of the people, can never receive this politic science.
[300e] Socrates: jun. For how can they?
[300e] Guest: It is requisite then (as it seems) that such-like polities, if they intend to imitate as much as possible that true polity which is governed according to art by one man, must never do any thing contrary to their written laws, and the customs of their country.
[301a] Socrates: jun. You speak most beautifully.
[301a] Guest: When, therefore, the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate such a polity an aristocracy: but when they pay no attention to the laws, an oligarchy.
[301a] Socrates: jun. So it appears.
[301a] Guest: And again, when one man governs according to the laws, imitating him who is endued with science, then we call such a one a king, not distinguishing by name him who governs with science from the monarch who governs with opinion according to the laws.
[301b] Socrates: jun. We appear to do so.
[301b] Guest: If, therefore, one man governs, who truly possesses a scientific knowledge of government, he is entirely called by this name a king, and by no other: for this alone, of the five names of the polities just now mentioned, belongs to him.
[301b] Socrates: jun. So it appears.
[301c] Guest: But when one man governs neither according to the laws, nor according to the customs of the country, but at the same time pretends that he possesses a scientific knowledge, and that it is best to act in this manner, contrary to the written mandates, though a certain intemperate desire and ignorance are the leaders of this imitation, must not a man of this kind be called a tyrant?
[301d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[301d] Guest: Thus, then, we say, a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, will be produced; mankind indignantly bearing the authority of a monarch, and not believing that any m n will ever be found worthy of such a government, so as to be both willing and able to govern with virtue and science, and properly distribute to all men things just and holy. They are likewise fearful, that one man endued with absolute power will injure, oppress, and slay whomsoever he pleases: though, if such a character should arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved, and his administration, on account of its accurate rectitude, would alone render a polity happy.
[301d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[301e] Guest: But now, since no such king is to be found in cities, who, as if produced in a swarm of bees, excels from the very beginning both in body and soul, it is requisite, as it seems, that men assembling together should compose written institutions, treading in the footsteps of the most true polity.
[302a] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[302a] Guest: And shall we wonder, Socrates, that in such-like polities those evils should take place which we behold at present, and which will subsist in future, when they rest on the foundation of written mandates and long established customs, and not on the firm basis of science? Or ought we not rather to admire how strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have subsisted for an immense length of time in this condition, yet some of them have continued stable, and have not been subverted; at the same time many of them, like vessels merged in the sea, have perished, do perish, and will perish, through the depravity of the pilots and sailors, who are involved in the greatest ignorance respecting the greatest concerns; for though they know nothing about political affairs, yet they think their knowledge of the political science is the most clear of all scientific knowledge.
[302b] Socrates: jun. Most true.
[302b] Guest: As, therefore, all these erroneous polities are full of difficulties, we should consider in which it is the least difficult and burthensome to live; for, though this is superfluous with respect to our present inquiry, yet, perhaps, universally we all of us do all things for the sake of this.
[302c] Socrates: jun. It is impossible it should not be requisite to consider this.
[302c] Guest: Of three things, therefore, they say that one is remarkably difficult, and at the same time easy.
[302c] Socrates: jun. How do you say?
[302c] Guest: No otherwise than as I said before, that there are three polities, a monarchy, the government of a few, and the government of a many, which three polities were at first mentioned by us in a confused manner.
[302d] Socrates: jun. There were.
[302d] Guest: Bisecting, therefore, each of these, we shall produce six, separating from these the upright polity, as a seventh.
[302d] Socrates: jun. How so?
[302d] Guest: We must distribute monarchy into the royal and the tyrannic; but the polity which is not composed from a multitude, into an aristocracy and oligarchy, which form an illustrious division. Again, we formerly considered the polity which is composed from a multitude as simple, and called it a democracy, but we must now establish this as twofold.
[302d] Socrates: jun. How so? And after what manner do we make this division?
[302e] Guest: Not at all different from the others, though the name of this is now twofold. But to govern according to the laws, and to transgress the laws, is common both to this and the other polities.
[302e] Socrates: jun. It is so.
[302e] Guest: Then, indeed, when we were investigating an upright polity, this section was of no use, as we have shown above: but since we have separated it from the others, and have considered the others as necessary, in these we divide each according to the legal, and the transgression of law.
[302e] Socrates: jun. It appears so from what has now been said.
[302e] Guest: A monarchy, therefore, when conjoined with good written institutions, which we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when subsisting without law is grievous, and most burthensome to live under.
[302e] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[302e] Guest: But the polity which is composed of not [303a] many, ought to be considered by us as a medium, in the same manner as a few is a medium between one and many. [303b] But again, we should consider the polity which is composed of many as in all things imbecil, and as incapable, when compared with the others, of accomplishing either any great good or great evil; in consequence of authority in this polity being divided according to small parts among many. Hence, this is the worst of all these legal polities, but the best of all such as are illegal. And where all are intemperate, it is best to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worst to live in. The first and best condition of life is in the first polity, the seventh being excepted. For this must be separated from all the other polities, in the same manner as divinity from men.
[303b] Socrates: jun. These things appear thus to subsist and happen; and that must be done which you mention.
[303c] Guest: Ought not, therefore, the governors of all these polities (the governor of the scientific polity being excepted) to be withdrawn, as not being truly political but seditious characters; and as presiding over the greatest images, and being such themselves? And as they are the greatest imitators and enchanters, are they not the greatest sophists of sophists?
[303c] Socrates: jun. This appellation seems to pertain, with the greatest rectitude, to those that are called politicians.
[303d] Guest: Be it so. This, indeed, is as a drama for us; just as we lately said that we saw a certain Centauric and Satyric Bacchic choir, which was to be separated from the politic art, and now this has scarcely been separated by us.
[303d] Socrates: jun. So it appears.
[303d] Guest: But another thing still more difficult than this remains, which is more allied to the royal genus, and which at the same time it is more difficult to understand. And we appear to me to be affected in a manner similar to those that purify gold.
[303e] Socrates: jun. How so?
[303e] Guest: Those workmen first of all separate earth, stones, and many other things; but, after this, such things as are allied to gold remain, which are honourable, and alone to be separated by fire,—I mean brass and silver, and sometimes diamonds. These being with difficulty separated by fusion, scarcely suffer us to see that which is called perfectly pure gold.
[303e] Socrates: jun. So it is said respecting these things.
[303e] Guest: After the same manner, we also appear now to have separated from the politic science things different, and such as are foreign and not friendly, and to have left such as are honourable and allied to it. But among the number of these, the military and judicial arts, and that rhetoric which communicates with the royal science, persuading men to act justly, and which, together with that science, governs the affairs of cities, may be ranked. These if some one should after a certain manner separate with facility, he will show naked and alone by himself that character which we are investigating.
[304a] Socrates: jun. It is evident that we should endeavour to do this.
[304a] Guest: For the sake of an experiment, therefore, it will be evident: but we should endeavour to render it apparent through music. Inform me, therefore.
[304a] Socrates: jun. What?
[304a] Guest: Have we any discipline of music, and universally of the sciences, concerning manual operations?
[304a] Socrates: jun. We have.
[304a] Guest: But what? Shall we say that any one among these is a certain science which teaches us what we ought to learn respecting these things, and what we ought not? Or how shall we say?
[304b] Socrates: jun. We must say that there is.
[304b] Guest: Shall we not, therefore, confess that this is different from the others?
[304b] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[304b] Guest: But whether must we say that no one of them rules over the other? or that the others rule over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?
[304b] Socrates: jun. That this science ought to rule over the others, which teaches us, whether it is requisite to learn any one of them, or not.
[304b] Guest: You assert, therefore, that it ought to rule over both the teacher and the learner.
[304c] Socrates: jun. Very much so.
[304c] Guest: And do you likewise assert, that the science which judges whether it is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over him who is able to persuade?
[304c] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[304d] Guest: To what science, therefore, shall we attribute that which persuades the multitude and the crowd, through mythology, but not through doctrine?
[304d] Socrates: jun. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the rhetoric science.
[304d] Guest: But again, to what science shall we attribute the power of judging, whether we should act towards certain persons through persuasion, or through a certain violence; or, universally, whether we ought ever to employ either persuasion or violence?
[304d] Socrates: jun. To that which rules over the arts of persuasion and discourse.
[304d] Guest: But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the politician.
[304d] Socrates: jun. You speak most beautifully.
[304e] Guest: Thus, therefore, the rhetoric appears to have been very rapidly separated from the politic science, as being another species, but subservient to this science.
[304e] Socrates: jun. Certainly.
[304e] Guest: But again, what must we conceive respecting this power?
[304e] Socrates: jun. What power?
[304e] Guest: That by which we war upon those against whom we have declared war. Whether shall we say that this is endued with, or deprived of, art?
[304e] Socrates: jun. How can we conceive that power to be deprived of art which the commanding art and all warlike actions employ?
[304e] Guest: But shall we consider that power which is able to consult scientifically, whether it is proper to engage in war, or make peace, as different from this, or the same with it?
[304e] Socrates: jun. From what has been before established, it necessarily follows that it must be different.
[305a] Guest: Must not, therefore, the military science have dominion over the warrior, if we in a similar manner follow what has been before advanced?
[305a] Socrates: jun. It must.
[305a] Guest: What science then shall we endeavour to evince as the despot of the whole of the military art, which is thus skilful and mighty, except the truly royal science?
[305a] Socrates: jun. No other whatever.
[305a] Guest: We must not, therefore, consider the science of military commanders as the same with the political, to which it is subservient.
[305a] Socrates: jun. It is not proper we should.
[305b] Guest: But come, let us contemplate the power of judges who judge rightly.
[305c] Socrates: jun. By all means.
[305c] Guest: Is it not, therefore, capable of doing more than merely judging what is just or unjust, respecting such compacts as are legal, and which have been established by royal authority; employing for this purpose its own proper virtue, so as never to wish to dissolve mutual accusations, either through the influence of certain gifts, or fear, or pity, or hatred, or love, contrary to the order of the legislator?
[305c] Socrates: jun. It will never wish to act in this manner; but that which you have mentioned is nearly the employment of this power.
[305c] Guest: We find, therefore, that the strength of judges is not royal, but is the guardian of the laws, and subservient to the royal science.
[305c] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[305d] Guest: This also must be observed, that no one of the abovementioned sciences will appear to be the politic science to him who perceives all of them. For the province of the truly royal science is not to act itself, but to rule over those that are able to act, since it knows the dominion and impulse of those that are the greatest in the city, respecting what is opportune and the contrary: but it is the province of the other sciences to do as they are ordered.
[305d] Socrates: Right.
[305d] Guest: Hence, since the sciences which we have just now discussed neither rule over each other nor themselves, but each is conversant with a certain proper employment of its own, they are justly denominated according to the peculiarity of their actions.
[305e] Socrates: jun. It appears so.
[305e] Guest: But rightly comprehending by a common appellation the power of that science which rules over all these, and takes care of the laws, and of every thing in the city, we may most justly, as it seems, call it the politic science.
[305e] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[305e] Guest: Shall we not, therefore, discuss this science at present, according to the paradigm of the weaving art, since all the genera pertaining to a city have become manifest to us?
[305e] Socrates: jun. And very much so.
[306a] Guest: We must therefore, as it seems, relate what the royal connection is, after what manner it weaves together, and what kind of web it produces for us.
[306a] Socrates: jun. It is evident.
[306a] Guest: It is, indeed, a thing difficult to be evinced; but, as it appears, it is necessary it should be unfolded.
[306a] Socrates: jun. It must, by all means.
[306a] Guest: For, that a part of virtue differs from the species of virtue, may be easily proved from the opinion of the multitude, in opposition to the contentious.
[306a] Socrates: jun. I do not understand you.
[306b] Guest: But again, thus consider. For I think that you consider fortitude as one part of virtue.
[306b] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[306b] Guest: And likewise, that temperance is different from fortitude, but that the former is a part of the same thing as the latter.
[306b] Socrates: jun. Yes.
[306b] Guest: We must dare to unfold a certain wonderful discourse respecting these things.
[306b] Socrates: jun. Of what kind?
[306b] Guest: That after a certain manner they are in many things very adverse and contrary to each other.
[306b] Socrates: jun. How do you say?
[306c] Guest: My assertion is by no means usual. For all the parts of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.
[306c] Socrates: jun. It is so said.
[306c] Guest: Let us consider, therefore, with the greatest attention, whether this is so simple, or differs more than any thing from these, in things of a kindred nature.
[306c] Socrates: jun. Inform me how we are to consider.
[306c] Guest: In all such things as we call beautiful it is proper to investigate, and refer them to two species contrary to each other.
[306d] Socrates: jun. You speak most clearly.
[306d] Guest: Have you ever then either praised yourself, or heard some other person praising sharpness and swiftness, either in bodies or souls, or the motion of voice, or in such imitations of these as musical and graphical imitations exhibit?
[306d] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly I have.
[306d] Guest: Do you likewise remember after what manner praise is bestowed in each of these?
[306d] Socrates: jun. By no means.
[306d] Guest: Shall we, therefore, be able to point out to you my conceptions of this in words?
[306e] Socrates: jun. What should hinder?
[306e] Guest: You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let us consider it, therefore, in subcontrary genera. For often, and in many actions, when we admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought, body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ one of the appellations of fortitude.
[307a] Socrates: jun. How so?
[307a] Guest: In the first place, we say it is acute and strenuous, swift and virile, and in a similar manner vehement: and, universally, we praise all these natures, by applying this name to them in common.
[307a] Socrates: jun. We do.
[307a] Guest: But what? Do we not often praise in many actions the species of quiet generation?
[307a] Socrates: jun. And very much so.
[307a] Guest: Do we not, therefore, in praising these, assert things contrary to what we did in praising those?
[307b] Socrates: jun. How so?
[307b] Guest: We say that each of these is quiet and temperate, and we admire these when they take place about cogitation; but about actions, we admire the slow and the soft, about voice, the smooth and the grave, all rhythmical motion, and the whole of the muse which employs slowness opportunely; and to all these we give the appellation of the moderate, and not of fortitude.
[307c] Socrates: jun. Most true.
[307c] Guest: But when both these take place unseasonably, we then blame each of them, and call them by contrary names.
[307c] Socrates: jun. How so?
[307c] Guest: When they appear to be unseasonably acute, swift, and hard, we then call them insolent and insane; but when they are unseasonably grave, slow, and soft, we call them timid and slothful. And we nearly find that these, and the nature of fortitude and temperance, are for the most part contrary to each other, as being hostile and seditious forms, and which are never mingled together in actions about things of this kind. We shall likewise find by investigation, that those who possess these in their souls, are discordant with each other.
[307c] Socrates: jun. Where do you say?
[307d] Guest: In all those particulars which we have just now mentioned, and, it is probable, in many others. For, I think, praising some things as their own property, on account of their alliance to both, but blaming others as things foreign, they become very adverse to each other in many things.
[307d] Socrates: jun. They appear to do so.
[307d] Guest: This difference, therefore, is the sport of these species. But a disease the most baneful of all others happens to cities about things of the greatest consequence.
[307e] Socrates: jun. About what things?
[307e] Guest: About the whole apparatus of living, as it is likely it should. For those who are remarkably modest are always prepared to live a quiet life, attending privately to their own concerns, and being after a certain manner disposed to associate peaceably both with their fellow citizens and foreigners. Through this love, however, which is more unseasonable than is fit, when they do that which they wish to accomplish, they become secretly enervated, and render young men similarly affected. Hence, they are always subject to injuries; and in a short time themselves, their children, and the whole city, often by slow degrees, from being free become slaves.
[308a] Socrates: jun. You speak of a severe and dire passion.
[308a] Guest: But those that verge more to fortitude, do they not incite the cities to which they belong to war, through a more vehement desire of a life of this kind than is becoming, and thus rendering many nations and potentates hostile to their country, either entirely subvert it, or bring it in subjection to the enemy?
[308b] Socrates: jun. They do.
[308b] Guest: How is it possible, therefore, we should not say, that in these things both genera are in the greatest degree adverse to each other?
[308b] Socrates: jun. It is impossible we should say otherwise.
[308b] Guest: Have we not, therefore, found that which we were considering in the beginning, that certain parts of virtue, which are not small naturally, differ from each other, and that they likewise cause those that possess them to do the same?
[308b] Socrates: jun. It appears we have.
[308b] Guest: Let us again too consider this.
[308b] Socrates: jun. What?
[308b] Guest: Whether there is any thing belonging to synthetic sciences which has any one of its works, though it should be the vilest, composed from things evil and at the same time useful? Or shall we say, that every science always rejects things evil to the utmost of its power, and receives such as are apt and useful? and that from these, which are both similar and dissimilar, collected into one, it fabricates one certain power and idea?
[308c] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[308d] Guest: The truly political science, therefore, according to nature, will never be willing that a city should be composed from good and bad men; but it is very evident that it will first of all examine every thing by discipline, and, after the examination, will commit this employment to such as are able to instruct others, and at the same time be subservient to others, itself commanding and presiding: just in the same manner as the weaving art presides over the wool-combers, and others that prepare the materials for weaving, and gives such [308e] orders to the preparatory workmen as it thinks will best contribute to the work it has in view.
[309a] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[309a] Guest: The royal science appears to me to do the very same, permitting those that instruct and educate others according to law, alone to exercise and teach that which being effected according to its temperature will produce worthy manners. But it punishes with death, exile, and the greatest disgrace, those that are unable to participate of fortitude, temperance, and such other things as tend to virtue, but through a depraved nature are violently impelled to impiety, insolence and injustice.
[309a] Socrates: jun. This is said to be the case.
[309a] Guest: But those that are rolled like cylinders in ignorance and an abject spirit, it subjugates to servile employments.
[309a] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[309a] Guest: It preserves and defends, therefore, such as are naturally qualified for acquiring the generous and the noble, when properly disciplined, and who through art can be mingled with each other. And such among these as verge more to fortitude, it considers as resembling strong thread in the loom on account of their solid manners; but such as verge more to modesty, as similar to fat and soft matter; and, that we may use an image from the weaving art, as resembling saffron-coloured thread. And such as tend contrary to these, it endeavours to bind together and connect after the following manner.
[309b] Socrates: jun. After what manner?
[309b] Guest: In the first place, according to the allied, it harmonizes together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond. But after that which is divine it harmonizes together their vivific part with human bonds.
[309c] Socrates: jun. How again is this?
[309c] Guest: When true opinion becomes stably inherent in the soul respecting things beautiful, just and good, and the contraries to these, we say that the divine in the dæmoniacal genus is produced.
[309c] Socrates: jun. It is proper it should.
[309d] Guest: Do we, therefore, know that a politician and a good legislator ought alone to be able, with the Muse of the royal science, to effect this in those that are properly disciplined, and whom we have just now mentioned?
[309d] Socrates: jun. It is fit this should be the case.
[309d] Guest: But he, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a thing of this kind, must by no means be called by the names which we are now investigating.
[309d] Socrates: jun. Most right.
[309e] Guest: What then? Must not a brave soul, when it receives truth of this kind, become mild, and thus be willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But when it does not receive it, must it not be considered as verging more to a certain savage nature?
[309e] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[309e] Guest: But what? Will not a soul of a modest nature, when receiving these opinions, become truly temperate and moderate in a polity? But when it does not partake of the things we are speaking of, will it not be most disgracefully branded with stupidity?
[309e] Socrates: jun. Entirely so.
[309e] Guest: Must we not say, that this connection and binding together of the evil with each other, and of the good with the evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever seriously attempt to accomplish this with such as these?
[310a] Socrates: jun. For how can it?
[310a] Guest: But in those alone who are endued with worthy manners from the first, and who are educated according to nature, this bond is naturally implanted through the laws. In these, too, this art is a remedy; and, as we said before, the natural virtue of the parts is the more divine bond of things dissimilar, and tending to contraries.
[310a] Socrates: jun. Most true.
[310a] Guest: Since this divine bond exists, there is scarcely any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which are human, or in bringing them to perfection when understood.
[310b] Socrates: jun. How so? And what are these bonds?
[310b] Guest: The communions of alliances and children, and those respecting private locations and marriages. For many respecting these things are not properly bound together for the purpose of begetting children.
[310b] Socrates: jun. Why?
[310b] Guest: Is it worth while to relate how anxiously they pursue riches and power in these things?
[310b] Socrates: jun. It is not.
[310b] Guest: But it will be more just to speak of those who make the human race the object of their care, and to consider if they do any thing improperly.
[310c] Socrates: jun. It will.
[310c] Guest: They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but pursue present pleasure; and in consequence of being delighted with those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are dissimilar, they attribute the greatest part to molestation.
[310c] Socrates: jun. How so?
[310c] Guest: Those that are modest seek after their own manners, and as much as possible marry those that are endued with them, and likewise marry their own offspring to such as resemble themselves. The genus about fortitude acts in the same manner, pursuing its own nature; when at the same time it is requisite that both genera should act in a manner entirely contrary.
[310d] Socrates: jun. How, and on what account?
[310d] Guest: Because this is the natural condition of fortitude, that when it has been unmingled for many generations with a temperate nature, it is florid with strength in the beginning, but in the end becomes entirely efflorescent with insanity.
[310e] Socrates: jun. It is likely.
[310e] Guest: Again, a soul very full of shame, and void of audacious fortitude, when it has subsisted in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unseasonably sluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.
[310e] Socrates: jun. And this also is likely to happen.
[311a] Guest: We have said that there is no difficulty in binding men with these bonds, if both genera have one opinion respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of royal weaving, viz. never to suffer temperate manners to subsist apart from such as are valiant, but, weaving together both these, from according opinions, honor, dishonor, and glory, to collect from these a web smooth, and, as it is said, well woven, and always to commit in common the authority of governors in cities to these.
[311a] Socrates: jun. How?
[311a] Guest: Where it happens that one governor is sufficient, a president should be chosen who possesses both these; but where more than one is necessary, parts of these must be mingled together. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, just, and salutary; but they require acrimony, and a certain acute and practical temerity.
[311a] Socrates: jun. These things also appear so to me.
[311b] Guest: Again, fortitude with respect to justice and caution is more indigent than those other virtues; but it excels them in actions. But it is impossible that all things pertaining to cities, both of a private and public nature, should subsist beautifully, unless both these are present.
[311c] Socrates: jun. Undoubtedly.
[311c] Guest: We must say then that this end of the web of politic action is then rightly woven, when the royal art, connecting the manners of brave and temperate men by concord and friendship, collects together their life in common, producing the most magnificent and excellent of all webs;— and besides this, when, embracing in common all others in the city, both slaves and free-born, it holds them together by this texture, and governs and presides over the city in such a manner that nothing may in any respect be wanting which is requisite to its felicity.
[311c] Socrates: jun. You have finished, O guest, your description of the royal and political character most beautifully.

## Notes

[1] i. e. Pertaining to criers.
[2] The substance of this fable is beautifully explained by Proclus, in his fifth book on the Theology of Plato, as follows: “This universe is very properly said to have twofold lives, periods and convolutions; one of these being Saturnian, and the other Jovian. According to the former of these periods, too, every thing good springs spontaneously, and every animated nature possesses a blameless and unwearied life; but the latter is the source of material error, and of an abundantly mutable nature. For, as there is a twofold life in the world, the one unapparent and more intellectual, but the other more natural and apparent, and the one being bounded by providence, but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according to fate,—hence this latter, which is multiform, and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian order; but the former, which is more simple, is intellectual and unapparent, and is suspended from that of Saturn. This the Elean guest clearly indicates, by calling one of the circulations Jovian, and the other Saturnian. Though Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent life of the universe, is the supplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection, yet he leads upwards all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and, being a leader, together with his father gives subsistence to the whole mundane intellect. Each of these periods, indeed, viz. the apparent and unapparent, participates of both these Gods; but the one is more Saturnian, and the other is in subjection to the kingdom of Jupiter. That the mighty Saturn, therefore, is allotted the other kingdom of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly evinces in what he says prior to the fable, viz. that we have heard from many of the kingdom which Saturn obtained; so that, according to this wise man also, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence, as his father Heaven contains the middle centres of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders, and supplies the whole of intellectual energy, first to the Gods; in the second place, to the genera superior to man; and in the last place, to partial souls such as ours, when they are able to extend themselves to the Saturnian place of survey. For this universe, and all the mundane Gods, perpetually possess this twofold life, and imitate the Saturnian intellection through unapparent and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter through providential attention to secondary concerns; and, in short, through the apparent fabrication of things. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually, and consecrate themselves to Saturn, and at another time according to the characteristic of Jupiter, and with unrestrained energy provide for subordinate natures. When they revolve, however, analogously to these deities, they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and adorn sensibles, and live both these lives in the same manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods are twofold, one intellectual and the other providential. Their paradigms also are twofold: of the one the Saturnian intellect, and of the other the Jovian;—since even the mighty Jupiter himself has a twofold energy; by intellect, indeed, adhering to intelligibles, but by demiurgic fabrication adorning sensibles. “Since, therefore, the revolutions are twofold, not only in wholes but likewise in partial souls, in the Saturnian period, says the Elean guest, the generation of men is not from each other, as in apparent men, nor, as the first man with us is alone earth-born, so, in partial souls, the one first soul is earth-born; but this is the case with all of them. For they are led upwards from last and earthly bodies, and they receive an unapparent, deserting a sensible, life. But neither do they verge to old age, and change from younger to older; but on the contrary they become more vigorous, and proceed intellectually in a path contrary to generation, and resolve as it were that variety of life, which in descending they made a composite. Hence, likewise, all the symbols pertaining to youth are present with those souls when they pass into such a condition of being; for they lay aside every thing which adheres to them from generation. And when they are distributed about Saturn, and live the life which is there, he says fruits are produced in abundance from the trees, and many other things spring spontaneously from the earth. The inhabitants also are naked and without beds, and for the most part are fed, dwelling in the open air: for they possess an indissoluble temperament of the seasons. The grass likewise springing abundantly from the earth supplies them with soft couches. These and such like goods, souls derive from this mighty deity, according to the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled with vivific good, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes, but do not extend to themselves, from partial energies, perfection and beatitude. For doxastic nutriment possesses divisible and material apprehensions, but that which is intellectual, such as are pure, indivisible and spontaneous; which the spontaneous here obscurely signifies. The fruits also imparted from the earth signify the perfection of the prolific intellect of the Gods, and which illuminates souls with a sufficiency from themselves. For, through an unenvying abundance of goods, they are also able to impart to secondary natures felicity in a convenient measure. Neither, therefore, are they invested with garments, as when they proceed into generation, nor do they abound with additions of life, but are themselves pure, by themselves, from all composition and variety; and exciting their own intellect, they are extended by their intellectual father to these divine benefits. They likewise participate of total goods, being guarded by the intellectual Gods; and receiving from them the measures of a happy life, they pass the whole of their existence with facility. And lastly, establishing a sleepless and undefiled life in the generative powers of intelligibles, and being filled with intellectual fruits, and nourished with immaterial and divine forms, they are said to live the life which belongs to the government of Saturn.”
[3] Plato, in what he here asserts of the Saturnian age, wonderfully accords with Orpheus, who, as we are informed by Proclus in Plat. Theol. lib. v. mystically says, “that the hairs of the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary.”
[4] i. e. Jupiter. See the Timæus.
[5] Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls; and the fire which he imparted to mortals is the rational soul itself, because this like fire naturally tends upwards, or, in other words, aspires after incorporeal natures.
[6] The soul possesses a twofold knowledge, one indistinct, but the other distinct, scientific, and without ambiguity. For we essentially contain the reasons of things, and breathe, as it were, the knowledge of them; but we do not always possess them in energy.
[7] i. e. Remedies of evils.
[8] i. e. Pertaining to the potter’s art.
[9] i. e. Pertaining to the brazier’s art.
[10] Viz. grammarians.